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ABSTRACT 
Smidts. A (1990) Decision making under risk. A study of models and measurement 
procedures with special reference to the farmer's marketing behavior. Wageningen 
Economic Studies, no. 18, Pudoc, Wageningen, 329 p., 24 figs, 54 tables, 
219 refs, 3 appendices, summary in Dutch. 
Free descriptors: utility/preference theory, marketing, risk attitude, relative risk 
attitude, strength of preference, subjective probability distribution, marketing 
behavior of farmers, marketing of ware potatoes, multiple method measurement. 
The objectives of the study were: a) to review, discuss and test a number of 
theories on individual decision making under risk; much attention is specifically 
given to the definition and empirical testing of the concept of relative risk 
attitude, b) to investigate in a large scale survey the validity, reliability and 
practical feasibility of measurement procedures for measuring subjective 
probability distributions, risk attitude, and strength of preference, and c) to 
develop and test a model which describes the farmer's decision making process 
with respect to the choice of a marketing strategy for ware potatoes. 
The theoretical and methodological issues in this study are analyzed in the 
context of a farmer's choice of a marketing strategy. A field study was conducted 
in which a large number of farmers (250) were interviewed three times in two 
consecutive years. 
The concept of the relative risk attitude concerns the relationship between a 
utility function assessed by means of lotteries and a strength of preference 
function assessed by means of riskless techniques. Per respondent the relative risk 
attitude was assessed. In both years a significant difference was found between 
the utility and strength of preference function. In this study therefore, the 
hypothesis of the relative risk attitude is confirmed. Moreover, the relationship 
between the functions can be described by the hypothesized negative exponential 
relationship. This means that the farmers exhibit a constant absolute and an 
increasing proportional relative risk attitude. The implications of the findings 
concerning the relative risk attitude are given. 
An evaluation was given of models originating from utility theory and 
behavioral decision theory (such as Prospect Theory). It was concluded that the 
subjective expected utility model is still the most useful model for analyzing 
decision making under risk. We applied this model to explain the farmer's 
marketing decision making process. Results show that, in both years, the 
subjective expected utility model outperformed the subjective expective value 
model in predictive validity. The farmer's risk attitude therefore significantly 
influences his prefences for marketing strategies. However, the increment in 
predictive validity due to taking the risk attitude into account was relatively 
small. This finding was attributed to the high percentage of pairwise second 
degree of stochastic dominant subjective probability functions. 
A multiple method procedure was applied in the assessment of both risk atti-
tude (that is, conjoint measurement and a standard lottery method) and strength 
of preference (that is, the midvalue splitting and the rating technique). The sta-
bility and convergent validity of the measurements were assessed. The results 
showed significant annual test-retest correlations ranging from 0.19 to 0.45. When 
conceiving risk attitude as a latent variable measured by two indicators the 
stability correlation is 0.82 (LISREL-estimate); likewise the stability of the latent 
variable strength of preference is 0.61. Convergent correlations were all 
statistically significant and ranged from 0.15 to 0.49. Further comparisons 
between the measurement techniques concerned the sensitivity to response 
effects, interviewer bias and practical feasibility. 
With respect to the measurement of risk perception two methods were com-
pared, the so-called indirect and direct method. In the indirect method a 
subjective probability distribution is obtained whereas with the direct method the 
first two moments of the distribution are directly assessed. Both methods yielded 
valid and plausible results and the correspondence in measurements between both 
methods was high. Since the direct method is more easy to apply to both the 
respondent and the interviewer and the predictive validity of models using data 
from both methods was equally high, the results in this study suggest that the 
direct method is to be prefered in survey research. 
Little empirical research deals with the farmer's marketing behavior under risk. 
In this study the marketing strategy with respect to ware potatoes, the farmers' 
most important crop, is analysed. To whom, when and how much to sell per 
selling-option are the major decisions. Typically, farmers choose a combination 
of selling-options, e.g. a fixed-price contract combined with selling at the spot 
market. 
The farmer's choice process was modeled by means of two attributes: price and 
marketing channel. This hypothesized two-attribute model was confirmed in both 
years of measurement. Furthermore, the farmers in the study can be characterised 
by a constant absolute and an increasing proportional risk attitude. Only a small 
percentage of farmers are slightly risk seeking, all others are risk neutral to risk 
averse. Differences between farmers in degree of risk aversion are substantial. 
However, few consistent relationships were found between the farmer's risk 
attitude and personal and situational variables. 
Implications of the results of the study and suggestions for further research are 
given. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SCOPE AND FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
This study is concerned with decision making under risk. The empirical setting of 
the study deals with the choice behavior of agricultural producers with respect to 
the marketing of their produce, in particular, the marketing of their ware potato 
produce. The main decisions the farmer has to make in this respect are: when, 
how much, at what type of selling-option and through which marketing channel 
he should sell. The important characteristics of this empirical setting are the large 
number of individual economic decision makers who are all confronted with the 
same risky marketing context and who have to choose between a large number of 
risky choice alternatives. 
At the beginning of the project the analysis of the farmer's marketing behavior 
was considered the central issue. To this end the theoretical notions on decision 
making under risk were studied. Very soon it turned out that the farmer's deci-
sion problem provided a good setting for the study of a number of scientifically 
interesting topics of decision making under risk. One of these topics concerns the 
concept of relative risk attitude which focuses on the distinction between a clas-
sical von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and a strength of preference 
function. Another topic concerns the methodological aspects of measuring risk 
perception, risk attitude and strength of preference in survey conditions. The 
focus in the study therefore shifted toward the theoretical and methodological 
issues. Consequently, the study consists of three main problem areas: the analysis 
of a number of theoretical and methodological issues in decision making under 
risk and the analysis of the farmer's marketing behavior as a decision under risk. 
This first chapter presents an introduction to the study by pointing out the im-
portant role of risk in agricultural decision making in general, and in marketing 
ware potatoes in particular. This is followed by a brief review of three scientific 
approaches to studying risky decision making and by a short review of the 
empirical research in decision making under risk conducted in the fields of 
agricultural decision making and marketing. Finally, research objectives are stated 
and a short description of the data set is presented. 
1.1 The role of risk in the farmer's decision making 
Risk is a pervasive element in agriculture. Stochastic environmental factors 
strongly influence the agricultural production processes, thereby creating uncer-
tain financial outcomes. One group of environmental factors, i.e. the climato-
logical and biological (e.g. infectious diseases) factors, cause variability in the 
physical production. The second source of uncertainty concerns market price 
variability, composed of variability in prices of inputs and in product prices. The 
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factors mentioned causing the uncertainty are fairly unpredictable and cannot be 
controlled by farmers. 
Farmers have to anticipate and respond to these risky circumstances. There are 
many possible reactions with respect to the variability in physical production. In 
the region in which this study took place, the variability in physical production is 
being taken into account as much as possible by means of e.g. adequate water, 
pest and fertilizer management. In this study we will concentrate on the farmer's 
response to the variability in product prices by means of his marketing decisions. 
Specifically his marketing decisions concerning the variability in market prices 
for ware potatoes. 
As will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2, ware potatoes are a very important 
crop in the region in which this study took place. Often farmers allocate no less 
than a fourth to a third of arable land to potatoes (either seed or ware potatoes). 
The remaining area is allocated to crops like wheat and sugar-beets, both crops 
with fairly stable financial results. Although the yield (in kg/ha) of the latter 
crops may fluctuate somewhat, prices for wheat and sugar-beets are fairly stable, 
although decreasing in recent years due to EC-price arrangements. Variability in 
the farmer's income is therefore mainly caused by variability in the financial 
results of ware potatoes. 
Variability in gross returns of ware potatoes is mainly due to variability in 
prices for ware potatoes. Prices for ware potatoes fluctuate heavily, both in 
respective marketing years, and within a marketing year. By choosing a particular 
way of selling, hereafter to be defined a marketing strategy (see Chapter 2), 
farmers may try to reduce this price risk. To illustrate the effect of choosing a 
particular marketing strategy on price variability, the following examples are 
presented. 
If in marketing year 83/84 a farmer had sold his potatoes at the spot market in 
October, he would have received 35 cts/kg (or Dfl/lOOkg) whereas, if he had 
waited until May he would have received 76 cts/kg; that is twice the price in 
seven months time. In the consecutive marketing year 84/85 however, selling in 
October would have resulted in 18 cts/kg whereas in May the farmer would have 
received only 11 cts/kg! 
As an alternative to spot market sales, the farmer could have chosen to sell by 
means of a fixed-price contract. In this way, he would have received 25 cts/kg in 
both years (a fixed-price contract of 25 cts/kg is common for farmers delivering 
in May/June). Selling by means of a so-called pooling contract would probably 
have resulted in the average market price in both years, that is 55 and 14 cts/kg 
respectively. The average price over two years on the basis of this pooling con-
tract, unweighted by yield, would have been 34 cts/kg compared to the 25 cts/kg 
on the basis of the fixed-price contract! That is, when considering only these two 
marketing years (83/84 and 84/85), choosing a fixed-price contract apparently 
reduces price risk but also lowers mean price; not every farmer would be willing 
to accept a lower mean price of this magnitude in exchange for reduced price 
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risk. This is the essence of decision making under risk: the trade-off between the 
expected value and price risk. 
The farmer has to make two important decisions concerning his marketing 
strategy. Firstly, he has to decide when and how much to sell at the spot market 
and/or how much to sell by means of a particular type of contract, e.g. a fixed-
price or pooling contract. The effects these decisions can have on mean price and 
price risk were shown in the examples described above. 
Secondly, the farmer has to choose a marketing channel. This concerns the 
choice between a cooperative company or one of several private marketing com-
panies. Each company will have pro's and con's and will try to persuade farmers 
to do business with them. Insights into the motives of farmers for preferring and 
choosing a particular company and into the way farmers deal with risk are very 
important to them. Information about the choice behavior of farmers is especially 
relevant with respect to the development of new services like new types of selling 
contracts, or information services about the potato market. For example, a seg-
mentation of the market with respect to risk attitude of farmers might give rise 
to new services tailored to the amount of price risk reduction each segment finds 
acceptable. 
1.2 Approaches to studying decision making under risk 
Reviewing the literature on decision making under risk, broadly speaking three 
orientations in the study of decision making under risk can be distinguished. 
Firstly, in the utility theory/decision theory approach, a strong axiomatically 
oriented and formal treatment of decision making is given. It is carried out 
mainly by economists and mathematical psychologists. The second approach con-
cerns the so-called behavioral decision theory, a specialization within cognitive 
psychology. The primary interest of the experimental and cognitive psychologists 
working in this field is the description of decision making under risk. Thirdly, an 
application oriented type of research known as decision analysis can be distin-
guished. Decision analysis is typically a field of intersection of economics, 
psychology, statistics, operations research and computer science. A short charac-
terization of each approach is given below. It should be noted that this overview 
intends to provide only a sketch of rather different fields of work on decision 
making under risk. It does not profess to be a complete or exhaustive overview. 
The first field of research: utility theory directly follows the line of research 
which started by the seminal work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). 
They deduced a normative decision rule, called the expected utility rule, from a 
limited number of compelling axioms. The expected utility rule prescribes how a 
decision maker or organization should choose between risky alternatives. The 
expected utility model is still the dominant model in the analysis of decision 
making under risk. Nowadays, much attention is given to the development of 
new or weakened axioms to account for the discrepancies which are frequently 
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found between the choice behavior predicted by the expected utility model and 
actual behavior. Consequently, alternative normative models of decision making 
under risk have been developed e.g. a generalized expected utility model 
(Machina 1982). 
In this approach, the economic behavior of individuals and the market patterns 
are analyzed from a formal viewpoint. Research topics include e.g. the theoretical 
analysis of optimum insurance policies, the analysis of time preferences and 
sequential choices and bargaining. Representatives of this field of inquiry are e.g. 
Arrow, Allais, Harsanyi, Fishburn and Machina. Recently, conferences on the 
Foundations and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theory, abbreviated 
as FUR-conferences, have been organized which bundle researchers working in 
this field. Conference papers published in Hagen and WenstOp (1984), Stigum and 
Wenstap (1983), Daboni et al. (1986), Munier (1988) and articles published in e.g. 
the journals 'Theory and Decision' and 'The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty' 
provide an overview of research topics. 
The second field, behavioral decision theory is predominantly interested in how 
decision makers decide. Their focus is on describing risky decision making. Much 
attention is paid to how people form judgments of risky events by processing 
probabilistic information and to the question of which simplifying rules people 
apply in arriving at decisions in complex risky situations. 
Research shows that experimental psychologists can create stimuli and situa-
tions in which predominantly naive and unaided subjects exhibit systematic and 
persistent deviations from the normative expected utility model. In the experi-
ments the prescriptive rules serve as a bench-mark from which deviations in 
choices are studied. The way in which the wrong choices are made provides clues 
for the characteristics of human information processing. These studies give rise to 
descriptive models of risky decision making as alternatives to the expected utility 
model. One important model in this respect is Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). 
Applications of behavioral decision theory can be found in such diverse fields 
as e.g. medical diagnostics, the perception and evaluation of risky technologies 
and gambling behavior in black jack or poker. Representatives of this field of 
inquiry are e.g. Tversky, Kahneman, Slovic, Fischhoff and Hogarth. Overviews 
of topics and findings can be found in e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1982), Ein-
horn and Hogarth (1981), Arkes and Hammond (1986). At SPUDM-conferences 
(Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making) presentations are given 
which provide an overview of recent topics. Reviewed conference papers are 
published in the journal 'Acta Psychologica'. 
The emphasis in the utility theory approach of decision making under risk is 
clearly on normative models and on theoretical as opposed to empirical research. 
Contrariwise, in behavioral decision theory emphasis is clearly on the description 
of risky decision making as opposed to the normative view of the utility theorists. 
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Consequently, in behavioral decision theory empirical research gets much atten-
tion. Predominantly experimental research is conducted. 
A further difference between both lines of inquiry mentioned above is that in 
utility theory the main attention is directed to the utility component of decision 
making: risk preferences, whereas behavioral decision theory concentrates mainly 
on risk perceptions. 
Decision analysis tries to reconcile both efforts. Notions of both fields men-
tioned above are synthesized and used in applications to important and complex 
risky decisions. Decision analysis consists of a set of techniques and procedures 
designed to help individuals and organizations make inferences and decisions. It 
is focused on making better decisions by careful analysis of those decisions. 
Decision analysis benefits from behavioral decision theory since this theory clari-
fies when, how and why people make risky decisions which depart from the 
normative models supplied by utility theory. Since decision problems are often 
very complex, unstructured and multiattributed, help is needed to decompose the 
problem into suitable parts and to assess decision makers' preferences for each 
part. Those parts are then recomposed by means of appropriate techniques to 
point out the best choice. The use of techniques from operations research may be 
useful in this assessment, especially in conducting sensitivity analyses. Careful 
and elaborate decision analysis is justified when the stakes are high and the 
inference or decision is intellectually difficult or insecure. 
Applications of decision analysis are very diverse. In principle each major 
decision could become a subject of decision analysis, e.g. deciding on the site for 
a nuclear power station, a new factory or airport, evaluating transport systems, 
and identifying and structuring corporate objectives. Representatives of this field 
are e.g. Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Howard (e.g. 1988), and von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards (1986). 
If utility theory is characterized as 'normative, theoretical' and behavioral 
decision theory as 'descriptive, empirical', then decision analysis can be charac-
terized by 'normative, empirical'. The main goal of decision analysis is a norma-
tive one, that is, to point out the best alternative to the decision maker using a 
normatively correct utility model and given the subjective input of the decision 
maker. This subjective input concerns the perception of the uncertain conse-
quences of alternatives open to the decision maker (the d.m.'s subjective proba-
bility distributions), and the evaluation of the consequences by the decision 
maker (the d.m.'s risk attitude). As a consequence, much attention and empirical 
research is devoted in decision analysis to techniques of eliciting subjective 
probability distributions and in assessing risk attitudes. 
In this study, theoretical notions and methodological considerations taken from 
all three fields will be used in an integrated approach to the choice problem 
under study. 
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1.3 Research on decision making under risk in agriculture and marketing 
In agriculture, especially ideas and practices derived from decision analysis and 
the expected utility model are used in analyzing farmers' decisions under risk. 
Overviews of the application of decision analysis in agriculture are presented by 
Dillon (1971), Anderson et al. (1977) and Barry (1984). A large body of literature 
exists in the field of risky decision making in agriculture, both at the theoretical 
and empirical level. An enumeration of research topics that have been given 
attention will now follow. 
By means of models from operations research, supply and demand structures 
are analyzed (Hanf and Mueller 1979, Hazell 1982)), and optimum farm cropping 
plans are constructed (Hazell 1971, Mapp et al. 1979, El-Nazer and McCarl 1986) 
or theoretically derived (Collender and Zilberman 1985, Collins and Barry 1986). 
Also theoretically optimum hedging ratio's are either derived (Bond and 
Thompson 1975, Nelson 1985) or obtained by simulation (Bailey and Richardson 
1985, Brandt 1985). 
Empirical studies concerning the attitudes of farmers towards income risk are 
Bond and Wonder (1980), Francisco and Anderson (1972), Dillon and Scandizzo 
(1978) and Binswanger (1980). Studies of Boussard and Petit (1967), Lin, Dean 
and Moore (1974), Brink and McCarl (1978) and Scott and Baker (1972) con-
cerned empirical studies of the choice of farm cropping plans as a decision under 
risk. 
Decisions concerning the optimum level of pesticides are analyzed in e.g. Carl-
son (1970), Webster (1977) and Thornton (1985). The use of fertilizer is analyzed 
in Moscardi and de Janvry (1977) and the amount of futter reserve in Officer and 
Halter (1968). Adoption and utilization of modern-seed technology in the Philip-
pines is studied in Huijsman (1986) who analyzes the hypothesis that slow 
adoption of new technologies by poor farmers is caused by farmers' risk aversion. 
Specific attention to risky decision making of small, subsistence farmers in 
underdeveloped countries is presented in Roumasset et al. (1979). 
Two aspects are striking in this literature. Firstly, literature on decision making 
under risk of farmers is predominantly devoted either to total farm planning, 
especially crop production planning, or to specific production decisions like fer-
tilizer input decisions and pest management. Surprisingly little literature exists 
about farmers' market related decisions under risk. When marketing decisions are 
studied, then they are mostly concerned with the futures market. One such study 
to be mentioned here is Martin and Hope (1984). It is not very surprising that 
attention is directed to the futures market when studying farmers' marketing 
behavior since the futures market is developed for reducing price risks (an 
analysis of the role of the ware potato futures market in price risk reduction can 
be found in Wierenga and Meulenberg 1984). In this study we will not pay 
attention to the futures market in an explicit sense. The role of the potato futures 
market for the individual farmer in the Netherlands is limited. Only a very small 
percentage of potato growers actually buy and sell on the futures market; it is 
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typically used by wholesale companies and the potato processing industry. In this 
study therefore, our attention is directed to the choice of marketing strategies as 
a decision under risk, irrespective of the use of the futures market. 
A second observation concerns the fairly small number of field or experimental 
studies of farmers' risky decision making. In the studies that do exist, the number 
of farmers researched is typically limited to some dozens, often selected subjec-
tively. It is therefore very difficult to generalize findings from these studies 
(Robison 1982). Robison further notes that many empirical studies suffer from 
methodological weaknesses. Binswanger (1980) is a notable exception in these 
respects since he studied a fairly large sample of farmers (about 200). 
Binswanger's research is furthermore very interesting because he measured risk 
attitudes using real-money-bets while nearly all the other studies apply bets with 
hypothetical outcomes. 
To conclude, field research devoted to modeling the farmer's decision making 
process with respect to the choice of marketing strategies as a decision under risk 
is sparse. Also, much of the research done is hampered by methodological and 
sampling problems which make it hard to generalize findings. 
Since the decision problem in this study concerns a marketing decision, also the 
body of literature on decision making under risk in marketing should be given 
attention to. In marketing, the decision making process of both the marketing 
decision maker and the consumer is interesting when studying the effects of risk. 
With respect to the way the marketing decision maker deals with risk it is 
concluded that this topic is scarcely researched empirically. Of course, each 
handbook on managerial decision making or on marketing research includes a 
chapter in which attention is given to the expected value and the expected utility 
model and in which the essentials of Bayesian decision theory are discussed. 
However, these models and techniques are not applied extensively in actual mar-
keting decision making (see e.g. Green et al. 1988). Green et al. state that reasons 
for the reluctant acceptance of these methods may reflect a lack of either under-
standing, capability, or need for more sophisticated techniques. In general, it is 
appropriate to state that systematic research into how marketing decision makers 
actually decide and particularly how they deal with risk, is lacking (Lee, Acito 
and Day 1987 and Perkins and Rao 1990). 
Literature on the modeling of consumer behavior under risk might be 
interesting for this study especially with respect to methodological issues, since 
our empirical setting concerns a large number of individual decision makers who 
will be interviewed in a survey. In consumer behavior, especially in the sixties 
and seventies, attention is given to the empirical study of decision making under 
risk. Starting with Bauer (1960) and shown in the volume of Cox (1967) consi-
derable research in this field was conducted with respect to the effects of per-
ceived risk on decision making. Usually, in multiattribute decision models, per-
ceived risk is incorporated by means of extra attributes. For example, Cunning-
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ham (1967) modeled perceived risk by two attributes: a) the uncertainty about the 
outcome of the decision, and b) the extent of negative outcomes that are possible 
after the purchase of a product. See also the models of e.g. Bettman (1973) and 
Pras and Summers (1978). 
In this type of research into perceived risk, hardly any reference is made to 
utility theory, the expected utility model or subjective probability distributions. 
Nor is much attention given to techniques and procedures in measuring risk atti-
tudes of consumers or to eliciting subjective probability distributions. One might 
characterize this research by a naive modeling of risk. Recently however, utility 
theory and measurement techniques have been given more attention to in con-
sumer decision making under risk. For example Hauser and Urban (1979) and 
Eliashberg (1980) successfully modeled consumer preferences by means of 
expected utility theory and predicted preferences reasonably well with the model. 
Also Currim and Sarin (1983) applied expected utility theory in modeling con-
sumer preferences under uncertainty by means of a multiattribute model. 
According to Corstjens and Gautschi (1983), the theoretical model of expected 
utility is particularly relevant for e.g. concept testing and new product develop-
ment. 
Notwithstanding these efforts, the bulk of consumer research does not deal 
explicitly with risk. Multiattribute models under certainty are assumed to provide 
a sufficient approximation of the consumer's preferences and choices. One very 
important reason for this limited attention is, according to Eliashberg and Hauser 
(1985), the difficult question formats and elaborate measurements that are needed 
in an explicit modeling of risk. Typically, in marketing research, interviews are 
subject to time limits. Moreover, it is not yet clear whether the predictive 
validity of the models will increase significantly if perceived risk and risk 
attitude are incorporated in accordance with the expected utility model. 
To conclude, more research is needed to evaluate the effects on predictive 
validity of the explicit modeling of decision making under risk and to develop 
respondent-friendly and easy-to-handle measurement techniques. The recent 
work by e.g. Eliashberg and Hauser (1985) and Currim and Sarin (1989) is sti-
mulating this kind of research. Since methodological problems in this study 
resemble those in consumer research, insights gained in this study will be bene-
ficial for consumer research, too. 
1.4 Research objectives 
From the review of the body of literature on decision making under risk the fol-
lowing conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, utility theory and behavioral decision theory provide a number of 
theoretical notions on decision making under risk. In both fields, a number of 
models are proposed to explain preferences and choices of decision makers. 
Typically, the models are confronted with one another in experimental research 
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and these experiments are often conducted with students as decision makers and 
with hypothetical decision contexts. It is interesting therefore to compare those 
models theoretically and empirically in a field study with decision makers 
familiar to the, non-hypothetical, decision problem. 
Secondly, in decision analysis and utility theory recently the concept of the 
relative risk attitude has been introduced (see e.g. Dyer and Sarin 1982). This 
concept seems attractive from both a theoretical and methodological point of 
view. However, empirical research into the concept is scarce and inconclusive. 
Thirdly, the methodology to be used in modeling decision making under risk 
stems mainly from decision analysis. However, in decision analysis assessments 
are conducted with a very small number of decision makers, in ideal conditions 
with respect to the time available in interviews, the motivation of the decision 
maker, the opportunity of using the computer in assessments and so forth. In a 
survey the conditions are much less ideal and the question arises whether the 
techniques from decision analysis are applicable and practically feasible in these 
conditions. 
Fourthly, in field studies that do exist, especially in studies with agricultural 
producers as respondents, typically a fairly small number of respondents is in-
volved. Furthermore, often only one measurement technique is used to elicit 
subjective probability distributions or to assess risk attitudes. Moreover, these 
measurements usually take place only once with each respondent. Consequently, 
in field studies there is very scarce evidence with respect to the validity and the 
reliability of the measurement procedures. 
In order to gain insight into the issues mentioned above, the purpose of this 
study is threefold. 
Firstly, theoretical notions from utility theory and behavioral decision theory 
on risky decision making will be reviewed and tested with respect to the expla-
nation of individual decision making under risk. Specifically, the subjective 
expected utility model will be compared to competing models (the subjective 
expected value model and a so-called pragmatic model) in the explanation and 
prediction of preferences. Another main topic concerns the definition and 
empirical testing of the concept of relative risk attitude. 
Secondly, in this study special attention will be given to the methodological 
problems of measuring the risk perceptions and risk attitudes of a large sample of 
decision makers in survey conditions. Insight will be gained into the stability of 
measurements and into convergent and discriminant validity of risk perception 
and risk attitude measurements by means of applying a multitude of measurement 
techniques twice for each respondent. The use of multiple techniques deserves 
much more attention than has been given until now (von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards 1986). 
Thirdly, an analysis is given of the farmer's decision making process with 
respect to the choice of a marketing strategy for ware potatoes. The choice of a 
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marketing strategy is an important and risky decision to be made by the farmer 
each year. Consequently, it is expected that an analysis that incorporates risk will 
perform better than an analysis without explicit attention paid to risk. This deci-
sion problem is thus suitable to test the theory and methodology. Insights into the 
farmer's decision making process can be useful for suppliers of marketing ser-
vices.'For example, the analysis will provide wholesale companies with informa-
tion about market segmentation, positioning, the development of new services or 
adjustment of present services. Findings from the study might also be useful in 
the design and development of decision support or expert systems meant to 
support and possibly improve decisions of individual farmers. 
From these three objectives specific research questions will be derived and 
presented (in Section 3.6), following the presentation of the structuring of the 
decision problem in Chapter 2 and a review and evaluation of models for deci-
sion making under risk in Chapter 3. 
1.5 The empirical study 
With a sample of 250 farmers, randomly selected from the population of farmers 
in an important region for ware potato production in the Netherlands, face-to-
face interviews were held in 1984 and 1985. In 1984 each farmer was interviewed 
twice for about one to one and a half hours each. In 1985 each farmer was inter-
viewed again in order to enable test-retest analyses. 
A preference formation model has been developed in which the main elements 
concern the way in which a farmer perceives the price risk associated with a 
marketing strategy (the risk perception) and the farmer's risk attitude. Multiple 
measurements of both risk perceptions and risk attitude were obtained. Tech-
niques used for measuring risk perceptions include an interval technique to elicit 
subjective probability distributions and magnitude scaling. Risk attitude is 
assessed by means of lotteries, conjoint measurement and a direct rating 
technique. Also, preference measurements for a number of marketing strategies 
and choice behavior of farmers were recorded. Furthermore, motives for choosing 
a marketing channel and a number of background characteristics of the farmer 
and his farm were collected. A detailed description of the operationalizations 
made, the data collection and the sampling procedures will be given in Chapter 4. 
The study differs from other studies in the field of decision making under risk 
in the following respects. This study analyzes and models decision making under 
risk for a fairly large sample of decision makers and the data used is collected in 
survey conditions. These circumstances led to the approach of multiple indicators 
in the measurement of important variables in the model. Risk perception, risk 
attitude as well as strength of preference are all operationalized in several ways, 
thus providing the opportunity to study whether the measurements of each 
concept correspond with one another. By repeating the measurements in two 
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consecutive years this correspondence can be analyzed twice and it is possible to 
get more insight into the stability of the respective measurements. 
In particular, the combination of the features of the large sample, the use'of 
multiple measurements procedures per concept and the use of test-retest 
measurements distinguishes this study from most of the other empirical studies. 
1.6 Outline of the book 
In Chapter 2, an elaborate delineation will be presented of the decision problem 
the farmer is confronted with. A description of the risks associated with the ware 
potato market, the structuring of the decision problem and the definition of the 
choice alternative in this study, namely the marketing strategy, will receive 
attention in this chapter. The chapter finishes with a conceptual model-of the 
farmer's decision making process. 
In Chapter 3, theories which are commonly used in decision making under risk 
are reviewed and evaluated. Much attention will be devoted to the subjective 
expected utility model and the concept of relative risk attitude, the latter being 
associated with the value/utility distinction. Some criticism of the descriptive 
inaccuracy of the subjective expected utility model is presented and alternative 
descriptive models like Prospect Theory are discussed. 
Chapter 4 contains a description of the design of the empirical study. 
Operationalizations of variables are given, followed by a description of data col-
lection and sampling procedures. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 each contain one of the main elements of the conceptual 
decision model: risk perception, risk attitude and the combination of both into 
preference formation. 
Chapter 5 deals with the methods of measuring risk perceptions and a subse-
quent extensive discussion of measurement results. Stability and convergent 
validity of the perception measurement are analyzed by comparing the results 
obtained by means of the elicitation of subjective probability distributions with 
those obtained by means of more simple and easy-to-handle direct measurement 
techniques. 
In Chapter 6, methods and procedures for assessing risk attitudes are presented. 
Risk attitude is assessed with both riskless and risky procedures. The results of 
assessing the degree of risk aversion of farmers are presented, the concept of 
relative risk attitude is tested and stability and convergent validity of the multiple 
measurements of risk attitude are discussed. Furthermore, the relationship 
between a farmer's risk attitude and background characteristics is determined. 
In Chapter 7, the preference for marketing strategies is analyzed. A test of the 
conceptual model of preference formation will be given. Specifically, the predic-
tive validity of the subjective expected utility model is compared with the sub-
jective expected value model. Furthermore, a comparison is made between the 
expected utility model and a pragmatic model of preference formation. Finally, 
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the preference of farmers for a marketing strategy is linked to background 
variables. 
Chapter 8 then contains a summary and synthesis of the major findings and 
conclusions, as well as suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STRUCTURING THE FARMER'S DECISION PROBLEM 
In this chapter the farmer's decision problem at the time of the research will be 
delineated. First, a description is given of the crops grown in the region and their 
respective yields, as well as the prices and gross margins over the years. Special 
attention is given to the price variations of ware potatoes, within and between 
marketing years. 
When confronted with the problem of marketing their ware potato produce, 
farmers have a number of selling-options and have to decide upon the moment 
of delivering their potatoes and through which marketing channel they wish to 
use. The choices open to farmers will be described and a definition of a mar-
keting strategy, as it is conceived in this study, will be given. This marketing 
strategy is the choice alternative in this study. When analyzing the attributes 
which might be important in choosing between marketing strategies, it will turn 
out that a two-attribute model of preference formation suffices. Those two 
attributes are the price which can be obtained by a marketing strategy and the 
marketing channel chosen. The chapter concludes with a description of the con-
ceptual model of the decision making process. 
2.1 A characterization of the decision context 
In the region in which this study took place, the IJsselmeerpolders, two polders 
located in the heart of the Netherlands, a typical farmer grows three crops: pota-
toes (ware or seed potatoes), sugar-beets and cereals (mainly wheat). If a fourth 
crop is grown farmers might choose, among other things, onions, pulses, French 
beans, sprouts or cabbage. 
Legally the area allocated to potatoes is limited to a maximum of a third of the 
arable land. Two common crop rotation plans exist in the region. First, a plan in 
which the area is allocated equally to three crops (potatoes, sugar-beets and 
cereals). In a second common plan the area is allocated equally to four crops 
(potatoes, sugar beets, cereals and some fourth crop). Nearly always farms grow 
either ware potatoes or seed potatoes, seldom both. 
The high intensity of potato production in the plan with only three crops poses 
cultivation problems, especially with respect to potato sickness. This high inten-
sity makes it necessary to take special production measures, like desinfecting the 
soil. Another way of preventing soil sickness is to choose a lower potato cultiva-
tion intensity, e.g. a fourth or a fifth of the arable land. 
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In Table 2.1 some statistics are presented concerning the average yield in kgs, 
price and gross margin1 for the most important crops over a number of years. 
This table clearly shows that the average gross margin of potatoes is by far the 
largest, at Dfl 8572,= for ware potatoes and Dfl 10.905,= for seed potatoes. The 
average yield for ware potatoes was 47148 kg/ha at an average price of 23.73 
cts/kg (or, equivalently, Dfl/100 kg), (see also Figure 1.1, Appendix I). 
Table 2.1 Mean yield (in kg/ha.), prices (in cts/kg) and gross margin (in 
Dfl/ha.) for a number of crops in the Central Clay area (73/74 to 
86/87) 
YEAR WARE SEED WARE SEED WHEAT SUGAR OTHER 
POTATOES POTATOES POTATOES POTATOES BEETS CROPS 
kg/ha cts/kg kg/ha cts/kg DFL/ha DFL/ha DFL/ha DFL/ha DFL/ha 
73/74 46197 15.87 31931 36.11 5981 9053 2332 4088 4366 
74/75 44869 14.61 28851 38.57 5021 8431 2791 4801 2885 
75/76 36022 35.09 24641 64.92 10942 12976 2408 5336 4630 
76/77 45869 44.45 30701 98.97 18501 26174 3071 5466 5774 
77/78 39614 13.01 21363 61.82 1940 6836 2234 4460 3249 
78/79 45036 17.76 27980 42.64 5501 7220 3156 4721 3743 
79/80 45399 19.37 27299 40.99 6566 7515 2956 4961 5090 
80/81 48755 21.28 29661 39.03 8365 8443 2990 6155 5636 
81/82 52005 27.21 32107 40.67 11955 9589 3391 6068 5438 
82/83 51340 19.32 33673 45.65 7442 11652 3923 5885 4812 
83/84 41958 51.11 24531 78.12 18568 15379 3750 5835 6950 
84/85 54633 17.36 35203 47.54 5812 11676 3688 6070 4882 
85/86 52481 15.97 36182 35.54 5090 7709 2675 5938 3307 
86/87 55987 19.76 38953 40.04 8330 10010 3415 6773 5907 
Mean 47148 23.73 30220 50.76 8572 10905 3056 5468 4762 
Median 46033 19.35 30181 41.85 7004 9321 3031 5651 4847 
St. dev. 5734 11.69 4906 18.69 4910 5028 536 766 1164 
Coef. var. 0.12 0.49 0.16 0.37 0.57 0.46 0.18 0.14 0.24 
Source: BUL 73/74-86/87, LEI, The Hague. 
The large difference in the amount of variation in gross margin between crops is 
striking (compare the coefficients of variation in Table 2.1). Whereas the gross 
margins for potatoes show a very large standard deviation in guilders per ha. and 
are skewed to the right (the mean is larger than the median), the results for 
sugar-beets and wheat are fairly stable. Gross margins for ware potatoes range 
from Dfl 1940,= to Dfl 18.568,= per ha. which is almost a tenfold difference. 
Moreover, these numbers are averages; for individual farms variations might be 
larger. 
Gross margin is defined as gross returns minus total allocated costs per ha. The allocated costs con-
sist of costs of seeds and seed potatoes, fertilizers, plant protection products, contract work and other 
costs (incl. interest). 
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Variation in gross margin of potatoes is mainly caused by variation in prices. 
Prices for cereals and sugar-beets are more or less stable since they are EC-regu-
lated, whereas potatoes are a free market crop and thus prices are a result of 
varying supply and demand levels. 
On the aggregate level, yield and prices for ware potatoes are not significantly 
correlated over the years.2 The main reason for this finding is probably the fact 
that market prices for ware potatoes in the Netherlands are influenced by the 
potato yield in countries importing Dutch potatoes. Since yield in the Netherlands 
appears to be practically independent of yield in those countries and almost two-
third of potato produce is exported, prices are influenced strongly by export 
demand (see also Figure 1.2, Appendix I). 
Table 2.2 Mean monthly prices of ware potatoes of the Dronten and Emme-
loord exchanges, 73/74-86/87, field crop delivery (0 mm. 
upwards), in cts/kg 
Year Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb March April May Mean St.dev. 
73/74 13.37 17.20 15.79 14.09 14.07 10.60 10.05 8.96 9.66 12.64 2.93 
74/75 7.71 11.18 17.41 15.44 10.76 9.88 10.76 14.53 15.81 12.61 3.27 
75/76 23.66 31.25 37.94 42.00 64.75 68.75 78.50 108.44 117.17 63.61 33.35 
76/77 55.50 50.38 48.81 49.75 66.91 41.26 35.31 35.56 33.60 45.11 8.84 
77/78 7.60 8.74 7.64 7.81 7.63 7.00 7.47 13.02 17.94 9.43 3.67 
78/79 10.00 11.47 14.64 16.29 18.46 16.94 17.74 22.29 21.96 16.64 4.18 
79/80 16.13 17.67 19.34 19.15 19.89 17.11 13.21 12.38 9.35 16.03 3.63 
80/81 11.79 16.06 22.00 21.17 20.78 18.94 19.03 18.48 27.16 19.49 4.22 
81/82 18.27 18.82 18.78 20.37 24.32 28.27 38.97 49.25 53.08 30.01 13.69 
82/83 14.21 15.52 16.92 16.24 13.63 13.71 13.67 11.84 15.74 14.61 1.60 
83/84 35.50 35.44 41.65 44.41 48.35 67.08 75.19 70.72 76.40 54.97 17.16 
84/86 16.41 17.63 13.51 11.71 13.09 12.89 12.41 12.63 11.62 13.41 1.92 
86/86 11.56 8.60 9.06 9.96 9.54 8.09 8.50 12.23 12.35 9.99 1.66 
86/87 18.00 16.90 15.75 16.40 20.48 18.10 18.44 15.84 9.63 16.62 3.01 
Mean 18.48 19.77 21.37 21.77 24.40 24.19 25.66 29.01 30.81 23.94 4.10 
St .dev. 12.85 11.64 12.39 13.41 18.22 20.53 23.60 28.85 31.40 
Coef. var. .69 .59 .58 .62 .75 .85 .92 .99 1.02 
To further illustrate the large price variation of ware potatoes, Table 2.2 presents 
the mean monthly prices of potatoes. Not only are there large price variations 
between marketing years but prices also fluctuate heavily within a year. Fluctua-
tions were especially large in 75/76, 81/82 and 83/84. Averaged over the years, 
prices increase within the marketing year as a result of storage costs. However, in 
some years prices increase strongly within a year (e.g. 75/76 or 81/82) but 
increases can also be minor (82/83). Even a decrease within a year may occur 
Pearson r = -.33, p < .12, one-tailed; Spearman is -05). 
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(e.g. 76/77 and 84/85). Table 2.2 furthermore shows that the coefficient of varia-
tion increases within a marketing year. This means that, in general, price risk 
increases within the year. The farmer has to deal with these price fluctuations 
within each marketing year by means of his selling strategy. The next section 
describes the marketing strategies which are optional to the farmer. 
2.2 Analysis of the farmer's marketing decision problem 
Potato harvest takes place in September or the first part of October, depending 
upon the weather conditions. Since almost all the farmers in the IJsselmeerpolders 
have their own storage facilities, a very large part of the total harvest in the 
region will be stored by the farmers themselves. Depending upon the quality of 
the storage facilities (e.g. insulation against high and low temperatures, air-con-
ditioning etc.), potatoes can be stored from September until the end of July the 
following year. During the storage period ware potatoes decrease in weight and 
the quality somewhat deteriorates. Through storage management the farmer can 
influence the degree of weight reduction and quality loss to some degree. The 
farmer has to be especially alert for disease and rot which, when not acted upon 
immediately, could lead to the deterioration of his total stocks. 
While storage facilities are provided by farmers, grading is performed by the 
wholesaler. Farmers will therefore deliver their potatoes in bulk. Delivery nearly 
takes place at one moment in time. 
As stated above, the farmer has the opportunity to market his ware potatoes as 
long as his storage facilities allow him to. To market his potatoes, a farmer has to 
decide upon three important issues. 
a) Choice of a marketing channel: "To whom should I sell?" 
b) Choice of how to allocate his potato harvest in kgs to a number of selling-
options and the timing of selling: "When and how much should I sell at each 
selling-option?" 
c) Choice of a moment of delivery: "When should I deliver?" 
As we will see in Section 2.3 the specific choice a farmer makes with respect to 
these three elements is what we define as the marketing strategy he chooses. 
Before presenting a definition of the marketing strategy, the three choices will be 
elaborated upon. 
2.2.1 Choice of a marketing channel 
In the IJsselmeerpolders almost all ware potatoes are sold to wholesale companies. 
The amount directly sold by the farmer to the potato processing industry or 
retailer is negligible (De Graaf 1981). We therefore focus on the wholesaler as the 
farmer's main marketing channel. Within the group of wholesalers the farmer has 
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to choose between selling to a cooperative company or to a privately-owned com-
pany. 3 4 
In the region in which this study took place, there is only one cooperative 
company, which markets approximately a third of the potatoes grown in the area 
(De Graaf 1981, Smidts 1985). Farmers have to be members of the organization 
in order to be able to deliver their crop. Membership at first is compulsory for 
two years and has to be renewed annually. A very important aspect of choosing 
to join the cooperative as wholesale company is the duty of delivery: a member's 
whole potato harvest has to be sold through and delivered to the cooperative; 
selling and delivering to another wholesale company is not allowed. Several 
private companies trade in the region. Farmers have freedom of choice with 
respect to how many and to which private companies they sell their potatoes to. 
In Section 2.4 more specific differences between both types of wholesale com-
panies are discussed. 
2.2.2 Choice of allocating harvest to selling-options and timing of selling 
After having chosen a marketing channel, a number of selling-options are open 
to farmers. The options are: a fixed-price contract, a pooling contract, a bottom-
price contract and selling on the spot market. As Table 2.3 points out, coopera-
tive and private wholesale companies differ with respect to the options available 
to farmers. The cooperative does not offer fixed-price or bottom-price contracts. 
The allocation of potato harvest to the two remaining options at the coopera-
tive is fixed: either 100% pooling or 50% pooling. Contrariwise, the allocation 
over options is left open to farmers dealing with private companies. For example, 
a farmer can sell 50% at a fixed-price contract, 25% by means of pooling and 
25% at spot market prices. The options offered by the cooperative company will 
be described first, then a description of the selling-options of private companies 
will follow. 
Because farmers are members of a cooperative company, in principle one cannot speak about "selling" 
to a cooperative company in the same sense as one speaks about selling to a private company. For 
reasons of comparibility in this study delivering to a cooperative company is denoted as selling. 
Henceforth, a privately-owned wholesale company is referred to as a private wholesale company. 
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Table 2.3 Selling-options open to the farmer and market share of each option 
in 1983 (calculated on kgs) 
Market share, 1983 b 
Cooperative company 36.1% 
1) 100% POOLING* 
2) 50% POOLING 
20.7% 
50% selling on the SPOT MARKET 15.4% 
(at one or more selling moments) 
Private companies 63.9% 
1) FIXED -PRICE CONTRACT 
2) BOTTOM-PRICE CONTRACT 
3) POOLING CONTRACT 
4) Selling on the SPOT MARKET 
15.5% 
5.4% 
8.1% 
34.9% 
(at one or more selling moments) 
100% refers to the total harvest of a farmer 
Source: Smidts (1985) 
Selling-options at the cooperative company 
Each year, before June, a farmer who sells to the cooperative company has to 
choose between: 
a) selling his total potato harvest (100%) by means of a pooling contract 
(henceforth referred to as 100% pooling) or 
b) selling 50% of his harvest by means of a pooling contract and 50% at spot 
market prices (referred to as 50% pooling, 50% spot market). 
a) 100% POOLING 
In this form of contract, all potatoes brought in by all farmers choosing this con-
tract are sold by representatives of the cooperative. The total gross returns of 
these sales, minus costs, is distributed among farmers in proportion to the amount 
of potatoes delivered. The price a farmer receives will be close to the average 
market price, since the cooperative is spreading its sales over the marketing year. 
At the moment of delivery, farmers receive a preliminary payment based on the 
expected pooling price. The final payments will be made in June or July. 
In principle each farmer receives the same price. However, price differentia-
tion takes place by means of a premium and discount system. Firstly, differences 
in storage costs are taken into account. Farmers delivering early in the season 
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(say October or November) have lower storage costs than farmers delivering at 
the end of the season (say July). The calculation of storage costs is based on the 
costs of average storage facilities. Secondly, premiums or discounts are given 
depending upon the waste percentage, size distribution and quality of the 
delivered potatoes. Quality is measured by means of a standardized and objective 
method. This quality premium system stimulates farmers to improve their ware 
potato quality. 
A very important characteristic of the 100% pooling system is that the farmer 
does not take active involvement in the market itself, i.e. in deciding how much 
and when to sell. These decisions are taken over by the representatives of the 
cooperative. Farmers are only engaged in the production and storage of potatoes. 
b) 50% POOLING, 50% SPOT MARKET 
In this form of contract, a farmer has to sell 25 tons/ha (net) potatoes by means 
of pooling. Since return is approximately 50 tons/ha net, this means that around 
50% of total harvest is sold via pooling. The remaining potatoes are sold to the 
cooperative at their spot market prices. The farmer is free to choose when and 
how much to sell at spot market prices. E.g. he can either sell this 50% at one 
moment in time or in portions at several moments (at probably different spot 
market prices). Selling at spot market prices implies that the farmer has to 
acquire as much information and insight into price movements as possible. He 
therefore has to keep track of the potato market actively. 
In comparison with the 100% pooling contract this form of contract should, in 
principle, result in a higher average price and a larger price risk. The reason for 
this is that the amount sold on the spot market by an individual farmer is fairly 
small which leaves less opportunity to the farmer to spread his sales over time 
than it does to the cooperative company selling a large amount. His price risk 
will therefore be larger and this larger price risk should be offset by a higher 
average price. The higher average price despite the larger price risk may be the 
main reason why a farmer prefers the 50% pooling form of contract to the 100% 
pooling contract. Another reason might be the active involvement in the market 
which does not reduce a farmer to a mere grower of potatoes. 
The same premium and discount system with respect to moment of delivery, 
waste percentage, size distribution and quality, as described for the 100% pooling 
contract is applicable here. 
Selling-options offered by private companies 
As Table 2.3 shows, a farmer can choose pooling, fixed-price, bottom-price con-
tracts or selling at spot market prices. 
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In contrast with the cooperative, the amount sold through each selling-option is 
to be decided by the farmer. He can therefore distribute his amount of potatoes 
among the options as he wishes. Contracts are settled at a fixed amount of pota-
toes, usually 100, 150 or 200 tons net. Usually, contracts are signed before 
planting and well before harvest time. Most contracts are only for one year. 
Premiums and discounts are given according to the specifications in the contracts 
depending upon the moment of delivery, size distribution, waste percentage and 
quality of potatoes. 
a) POOLING CONTRACT 
This contract resembles the cooperative pooling system. A number of farmers 
bring in a certain amount of potatoes. A pooling committee, consisting of repre-
sentatives of the wholesale company and a representation of farmers, decides 
when to sell and how much. The committee can decide to spread sales evenly 
over the marketing year in order to arrive at an average market price. The 
strategy employed depends on the price risk the committee is willing to take. 
Also, a very risky selling strategy might be employed e.g. by selling at only a few 
moments in time. 
The price farmers receive is based on the gross return minus a payment to the 
wholesale company as compensation for using the representatives' market infor-
mation and sales system. This compensation amounts to approximately 10% of the 
wholesaling price. 
b) BOTTOM-PRICE CONTRACTS 
A second selling-option consists of the bottom-price contract. According to this 
contract, the farmer always receives a specified bottom-price. The wholesale 
company guarantees payment of this bottom-price irrespective of the market 
situation. Of course, this payment will not be made when the wholesale company 
goes bankrupt. 
The price farmers receive is calculated as follows. A weekly regional market 
price is set at the regional potato exchange. On the basis of this price, an average 
market price is calculated for the marketing year. In case this average market 
price is higher than the average bottom-price, 75% of the positive difference is 
paid to the farmer, on top of the bottom-price. The remaining 25% of the 
difference is received by the wholesale company. In case the average market 
price falls below the bottom-price, the farmer receives only the bottom-price. 
The price risk is limited in this form of contract because of the bottom-price 
and because the final price is calculated on the basis of the average market price. 
The level of bottom-prices varies somewhat between wholesale companies and 
respective years. 
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C) FIXED-PRICE CONTRACT 
A third option consists of selling a net amount of potatoes at a fixed contract 
price. A characteristic of this contract is the transfer of total price risk from the 
farmer to the wholesale company. Furthermore, the farmer knows the final price 
he will receive with certainty well before the marketing year. The farmer's 
income from potatoes will, of course, still be uncertain because of yield risk. 
d) SELLING ON THE SPOT MARKET 
A final option consists of selling an amount of potatoes at one or more moments 
in time at spot market prices. Prices are settled by taking into account the 
moment of delivery, which may be several months later than the actual selling 
moment. 
The timing of the moment of selling is, of course, very important, especially 
when market prices fluctuate heavily. The farmer should therefore be informed 
about the potato market and the expected price changes as well as possible. Of 
course, a farmer might reduce his price risk by spreading his sales over the mar-
keting year. Selling the total amount at one moment in time would be most risky. 
2.2.3 Choice of a moment of delivery 
A third choice to be made by the farmer is the moment of delivery. As stated 
above ware potatoes can be stored until the end of July, which is, however, only 
possible with very good storage facilities. The quality of the storage facilities is 
therefore a limiting factor on the moment of delivery. 
There are four natural moments of delivery depending upon the storage facili-
ties. Firstly, if no facilities are available at all, delivery takes place during the 
harvest in September or October. Secondly, if insulation against low temperatures 
is limited, delivery will take place around the end of December. Thirdly, if in-
sulation against high temperatures is limited and/or no measures are taken against 
sprouting of potatoes by using chemicals, delivery typically takes place at the end 
of March. The fourth group of storage facilities and storage measures allows 
storage towards June or July. In our operationalisation of the marketing strate-
gies, described in Section 2.3, these four natural moments of delivery will be 
taken into account. 
2.3 Defining the choice alternative: the marketing strategy 
From the description above, it is clear that a farmer has to make many decisions 
and that these decisions are spread over a long period of time. Contracts with 
private companies are mostly decided upon around February and March, even 
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before the potatoes have been planted, whereas spot market sales may start in 
September and could well last until April or June of the following year, even 
after the new potato crop has already been planted. 
Since we do not intend to describe this whole on-going decision making pro-
cess, some limitation is needed. In our view a useful focus of research would be 
the choice situation in June. By then, the marketing channel and delivery period 
will usually have been decided upon. Also, more importantly, at this moment the 
cooperative farmers will have decided upon their choice between 100% pooling 
and 50% pooling and the farmers selling to private companies will have chosen 
the type of contracts and the amount per contract. Furthermore, the amount to be 
sold at spot market prices will be reasonably clear by subtracting the amount 
contracted from the expected yield. 
The sole issue that will not yet be settled in June is the exact timing of spot 
market sales. However, farmers will probably have certain intentions concerning 
both the number of times they plan to sell (often this is a rather small number) 
and the approximate selling moments. The latter are described in terms of 
"towards the moment of delivery", "before winter" or "in early spring". From the 
viewpoint of studying the risk taking behavior of farmers, we are more interested 
in knowing whether someone intends to sell, say 40% in March or April, than in 
knowing that he actually sells, say 32% on April 14. Not knowing the exact 
timing and amount of spot market sales therefore poses no problem in studying 
the influence of risk perceptions and risk attitudes on the overall strategy chosen. 
The marketing strategy that a farmer chooses is thus defined as a farmer's choice 
of a marketing channel (in terms of the type of wholesale company), and given 
this channel choice, his choice of allocating the harvest to selling-options and the 
timing of selling at the spot market, and the choice of a moment of delivery. 
To further characterize the marketing strategy we might view the farmer as 
one who allocates his 'potato capital' to selling-options to construct a portfolio 
analogous to a portfolio of stocks. He chooses types of contracts and amounts per 
contract in such a manner that he will arrive at a trade-off between the expected 
price and the price risk he finds acceptable. The trade-off the decision maker 
finds acceptable is seen as being dependent upon his risk attitude. 
To illustrate the concept, some examples of marketing strategies are described 
below: 
1. Sell to a cooperative company 
100% POOLING 
Delivery: April 
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2. Sell to a cooperative company 
50% POOLING 
50% SPOT MARKET: sell 25% in December/January and the remaining 25% in 
April/May 
Delivery: June/July 
3. Sell to a private company 
100% BOTTOM-PRICE: with bottom-price at 16 cts/kg 
Delivery: December/January 
4. Sell to a private company 
100% SPOT MARKET: sell 10% in October, 50% in January and 40% in March 
Delivery: March 
5. Sell to a private company 
25% POOLING 
50% FIXED-PRICE of 25 cts/kg 
25% SPOT MARKET: sell in April/May 
Delivery: May 
In this study data will be collected concerning perceptions and preferences of 
marketing strategies which are similar to the examples above. The marketing 
strategies used will be described in Chapter 4. 
2.4 Choice of a marketing strategy as a two-attribute decision problem 
The marketing strategy as defined above and further illustrated in the examples, 
is the object of choice in this study. The focus is on explaining the preference 
for a marketing strategy: why do farmers differ in their preferences for mar-
keting strategies? The first part of this section concerns a brief presentation of 
modeling multiattribute decision making in general. In the second section the 
farmer's decision making process will be modeled by means of two attributes. 
2.4.1 Analysis of multiattribute decision processes 
The decision making process for choosing one alternative from a set of alterna-
tives is often divided into a number of distinct stages. Usually the following 
stages are distinguished: a) problem definition, b) the search for information 
about alternatives, c) evaluation of the alternatives, d) choice of one alternative 
and e) evaluation of the results or outcomes of the final choice (Keeney and 
Raiffa 1976, Engel et al. 1986, Boehlje and Eidman 1984). Here we will focus on 
the evaluation of the alternatives stage. 
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Usually, in models of both risky and riskless decision making, preference or 
attitude formation at the stage of evaluation of alternatives is conceived as con-
sisting of at least three important elements: 
a) perception of each alternative in respect of one or more relevant attributes 
b) the evaluation of each possible outcome for each attribute 
c) some rule combining perception and evaluation. 
Since these three elements also form the essence of the theories of decision 
making under risk which will be described and discussed in detail in Chapter 3, 
only a very short description of each element is presented here. 
a) Perception of alternatives in respect of attributes 
Important here is how many and which attributes are relevant in forming the 
perception of a choice alternative. If only one attribute captures the essence of an 
alternative a one attribute decision problem results. However, more than one 
attribute is mostly needed to fully describe alternatives. These multiattribute 
decision models are common in e.g. modeling consumer behavior (Engel et al. 
1986). 
A second important aspect concerns the distinction between certainty and risk. 
Are the outcomes certain when choosing an alternative or are they merely 
probable? If outcomes are merely probably the perception is usually captured by 
a subjective probability distribution of outcomes. If outcomes are certain the 
perception of each alternative can be represented by one score on an attribute, 
for example measured on a Likert scale. 
In essence, outcomes are never certain to the decision maker. For example: 
what will a meal ordered in a restaurant taste like or what will be the fuel usage 
of a car one has bought? All decision making is therefore essentially decision 
making under risk. However, in studying decision making, modeling the decision 
process as if it were a decision under certainty, often may be accurate enough in 
explaining choice behavior. Especially consumer behavior is usually modeled as a 
decision under certainty as is shown by e.g. the Fishbein and Ajzen model of 
reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980), fairly popular in the study of con-
sumer behavior. Not modeling risk explicitly may be less appropriate for impor-
tant consumer decisions with fairly large risks (Hauser and Urban 1979). In these 
cases multiattribute decision models under risk are more appropriate. These 
models are discussed extensively in Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
An important reason for modeling under certainty is its simplicity in respect of 
measurement procedures and analysis compared with modeling under risk. In 
general, modeling decisions under risk should predict preferences and behavior 
better to justify the additional effort. 
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b) Evaluation of outcomes for each attribute 
This element in the evaluation of alternatives concerns a statement of a decision 
maker about the attractiveness of each possible outcome for each attribute. In 
case of certainty (only one possible outcome), the evaluation is one score e.g. 
measured on a semantic differential scale. In case of risk, the evaluation of 
possible outcomes can be represented by a function that links each outcome to its 
attractiveness to the decision maker. In the expected utility model, to be dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, the shape of this function indicates the risk attitude of the 
decision maker. 
The manner in which the evaluation function should be assessed and the inter-
pretation that should be given to each type of assessment, is subject to discussion. 
Two different views exist in this respect. According to one view the assessment 
should be performed by registrating decision makers' responses to lotteries. In 
this way, a so-called utility function can be constructed which indicates the risk 
attitude. According to another view responses should be assessed with respect to 
differences in outcomes which are certain. The resulting function is called a 
value function which indicates a decision maker's strength of preference and not 
his risk attitude. This value/utility debate concerning the theoretical and empi-
rical relationship between the two types of functions constructed will be dis-
cussed extensively in Chapter 3. 
After assessing single-attribute evaluation functions, the trade-off between 
attributes should also be assessed for multiattribute models. Descriptions of these 
procedures can be found in Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards (1986). 
c) Combining perception and evaluation 
In most preference formation models under certainty the perception and evalua-
tion scores are combined multiplicatively by attribute. These multiplied compo-
nents are then added over attributes to arrive at a summated rating of 
favorableness (expectancy-value models). In case of risk and a one-attribute 
model, this implies that the probability of an outcome is multiplied by the 
evaluation of this outcome. Summing these components over all possible outcomes 
results in a preference score for each alternative. The validity of the combination 
rules of multiplication and addition are studied explicitly in information 
integration theory (Anderson 1981, Anderson and Shanteau 1970). 
In case of multiattribute decision models, several combination functions are 
proposed for combining the separate utility components of single attributes. The 
most simple model is an additive one in which utility components are simply 
summed over attributes. This special case results if mutual utility or value inde-
pendence exists between attributes (see Keeney and Raiffa 1976 for a definition 
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of mutual utility independence). Another model is the multilinear model which 
incorporates interaction effects between the utility components. 
This general discussion of modeling the stage of evaluation of alternatives is 
now followed by a specific analysis of this stage in the farmer's decision problem 
under study. 
2.4.2 Attributes for evaluating marketing strategies 
Each year the farmer has to choose a marketing channel and a combination of 
selling-options. Important in both decisions is: what are the relevant attributes for 
evaluating both choices? An overview of attributes will be given here. Some cri-
teria emerge when studying the differences between marketing strategies, other 
criteria have been suggested by farmers during a number of depth interviews. 
Attributes for choosing a marketing channel 
The focus here is on the choice of the type of wholesale company: a cooperative 
and a private company. Many differences exist between them. The most impor-
tant motives which probably play a significant role in choice behavior are briefly 
discussed here.5 
First, risk of bad debt will probably be assumed to differ between a coopera-
tive and a private company. In this context, the risk of bad debt is defined as the 
risk of receiving payment too slowly, not fully or not at all. Although the chance 
of receiving no payment at all is actually fairly small because of the small 
number of bankruptcies, this event occasionally happens. In fact, in 1986 a pri-
vate company in the region in which this study took place did go bankrupt. 
Nevertheless, most farmers received most of their credits. 
Apart from the possibility of not paying at all, firms will probably differ with 
respect to speed of payment. A slow payment will probably be experienced by 
farmers as much more annoying than the chances of receiving no payment at all. 
A difference in this respect between cooperative and private companies especially 
came up in depth interviews with the farmers. No notable payment problems 
were reported with the cooperative, whereas accounts were given of instances of 
irregularities with private companies. Of course, private companies will differ in 
this respect. 
A second attribute concerns contracting risk, which is defined here as the risk 
that a wholesale company does not stick to the arrangements made in the con-
tract. One example is the risk of being urged to deliver later than agreed which 
causes extra storage costs or storage problems with respect to potato quality. 
Another, even worse example is that the wholesale company does not want to 
In this study's questionnaire a number of open-ended questions was included in order to list these 
motives. The findings are reported in Smidts (1986). 
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receive the inventory at all. Other contracting risks are incorrect quality, size 
and/or waste determination. In the interviews, the above mentioned risks were 
seen as very small or negligible when dealing with a cooperative but potentially 
problematic with private companies. It should be noted, however, that although 
potentially problematic, contracting risk was not seen as a severe risk with 
private companies either. 
Quality determination and a quality premium and discount system may be a 
third attribute. In this system the quality of ware potatoes is assessed by means of 
an objective and standardized method; premiums and discounts are given in 
accordance with the quality ratings. The cooperative company already started 
with such a standardized system in the early seventies. Recently, the larger 
private companies are also applying a standardized quality premium system in 
connection with their contracts, especially pooling. However, most spot market 
sales at private companies are still carried out without such a system. With those 
companies, quality is usually assessed by eye-balling and is implicitly accounted 
for in the price. At this moment, the quality payment system still constitutes a 
relevant difference between private and cooperative companies but differences 
are decreasing, particularly between the larger private companies and the 
cooperative company. 
Still other differences exist between cooperative and private companies. To 
mention but a few: the obligation to deliver the total harvest to the cooperative, 
the limited number (i.e. two) of selling-options available at the cooperative com-
pared to the larger number at private companies, the specification of the payment 
bill, friendliness and expertise of the company's representatives and service and 
advice about e.g. technical aspects during the potato production process and at 
delivery. 
All aspects mentioned above will to some extent influence the preference and 
choice of a marketing channel. The choice of the marketing channel can be 
viewed as a two-stage process. Firstly, the farmer chooses between the coope-
rative and a private company (in the region in which this study took place, there 
is only one cooperative wholesale company). Secondly, when he has decided not 
to deal with the cooperative, he has to choose one or more specific companies 
from the group of private companies. Most of the attributes mentioned above are 
linked to the first choice between the cooperative and private company; some are 
relevant in the second stage. The focus in this study is on the first stage. We will 
concentrate on modeling whether a farmer chooses either a cooperative or a 
private company. Therefore all differences between the two types of wholesale 
companies can be represented by only one attribute which is a dichotomy: either 
a farmer favors a cooperative or he favors a private company. Preferences for a 
specific private company within the group of private companies will not be 
studied here. 
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Price as an attribute for choosing a combination of selling-options 
Earning money is the primary objective of selling potatoes. Before planting, one 
might therefore view gross margin as the farmer's appropriate attribute for 
evaluating selling-options. After planting gross return would be considered most 
appropriate. In this study however, price is taken as an attribute. There are three 
arguments for this choice. Firstly, since price and yield are often negatively 
related in agriculture, striving for a small price risk could result in high return 
risk. As stated above, however, the correlation between yield and price of ware 
potatoes is not significantly different from zero on the aggregate level. Because 
of the lack of correlation between yield and price and the small variability of 
yield (see Table 2.1) the variability in gross return stems mainly from the 
variability in prices. 
Secondly, a further argument for choosing price instead of return as attribute, 
is the moment of chosing a marketing strategy, namely June. In June, the farmer 
can already make a fairly good prediction of the yield. That is, yield is not very 
uncertain anymore at that moment, but has a more or less fixed value. Farmers 
will therefore choose between marketing strategies conditional on this information 
about expected yield. 
A third, but perhaps most important, argument for choosing price came up at 
individual depth interviews with sixteen farmers. Those farmers stated price and 
not gross return or gross margin as the criterion of choice between marketing 
strategies. 
When choosing between marketing strategies, the price to be obtained with 
each strategy is not known beforehand, and uncertain. An impression of the 
prices which might result and the chances of occurrence is therefore needed. This 
impression. can be formally described by a probability distribution. Since each 
farmer could perceive the market situation differently, these probability distribu-
tions are subjective (or personal) probability distributions. They indicate a 
farmer's degree of belief about the chance of occurrence of an outcome. Hetero-
geneity in perception is therefore handled by means of these subjective proba-
bility distributions. 
Conclusion 
It follows from our definition of the choice alternative, the marketing strategy, 
and from the review of attributes, that two attributes are most important in 
modeling preference and choice. These attributes are price and marketing 
channel. Price is an attribute for which outcomes are uncertain whereas the mar-
keting channel can be described by a dichotomy: a cooperative versus a private 
wholesale company. 
Note that the moment of delivery is a limitation which is handled by means of 
the description of the marketing strategy, that is, farmers who cannot deliver 
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later than, say, December will have to state their preferences for a set of mar-
keting strategies delivering in December (see Chapter 4). 
2.5 A model of the decision making process 
A schematic overview of the model for choosing a marketing strategy in a spe-
cific marketing year is presented in Figure 2.1. Three decision stages are dis-
tinguished in this model: the evaluation of alternatives, the choice of one alterna-
tive and the outcomes of choice. 
The evaluation of alternatives is modeled by means of two attributes: price and 
marketing channel. Important elements in the formation of the preferences are 
the perception of the marketing strategy in respect of price and the risk attitude 
of the decision maker in respect of price. The motives linked to the choice of a 
marketing channel are combined into a single choice between a cooperative and a 
private wholesale company. 
The evaluation of alternatives results in a preference ordering of marketing 
strategies. In the model it is assumed that a high preference for a marketing 
strategy will result in a high intention to choose the marketing strategy. However, 
the relationship between preference and choice is influenced by the storage 
facilities of the farmer which acts as a short term limitation on choice with 
respect to the moment of delivery. 
At the end of the marketing year, the post-decision outcomes will be apparent. 
They concern the ware potato price the farmer has received and the farmer's 
(dis)satisfaction with this price, bad or good experiences with respect to the mar-
keting channel, etc. It is expected that the post-decision outcomes will influence 
decision making in the ensuing year by means of a feed back loop. Examples in 
this respect are that a farmer switches from the cooperative company to a private 
company or changes his perception of a particular selling-option. Another 
example is that a high price of ware potatoes in a particular year may raise the 
farmer's wealth.. This might induce him to become less risk averse in the fol-
lowing year (this effect can be represented by a utility function for wealth with 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (see Chapter 3)). 
The essential elements of the stage of evaluation of alternatives with respect to 
price are the price perception of marketing strategies, the farmer's risk attitude 
and the way in which these two elements are combined into a preference index. 
The first element concerns the price perception (in June) of marketing strategy 
j . It is assumed that a farmer does have an idea about what prices to expect and 
the degree of belief of occurrence of these prices with each marketing strategy. 
That is, farmers should form an impression of the price risk for each marketing 
strategy. These opinions can be encoded into a coherent probability distribution 
by means of suitable elicitation techniques. 
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Figure 2.1 A conceptual model for the decision making process with respect to 
the choice of a marketing strategy 
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In the study it is thus assumed that the farmer forms an impression of the 
probability of each price associated with each marketing strategy. However, the 
process of how a farmer forms this perception is not studied here. Most probably, 
the farmer will combine knowledge of previous prices per strategy with recent 
information about the market stemming from e.g. futures market prices, forecasts 
of yield in the Netherlands and abroad and a forecast of mean market price by a 
macro model of the Agricultural Economic Research Institute-LEI. Furthermore, 
this perception will probably be influenced by the farmer's characteristics like 
the number of years he has already been marketing ware potatoes (in turn this 
experience will be strongly related to the age of the farmer). How farmers 
combine all these sources of information, for example whether they combine 
these in a normatively correct manner (e.g. the Bayes rule) or whether psycho-
logical biases are present (Kahneman and Tversky 1982), is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
The second element in the evaluation stage is the risk attitude in respect of 
price. In general, this is the inclination to forebear risks to a greater or lesser 
extent. In Chapter 3 more specific information about the theoretical content and 
measurement of this attitude will be given. For example, in the expected utility 
model this attitude is represented by a utility function measured by means of 
lotteries. 
In the model a relationship is conceived between risk attitude and background 
characteristics of the farmer. Since in the literature few consistent relationships 
have been reported between the risk attitude and characteristics of a person this 
is largely an exploratory research subject. Variables that are potentially relevant 
in this respect are specified. The most important variables are a farmer's age and 
level of education (younger and more educated farmers are supposed to be less 
risk averse), his experience with marketing potatoes (more experienced farmers 
are probably less risk averse), and farm characteristics like arable land and sol-
vency (farmers of larger farms and/or more solvent farms are less risk averse). 
Characteristics of the farmer will possibly also be related to the motives for 
choosing a marketing channel. This will largely be an exploratory research sub-
ject. 
Up until now, the elements which seem important in choosing between marketing 
strategies have been delineated. Yet, no analysis is given about how to combine 
perceptions and risk attitude into a preference index or how to combine the two 
attributes of price and marketing channel into one overall evaluation. Also, the 
concepts of risk attitude and risk perception are still largely undefined and no 
procedures about how to measure these elements are presented. These subjects 
will be dealt with in Chapter 3. In that chapter theories about how one should 
select an alternative with uncertain outcomes from a set of alternatives and about 
how people actually make these choices, is extensively discussed and evaluated. In 
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Chapter 4 then, an operationalization of the conceptual model presented here will 
be given. 
Summary 
In this chapter the farmer's decision making process was structured. It was 
pointed out that in the region where this study took place the gross margin of 
ware potatoes is most variable and consequently influences the farmer's income 
most. 
The variability in gross margin of ware potatoes is mainly due to variability in 
market prices for potatoes. By means of the marketing strategy the farmer can 
respond to this variability in prices. A farmer may choose a risky marketing 
strategy supposedly leading to a high mean price over marketing years but also to 
a high variability in price. Contrariwise, he might choose a strategy with low 
risk, e.g. a fixed-price contract. An elaborate discussion was presented of the 
selling-options open to the farmers. 
A second important choice with respect to the marketing strategy is the choice 
of a marketing channel. This channel is differentiated into a cooperative and a 
private company. 
The analysis of the decision context resulted in the conception of a two-
attribute decision making model with price and marketing channel as attributes. 
The main elements in this model are the risk perception and risk attitude in 
respect of price. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MODELING DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK 
The farmer's decision problem was delineated in the previous chapter. It was 
concluded that a farmer has to choose between marketing strategies on the basis 
of essentially two attributes: price and marketing channel. Since price is a random 
variable, choosing between marketing strategies concerns decision making under 
risk. How to choose between alternatives with uncertain outcomes constitutes the 
subject of this chapter. 
Since the farmer's decision making is seen as an example of decision making 
under risk, in this chapter an up-to-date review of the major theoretical issues 
into the general problem of decision making under risk will be presented. The 
most important models proposed to prescribe and describe choice behavior under 
risk will be discussed. 
Most attention will be devoted to the subjective expected utility model since 
this is the dominant model to study risky decision making. The basic ideas in this 
expected utility model originate from Bernoulli in 1738 (see Section 3.1). Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) succeeded in providing the fundamental foun-
dation of the model (Section 3.2). An interesting recent development with respect 
to the expected utility model is the hypothesis of relative risk attitude. This con-
cept is linked to the discussion about the theoretical and empirical relationship 
between a strength of preference and a utility function. In Section 3.3 the con-
cept of relative risk attitude will be defined and evaluated. It will be made clear 
that one can view this concept as providing the proper link between the Bernoulli 
and the von Neumann-Morgenstern model. 
The expected utility model is essentially normative. It prescribes how a deci-
sion maker should choose. As a descriptive model of decision making it has 
received a lot of criticism (Section 3.4). Alternative descriptive models proposed, 
like Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), will also be discussed. 
Following the review of theoretical issues, the chapter finishes with applying 
the theory of decision making under risk to the problem of selecting marketing 
strategies (Section 3.5) and with formulating research topics and questions for 
empirical study (Section 3.6). 
3.1 Decision making under risk: the basic ideas 
In essence, choosing between alternatives with uncertain outcomes implies 
choosing between probability distributions of outcomes X. A first possibility to 
choose between the probability distributions is by rank ordering them according 
to the centre of gravity of the distribution: the expected value, denoted as E(x), 
and by then choosing the alternative with the highest expected value (henceforth, 
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a random variable will be denoted by x). A consequence of this decision rule is 
that a decision maker should be indifferent between two distributions with the 
same expected value, irrespective of the higher moments of the probability dis-
tribution. In general, however, most people will prefer one distribution to the 
other; they are not indifferent to the distribution of outcomes around the 
expected value. 
For example, in case a choice has to be made between two alternatives with 
normally distributed outcomes with the same expected value but with different 
variances, the choice criterion of expected value implies that people do not prefer 
one distribution to the other. However, it is usually contended that most people 
would prefer the distribution with the smaller variance. The latter type of 
preference is called risk aversion. 
To account for risk averse preferences Bernoulli suggested already in 1738 that 
by taking the expected value of the probability distribution measured in sub-
jective psychological values, a better criterion for rank ordering distributions 
would be obtained. (For the English translation of the original Latin text see 
Bernoulli 1954). This choice criterion is denoted as the expected utility criterium 
E[v(x)], where v(x) is the transformation function of outcomes X into subjective 
values or utilities. It would be rational to then choose the probability distribution 
with the highest expected utility. To be more specific, the transformation func-
tion v(x) which Bernoulli proposed was a logarithmic function implying dimi-
nishing marginal utility. This function was clearly meant to indicate the intensity 
of satisfaction (strength of preference) for an outcome. In this study the function 
v(x) will be called a value or strength of preference function.1 
The concavity of the function v(x) has a significant implication for the evalua-
tion of risk: a decision maker is risk averse if and only if his evaluation function 
is concave (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). Firstly, however, let us define risk aversion 
more precisely. Consider a decision maker facing a lottery L1 yielding either 
outcome x H or a less preferable outcome x L with equal probability (p => 0.5). Evi-
dently, the expected value E(x) of this lottery is (x L + x R ) / 2 . Now suppose the 
decision maker is asked to state his preference for either receiving E(x) with 
certainty or the lottery L r If the decision maker prefers the certain outcome E(x) 
to the lottery h1 with the same expected value, then the decision maker states 
that he prefers to avoid the risks associated with the lottery. This preference is 
defined as risk aversion. Apparently a 50% chance of losing an amount x does 
not counterbalance a 50% chance of winning an amount x. 
Risk aversion is implied in a concave evaluation function (see Figure 3.1). For 
a concave curve, the expected utility of the probability distribution (E[v(x)]) is 
smaller than the utility of the expected value of the probability distribution 
(v[E(x)]), that is, E[v(x)] < v[E(x)]. For example, a decision maker with v(x) = In 
In the visual notation the Bernoulli function is denoted by u(x) instead of v(x) and is called a utility 
function. In this study, however, we want to differentiate between a value function v(x) and a von 
Neumann-Morgenst em utility function u(x) (see Section 3.2). The function Bernoulli proposed is 
clearly a value function. In Section 3.3 the relationship between v(x) and u(x) will be discussed. 
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x and facing a 50/50 lottery with as outcomes $ 100 and $ 200 will prefer the 
amount $ 150 for certain to the lottery, because v[E(x)] = In 150 = 5.01 is larger 
than E[v(xJ] = (In 100 + In 200)/2 = 4.95. Stated otherwise, a decision maker with 
a concave function v(x) should be willing to exchange a distribution of outcomes 
for a non-random outcome of the size of the expected value of the distribution. 
H * 
X u CE EDO X H 
v(x): value function of a risk averse decision maker 
E(X): expected value of lottery L yielding x^ with probability p (= 0.5) and X g with 1-p (=0.5) 
CE: the decision maker's certainty equivalent for lottery L 
HP: risk premium of lottery L 
E[v(x)]: expected utility of lottery L 
v[E(X)]: utility of expected value of lottery L 
Figure 3.1 Graphical illustration of important concepts in decision making under 
risk 
In Figure 3.1 also the concepts of certainty equivalent and risk premium are 
presented graphically. These concepts are defined as follows. 
The lowest non-random outcome the decision maker is willing to accept in 
exchange for a probability distribution is called the certainty equivalent. This 
certainty equivalent, denoted as CE, is defined by: 
v(CE) = E[v(x)] (3.1) 
that is, the utility of the certainty equivalent equals the expected value of the 
distribution of subjective values. 
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The difference then between the expected value of the distribution of outcomes 
and the certainty equivalent is called the risk premium of the lottery: 
RP = E(x) - CE (3.2) 
The risk premium RP thus is the amount of the attribute the decision maker is 
willing to 'give up' from the average (i.e. the expected value) to avoid the risks 
associated with the particular lottery (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). The risk 
premium is a suitable indicator to express the degree of risk aversion. Confronted 
with the same lottery, the more risk averse decision maker is willing to give up 
more for having the dispersion completely eliminated, which means that his risk 
premium is larger. 
In contrast to a risk averse decision maker, a decision maker with a convex 
value function, that is, a function with increasing marginal utility, would opt for 
the distribution instead of a non-random outcome of the same size as the 
expected value of the distribution (a negative risk premium). A decision maker 
with such a preference is defined as risk seeking. 
Only in case of a linear function v(x), a decision maker would be indifferent 
between the expected value of the distribution and the non-random outcome of 
the same size. This risk neutral case implies the use of the decision rule of 
expected value: the expected value rule is a special case of the expected utility 
model when assuming a risk neutral decision maker. 
To summarize the ideas so far 
FUNCTION RISK PREMIUM RISK ATTITUDE 
concave <=> risk premium > 0 <=> risk averse 
linear <=> risk premium = 0 <=> risk neutral 
convex <=> risk premium < 0 <=> risk seeking 
(3.3) 
However, Bernoulli's approach of proposing a diminishing marginal utility func-
tion for evaluating probability distributions showed some difficulties (Sinn 1983). 
Firstly, no explanation for risk seeking behavior was presented, since this would 
imply a convex, that is, an increasing marginal value function. Such a function is 
not very plausible. Secondly, many questioned the interval or cardinal character 
of the proposed value function. According to them, only ordinal utility existed. 
Thirdly, even if there is an interval value function for non-random outcomes, 
there is no obvious reason for risk to be evaluated by using this function. Why 
should a value function describing preferences under certainty have anything to 
say about preferences under risk? Allais (1953) pointed out that two people with 
the same value function may well differ with regard to their preferences in risky 
choices. Especially this third point will be discussed later when presenting the 
theory of Allais and discussing the value/utility distinction. 
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The element that remained of Bernoulli's model was the idea of maximizing the 
expectation of subjective values of outcomes. Not until the work of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), however, the reason for taking the expectation 
of subjective values as the appropriate rule for rank ordering probability distri-
butions was made clear. Their theory of expected utility will be presented in the 
next section. 
3.2 The expected utility model 
The dominant model for studying risky decision making undoubtedly is the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) model (abbreviated as NM-model). Like Bernoulli, 
NM also developed an expected utility rule. That is, probability distributions 
should be rank ordered with respect to expected utility. However, their theory 
differs from Bernoulli's theory in important respects. Firstly, while Bernoulli 
directly states that people should maximize expected utility, NM make a set of 
assumptions (axioms) about preference orderings and they prove that, if one 
abides by those assumptions, one always prefers the alternative with the highest 
expected utility (after the original formulation by von Neumann-Morgenstern 
many alternative systems of axioms have been formulated; important examples 
are Savage (1954) and Luce and Raiffa (1957)). Secondly, the nature of their 
evaluation function, hereafter called the utility function, has nothing to do with 
strength of preference, according to NM. 
The expected utility theory has been derived and explained in many sources. A 
selection of these sources now follows. Very formal and axiomatic descriptions 
and explanations of expected utility theory are presented in Savage (1954), Luce 
and Raiffa (1957) and Fishburn (1970, 1982, 1988). A less formal approach can 
be found in Dillon (1971), Levy and Sarnat (1972), Vlek and Wagenaar (1979), 
Schoemaker (1980), Sinn (1983) and von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986). 
The following, fairly informal presentation of axioms draws heavily on Sinn 
(1983) and von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986). 
The following sets are defined: 
1) A set of choice alternatives A = (A ;^ i= 1, 2, ... , I) 
2) A set of outcomes X = ( X J ; j = 1, 2, ... , J) 
3) A set of probabilities P = (Pj(Xj) ; i = 1, 2, ... , I; j = 1, 2, ... , J), in which 
Pj(Xj) is the probability of outcome Xj with alternative Aj. 
These sets are known and certain.2 The (only) way that uncertainty enters into the 
choice problem is when the choice must be made before it is known which out-
This is one of the main points of criticism of Simon (1986) against the expected utility model as a 
descriptive model of decision making. For example, he states that one of the main issues in problem 
solving concerns the search for good alternatives (see Section 3.4.1). 
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come will prevail. Each alternative Aj is thus represented by a probability distri-
bution. The existence of a function U(.) which orders probability distributions in 
an ordinal way follows from the following axioms. 
Axiom of ordering 
The decision maker has a complete weak ordering of all attainable probability 
distributions of outcomes. 
The weak ordering of course implies connectivity and transitivity. By connec-
tivity is meant the ability of a decision maker to indeed make judgments of 
preference or indifference when faced with any two lotteries in A. That is, for 
any two lotteries L x and L 2 , he prefers either L x to L 2 or L 2 to L x or else he is 
indifferent. Connectivity would be violated if the respondent said: "I really can't 
make up my mind". Violations of that kind may occur if the lotteries are very 
similar in expected utility or are very complex (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
(1986). 
Transitivity implies that if Lj is preferred to L 2 and L 2 to a lottery L 3 , then Lj 
must also be preferred to L 3 . If a decision maker would not be transitive he 
could be used as a money pump. This implication can be shown by the following 
example. If a decision maker owns L 3 , then given a choice between L 3 and L 2 , 
he would be prepared to pay to exchange L 3 for L 2 . Then given L 2 , he would 
pay something more to exchange it for the preferred L r Finally, as a result of 
his intransitivity, he would again be prepared to pay when given a choice 
between L x and L 3 in order to end up with L g etc.! Thus, he begins and ends at 
the same lottery, but becomes poorer in the process (Fishburn 1988).3 Like 
connectivity, transitivity may be violated if lotteries are very complex or similar 
in expected utility. The so-called preference reversals (Grether and Plott 1979) 
are an example of intransitivity. 
Axiom of independence 
Suppose a decision maker prefers probability distribution Lj to L 2 ; it thus follows 
that distributions built up by combining Ll and L 2 with another distribution L 3 , 
It is doubtful that any subject would agree to be used as a money pump. This implication illustrates 
the necessity of providing a subject with a cycle of choices instead of a number of single choices in 
experiments which investigate the transitivity in choice behavior. 
satisfy 
if 0 < p < 1. 
3 
38 
This axiom means that, given a choice between two lotteries, both providing the 
same prize with probability (1-p), but different prizes with probability p, the 
ordering of the two lotteries should be the same as that of the two different 
prizes. 
This axiom is very important since it implies that the utility of an outcome is 
independent of the probability of receiving that outcome and that the evaluation 
of an alternative is independent of other alternatives in the choice set. A viola-
tion of this axiom would mean that no single evaluation function exists; only 
evaluation functions conditional on probabilities would exist. The famous Allais-
paradox is an example of the violation of the independence axiom (Allais 1953, 
1979). This effect is referred to by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as the cer-
tainty effect people overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to 
outcomes which are merely probable. 
The formulation of the independence axiom presented above stems from 
Samuelson (1952). Other versions of the principle in this axiom are the sure-thing 
axiom of Savage (1954) and the substitution axiom (Allais 1953). 
Archimedes axiom 
If outcome X% is preferred to X 2 and X 2 to X 3 then there is one and only one 
probability p (0 < p < 1), so that the decision maker is indifferent between the 
certain amount X 2 and a lottery offering X x or X 3 with probabilities p and 1-p 
respectively. 
This axiom, also called the continuity axiom, states that some indifference 
probability can always be found. It would be violated if any one alternative or 
outcome is so attractive or unattractive that even very small probabilities cannot 
reduce their utility or disutility (e.g. a nuclear energy accident with catastrophic 
consequences). 
Axiom of non-saturation 
If X x is larger than X 2 then X t is preferred to X 2 . This implies a monotonically 
increasing evaluation function. 
The above axioms are sufficient to prove that a utility index u(x) exists, unique 
up to positive linear transformations, so that computing expected utilities will 
yield a preference ordering U(.) among probability distributions in accordance 
with the axioms.4 U(.) takes the following form: 
The formal proof will not be given here since excellent references exist in this respect e.g. Luce and 
Raiffa (1957) or Fishburn (1970). More important, however, is the interpretation of expected utility. 
This will be presented in the next section. 
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U(Ai) = £ Pi{xj) u(Xj) (3.4) 
in case of discrete probabilities, and: 
U{Ai) = J fi{x)u{x)dx (3.5) 
in case of continuous probabilities, 
with: 
U(Aj) = expected utility of alternative Aj 
P;(Xj) = probability of outcome Xj with alternative Aj 
f j(x) = probability density of alternative Aj 
u(x) = utility function 
The preference function U(.) appears to be the expected value of the utility of 
outcomes with probabilities taken as weights. The function u(x) is defined up to 
positive linear transformations which means that the function g(x) = a + b u(x) 
with b > 0 results in the same ordering of probability distributions. Thus, u(x) is 
an interval scale. 
The interpretation of expected utility and the utility function 
In Sinn (1983) a very readable derivation of the expected utility rule from the 
axioms can be found. Here, however, we confine ourselves to a demonstration of 
the application of the axioms in a specific example in order to clarify the inter-
pretation of expected utility. Specifically, attention will be given to the interpre-
tation of the utility function u(x). 
Suppose a farmer has to choose between the marketing strategies At and A 2 , 
described by the probability distributions shown in Figure 3.2A. In this figure 
the outcomes concern the prices for ware potatoes in cts/kg. Notice that the 
expected value of A 2 (24.0 cts/kg) is larger than A x (21.5 cts/kg) but that the 
standard deviation is also larger (the standard deviation of A 2 is 15.3 cts/kg and 
7.8 cts/kg for A x ) . Confronted with these distributions, how should he choose 
between them? Does the higher expected value of A 2 compensate the larger risk? 
In accordance with the expected utility model, the expected utility of each alter-
natives should be computed and compared. Hereto, the farmer's utility function 
u(x) must be known. 
Suppose Figure 3.2B describes the utility function of two farmers. Both these 
functions are concave, which implies risk averse farmers. The functions are 
scaled between 0 and 1, for the relevant range of potato prices (10 to 70 cts/kg). 
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Of course, a higher price is preferred to a lower price so 70 cts/kg is scaled as 1 
and 10 cts/kg is scaled as 0. Later on, a description will be given of the 
questioning procedures to assess such a function u(x). In these procedures use is 
made of the Archimedes axiom. 
Since u(x) is an interval function other values than 0 and 1 could have been 
taken equally well. For convenience and clarity the utilities are scaled between 0 
and 1 since this makes it possible to read the indifference probabilities directly 
from the graph. For example, according to the graph for Farmer 1 the utility of 
25 cts/kg equals 0.40. Since u(10)=0 and u(70)=l we can derive the indifference 
probability between the certain outcome 25 cts/kg and a lottery yielding 70 
cts/kg with probability p and 10 cts/kg with probability 1-p as follows. Applying 
the expected utility rule: 
u(25) = p u(70) + (1-p) u(10) 
thus: 
0.40 = p 1 + (1-p) 0 = p 
Therefore the indifference probability of 25 cts/kg is p = 0.40 (Archimedes 
axiom). Stated otherwise, Farmer 1 facing the lottery [70, 0.40; 10, 0.60] would 
have specified 25 cts/kg as his certainty equivalent. (Note that the expected value 
of this lottery is 34 cts/kg; since the farmer's certainty equivalent is 25 cts/kg, it 
follows that the risk premium is 9 cts/kg). 
In the same manner, Farmer 1 is indifferent between 40 cts/kg and the lottery 
[70, 0.68; 10, 0.32] and for him 15 cts/kg is equivalent to the lottery [70, 0.15; 
10, 0.85] (see the function u(x) in Figure 3.2B). 
The next step is to substitute the outcome of 25 cts/kg in alternative A x 
(Figure 3.2A) by the lottery [70, 0.40; 10, 0.60] by applying the independence 
axiom. In the same manner each possible outcome of alternatives A x and A 2 can 
be substituted by binary lotteries with 10 and 70 cts/kg as outcomes and with 
probabilities derived from the function u(x). In Figure 3.2C the substitution of all 
possible outcomes by these binary lotteries is shown for both alternatives and for 
Farmer 1. 
By applying standard probability calculus to both alternatives, Figure 3.2D 
results from Figure 3.2C. Now, each alternative is expressed as a binary lottery 
with possible outcomes 10 and 70 cts/kg and their respective probabilities. Con-
fronted with these two lotteries in Figure 3.2D, it is clear that Farmer 1 chooses 
the alternative for which the probability of receiving 70 cts/kg is largest (implied 
in the axiom of non-saturation); in this case he chooses alternative A 2 (a proba-
bility of 0.322 on 70 cts/kg compared to a probability of 0.303 on 70 cts/kg for 
alternative AJ. 
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price in cts/kg 
Figure 3.2B The utility function u(x) of two farmers 
Figure 3.2C Substitution of outcomes by binary [70, p ; 10, 1-p] lotteries, with p 
in accordance with u(x) of Farmer 1 
Figure 3.2D Reduction of distributions Ax and A2 into equivalent binary [70, 
p ; 10, 1-p] lotteries, for Farmer I 
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The same procedure can be followed for the more risk averse Farmer 2 (see the 
u(x) function in Figure 3.2B). In contrast to Farmer 1, this farmer will prefer 
alternative A x to alternative A 2 since A x is equivalent to the binary lottery [70, 
0.398; 10, 0.602] and alternative A 2 is equivalent to [70, 0.384; 10, 0.616]. 
The axioms of expected utility theory thus imply that when u(x) is known, all 
probability distributions can be transformed into equivalent binary distributions. 
Maximizing expected utility then means: choosing the alternative (binary distribu-
tion) with the largest chance of receiving the most attractive outcome. 
This result is very elegant. No reference whatsoever needs to be made to a 
strength of preference function for outcomes. The evaluation function u(x) 
should therefore better be called a probability indifference function instead of a 
utility function to point out the exact nature of the function. In measurement 
procedures only indifference probabilities have to be obtained without reference 
to intensity of psychological satisfaction for an outcome. 
In essence, the function u(x) has nothing to do with the type of function 
Bernoulli proposed. Marginal utility for u(x) here refers to marginal substitution 
between the probability of receiving X H in a standard lottery [X H , p ; X L , 1-p] 
and X (Baumol 1972). A convex function is therefore no problem since no 
increasing marginal utility has to be assumed. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that the cardinal or interval nature of u(x) only has an operational meaning, since 
the NM model starts from an ordinal ordering of alternatives (axiom of ordering). 
The NM-model thus meets the criticism on the Bernoulli model. 
To remain in accordance with literature, the von Neumann-Morgenstern eva-
luation function will be called the utility function (denoted by u(x)) and a 
Bernoulli type evaluation function will be called a value function or strength of 
preference function (denoted by v(x)). Later, the diverging views with respect to 
the nature of the utility function and its relation to the value function will be 
discussed (see Section 3.3). 
Characterising the risk attitude of a decision maker by means of the Pratt-Arrow 
coefficients of risk aversion 
A measure is needed to capture the concavity of the utility function in order to 
classify decision makers with respect to risk attitude. Since the function u(x) is 
unique up to positive linear transformations a measure is needed which is inde-
pendent of the particular transformation parameters. Pratt (1964) and Arrow 
(1965) independently defined such measures as the absolute and proportional risk 
aversion coefficients, which are defined as follows: 
Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
u (x) 
(3.6) 
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with: 
u'(x) — d ( \ 
and 
u"(x) = 
Pratt-Arrow coefficient of proportional risk aversion 
The sign of the second derivative of the function provides information about the 
form of the increasing function. If this second derivative is negative for all x, 
then u(x) must be concave, and the decision maker therefore risk averse (in this 
case r(x) > 0 and s(x) > 0). If the second derivative is positive for all x, then u(x) 
is convex implying that the decision maker is risk seeking (r(x) < 0 and s(x) < 0). 
Since the magnitude of the second derivative depends upon the scaling of the 
interval scale u(x), this scaling effect is removed by dividing the second deriva-
tive by the first derivative (the first derivative is positive for increasing func-
tions). 
The coefficients of risk aversion have the following behavioral implications. 
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion indicates the risk preferences associated 
with lotteries with absolute changes in outcomes, that is, e.g. a 50/50 binary 
lottery with outcomes $ 100 above or below the status quo. If the degree of risk 
aversion, that is, the magnitude of the risk premium of the lottery, does not 
depend on the level of the status quo, then such a decision maker is said to be 
constantly absolute risk averse (r(x) is constant). If the risk premium of the 
lottery decreases as the level of the status quo increases, then such a decision 
maker is said to be decreasingly absolute risk averse (r(x) is decreasing in x). 
To illustrate these definitions, consider the reaction of a person to losing $ 100 
when he is poor and the reaction to losing the same amount when he is wealthy. 
If in both cases losing this amount is considered equally undesirable, then this 
person is said to be constantly absolute risk averse. On the other hand, when 
losing $ 100 is considered less a problem when he is wealthy than when he is 
poor, the person is said to be decreasingly absolute risk averse. The latter 
phenomenon makes sense, especially for wealth, since we expect rich people to be 
less concerned by losing a particular absolute amount than poor people (see also 
Chapter 6). 
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Proportional risk aversion pertains to the reaction to lotteries with outcomes e.g. 
10% above or below the status quo. Again, if the risk premium of any specific 
lottery does not depend on the level of the status quo, then such a decision maker 
is said to be constantly proportional risk averse. In the above example this means 
that losing 10% of one's wealth is evaluated equally undesirable independent of 
the level of wealth. 
If a decision maker is constantly absolute risk averse/seeking, then his u(x) 
must be a negative exponential function. In case the decision maker is constantly 
proportional risk averse/seeking, his u(x) must be a logarithmic or power func-
tion (Keeney and Raiffa (1976). (See also Chapter 6 for specifications of these 
functions). 
Measurement of the utility function u(x) 
In the standard expected utility model, u(x) is assessed by means of lotteries. 
Although many different questioning procedures exist which will be described in 
Chapter 6, their common feature is that indifference judgments between pairs of 
lotteries are obtained. In the simplest case, two binary lotteries are compared. 
These binary lotteries are characterized by four elements: the outcomes of both 
lotteries and the respective probabilities. By fixing three elements, the decision 
maker has to specify the fourth element such that he becomes indifferent 
between both lotteries. By varying the specification of the three elements in a 
systematic way, a number of indifference judgments are obtained from which the 
function u(x) can be constructed. 
One example of a measurement procedure is the certainty equivalence proce-
dure. By means of this technique the decision maker has to state his certainty 
equivalent with respect to a lottery with two outcomes. By varying the proba-
bility in the lottery, a number of certainty equivalents are specified by the deci-
sion maker. Alternatively, the certain outcome could be varied and the decision 
maker would then have to specify the probability in the lottery for each certain 
outcome {probability equivalence procedure). For all values on an interval, the 
indifference probabilities can thus be obtained resulting in the required function 
u(x). 
It follows from the independence axiom that it should not matter which proba-
bility is used in the questioning procedure. One should get the same utility func-
tion irrespective of the probability used in the lottery, and abstracting from 
random response error. Also the certainty equivalence procedure should result in 
the same function as the probability equivalence procedure. However, if decision 
makers do not, willingly or unwillingly, accept the axioms, such procedures do 
not necessarily result in the same utility function. 
Many empirical studies show that, generally speaking, the utility functions 
assessed are not completely independent of the probability used in the lotteries, 
response mode (e.g. probability equivalence methods compared to certainty 
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equivalence methods) or context of lotteries (e.g. framing the choice as a gamble 
or as an insurance decision). Examples of such studies are, amongst others, van 
Dam (1973), McCord and de Neufville (1983), Hershey et al. (1982), Schoemaker 
(1980) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986, 1988). 
Some people attribute these differences in assessment mainly to random error 
or response effects, resulting in unintended and unwilling inconsistencies. By 
confronting the subject with these inconsistencies they can be resolved into one 
consistent utility function (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). Differences in 
assessment are thus conceived as a psychometric measurement problem. Other 
people view the inconsistencies as indications of a violation of the expected 
utility rule and thus as a reason for refutation of the theory (e.g. Allais 1953, 
1979), or they propose alternative (expected utility) models which can account for 
the deviations in a logical manner (e.g. Machina 1982, Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). These alternative models will be discussed in Section 3.4. More will be said 
about this issue in the following sections. 
The subjective expected utility model 
In the expected utility model as presented so far, it was taken for granted that 
the probability distributions are objective. That is, probabilities were seen as 
relative frequencies of events in a repeating process like throwing dice. Often, 
however, relative frequencies do not exist since a process does not repeat itself a 
large number of times in an identical way. For these situations the concept of 
subjective or personal probabilities is defined, in accordance with the work of 
Savage (1954). A subjective probability indicates the "degree of belief" or plausi-
bility of an event. It is assumed that these degrees of belief can be elicited into 
coherent probability distributions which abide by the rules of probability cal-
culus. 
In essence, the measurement procedure for subjective probabilities is as 
follows. Suppose a decision maker has to choose between the following two 
lotteries: 
A) win $ x if event E happens 
lose $ y if event E does not happen 
B) win $ x with probability p 
lose $ y with probability 1-p 
Depending upon the decision maker's preference for either A or B his subjective 
probability of E is smaller than or larger than p. The subjective probability of 
event E is obtained by varying p until the decision maker becomes indifferent 
between A and B. 
If subjective probabilities are assumed in the expected utility model, this model 
is called the subjective expected utility model (abbreviated as SEU-model). Much 
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more can be said about the theoretical and empirical aspects of subjective proba-
bilities. An extensive discussion of the idea and measurement procedures for 
subjective probabilities will be presented in Chapter 5. 
3.3 Relationship between a value and a utility function 
In the expected utility model of Bernoulli, a strength of preference function was 
assumed. To Bernoulli, the decreasing marginal value for outcomes explained why 
decision makers are risk averse. A risk averse decision maker prefers e.g $ 150 
for certain to the 50/50 lottery yielding $ 100 or $ 200 because going from $ 100 
to $ 150 is worth more than going from $ 150 to $ 200. However, are the con-
cepts of decreasing marginal value and risk attitude really equivalent? 
In the expected utility model of von Neumann-Morgenstern no reference needs 
to be made to strength of preference in order to prove that it is rational to rank 
order probability distributions with respect to expected utility. Their utility 
function is a probability indifference curve without referring to intensity of 
satisfaction. People need only be capable of providing indifference probabilities 
in standard lottery questions. However, the theory does not explain why or how 
decision makers arrive at these probabilities. That is, the theory provides no 
explanation for risk aversion. 
The question now is whether a relationship exists between a value function and 
a utility function. Are they one and the same function or is the utility function a 
transformation of the value function? This issue will be dealt with in this section. 
In Section 3.3.1 the concept of relative risk aversion will be introduced and 
defined. This is followed by an evaluation of the concept in Section 3.3.2. A 
conclusion in 3.3.3 ends this section. 
3.3.1 The concept of relative risk aversion 
Fairly recently, the characterization of the risk attitude of a decision maker by 
means of the utility function obtained by lotteries was questioned. Bell and 
Raiffa (1982), Dyer and Sarin (1982), Sinn (1983), Currim and Sarin (1983) and 
Krzystofowicz (1983) articulate ideas already presented by Krelle (1968). These 
ideas give rise to the so-called value/utility debate. 
According to the above mentioned authors the coefficients of risk aversion 
based on the utility function u(x) are an entangled measure of two aspects: 
a) the evaluation of outcomes under certainty, and 
b) the risk attitude. 
This idea can be articulated as follows. The outcomes in a lottery are transformed 
into subjective values under certainty by the value function v(x). Then, the sub-
jective values are taken as the consequences in the lottery which are evaluated 
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under risk resulting in the utility function u(x) by means of a transformation of 
v(x), that is: u(x) = g(v(x)). Differences between the utility and the value func-
tion are attributed to the influence of risk on preferences. The latter difference is 
therefore called the "true risk attitude" of a decision maker. 
Dyer and Sarin (1982) label this attitude the relative risk attitude, since it is 
defined relatively to the value function.5 Bell and Raiffa (1982) label this concept 
the intrinsic risk attitude since they see it as an intrinsic characteristic of the 
decision maker, irrespective of the attribute that is evaluated (e.g. money, time) 
and the decision context. They even go as far as to call it (p. 341): " ... a basic 
(personality) trait of the individual". In this study we will follow the terminology 
of Dyer and Sarin (1982). The concept of relative risk attitude will now be elabo-
rated. 
The evaluation function of outcomes under certainty is called a strength of 
preference function or value function v(x). Axiomatic foundations and the pro-
perties of value functions can be found in e.g. Krantz et al. (1971) or Dyer and 
Sarin (1979) (see also Chapter 6). The strength of preference function describes 
the intensity of preference a decision maker has for an outcome (like Bernoulli's 
function). This means that a decision maker should be capable of making 
preference judgments between differences in outcomes. In effect in this study a 
farmer should be able to state that e.g. getting 20 cts/kg instead of 10 cts/kg is 
more attractive than receiving 30 cts/kg instead of 20 cts/kg. By decreasing the 
amount of 20 cts/kg it is possible to find such a price, say 16 cts/kg, that the 
farmer becomes indifferent between both intervals. That is, the farmer states that 
an increase from 10 cts/kg to 16 cts/kg is similar in attractiveness/value to an 
increase from 16 to 30 cts/kg. (Such a preference would imply a concave value 
function (decreasing marginal value)). 
However, can we conclude that if an increase from 10 to 16 cts/kg equals in 
value an increase from 16 to 30 cts/kg then this farmer will be indifferent 
between receiving 16 cts/kg for certain and the 50/50 lottery yielding 10 or 30 
cts/kg? Bernoulli would probably answer in the affirmative; Bell and Raiffa 
(1982) clearly reply in the negative and suggest the concept of relative/intrinsic 
risk attitude. 
Bell and Raiffa "explain" the relative risk attitude by pointing out that, apart 
from strength of preference governing choice, the farmer in the example above 
would be "nervous" about the risk in the lottery. This risk introduced in the 
lottery might lead to another certainty equivalent than 16 cts/kg. Sinn (1983) 
states that the relative risk attitude indicates an aversion to or preference for dis-
persions in utility analogous to the traditional concept of risk attitude which 
concerns an aversion to or preference for dispersions in outcomes. 
Note the difference between the relative risk attitude as defined here and the Pratt-Arrow coefficient 
of proportional risk aversion, which is sometimes called the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
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Before digressing further on the concept of relative risk attitude, a number of 
definitions are presented here first, following the terminology of Dyer and Sarin 
(1982). 
Analogous to the certainty equivalent of u(x) for v(x) an equal-difference point 
is defined. On the interval (X L , X H ) the equal-difference point ED is the point 
for which holds: 
v(X L ) - v(ED) = v(ED) - v(X H ) . (3.8) 
The relative risk premium RRP can now be defined as the difference between the 
equal-difference point (ED) and the certainty equivalent (CE): 
RRP = ED - CE (3.9) 
Figure 3.3 illustrates these concepts further. 
U(X ) 
H 
X L CE ED E(X) 
where: 
CE = certainty equivalent for 50/50 lottery [10, 70] 
ED = equal-difference point for interval (10, 70) 
u(x) = a decision maker's utility function (measured under risk) 
v(x) = a decision maker's value function (measured under certainty) 
RP = risk premium of the lottery 
RRP = relative risk premium 
Figure 3.3 Graphical illustration of the concept of relative risk attitude 
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Furthermore, coefficients can be defined for v(x) which are analogous to the 
Pratt-Arrow coefficients for u(x). Analogous to r(x), Dyer and Sarin define the 
coefficient of absolute value satiation m(x): 
m(x) — — v"(x) 
VJx) 
(3.10) 
By comparing m(x) and r(x) the following definition of relative risk attitude is 
obtained; a decision maker is said to be: 
relatively risk averse iff. m(x) < r(x) (RRP > 0), 
relatively risk neutral iff. m(x) = r(x) (RRP = 0) and 
relatively risk seeking iff. m(x) > r(x) (RRP < 0). 
Graphically, this means that if the function u(x) is at the left of v(x) this 
characterizes a relatively risk averse decision maker (his certainty equivalent is 
smaller than his equal-difference point, RRP > 0), if u(x) is at the right of v(x) 
then the decision maker is relatively risk seeking (RRP < 0). If u(x) and v(x) 
coincide, the decision maker is said to be relatively risk neutral. 
According to the ideas of the authors mentioned above, it is possible that a 
decision maker has a concave v(x) function and a less concave u(x) function. In 
the traditional sense, such a decision maker would be classified as risk averse 
since u(x) is concave. According to the new interpretation such a decision maker 
is classified as relatively risk seeking since v(x) is at the left of u(x). 
Of course, u(x) and v(x) might be related by linear function (u(x) = a + b v(x); 
b > 0) implying no difference. In such a case a decision maker is said to be rela-
tively risk neutral: introducing risk does not affect his decisions! His choices 
between probability distributions can be completely explained by his value func-
tion, that is, diminishing marginal value completely explains his preferences under 
risk. 
Disentangling strength of preference and utility, of course, is possible only if a 
decision maker's value function can be assessed. Are people capable of making 
judgments on similarity of differences? In general the answer to this question is 
positive (see e.g. Baird and Noma 1978, Stevens 1975, Lodge 1981, von Winter-
feldt and Edwards 1986, and Sinn 1983). In psychophysics the subjective magni-
tude of stimuli is studied. Routine judgments of loudness, pitch, brightness and 
the like are collected. Since strength of preference for an outcome is a subjective 
magnitude, why would it not be possible to measure such a magnitude by 
applying measurement techniques used in psychophysics? Psychophysics suggests 
that respondents are even capable of judging differences between stimuli on a 
ratio scale. Measurement procedures which can be used to assess strength of 
preference will be presented and evaluated in Chapter 6. 
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The hypothesis of a constant absolute relative risk attitude 
An interesting question concerns the specific relationship between v(x) and u(x), 
that is, the form of the function g in u(x) = g(v(x)). When examining the logical 
relationships between value and utility functions several authors conclude that 
either a negative exponential function or a linear function is most plausible 
(Keeney and Raiffa 1976, p. 330-2, Bell 1981, Bell and Raiffa 1982, Sinn 1983, 
1985, Barron et al. 1984).6 
A negative exponential function implies a constant absolute relative risk atti-
tude on the subjective continuum v(x)): 
u(x) = a + be~cvW (3.11) 
where c is the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion defined on v(x). 
If c > 0 the decision maker is relatively risk averse, if c < 0 the decision maker is 
relatively risk seeking. 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Bell and Raiffa (1982) arrive at the conclusion 
of either a negative exponential or a linear function by analyzing the relationship 
between a multiattribute value and utility function. Assuming an additive value 
function and utility independent attributes, only a negative exponential relation-
ship leads to a multiplicative utility function. A linear transformation of the 
value function leads to an additive utility function. In plain words, they reason 
that if each outcome in a lottery is increased in such a way that the same quan-
tity measured in value is added to each outcome, the certainty equivalent should 
also increase by this same quantity of added value. This is only possible if a 
negative exponential or a linear function describes the relationship between the 
value and utility function. 
Sinn (1983, 1985) arrives at the conclusion of a negative exponential/linear 
function between v(x) and u(x) from psychophysics. He argues that v(x) is most 
likely a logarithmic function: v(x) = In x. Furthermore, he contends that u(x) is a 
logarithmic or a power function: u(x) = x c or u(x) = In x. Hence, only a linear or 
a negative exponential function (see Equation 3.11) can describe the relationship 
between v(x) and u(x). 
Therefore the conclusion is, that if the relative risk attitude is a viable concept, 
it should be a constant absolute relative risk attitude. 
Advantages of the concept of relative risk attitude 
It should be noted that in the view presented so far, u(x) is still used for rank 
ordering probability distributions, since only this function incorporates the deci-
As shown above, the specific possibility of a linear relationship between u(x) and v(x) implies a rela-
tively risk neutral decision maker. Such a linear function would imply the refutation of the concept of 
relative risk attitude. In the next Section (3.3.2) further arguments and stronger conditions are 
presented explaining why both functions should be equivalent. 
51 
sion maker's reaction to risk. From the viewpoint of predicting preferences for 
choice alternatives therefore, the concept of relative risk attitude is not required. 
The question therefore is: what might be gained by separating the effect of risk 
attitude from the effect of strength of preference? 
The main advantage is, of course, that the relative risk attitude is thought to 
be a better definition and description of risk attitude. It is a more accurate 
characterization of the psychological reaction of a decision maker towards risk. If 
two decision makers choose differently between lotteries, this difference is 
attributed to and interpreted as a difference in risk attitude, according to the 
classical expected utility model. However, it may well be that they have the same 
relative risk attitude whilst they differ in value function (this difference in value 
function might be caused by e.g. a difference in wealth between the two decision 
makers). Since the effect of the value function is corrected for, it is suggested 
that a description of a decision maker has been found which is less dependent 
upon the decision context or the attribute of the decision. For example, the same 
relative risk attitude may operate for such diverse attributes as money and time 
(Bell and Raiffa 1982) or for e.g. insurance behavior with respect to financial loss 
or health risks (Schoemaker 1980). 
Furthermore, since a measure for the true risk attitude of a decision maker is 
obtained which is less or not at all dependent upon the attribute or decision con-
text, one might expect to find larger correlations between characteristics of the 
person on the one hand and the relative risk attitude on the other hand. 
The concept of relative risk attitude might also be beneficial for modeling 
multiattribute (consumer) decision making under risk. It has been shown (Keeney 
and Raiffa 1976, Bell and Raiffa 1982) that in the multiattribute case the same 
relative risk attitude, that is the same parameter in the negative exponential 
function operates for all attributes. This implies that a multiattribute additive 
value function, describing decision making under certainty, can easily be trans-
formed into an additive or multiplicative utility function describing decision 
making under risk. In principle, only one lottery for one attribute would suffice 
(Currim and Sarin 1983). We conclude that this opens up many opportunities for 
analyzing consumer decision making under risk. Since in consumer research much 
experience exists in assessing multiattribute value functions, e.g. by means of 
conjoint measurement, these models can be transformed into models describing 
consumer decision making under risk. Only a few extra assessments are needed. 
Of course, an even greater advantage for modeling decision making would arise 
if it turned out theoretically and empirically that u(x) is linearly related to v(x), 
since the usual models under certainty could then be applied directly in decision 
making under risk! 
Other advantages of defining the concept of relative risk aversion, especially 
with respect to group decision making, are described in Dyer and Sarin (1982) 
and Currim and Sarin (1983). 
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3.3.2 Criticism on the concept of relative risk attitude 
Assuming it is possible to measure a value function, the important point here is 
that the measurement techniques applied do not depend on lotteries. That is, no 
risk is introduced in the assessment of a value function. The question is, will a 
function measured by means of such techniques result in the same function as 
one measured by means of lotteries? If it does, the hypothesis of relative risk 
aversion can be refuted. Before presenting some empirical evidence about the 
relationship between v(x) and u(x), some theoretical notions are reviewed. 
In the original formulation of expected utility theory no relationship was 
conceived at all between utility and value functions. For example, Baumol (1958, 
p. 665) argues against " ... the mistaken view that the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility index is, or is intended to be, just another device for measuring 
neoclassical introspective utility, ... ". 
Another firm example of this view is given in Keeney and Raiffa (1976) who 
vigourously point to the difference between a value and a utility function. 
According to Keeney and Raiffa the value function has nothing to say about 
preferences for risky options (p. 150): "No probabilistic notions are introduced, 
and any expected utility calculated from such a utility function (i.e. v(x): AS) has 
no particular interpretation as it does in the case of von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility functions The concept of 'expected utiles' has no meaning". They con-
clude (p. 150): "The (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility functions are completely 
different from the economist's utility function. Knowing one implies very little 
about the other. One function can easily be convex and the other concave for the 
same attribute".7 
Also e.g. Fishburn (1970, p. 82) has argued that a utility function does not 
measure preference differences between outcomes since it is only based on simple 
lottery comparisons and therefore he sees no reason why lottery comparisons 
should coincide with or be related to preference difference comparisons. 
Especially Allais (1953, 1979, 1984) fiercely objects to the idea of a relative 
risk attitude. However, for another reason than the authors mentioned above. In 
1952, Allais was already skeptical of the idea that one could construct a utility 
function by means of lotteries. To prove his ideas he conducted an experiment 
which showed that even people well acquainted with expected utility theory did 
not choose according to the independence axiom. This experiment has become 
well known as the Allais-paradox. The essence and outcome of the experiment 
was often replicated (see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Essentially, Allais 
states that a utility function u(x) cannot not be measured, and therefore does not 
exist, because the function depends on the probabilities used in the elicitation. 
This standpoint implies a refutation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected 
utility model. 
To some extent, their statement is surprising since it is not consistent with their theorem concerning 
a negative exponential/linear relationship between a multiattribute value and utility function 
(Keeney and Raiffa 1976, p. 330-332 and Section 3.3.2). 
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Instead of a function assessed by lotteries, Allais proposed to assess a value 
function for evaluating probability distributions. (In particular, Allais states that 
v(x) is a loglinear function (Allais 1988)). Moreover, according to Allais, if a 
utility function u(x) does exist it should be linearly related to a value function 
v(x). By introducing his fairly restricted "axiom of cardinal isovariation" he 
proved this equivalence of a value and utility function (Allais 1979). 
By assuming equivalence of the value and utility function however, an old 
problem is re-introduced: why should a function which describes values attached 
to outcomes under certainty imply anything about choices under risk? To account 
for risk in decision making Allais therefore introduced the idea of taking into 
account the whole distribution of subjective values and not solely the expected 
value of this distribution as proposed in the expected utility model. To Allais 
(1953, p 55): " ... the dispersion of psychological values ... is the specific charac-
teristic of the psychology of risk". Hagen (1979) specifies such a model with the 
variance and skewness of the probability distribution of v(x) as extra elements in 
addition to the expected value E[v(x)]. The parameters attached to the variance 
and skewness, can be interpreted as the risk attitude of the decision maker. In 
Hagen's model a risk neutral decision maker takes only the expected value E[v(x)] 
into account. 
Allais' standpoint shows that a possible difference between u(x) and v(x) 
should not merely be conceived as a psychometric problem as e.g. von Winter-
feldt and Edwards (1986) do (see below); he essentially disagrees with the 
conclusion of NM: the expected utility principle. 
Sarin (1982) and, in a similar vein, Bouyssou and Vasnick (1988), also intro-
duced a number of conditions on the basis of which it can be proved that u(x) 
and v(x) should be linearly related.8 Sarin (1982) defined the so-called 'Sure-
Thing Theorem for Exchanges', a strong version of the independence axiom. This 
theorem defines strength of preference both on lotteries and on outcomes. This 
implies that it would be possible for a decision maker to state the strength of 
preference of one lottery over another lottery, whereas the expected utility model 
only assumes a preference rank order of lotteries (axiom of ordering). Of course, 
empirical examination would be necessary to assess whether subjects are capable 
of expressing strength of preference on lotteries. 
So far, authors have been presented who formally deduce a linear relationship 
between v(x) and u(x) by introducing extra conditions or axioms. Von Winterfeldt 
and Edwards (1986) come to the same conclusion in a different manner. They 
clearly state that the distinction between value and utility is spurious. As decision 
analysts they have a practical view on the matter. An equivalence of v(x) and 
u(x) would be very advantageous since it would ease the measurement procedures 
in decision analysis very much, especially in case of multiattribute decisions 
It is interesting to note that at the very same time that Sarin (1982) deduced conditions for the 
equivalence of v(x) and u(x), the concept of relative risk aversion was introduced (Dyer and Sarin 
1982). 
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(which are most common in decision analysis). Multiattribute value functions are 
more easily assessed than multiattribute utility functions. Apart from referring to 
Sarin (1982), they present four arguments in favor of the spuriousness of the dis-
tinction (von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, p. 213). 
Their first argument is: "There are no sure things, and therefore values that are 
attached to presumably 'riskless' outcomes are in fact attached to gambles". This 
argument states that an outcome is merely one event in an endless temporal chain 
of events. Therefore the value of e.g. an amount of money actually represents the 
value of future events made possible by the current one and one cannot know for 
sure what those events will be. 
In a second argument they state that risk aversion can frequently be explained 
by marginally decreasing value functions and/or by introducing extra attributes 
representing e.g regret. From a practical standpoint then it is not necessary to 
bother about the utility function. 
Their third argument is that: "... repetitive choices tend to eliminate risk aver-
sion, and an argument can be made that all choices in life are repetitive" (p. 213). 
In our opinion this argument is rather weak, since if it were true, why assume 
non-linear value functions (as they clearly do in their book). When repetitive 
choices are concerned, one should choose according to the expected value of 
outcomes implying linear utility or linear value functions. 
Their fourth argument is of an empirical nature. They state that (p. 213): 
"... error and method variance within value and utility measurement procedures 
overshadow to a great extent the subtle distinctions that one may extract from the 
theoretical differences". In short, if utility functions measured by means of dif-
ferent techniques differ as much from one another as they do from value func-
tions it is hard to tell whether a true difference (or some smooth relationship) 
between the functions exist. This argument somewhat resembles the argumenta-
tion of Allais concerning the non-existence of u(x) because different probabilities 
yield different u(x) functions. However, von Winterfeldt and Edwards point out 
that value functions are also constructed with, possibly systematic, error. Allais 
never admitted this since it would refute his axiom of cardinal isovariation. 
Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) further recommend (p. 256-7): " ... we 
promote the use of multiple convergent procedures for eliciting utility as we do 
for construction of value functions. In particular, we argue analysts to use both 
riskless and risky procedures simultaneously when assessing a utility function. ... 
We speculate that formally justified utility elicitation methods deviate at least as 
much from one another as the utility methods do from the value scaling methods. 
Indeed, this is what we imply in our argument that both do or should measure 
the same thing. This is, of course, an experimental question". 
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Empirical research into the concept 
Some empirical studies are available. Empirical research with respect to the rela-
tionship between value and utility functions has been performed by Fischer 
(1976, 1977), McCord and de Neufville (1983), Barron et al. (1984), Krzysto-
fowicz (1983a, 1983b) and Van de Stadt et al. (1984). 
Fischer (1976) in an experiment concerning multiattribute descriptions of cars, 
found a high convergent correlation between a subject's strength of preference 
and his utility for a car (correlations were taken over cars, within-subjects; 
median correlations fell between 0.84 and 0.95). 
McCord and de Neufville (1983) compared the measurement of a value func-
tion with utility functions assessed for 23 subjects by applying different assess-
ment methods. In the within-subject analysis, it turned out that differences 
between the utility functions were of the same magnitude as differences between 
the value function and the utility function assessed by means of the most 
commonly used assessment method (certainty equivalent method with 50/50 
probabilities). Although questions can be raised about the internal and external 
validity of the experiment, their results hint that method variance may be so 
large as to prevent detection of true differences between functions.9 
Barron et al. (1984) found, when analysing multiattribute decisions, that in 
most cases a linear relationship between utility and value function provided a 
good fit and that an exponential transformation improved very little on the linear 
relationship. Such curvilinearities were considered negligible, especially with a 
view to the random error in the data. 
Krzystofowicz (1983a,b, 1984), on the other hand, did find significant 
differences between value and utility functions after analysing data of 34 
respondents. Moreover, the hypothesis of a negative exponential relationship 
between u(x) and v(x) could not be rejected. 
Van de Stadt et al. (1984) also found an empirical confirmation of the relative 
risk attitude. Their results can be interpreted as indicating relative risk aversion 
on the part of their respondents. 
Clearly, until now, empirical research into the concept of relative risk attitude 
is limited and inconclusive. Further empirical work needs to be done on this 
issue. An important point which comes up when empirically studying the concept 
of relative risk attitude is the method variance of assessing value and utility 
functions. This variance might obscure possibly true differences between both 
functions. A large body of literature on this subject, to be reviewed in Chapter 6, 
is devoted to the effects of response modes and context in assessing utility func-
tions. Less is known about the variability in assessing value functions, although 
von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, p. 211) state that " ... (we) conclude that 
judgments based on strength of preference are not inferior in either reliability or 
The internal and external validity are doubtful, because half of the subjects were classified as risk 
seeking which is an implausible high percentage if serious decision making is concerned. Furthermore, 
the number and type of subjects (MIT-students and faculty staff) are limited. 
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validity to judgments based on preference itself; if anything it is the other way 
around". 
Of course, since von Winterfeldt and Edwards reject the idea of relative risk 
attitude, they suggest a measurement procedure which is aimed towards mini-
mizing differences between risky and riskless techniques. They promote to start 
an assessment with techniques measuring value functions. Then a number of 
responses are elicited by means of lotteries to provide consistency checks. When 
the answers do not coincide the respondent is confronted with his inconsistency 
and reasons for these differences are sought. According to the authors, this pro-
cess mostly results in one consistent function. Differences are seen as resulting 
from random error and unintended inconsistency and they are therefore seen 
more as an asset which stimulates harder thought than as an indication of relative 
risk aversion. 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
In Section 3.3.1. arguments were put forward which suggest that by comparing a 
value function and a utility function, of which the former is measured with 
riskless techniques and the latter with lotteries, a more adequate indicator of the 
risk attitude of a decision maker is obtained. This attitude is called the relative 
risk attitude. To be more specific, the relationship between both functions should 
be a negative exponential one, implying a constant absolute relative risk attitude. 
In contrast, in Section 3.3.2. arguments were presented which suggest an equiva-
lence of value and utility functions: they should be linearly related. If this is the 
case, the idea of relative risk attitude is spurious. Empirical research into the 
issue is inconclusive. 
However, irrespective of whether the relationship between u(x) and v(x) 
eventually turns out to be a negative exponential or a linear function, in both 
cases the concept of relative risk attitude is of great value. Firstly, it enhances 
our understanding of risk aversion by providing a proper link between the 
Bernoulli model and the von Neumann-Morgenstern model. Secondly, the 
practical implication of finding a negative exponential or a linear relationship 
irrespective of attribute under consideration, will be that it simplifies decision 
analysis and the analysis of e.g. consumer decision making under risk very much 
since riskless techniques are more easily applied than techniques using lotteries. 
By means of a consistent transformation function, the model under certainty can 
easily be transformed into a model under risk. 
At this moment in time, we think that the theoretical arguments and empirical 
research concerning the concept of relative risk attitude do not warrant a definite 
conclusion to be made about the type of transformation function, and con-
sequently, the relevance of the concept. The main conclusion that one can draw 
from the issue is that, in basic research, and if feasible also in applied research, 
one should not rely on only one measurement procedure for assessing risk atti-
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tude. Firstly, in order to analyze the method variance and reliability of the 
measurement of risk attitude, multiple procedures should be applied. Secondly, 
the hypothesis of relative risk attitude clearly requires the use of both riskless 
and risky techniques in measuring risk attitude. 
In this study, we will follow the main conclusion and therefore apply the 
recommended multiple indicator approach. Both risk attitude and strength of 
preference will be measured with several techniques. In this manner the conver-
gent validity of the techniques in measuring each concept can be analyzed, 
followed by an analysis of the relationship between both concepts (a test of the 
concept of relative risk attitude). By repeating the measurements for the same 
respondents, insight into the stability of the measurements can be gained (see 
Chapter 4 for the design of the study and Chapter 6 for elaborate presentations 
of specific operationalizations made). 
In a number of respects the research in this study concerning the issue of rela-
tive risk attitude distinguishes itself from the empirical research that has been 
conducted so far. 
Firstly, in this study, decision makers are confronted with their own and real 
economic decision problem. It is thought that these 'real' subjects will yield more 
serious responses and will spend more thought than e.g. students would, when 
confronted with more or less hypothetical decision contexts. 
Secondly, the scale of this study is much larger than usual. Elaborate measure-
ments will be obtained twice for 200 to 250 decision makers. By questioning such 
a large number of respondents more statistical analyses can be applied. For 
example, the multiple indicator approach, in combination with the large number 
of respondents, makes it possible to conceive the concepts of risk attitude and 
strength of preference as latent variables. The relationship between these concepts 
and their stability can then be analyzed by means of causal modeling techniques 
(J6reskog and Sorb6m 1976, 1977). 
Thirdly, the stability of the concepts of risk attitude, strength of preference 
and relative risk attitude will be assessed. In general, little attention has been 
given in the literature to reliability issues in assessing utility and value functions. 
Furthermore, to our best knowledge, the stability of the relative risk attitude has 
never been assessed. 
Fourthly, until now, no attention has been given to the analysis of the rela-
tionship between the relative risk attitude and characteristics of the decision 
maker like age and level of education. In this study, it will be studied whether 
such relationships exist. 
Finally, experience will be obtained concerning the practical problems of 
assessing value and utility functions in survey conditions for a large number of 
respondents. This information will be useful especially from the viewpoint of 
modeling decision making under risk in small-businesses or of consumers. 
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3.4 Evaluation of the subjective expected utility model in describing choice 
behavior 
3.4.1 Violations of the expected utility rule 
The (subjective) expected utility model (SEU-model) can be seen as both a nor-
mative and as a descriptive model. As a normative model it states that if the 
decision maker agrees with the axioms, he will prefer the alternative with the 
highest expected utility most. By delineating his preferences, that is, his utility 
function u(x), it is possible to prescribe how and which risky decisions ought to 
be made (given the objective or subjective probability distributions). Stated 
otherwise, if the intuitive decisions tend to conflict with SEU prescribed deci-
sions, it follows that decision making will become improved if in the future acts 
are chosen that have the highest subjective expected utility (Wright 1984). Of 
course, this implies the possibility to measure this utility function in a valid and 
reliable way. 
As a normative model, the SEU-decision rule is hardly questioned (Howard 
1988). Of course, if a decision maker does not agree with the axioms, his choices 
would consciously depart from the expected utility model. Such is the case with 
e.g. Allais (1979). 
As a descriptive model the expected utility model states that decision makers 
choose between alternatives with uncertain outcomes as if they were maximizing 
expected utility. Although the information processing capacity of decision makers 
is limited and imperfect, it is thought that economic decision makers strive to 
behave in accordance with the axioms when confronted with serious economic 
decisions. The expected utility model should therefore at least give an approxi-
mation of behavior (Sinn 1983). By means of the model insight is gained into how 
risky decisions are made. The usefulness of the subjective expected utility model 
to describe choice behavior is tested by establishing the capability to predict these 
choices. The degree of departure of actual decisions from the prescribed decisions 
can be studied. 
As a descriptive model the subjective expected utility model has received a lot 
of criticism. At this moment in time, the dominant opinion is that the SEU-
model is a failure as a descriptive model. The predictive validity of the model is 
low. The SEU-model does not describe the choice between gambles accurately, 
not even in relatively simple decision problems and thus is not adequate for 
describing risky decision making in the more complex real-world, either. 
Reviews of the descriptive strengths and weaknesses of the SEU-model are 
given by Schoemaker (1982), Fischhoff et al. (1983), Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) 
and Pitz and Sachs (1984). Recent reviews of applications of the SEU-model in 
agriculture^are.L presented by Young (1979) and Robison (1982). The main argu-
ments and conclusions from these reviews will be given here. 
As stated in Section 3.2, it is very important to recognize that the expected 
utility model is limited to the final comparison of alternatives: the computational 
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phase. That is, the set of choice alternatives and (subjective) probability 
distributions are already given and certain. According to many authors, e.g. 
Simon (1986) and von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986), the structuring phase, 
however, is by far the most important phase in actual decision making. Most 
difficulties in choosing under risk appear with the identification and recognition 
of the alternatives open to choose, determination of relevant attributes, the 
processing of available information about alternatives, time pressure etc. The 
computational phase is only of minor importance: half of the problem is solved 
by defining it. Since the expected utility model is limited to the computational 
phase, the expected utility model has very little to offer in describing risky 
choices. 
Especially Simon (1986) is very critical of the SEU-model in this respect. He 
states that, in typical real-world situations, decision makers simply cannot apply 
the SEU-model no matter how hard they try. According to Simon, human beings 
have neither the facts nor the consistent structure of values nor the reasoning 
power at their disposal that would be required to apply SEU-principles. Even in 
laboratory experiments with choices concerning problems much simpler than real-
world problems, choices widely depart from prescriptions by the SEU-rule. With 
respect to decision analysis, Simon remarks that the real-world problem is often 
carved and bounded in a simplified approximation so that (p. 102): " ... the 
correctness of decisions it will produce depends much more on the adequacy of 
the approximating assumptions and the data supporting them than it does on the 
computation of maximizing value according to the prescribed SEU-decision rule". 
Taking the above criticism into account, the question is: do decision makers 
then at least choose according to the expected utility model if the decision 
problem is structured and in accordance with the model? Numerous, mostly 
experimental, studies are conducted to evaluate the SEU-model in this respect. 
Actual preferences and decisions are compared with predictions resulting from 
the SEU-model. Most authors come to the conclusion that even in these struc-
tured problems, SEU fails to describe and predict the choices accurately. To 
quote von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, p. 369): "An inordinately long history 
of discrepancies between the predictions of the model and experiments on choices 
among bets makes it clear that it does not predict the details of those choices 
well". 
Violations of the SEU-rule are concerned with violations of the independence 
axiom like the Allais-paradox (called the certainty effect by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979): people overweight outcomes that are considered certain relative 
to outcomes that are merely probable). The isolation effect concerns the tendency 
of people to often disregard mutual components of alternatives in order to sim-
plify the choice between alternatives, and to focus on the components that dis-
tinguish them (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Violations of transitivity are the 
preference reversals (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971, Grether and Plott 1979). A 
preference reversal means that a subject prefers lottery A to B if he directly 
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compares them, but that the certainty equivalent of lottery A is smaller than that 
of lottery B, implying that he should prefer B to A in a direct comparison. This 
phenomenon, of course, leads to the conclusion that the subject could be used as 
a money pump (see above 3.2). Other violations of the axioms are the Ellsberg 
paradox (Ellsberg 1961) and the ideal-risk preferences (Coombs 1975, Coombs 
and Huang 1976). 
Further violations of the SEU-rule stem from the context of the decision 
problem. For example, the wording of a problem may induce decision makers to 
change their choice between options. In this regard Schoemaker (1980) showed 
the effect of insurance formulations (pay an insurance premium of $ x) compared 
to gamble formulations (a sure loss of $ x). While formally equivalent, the 
insurance formulations evoked greater risk aversion than did the gamble formu-
lation. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced the terminology of framing to 
refer to the effects of different descriptions on choice (see also Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984, Tversky and Kahneman 1988). 
The reviews of applications of the SEU-model in studies with agricultural pro-
ducers as subjects are critical of the model too, but the criticism is less profound. 
According to Young (1979), it is hard to generalize about results from the 
empirical studies because of the small number of farmers that is analysed per 
study and the non-representativeness of samples. Also, most studies show one or 
more methodological problems. The SEU-hypothesis is explicitly tested against 
other decision criteria in only a limited number of studies. Two studies in this 
respect are those of Lin et al. (1974) and Officer and Halter (1968). In both 
studies some support was found for the model but the predictive validity was 
fairly low. 
Robison (1982) also concludes that it is not convincingly proven that farmers 
make use of the expected utility decision rule. However, the inadequate test 
designs of many studies make hard conclusions difficult. The SEU-model seems a 
useful but far from perfect predictor of choice behavior. Nevertheless, Robison 
views the SEU-model as the most suitable and useful decision model available. 
A lot of research thus indicates systematic violations of the SEU-model, even in 
relatively simple choice problems. These deviations from the normative model, of 
course, are the key to generating explanations for these deviations. 
Schoemaker (1982) concludes that the failure of the SEU-model (p. 548): 
"... stems from an inadequate recognition of various psychological principles of 
judgment and choice. Underlying most of these is a general human tendency to 
seek cognitive simplification". An important principle in this respect is that deci-
sion makers do not structure decision problems as holistically as the SEU-model 
assumes. For example, subjects focus on either probabilities or outcomes and 
seldomly focus on both simultaneously. Another principle is that probabilities are 
not processed in accordance with probability theory. 
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Vlek (1987) also notes the limited information processing capabilities of decision 
makers. Often this will result in sequential instead of a holistic processing of 
information. Another conclusion of Vlek is that complex decision problems more 
or less invite decision makers to use simplifying decision rules or habitual deci-
sion rules. Especially, stress stimulates hasty and sloppy decision making. 
Jungermann (1983) distinguishes two conflicting groups (pessimists and opti-
mists) with contrasting interpretations of the divergences from the SEU-model: 
one that points to the deficiency and one that argues for the efficiency of human 
judgment and decision. 
The first group ("biases are in the people") seeks the explanation for the 
systematic biases and departure from the rationality of the SEU-model in the 
decision maker himself. "This deficiency is not simply seen as a consequence of 
cognitive overload in highly complex or unfamiliar situations, but as ... rooted in 
mechanisms working within the human information processing system itself. 
People are prone to violate principles of rationality" (Jungermann 1983, p. 68). 
Notable representatives of this group are Kahneman and Tversky and most of the 
authors in Kahneman et al. (1982). 
According to Jungermann (1983), three explanations are given for the 
deficiencies. Firstly, judgmental errors are made by using Kahneman and 
Tversky's heuristics of availability, representativeness and anchoring and adjust-
ment (see Chapter 5 for a description of these heuristics). They use these fairly 
simple procedures, rules and tricks in order to reduce mental effort (Hogarth 
1980). Secondly, decisions and preferences can be inconsistent as a result of 
errors in the representation of the problem. The inconsistent preferences are seen 
as the result of deficient perception and interpretation of the decision problem. 
Thirdly, information processing is often defective because of motivational factors. 
Janis and Mann (1977) distinguish five coping patterns people use when they are 
confronted with decision problems in stressful conditions. Only one of these' 
patterns, namely the one which operates at medium stress levels, resembles the 
rational behavior assumed in the SEU-model. In badly defined, complex and 
dynamic situations other patterns are used, which easily lead to errors in assimi-
lating and combining information. 
The second group ("biases are in the research") emphasizes the implicit ratio-
nality of human judgment and decision making. They are skeptical of the 
analysis of decision making performed by the first group. The internal and 
external validity of the research and the interpretation given to the results are 
questioned. Representatives of this opinion are Berkeley and Humphreys (1980), 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) and Phillips (1983). 
Jungermann (1983) also classifies three arguments for this group. The first 
argument is the one of metarationality. It means that decisions which are classi-
fied as not rational since they are not taken in accordance with the SEU-model 
could be seen as rational if the cognitive costs of being rational in the SEU sense 
are taken into account. Especially decision making costs such as time and effort 
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could be reasons why people do not decide according to the SEU-model. The 
decision strategy is a compromise between costs (time and effort) and benefits 
(wish to attain an optimal decision). Decisions are therefore almost always multi-
attribute and it is not easy to know all attributes in a given situation. In experi-
ments, the decision making task is often limited to only one attribute. 
The second argument concerns the continuity of decisions. Judgments and 
decisions are merely moments in a continuous process. What might be interpreted 
as bias in a decision problem singled out from the process, could be functional in 
the light of the continuous process. Many experiments neglect the decision pro-
cess; decisions are seen as discrete events. For example, in many experiments no 
feedback is given. The judgmental biases are artifacts of the experiments them-
selves which are therefore low in external validity. 
A third argument concerns the structuring of the decision task. It is seldom 
explicitly checked whether subjects interpreted the task in the same way as the 
researcher. 
Jungermann concludes that the representatives of this group do not yet accept 
the description of the human being as an "intellectual cripple". The experiments 
which try to prove this are surrounded by too many problems. Von Winterfeldt 
and Edwards (1986, Chapter 13) come to a similar criticism on the way in which 
experiments on decision making are conducted. They particularly stress that sub-
jects are usually not permitted to use physical tools in experiments (e.g. paper 
and pencil, calculators, books on probability theory) and that subjects in experi-
ments (most often students, as Berkeley and Humphreys (1982) show) are not 
stimulated enough to think hard about a problem and thus do not arrive at the 
'right' answer (the problem is not important enough to these subjects). 
The view of the second group suggests that for well-structured tasks, with 
important consequences to the decision maker and decision makers who are 
familiar with the, possibly repetitive, decision problem, the SEU-model might be 
a useful approximation of choice behavior. Such may be the case for the decision 
problem in this study: the farmer's choice of a marketing strategy. However, 
much evidence is available that even in such favorable circumstances, decisions 
might easily deviate from the normative model. These deviations from the 
normative model stimulated a lot of research into alternative models. In the next 
section most of these models will be reviewed and their usefulness for empirical 
research on decision under risk will be evaluated. 
3.4.2 Alternative descriptive models 
A fairly large number of alternative models have been formulated which try to 
account for the deficiencies of the SEU-model found in experiments. Of these, 
the following models can be mentioned: the Prospect Theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), the regret theory of Bell (1982, 1985) and Loomes and Sugden 
(1982), the generalized expected utility model of Machina (1982), the opti-
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mism/pessimism approach of Hey (1984), and the lottery dependent utility model 
of Becker and Sarin (1987). 1 0 
Most of the alternative models are still close to the principles of the SEU-
models and can be viewed as extensions or variants of the SEU-model, other 
models deviate largely from the SEU-theory. The most important representative 
of the latter category is Prospect Theory. 
The models of Hey, Machina, Loomes & Sugden and Becker & Sarin all 
weaken the independence axiom or replace it with some other assumption. This 
implies that the utility of the outcomes is made dependent on the probability 
distribution of outcomes. For example, Machina (1982) defines a local utility 
function u(x; f(x)) which depends specifically on the particular probability distri-
bution f(x). In a similar vein Becker and Sarin (1987) define their lottery depen-
dent utility. In the regret model of Loomes and Sugden (1982) the utility of a 
particular outcome is not independent any more of the other possible outcomes. 
In Hey's optimism/pessimism model (1984) the subjective probability distribution 
is dependent upon the outcomes. If the outcome is favorable, the subjective 
probability is adjusted upwards, if unfavorable the probability is adjusted down-
wards. Hey calls such a decision maker an optimist. A pessimist revises down the 
probabilities of favorable outcomes and revises up the probabilities of un-
favorable events. Only a realist decides according to the expected utility model. 
Hey presents a clear comparison of his own model and the models Machina, 
Loomes and Sugden. 
In the model of Bell (1982) regret is introduced as a second attribute. In this 
way, Bell succeeds in explaining many experimental violations of the SEU-model. 
Regret may occur when a risky choice turns out to be "wrong" after the fact an 
alternate choice would have been better given the state-of-the-world that 
occurred. In Bell (1985) disappointment is introduced. Disappointment is the 
reaction to an outcome that is below expectations. In this model then, the utility 
of an outcome depends upon the expected value of the probability distribution. 
Howard (1988) considers these regret models theoretically rather unattractive 
since it makes preference dependent on what one might have received, instead of 
what one actually received. 
To conclude, it is clear from all alternative models presented so far that extra 
parameters are introduced compared to the SEU-model. It should therefore not 
come as a surprise that these models "explain" the violations of the SEU-model. 
The utilization of these models, however, is hampered by the difficulty of opera-
tionalizing certain elements of the models. For example, how should one measure 
the optimism/pessimism parameters in Hey's model, the regret parameter in 
Loomes and Sugden's model, or the local utility function depending on the 
probability distribution in Machina's model? Contrary to Machina, Becker and 
Still other models can be mentioned. For example the Allais-model (already discussed in Section 
3.2) and Coombs' single-peaked preference model (Coombs 1975). This latter model will be pre-
sented in Chapter 6 discussing the results of conjoint measurement. Becker and Sarin (1987) pro-
vide a schematic overview of all proposed models. 
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Sarin (1987) do suggest a method to measure their probability dependent utility 
function. Their method boils down to measuring a number of negative exponen-
tial utility functions with different elicitation probabilities. From these measure-
ments an estimate of the probability dependent function can be obtained. 1 1 Until 
now, no empirical studies have employed their method of assessment and tested 
the model. 
In general, the models are theoretically interesting, especially if it can be 
shown that the basic concepts, tools and results of expected utility do not depend 
on the much questioned independence axiom (Machina 1982). However, at this 
moment in time, the alternative models are not empirically testable. 
All models discussed so far, originate from people working in utility theory or 
decision analysis. This is evident by the great emphasis on formal axiomatical and 
mathematical considerations. The next model to be discussed, Prospect Theory, 
originates from psychology. In this model the psychology of decision making is 
emphasized. 
Prospect Theory 
The most deviant theory from the SEU-model and according to von Winterfeldt 
and Edwards (1986, p. 372) " ... the most illustrious contemporary competitor as a 
descriptive theory of choice" is Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
This theory is built on a number of experimental observations. The two main 
elements of the model are the editing phase and the computational phase. In the 
editing phase the options are structured and reformulated so as to simplify the 
subsequent evaluation and choice. An important operation in the editing phase is 
the coding of outcomes. Outcomes are recoded as gains or losses with respect to 
some reference point. 
The second element of Prospect Theory concerns the computational phase. 
Important elements in this phase are a) the value function, b) the decision weight 
function, c) a combination rule of values and decision weights and, finally, d) the 
decision rule: choosing the prospect with the highest value. 
In Prospect Theory a value function is defined on gains and losses with respect 
to a reference point. This function is assumed concave for gains (implying risk 
aversion) and convex for losses (implying risk seeking behavior). Also the convex 
part of the function is steeper than the concave part the aggravation one expe-
riences in losing a specified amount of money is greater than the pleasure asso-
ciated with gaining the same amount. The effect of reversing the risk attitude 
around a reference point is called the reflection effect. Figure 3.4 illustrates such 
a value function. 
One might view the differences between functions as a psychometric problem, that is, the differences 
are caused by method variance. In this view, it would be appropriate to confront the subject with 
his inconsistent elicitations and urge him to think hard about his preferences. According to von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) this process will mostly end in one consistent utility function. 
65 
By calling the evaluation function a value function it is suggested that no risk is 
introduced in the measurement procedure of this function. However, the authors 
do not specify a procedure for measuring the function. An important aspect of 
the theory is the assumption that the decision maker recodes outcomes into gains 
or losses with respect to reference point. Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the 
status quo will serve as the reference point, but this might also depend on the 
expectation, e.g. the aspiration level, of the decision maker (Payne et al. 1980, 
1981). Of course, also the framing of the decision problem will influence the 
choice of the reference point (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). 
p (ProbaDility) 1 
Figure 3.4 The hypothetical value function v(x) and weighting function w(p) 
proposed in Prospect Theory 
With the utility component of the SEU-model being replaced according to a value 
function of a very specific form, the probability component in the SEU-model is 
even more dramatically transformed in Prospect Theory. Decision weights w(p) 
are introduced to replace subjective probabilities. Figure 3.4 shows the proposed 
weighting function, too. 
The decision weights measure the impact of probabilities on the desirability of 
outcomes. They have almost nothing in common with subjective probabilities. For 
example, the decision weights do not have to sum up to one, their sum can be 
smaller (subcertainty). Furthermore, according to Kahneman and Tversky, very 
small probabilities are generally overweighted, that is, the decision weight 
attached to the rare event is larger than the probability. Except for very small 
probabilities, the probabilities are generally underweighted, that is, the decision 
weight is smaller than the probability. For very extreme probabilities (close to 0 
or 1) the relationship between decision weights and probabilities is not well 
behaved. This so-called "quantal effect" is caused by the categorical distinction 
between certainty and uncertainty. 
In a similar vein as in the expected utility model, values and weights are com-
bined in Prospect Theory. Outcomes, transferred into values by the value func-
tion, are weighted by the decision weights and then summed. This summed index 
66 
is the index by which probability distributions are rank ordered and the subject 
is assumed to choose the distribution with the highest index (expectancy-value 
models). 
Equations 3.12 (expected utility model) and 3.13 (Prospect Theory) show both 
rules for the evaluation of lottery [ x r p, x 2 , q, 0, 1-p-q]; a lottery with three 
outcomes ( x r x 2 , 0) with the following probabilities (p, q, 1-p-q): 
EU = p u(x x) + q u(x 2) + (1-p-q) u(0) (3.12) 
V = w(p) v(x x) + w(q) v(x 2) + w( 1-p-q) v(0) (3.13) 
where EU denotes the expected utility of the lottery and V the value of the 
lottery in Prospect theory. 
In both models, a multiplication is followed by an addition. Also, again this 
summed index is maximized. However, in contrast with expected utility, in 
Prospect Theory no justification, apart from face validity, is given to explain 
why it would be rational to choose the prospect with the highest value. 
It is interesting to note that in some respect Prospect Theory includes the 
hypothesis of relative risk attitude. More specifically, the hypothesized decision 
weight function w(p) leads to the conclusion that, in general, decision makers 
should be relatively risk averse. This can be shown as follows. Prospect Theory 
and expected utility theory coincide when w(p) = p for all p and when 
u(x) = v(x). In that case the expected utility of a lottery defined on v(x) equals 
the value V of the gamble in Prospect Theory (see Equations 3.12 and 3.13). 
However, according to Prospect Theory the decision maker valuates the lottery 
less than V due to the general underweighting of probabilities (w(p) < p) and 
subcertainty. Stated otherwise, the decision maker's certainty equivalent of the 
lottery will be smaller than V (the decision maker is more risk averse than 
expected on the basis of w(p) = p). The same effect can be achieved in the 
expected utility model (where w(p) = p) only if u(x) implies more risk aversion 
than v(x). Consequently, u(x) is more concave than v(x) which implies relative 
risk aversion. 
A large range of observed violations of SEU theory can be explained by means 
of Prospect Theory. This should not be a great surprise of course, since the 
model is built on the basis of the observed violations in experiments. Moreover, 
since there are many parameters in the model it will be rather easy to find a set 
of parameters which can provide a suitable "explanation". Given a value function 
of whatever form, e.g. a twice differentiable function is not needed, some set of 
decision weights can be found to account for a choice. Particularly the choice of 
the reference point is relevant in this respect. Since no rules are given on how to 
select this reference point, one can always find a point which explains the choice. 
It will therefore be very hard to refute the model if no restrictions are applied to 
the parameters. 
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Apart from the problem why a decision maker should maximize V and the diffi-
culty in falsifying the model, some other problems remain with the theory. 
Firstly, it is not clear whether the rules of probability theory apply to Prospect 
Theory. For example, assume a decision tree with several chance nodes. The 
axioms in expected utility imply that this tree can be reduced into a tree with a 
single node by means of standard probability calculus. Does Prospect Theory 
allow this reduction too? And what about the decision weight function; is the 
function applied to only the probabilities in the final reduced tree, or should all 
probabilities in the tree be replaced by decision weights first, before reduction? 
Secondly, it is not clear how one should evaluate alternatives with continuous 
probability distributions. Since the decision weight function is not well behaved 
near the ends, these functions cannot be evaluated. 
Thirdly, no indication is given of the manner in which attributes should be 
combined in multiattribute decision making. Is the proposed value function also 
valid for other attributes than money and how should these functions be com-
bined? 
Finally, the authors present no indication on how the value function and the 
decision weight function should be measured. Not until Currim and Sarin (1989), 
to be discussed below, were assessment procedures suggested. 
Prospect Theory already stimulated a substantial amount of theoretical and 
empirical work. For example, an interesting exposition of the consequences of 
Prospect Theory's proposed value function on consumer decision making is given 
by Thaler (1980, 1985). Not surprisingly, empirical work on Prospect Theory has 
concentrated on the reflection hypothesis since this is an interesting idea and can 
be experimentally researched fairly easily. For example, because the reflection 
effect of Prospect Theory had been based upon between-subjects experiments, 
that is, subjects had been used which evaluated either lotteries with gains or 
lotteries with losses, Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) did some experiments with a 
within-subjects design. They found no clear reflection effect; apart from 
convex/concave functions they found all other types of combinations of convex 
and concave functions. However, see also Keren and Raaijmakers (1988) who 
question the within-subject analysis used by Herschey and Schoemaker. They 
consider only between-subject experiments valid for testing the reflection 
hypothesis. 
A more important empirical test of the use of Prospect Theory concerns the 
issue of the predictive validity of the model relative to that of the expected 
utility model. To our best knowledge, Currim and Sarin (1989) are the first who 
tested Prospect Theory in this respect. They operationalize the decision weight 
function and the value function. Based on three experiments with MBA-students, 
they conclude a high consistency with the postulates of both models. On pre-
dictive validity the Prospect model outperforms the expected utility model for 
paradoxical choices (e.g. the Allais-paradox). However, for nonparadoxical 
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choices they found little difference in predictive validity of both models. 
Furthermore, they found some evidence that the decision weight function might 
be different for gains and losses. This latter finding complicates the theory even 
more. 
3.4.3 Conclusion 
The decision problem in this study, as structured in Chapter 2, concerns the 
choice between marketing strategies, described by continuous probability distri-
butions. The SEU-model provides the information on how one should choose 
between those distributions. This normative principle is not questioned here. The 
question then is, can the SEU-model be used as a descriptive model and if not, 
which alternative model should be used? 
Our review showed that a large amount of evidence suggests that the SEU-
model might be only approximately right in describing choices. This approxi-
mation is probably better in well-defined, short term decision problems, with 
important consequences for the decision maker and with a decision maker who is 
familiar with the decision problem, as in this study. However, even in those cir-
cumstances predictive validity is probably low. The question is whether alterna-
tive descriptive models are more accurate than the SEU-model. 
In our view, the alternative models reviewed, however, do not provide a real 
alternative to the SEU-model. A general feature of all these alternative models is 
that they all imply the maximization of an index which is constructed by means 
of a multiplicative and an additive computation. In these respects, these models 
do not differ from the SEU-model. All models are expectancy-value models. Any 
criticism on this aspect of the SEU-model thus pertains to all the reviewed 
descriptive models of decision making under risk. Another general feature of the 
alternative models is that extra parameters are introduced. This makes the models 
much more complex than the SEU-model. Furthermore, many models contain 
elements which cannot be operationalized yet and consequently are not empiri-
cally testable. 
Of the alternative models reviewed, Prospect Theory emerges as the most 
serious competitor of the SEU-model. The main contributions of Prospect Theory 
are the strongly emphasized editing phase, the idea that the decision maker might 
code outcomes into gains or losses with respect to a reference point and the idea 
of a reflection effect. 1 2 However, with respect to the computational phase we 
came across a number of serious problems with this theory. For example, the 
appropriate definition and determination of the reference point, the measurement 
of the value function, the assessment of the decision weight function and the 
An interesting topic of research, not studied here, might concern the reference point. Do farmers 
evaluate prices for potatoes as a stream of income, as assumed in expected utility theory, or do they 
code prices into gains and losses? Also, do farmers take the direct costs of ware potato production as 
a reference point in coding gains and losses, or do they refer to total costs or an aspiration level as a 
reference point etc.? 
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discontinuities of this function, hamper the empirical use of this model. Further-
more, although the findings of the study by Currim and Sarin (1989) need 
further empirical confirmation, their findings suggest that in spite of the greater 
complexity, Prospect Theory does not outperform the SEU-model. For these 
reasons we did not choose Prospect Theory as the model for analyzing the 
farmer's decision making. 
We chose the SEU-model for modeling the decision problem in this study. 
Important merits of the SEU-model are its elegance and tractability (Pitz 1977). 
Also, the model is very robust (Fischhoff et al. 1983) like all additive models. 
Moreover, since the SEU-model is a normative model, the comparisons of nor-
mative predictions with actual choices highlight the differences. In this way, 
insight is gained into the extent to which people decide rationally. Furthermore, 
despite strong criticism, the SEU-model is still the main frame of reference for 
both modeling decision making under risk and the formulation of alternative 
descriptive theories. The non-existence of a good alternative model could also be 
seen as a strength of the SEU-model (Jungermann 1983). 
We conclude therefore, not only for the decision problem in this study but in 
general, that before other models are constructed which are shown to predict 
preferences and choices better than the SEU-model and which are just as opera-
tionally tractable in practical applications, the SEU-model will remain an 
adequate reference model for studying actual decision making under risk. How-
ever, it is acknowledged that the predictive validity of the model will probably 
be low. 
3.5 Applying the SEU-model to the preference for a marketing strategy 
The preference for marketing strategy j of farmer i is modeled by two attributes: 
price and marketing channel (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, in the conceptual 
model of Chapter 2, the concepts of risk perception and risk attitude were intro-
duced. In this chapter definitions of both concepts were presented and indications 
were given how both concepts might be operationalized. Furthermore, the theory 
here makes it possible to specify how risk perception and risk attitude should be 
combined into a consistent model of preference formation. 
In order to evaluate the predictive validity of the subjective expected utility 
model (SEU-model), this model is compared to the subjective expected value 
model (SEV-model). The predictive validity of the SEV-model is thus seen as the 
bench-mark with which to compare the SEU-model. In the SEV-model the 
farmer is assumed to rank order marketing strategies according to the expected 
value of the subjective probability distribution of price. This implies that a risk 
neutral farmer is assumed which means that second and higher moments of the 
probability distribution do not influence preference. 
In the SEU-model, this assumption of risk neutrality is abandoned. The effect 
on preference of a decision maker's degree of risk aversion is taken into account. 
70 
Since farmers will probably be risk averse, it is hypothesized that the SEU-model 
will outperform the SEV-model in predictive validity. This hypothesis will be 
tested in Chapter 7. The testing procedure applied will be described there, too. 
The two models can be specified as follows. 
Model 1 Subjective expected value model (SEV-model) 
Ui(Sj) a (3.14) 
with: 
Uj(Sj) = utility of marketing strategy Sj for farmer j , 
f;j(x) = probability density of price x with strategy Sj as perceived by 
farmer i, 
MCj = the type of marketing channel of strategy Sj (a cooperative or 
private wholesale company). 
Alpha, beta and gamma are parameters which will be empirically derived. 
Model 2 Subjective expected utility model (SEU-model) 
Uj(x) = utility function of price x for farmer i, measured by means of 
Other elements in (3.15) have the same meaning as in (3.14). 
Model 2 can be simplified if certain restrictions can be put on the probability 
distribution or the evaluation function. For example, if the probability dis-
tribution is normally distributed, only the mean and variance of the distribution 
will be relevant for calculating the expectancies. Another special case, the so 
called mean-variance case, results if the evaluation function is a quadratic poly-
nom. Then, irrespective of the form of the probability distribution, expected 
utility will only be based on the mean and variance of the probability distribu-
tion. 
As Equations 3.14 and 3.15 show, the sole difference between the two models 
is that x in the SEV-model is substituted by uj(x). 
According to standard expected utility theory, the function Uj(x) in the SEU-
model is a utility function which should be assessed by means of lotteries. How-
ever, introduction of the concept of relative risk attitude suggests that also a 
strength of preference function v ;(x), assessed by means of riskless techniques, 
(3.15) 
with: 
lotteries. 
71 
could be assumed in the model. It is interesting to test whether a substitution of 
the utility function by the strength of preference function affects the predictive 
validity of the model. Of course, if vj(x) and uj(x) are linearly related (a rela-
tively risk neutral farmer) the predictive validity is equal. Otherwise, standard 
expected utility theory predicts that the model incorporating Uj(x) should out-
perform the model incorporating vj(x) in predictive validity, since only in uj(x) 
the decision maker's risk attitude is included. In Chapter 7 this hypothesis will be 
tested. 
Models 1 and 2 are specified as additive models of the two attributes price and 
marketing channel. This implies that the set of probability distributions of price 
is independent on the marketing channel. In essence, this assumption means that 
the farmer has full opportunity within both marketing channels to construct a 
combination of selling-options (a marketing strategy) which suits his risk attitude. 
The parameters beta and gamma in this case are interpreted as the (linear) trade-
off between the utility derived from the prices which can be attained by a 
marketing strategy and the utility derived from choosing a particular marketing 
channel. 
In general we expect a two-phase choice process. First, a farmer chooses a 
marketing channel on the basis of non-price attributes, and then he chooses a 
combination of selling-options in accordance with his risk attitude. The diffe-
rence in preference between both channels could be so large that hardly any 
difference in price distribution can offset this preference. In such a case, if we 
asked respondents to rank order a number of marketing strategies Sj with respect 
to preference, all cooperative or all private marketing strategies would be 
preferred to the other irrespective of the combination of selling-options. In the 
models we would find a large standardized coefficient of gamma compared to the 
one of beta. In Chapter 7 the specification of the models will be discussed 
further. 
3.6 Research questions 
After structuring the decision making process in Chapter 2 and discussing the 
theoretical notions about decision making under risk in this chapter, the fol-
lowing research topics and questions can be derived from the research objectives. 
In this chapter three main issues emerged. The first topic concerns the theo-
retical and empirical relationship between a utility and a strength of preference 
function. This centers around the concept of relative risk attitude. Until now, 
empirical research into this concept has been limited and inconclusive. 
A second topic is a methodological one and concerns the measurement of sub-
jective probability distributions and risk attitude. In general, it was concluded 
that a multiple indicator approach should be followed, especially with respect to 
the measurement of risk attitude. This approach is especially relevant considering 
the theoretical differences between utility and strength of preference functions. 
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Another conclusion is that in survey research sparse attention is given to validity 
and reliability issues in the measurement of risk perception and risk attitude (in 
Chapter 6 more will be said about this issue). The recommended multiple indica-
tor approach lacks completely in survey research. 
Furthermore, the hypothesized preference formation model implies the elicita-
tion of several subjective probability distributions per individual. Research on 
whether it is feasible in survey conditions to elicit these distributions in a valid 
and reliable manner is rare. 
The third topic deals with the predictive validity of the proposed model of 
preference formation. On the basis of a review of alternative descriptive models 
for decision making under risk it was concluded that the SEU-model is the most 
theoretically attractive and the best empirically testable model for modeling the 
decision problem in this study. The predictive validity of this SEU-model and 
the question whether it outperforms the SEV-model in this respect, remain to be 
studied. Furthermore, the predictive validity of the proposed two-attribute model 
of preference formation should be assessed. 
From a theoretical and methodological point, therefore, the following questions 
are relevant 
- What is the relationship between a strength of preference function and a 
utility function: is the hypothesis of a (constant absolute) relative risk attitude 
confirmed? What is the usefulness of differentiating risk attitude and relative 
risk attitude? 
- What is the reliability and validity of measurement procedures of risk percep-
tions, risk attitude and strength of preference in survey conditions? Which 
procedures perform best in these respects? To what extent is the application of 
multiple measurements of risk perceptions and risk attitude useful and practi-
cally feasible in basic research and in applied studies? 
- Does the subjective expected utility model predict preferences significantly 
better than the subjective expected value model does? How well does the 
subjective expected utility model predict a farmer's preferences for marketing 
strategies? Are both price and marketing channel significantly affecting prefe-
rences for marketing strategies and are both attributes equally important? 
Another interest in this study concerns a number of topics which are related 
directly to the specific decision problem under study: preferences for and choice 
of marketing strategies. The following topics are especially relevant in this 
respect. 
- How do farmers perceive marketing strategies, especially with respect to price 
risk and marketing channel? How large are differences in perception between 
very safe and very risky strategies? How homogeneous is the price perception 
of farmers in respect of these strategies? 
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- How do farmers differ with respect to the degree of risk aversion, strength of 
preference and relative risk aversion? To what extent are these differences 
between farmers related to personal and situational factors? 
- Which marketing strategies are preferred and chosen by farmers? How is this 
preference related to the risk perception of marketing strategies and the risk 
attitude of the farmer? To what extent are differences in preferences of 
farmers for a particular marketing strategy related to personal and situational 
factors? 
In the following chapter the design of the empirical study which was conducted 
to answer these questions is presented. Results of this study are given in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7 and a synthesis and discussion of results can be found in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DESIGN OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
In the previous chapters, the decision problem was structured and theories about 
decision making under risk were presented and evaluated. A conceptual model of 
the decision making process with respect to choosing a marketing strategy was 
proposed. In this chapter, the operationalization of the conceptual model will be 
dealt with. 
As will be described below, data were collected by means of a survey. Personal 
interviews were held with a sample of farmers. Firstly, the design and contents 
of the questionnaire will be dealt with. Secondly, the research population is 
defined and sampling plan and data collection procedures will be presented. 
Finally, a characterization of the sample with respect to a number of background 
variables will be given. 
4.1 Operationalization of the conceptual model 
In this section an overview is presented of the most important choices which had 
to be made in order to be able to empirically test the conceptual model for 
choosing marketing strategies. Here, attention will be directed towards providing 
general insight into the operationalizations eventually chosen, without discussing 
all the details of the measurements. An elaborate discussion and evaluation of 
specific measurement procedures applied in the study will be given in subsequent 
chapters dealing with, respectively, risk perceptions, risk attitude, strength of 
preference and preferences. This section thus intends to show the structure of the 
empirical study. 
An important decision was the choice to interview farmers in two consecutive 
years. The main reason for this choice is the limited attention given in field 
studies to the analysis of the stability of risk attitude and risk perception 
measurements, as has already been pointed out in Chapter 3. A second reason is 
that the ware potato market circumstances can differ considerably between 
marketing years, which might induce farmers to change their perceptions and 
thus their preferences for marketing strategies. If the hypothesized preference 
model has proven accurate in two possibly widely different marketing years, this 
will greatly increase confidence in the validity of the model. In the study, each 
farmer was therefore interviewed in two consecutive years, namely in June 1984 
and in June 1985.1 
Since a large number of measurements was needed, in June 1984 each farmer 
was interviewed twice with one or two weeks in between. In 1985, however, time 
The reason for choosing June as the most appropriate moment of measurement was explained in 
Chapter 2. 
75 
was only available for one interview with each farmer because of budgetary con-
straints. As a consequence, changes were deemed necessary in some respects in 
1985 although for the most part exactly the same measurements took place in 
both years. These differences between both years of measurement will be pointed 
out below. 
4.1.1 Formulation of a set of marketing strategies 
In order to analyze preferences for the object of choice, the marketing strategy, a 
set of marketing strategies has to be formulated, for which a farmer's risk per-
ceptions and preferences should be measured. Care should be taken with the for-
mulation of marketing strategies to provide a stimulus set which can represent the 
whole range of marketing choices farmers actually make. Also, the stimulus set 
should consist of strategies which cover the entire range of price risk; both 
strategies with very small price risk and strategies with intermediate and large 
price risk should be included. Furthermore, the marketing strategies should be 
easy to understand by respondents, especially when combinations of selling-
options are considered. 
These requirements led to the specification of marketing strategies (13 in 1984 
and 18 in 1985) which are described in Table 4.1. In the description of the 
marketing strategies in Table 4.1 blancs (denoted by ...) are shown. These concern 
either the levels of fixed and bottom-prices that were specified in the respective 
contracts or the timing of selling on the spot market. Both depend on the moment 
of delivery. This aspect will be elaborated upon below. 
Since private companies offer more selling-options than the cooperative 
company, more strategies have to be formulated with the private companies as 
marketing channels in order to arrive at a representative set of strategies. For 
three strategies, namely Strategies 1, 7 and 11, the cooperative is specified as the 
marketing channel; for the remaining strategies a private company is specified. 
Apart from 100% marketing strategies (Strategies 1 to 6 and 14 in Table 4.1) 
indicating that a farmer's total potato produce is marketed by means of only one 
selling-option, a number of combinations of selling-options are defined. These 
combinations consist of only two selling-options in a ratio of 50/50 in order to 
simplify a respondent's understanding and interpretation of strategies. The most 
common combinations of selling-options are defined (Strategies 7 to 13, 15 and 
16 in Table 4.1). For reasons of completeness, the stimulus set is extended by 
Strategies 14 to 18 (Table 4.1) in 1985 to arrive at a total of 18 marketing 
strategies. In this way, two strategies with three selling-options (Strategies 17 and 
18) are included as well as a strategy consisting of a three-year fixed-price 
contract. 
With the exception of Strategy 13, in all combinations of selling-options 50% 
of the total produce is sold by means of spot market sales. As was noted in 
Chapter 2, selling on the spot market sales is a fairly popular selling-option. For 
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example, in 1979 55% of potato harvest was sold at spot market prices (De Graaf 
1981) and in 1983 this percentage was 43% (Smidts 1985). 
Selling at spot market prices is subdivided into two propositions: selling at one 
moment in time or spreading sales by choosing two selling moments. Price per-
ception will probably vary in these options. Again, for purposes of clarity of the 
strategy's interpretation by the respondent, the differentiation is limited to selling 
at one or two moments. 
Strategy 13 is constructed by combining a fixed price and a bottom price 
contract, thus yielding a marketing strategy which is probably perceived as a 
strategy with a small price risk. 
In the formulation of marketing strategies the moment of delivery is directly 
taken into account. Four sets of marketing strategies are defined, one set for each 
important moment of delivery (see Chapter 2): at harvest-time (September), in 
December, in March and in May/June. In the interview the moment the farmer 
usually delivers his potatoes is established first. Next, the appropriate set of mar-
keting strategies is selected, and for this set the farmer's preferences and 
perceptions are measured. 
The four sets of strategies differ from one another with respect to the levels of 
the fixed and bottom-price specified in the respective contracts and the timing of 
selling on the spot market. Table 4.1 shows these levels and selling moments per 
moment of delivery. For example, for a farmer who has to deliver in December 
Strategy 6 is formulated as: 100% spot market (sell 50% in October and 50% in 
December). For a farmer who delivers in May/June Strategy 6 is formulated as: 
100% spot market (sell 50% in December and 50% in May). Likewise, for a farmer 
delivering in December Strategy 9 in 1984 is: 50% fixed-price contract of 23 
cts/kg and selling 50% at the spot market (sell in October), whereas for a farmer 
delivering in May/June Strategy 9 is: 50% fixed-price contract of 26 cts/kg and 
selling 50% at the spot market (sell in May). 
Table 4.1 further shows that when selling only once on the spot market the 
moment of selling equals the moment of delivery. When selling at two moments 
on the spot market, the first moment of selling is chosen early in the marketing 
year (September for farmers delivering in December and December for farmers 
delivering in March or in May/June), while the second moment of selling again 
corresponds to the moment of delivery. In the strategies the moment of selling is 
specified on a monthly basis. The farmer is asked to imagine selling at an 
appropriate moment in the specified month. 
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Table 4.1 Formulation of marketing strategies which are used in the measure-
ment of price perception and preferences in 1984 and in 1985 
(Strategies 14 to 18 are used in 1985 only) 
1. 100 % Pooling Cooperative 
2. 100 % Bottom-price (... cts/kg) 
3. 100 % Fixed-price (... cts/kg) 
4. 100 % Spot market (sell 100% in •-) 
5. 100 % Pooling Private 
6. 100 % Spot market (sell 50% in .. , and 50% in ...) 
7. 50 % Pooling Cooperative 
50 % Spot market (sell in ...) 
8. 50 % Bottom-price (... cts/kg) 
50 % Spot market (sell in ...) 
9. 50 % Fixed-price (... cts/kg) 
50 % Spot market (sell in ...) 
10. 50 % Pooling Private 
50 % Spot market (sell in ...) 
11. 50 % Pooling Cooperative 
50 % Spot market (sell 25 % in . ... and 25 % in ...) 
12. 50 % Fixed-price (... cts/kg) 
50 % Spot market (sell 25 % in . . . and 25 % in ...) 
13. 50 % Fixed-price (... cts/kg) 
40 % Bottom-price (... cts/kg) 
10 % Spot market (sell in ...) 
14. 100 % Fixed-price (three years fixed ... cts/kg) 
15. 50 % Fixed-price (three years fixed ... cts/kg) 
50 % Spot market (sell in ...) 
16. 50 % Pooling Private 
50 % Spot market (sell 25 % in . ... and 25 % in ...) 
17. 25 % Pooling Private 
25 % Fixed-price (... cts/kg) 
50 % Spot market (sell ...) 
18. 25 % Pooling Private 
25 % Fixed-price (... cts/kg) 
50 % Spot market (sell 25 % in . , . and 25 % in ...) 
SELLING ON THE SPOT MARKET 
FIXED BOTTOM 
PRICE PRICE TWO MOMENTS 
Moment of One First Second 
delivery 1984 1985 1984, 1985 moment moment moment 
September 20 18 15 15 September September -
December 23 20 17 17 December October December 
March 24 23 18 18 March December March 
May/June 26 25 20 20 May December May 
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Further differences between the four sets of strategies concern, of course, the 
level of bottom and fixed-prices in the respective contracts since delivering early 
in the marketing year implies lower storage costs. These precise differences 
between strategies are presented in Table 4.1. The prices of bottom and fixed 
price contracts were set in accordance with the contract prices agreed upon at the 
moment of the interviews. Three private companies were contacted which pro-
vided these prices, one for each moment of delivery. The prices of the companies 
largely corresponded. 
A difference between 1984 and 1985 can be seen with respect to the level of 
fixed-price contracts. Fixed prices were clearly higher in 1984 than in 1985. 
There was a demand hausse in May and June 1984, resulting in relatively high 
fixed-price contracts. An explanation suggested for this upward movement of 
prices at the time was that farmers were fairly reluctant to contracting because 
they had experienced very high potato prices on the spot market in 1983, 
especially at the end of the season. According to spokesmen of the wholesale 
companies contacted, farmers motivated their reluctance by stating that they did 
not want "to miss the boat again because of contracting or selling too early". 
Another explanation might be that farmers, on average, were less risk averse in 
1984 as a result of the increase in wealth in 1983. Wholesale companies therefore 
had to provide relatively attractive fixed-price contracts. In 1985 such an effect 
was not present since overall 1984 was a year characterised by mediocre prices. 
Fixed-price contracts in this year are therefore more in accordance with the 
usual situation. 
4.1.2 Measurement of risk perception, risk attitude and strength of preference 
The procedures applied in measuring price perception and risk attitude will now 
be briefly discussed. Table 4.2 provides a short representation of the operationali-
zation of the model in both years and delineates the differences between the 
years. 
Price perception of marketing strategies is measured in two different ways. In 
the first method the perception of price is viewed as a probability distribution. 
Many techniques exist to elicit subjective probability distributions, which will be 
discussed and evaluated elaborately in Chapter 5. 
Our evaluation of techniques has led us to the choice of the interval technique. 
By means of this technique, the respondent has to state a minimum ( P ^ ) and a 
maximum price ( P m a x ) he expects to receive when choosing a specific strategy. 
The minimum price is defined as the price for which it is "very unlikely" that 
prices will turn out lower. In the same way the maximum price is obtained. 
Subsequently the median price is elicited by asking the respondent to specify the 
price P m e d between minimum and maximum so that the probability of obtaining a 
price between minimum and P m e d equals the probability of obtaining a price 
between P , and maximum. In the same manner, the first and third quartile are 
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assessed; the first quartile between P m i n and P m e d and the third quartile between 
P . and P 
med max 
Table 4.2 Overview of measurement procedures applied in the study 
Price perception 
1. Interval technique 
- elicitation of five points of the cumulative probability distribution 
function 
- limited to 7 marketing strategies 
* 
2. Direct questioning 
- direct questioning of mean price 
- price risk measured by means of magnitude estimation 
- for total set of strategies 
Risk attitude 
1. Lottery technique 
- assessment of ten points of the utility function by means of 50/50 lotteries 
- three consistency checks are included 
- respondent has to specify the certainty equivalent of the lottery 
2. Conjoint measurement* 
- the profiles consist of 50/50 lotteries 
- full factorial design of 4 levels of mean price and 6 levels of variance 
- respondent has to rank 24 profiles in accordance with preference 
Strength of preference 
1. Midvalue splitting technique 
- assessment of ten points of the value function 
- two consistency checks are included 
- respondent has to specify the equal difference point 
* 
2. Rating technique 
- assessment of ten points of the value function 
- respondent has to rate ten price levels on a scale from 0 to 10 
Preference 
1. In 1984 13 strategies are rated on a 7-point rating scale, in 1985 this 
concerns 18 strategies 
2. Complete rank order of strategies with respect to preference 
Choice behavior 
From marketing year 80/81 to 84/85 choice behavior is registered with respect to 
choice of marketing channel, choice of selling-options, amount sold per selling-
option and, if available, prices obtained 
In 1985 limited to a randomly selected third of the respondents. 
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Five points of the cumulative probability distribution are thus obtained. A 
probability distribution function is fitted to these elicited points. 
Since test interviews showed that the interval technique does take a lot of 
interviewing time and is a fairly difficult, strenuous and perhaps also somewhat 
boring task for respondents, a probability distribution could not be obtained for 
the total set of marketing strategies. The elicitation task therefore had to be 
limited to a selection of the 7 most important strategies. This aspect will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter 5. 
A second technique applied in getting information about the price perception 
of farmers concerns directly questioning the mean price (expected value) and 
price risk of a strategy. In this case price perception of a strategy is not 
conceived as a probability distribution but as consisting of the values of two 
attributes, namely mean price and price risk. 
Price risk is measured by means of magnitude estimation, a scaling technique 
well known in psychophysics. The respondents have to draw a line to express the 
price risk of a strategy in comparison with a reference line which indicates the 
price risk of the reference strategy. In this manner an assessment of price risk is 
obtained for all marketing strategies. It should be noted that in this magnitude 
estimation task the meaning of risk is left open to the respondent, that is, risk is 
not specified as e.g. a probability distribution or variance. 
By comparing the results of the elicited subjective probability distributions 
with those of the direct measurement procedure, information is provided about 
the (convergent) validity of the measurements. Comparing the price perception 
measurements between both marketing years provides information about possible 
changes in price perception. 
As is the case with price perception, risk attitude too is measured by two 
techniques. An elaborate description and evaluation of available techniques is 
given in Chapter 6. Here, we limit ourselves to a short indication of the tech-
niques which were eventually chosen in this study. 
In the first technique lotteries are used to measure the von Neumann-Morgen-
stern utility function. Specifically, we applied the certainty equivalent technique. 
This task implies confronting respondents with 50/50 lotteries for which they 
have to state the certainty equivalent. With this method 10 points of the utility 
curve are assessed, including three points assessed to check the consistency of the 
measurements. By means of non-linear least squares suitable utility functions are 
fitted to the data. 
A second procedure applied is conjoint measurement. With this technique 
respondents have to rank order 24 profiles consisting of 50/50 lotteries. These 
profiles are constructed by means of a full factorial design of 4 levels of mean 
price and 6 levels of price variance. By applying regression analysis the trade-off 
between mean price and price risk is obtained from this ranking of profiles. The 
trade-off can be seen as an estimate of the risk attitude of the respondent. 
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Contrary to the two measurement procedures described above, in the third and 
fourth procedure applied, risk is not introduced into the measurement. That is, 
the evaluation function is measured under certainty, thus resulting in a value or 
strength of preference function. Specifically the techniques applied are the so-
called midvalue splitting technique and a rating scale. The midvalue splitting 
technique resembles the lottery technique with respect to the questioning 
procedure. However, now the respondent has to state his equal difference points 
instead of the certainty equivalents. In the rating technique the respondent is 
provided with 10 price levels which he has to rate with respect to attractiveness 
on a scale of 0 to 10. Both techniques lead to ten points of the value function to 
which suitable functions are fitted. 
The application of four techniques, two with risky and two with riskless out-
comes, enables a comparison of the estimates of the attitude obtained. First, the 
utility and value function can be related directly to test the hypothesis of the 
relative risk attitude and to study the precise relationship between the functions. 
Secondly, estimates for convergent and discriminant validity are obtained. One 
expects to find a higher correlation between either two risky techniques or two 
riskless techniques than between risky and riskless techniques. Furthermore, since 
the measurements are repeated in the second year with the same respondents, an 
indication of the stability of the measurements can be gained. These elaborate 
measurements enable the use of LISREL models. In Chapter 6 these matters will 
be extensively analysed and discussed. 
As noted above, in 1985 farmers could be interviewed only once. It was therefore 
not possible to repeat all measurements for each respondent. An efficient survey 
design was required. Table 4.2 shows the choices made. It was decided to repeat 
the measurement of the subjective probability distribution of price (interval 
technique) and the measurement of risk attitude by means of lotteries for each 
respondent since these measurements are at the heart of the study. Also, the 
rating technique used for measuring the value function could be repeated for 
each respondent since it did not take much time and farmers responded easily to 
the questioning procedure. 
The direct measurement of price perception, the conjoint measurement task 
and the midvalue splitting technique were repeated only for one-third of the 
respondents. Each respondent in 1985 was randomly assigned to one of these 
three techniques. As a consequence correlations in 1985 between respective 
techniques are calculated for different respondents (for example the correlation 
between estimates of the lottery technique and the conjoint measurement task is 
calculated for a different group of respondents than the correlation between the 
lottery estimates and the midvalue splitting technique) or are non-existent (for 
example the correlation between the conjoint measurement and the midvalue 
splitting technique). These aspects complicate the analysis in 1985 and in some 
respects constrain the comparison between both years. 
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4.1.3 Measurement of preference, choice behavior and background characteris-
tics 
Preferences for marketing strategies were measured by asking the respondents to 
rate the strategies on a 7-point rating scale, according to their preference of 
choosing the strategy for the coming marketing year. This rating task was 
followed by a task of ranking the strategies according to preference. Thus, a 
complete rank order is realised. Furthermore, the respondents had to indicate the 
strategies which they did not consider choosing, thus indicating the evoked set of 
strategies. 
In the questionnaire choice behavior of farmers in the past years was registered. 
The behavior in five years was established from marketing year 80/81 up to 
84/85. This registration enables linking preferences of farmers with their actual 
behavior and also provides information about changes in choice behavior. Apart 
from determining which selling-options a farmer had chosen, also the amount 
sold per option, the moment of selling and, if available, the prices received were 
listed. After registration, a number of open questions were asked enabling 
farmers to provide their motives for choosing a particular strategy. Especially, 
questions have been asked in search of motives for preferring one marketing 
channel to the other. Complete results concerning the farmer's actual choice 
behavior and their motives are described in Smidts (1985). In this text only the 
main results of these aspects will be presented. 
In the interview also a number of characteristics of farm and farmer were 
collected. These personal and situational factors might influence one or more 
stages in the decision making process, as is assumed in the model. The most 
important characteristics of the farmer registered are: age, level of education, 
number of years of experience as a farmer and the availability of a successor in 
the family. Because the region in which this study took place consists of two 
polders reclaimed only recently, the Dutch region from which the farmer's family 
originated is also registered. The characteristics of the farm listed are: acreage, 
cropping plan, solvability, the region in which the farm is located and type and 
quality of storage facilities. 
4.2 Description of the population 
There are two main ware potato cultivating areas in the Netherlands, namely the 
IJsselmeerpolders and the South-West region. Data collection in this study is con-
fined to the IJsselmeerpolders. The main reason for this confinement is that at 
the time of this study, in the South-West region many farmers did not have 
adequate storage facilities. They were therefore limited in their choice of 
marketing strategies since they had to deliver at harvest-time or very early in the 
marketing year (December). In contrast, the IJsselmeerpolders farmers' marketing 
behavior would be less prohibited by the restrictive factor of storage facilities 
because most farmers had good quality storage facilities. Perceptions and risk 
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attitude in the IJsselmeerpolders region would therefore influence preferences 
and choice behavior to a larger extent. Therefore the IJsselmeerpolders was a 
much more suitable region for research. 
The IJsselmeerpolders consists of two polders. The Noord-Oost polder was 
reclaimed in 1942, the other polder, Oostelijk Flevoland, in 1957 (further on in 
this text the polders will be referred to as respectively NOP and OF). Soil and 
weather conditions are very suitable for growing potatoes in these areas which is 
apparent from the large yields per ha. (see Table 2.1). The population of 
farm(er)s in the region can be described by data available from the Agricultural-
census-May. Each year in May all farmers in the region are questioned about 
their acreage and cropping plan and some personal characteristics. 
Table 4.3 shows some statistics on ware potato cultivating farms in 1982 (this 
was the most recent census information available at the time of data collection). 
In this table, farms are classified with respect to the proportion of arable land 
allocated to ware potatoes. Three categories of cultivation intensity are defined 
with the following ranges: smaller than 0.195, from 0.195 to 0.255 and larger than 
0.255 (with 0.333 as the legal maximum). These intensities correspond res-
pectively to a five, four or three yearly crop rotation plan. Subsequently, the 
category of farms with a cultivation intensity of less than 0.195 is divided into 
two classes: farms growing less than 5 ha. of ware potatoes and farms growing 5 
ha. or more. 
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of census population of ware potato cultivating 
farms in the IJsselmeerpolders in 1982 
NOP 
% 
COMBINATION OF INTENSITY 
AND ABSOLUTE POTATO ACREAGE 
< 0.195 and < 5 ha. 26.2 
< 0.195 and > 5 ha. 7.6 
0.195 - 0.255 27.0 
> 0.255 39.1 
Total 100% 
N 721 
Intensity is measured by the portion of arable 
OF TOTAL 
% % N Ware 
potato 
acreage 
5.7 16.4 226 4.7 
9.3 8.4 116 8.1 
45.5 35.8 492 37.6 
39.5 39.3 540 49.3 
100% 100% 1374 100% 
653 1374 
allocated to ware potatoes. 
Source: Agricultural census May 1982 and own calculations 
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The distribution of farms in the population per category and per region is shown 
in Table 4.3. In 1982, a total of 1374 farms were growing ware potatoes. Of these 
farms 16.4% can be characterized as farms with low potato cultivation intensity 
and few hectares (< 0.195 and < 5 ha.). These 16.4% of the farms, mainly situated 
in the NOP, grow only 4.7% of the total potato acreage in the region. This means 
that ware potatoes for these farms are a fairly unimportant crop and the farmers' 
incomes do not depend on this crop. Ware potatoes are also not so important in 
proportion to other crops (intensity is less than 0.195) nor is the absolute amount 
of potatoes that the farmer has to sell substantial (less than a yield of 5 ha.). The 
marketing behavior of these farmers is therefore a less interesting object of 
study. For this reason, the research population is limited by excluding farms 
allocating less than 0.195 of arable land to ware potatoes and at the same time 
having less than 5 ha. of total potato acreage. In this manner, the population is 
reduced to 1148 farms growing 95% of total acreage of ware potatoes in 1982. 
The sampling frame consists of these farms. 
As can be deduced from Table 4.3, the farms with low cultivation intensity but 
with more than 5 ha. of potato acreage (116 farms) are fairly large farms; 8.4% 
of the farmers grow 8.1 % of total potato acreage in spite of their low intensity. 
These farms are therefore a very interesting group to study. 
In Table 4.4 some further statistics on the research population are presented. A 
total of 46.3% of the farms is located in the NOP region. It is clear that farm 
structure differs notably between the two polders. In the NOP a relatively large 
percentage of the farms allocate more than a quarter of arable land to potatoes in 
comparison with OF (53% compared to 42%).2 
Nevertheless, average potato acreage in the NOP is lower than in OF, 
respectively 7.76 ha. and 11.23 ha. (for all the farms the average ware potato 
acreage is 9.62 ha.). The reason for this smaller potato acreage in the NOP is that 
the average farm size in the NOP is considerably smaller than in the OF. Whereas 
in the NOP 59.4% of the farms is smaller than 30 ha., this percentage is only 
17.9% in the OF. 
Another notable difference between the polders is that in the NOP the farmers 
are either fairly young (younger than 35) or old (over 54), whereas middle aged 
farmers (35-54 year) dominate the OF polder. 
In brief, the farms in the NOP can be characterized as relatively small farms, 
cultivating ware potatoes with high intensity and managed by either a young or 
an old farmer. In the OF, fairly large farms relatively often allocate a quarter of 
arable land to potatoes and are managed by middle aged farmers. 
This effect is consistent even after age of farmer and arable land are controlled for. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of sampling frame of ware potato cultivating 
farms in the Usselmeerpolders, in 1982 
FARMS WARE POTATO ACREAGE 
NOP OF TOTAL NOP OF TOTAL 
Combination of intensity 
and absolute potato acreage 
< 0.195 and > 5 ha. 10.3 9.9 10.1 9.6 8.4 8.8 
0.195 - 0.255 36.7 48.2 42.9 32.2 43.7 39.5 
> 0.255 53.0 41.9 47.0 58.2 49.9 51.7 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 532 616 1148 
% 46.3 53.7 100% 
WARE POTATO ACREAGE IN HA. 
NOP OF TOTAL 
Combination of intensity 
and absolute potato acreage 
< 0.195 and > 5 ha. 7.20 9.53 8.43 
0.195 - 0.255 6.81 10.18 8.84 
> 0.255 8.52 12.84 10.58 
Total 7.76 11.23 9.62 
Arable land (in %) 
< 15 ha. 13.0 .2 6.1 
15 < 20 ha. 9.4 .3 4.5 
20 < 30 ha. 37.0 17.4 26.5 
30 < 50 ha. 32.9 56.5 45.6 
> 50 ha. 7.7 25.6 17.3 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Age (in %) 
< 35 23.1 9.3 15.7 
35 - 54 34.4 57.9 47.0 
> 54 42.5 32.8 37.3 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Agricultural census May 1982 and own calculations 
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4.3 Sampling procedure and field work 
The research population is defined as: family farms in NOP and OF cultivating 
ware potatoes of the variety Bintje in 1984 excluding farms that cultivate less 
than 5 ha. of ware potatoes if the potato cultivation intensity is lower than 0.195. 
The sampling frame is derived from the census information in 1982, as described 
above. 
Since it was expected that the proportion of arable land allocated to ware 
potatoes might influence risk attitude and preferences for marketing strategies, 
this proportion has been considered a stratification variable. If a farmer allocates 
as much as a third of his total arable land to ware potatoes, his income depends 
very much on the yield and price for potatoes. Such a farmer will probably 
choose a less risky marketing strategy than a farmer who e.g. allocates only a 
fifth of his arable land to potatoes. 
A second reason for stratification is the opportunity to oversample a stratum. 
This is applied here. Because of budgetary constraints, the sample had to be 
limited to a maximum of about 250 farmers. In case of proportional sampling 
only 25 farmers (10% of the sample, see Table 4.4) cultivating potatoes with low 
intensity (< 0.195) but more than 5 ha. (on average 8.4 ha., see Table 4.4) would 
be interviewed. In order to enable analyses for this subsample, it was decided to 
oversample this category of fairly large farms. 
A disproportionate stratified sample of 400 farms was drawn (Table 4.5). In the 
first stratum 80 farmers were sampled (stratum A), the remaining 320 farmers 
were drawn in proportion to the sizes of the strata B and C. 
Table 4.5 shows that the sampling frame and research population did not match 
completely. Of the sample of 400 farms, 37 farms did not belong to the popula-
tion (see Table 4.5 for the reasons of this overcoverage). Of the remaining 
addresses, eventually 40 were not contacted since these farmers had either already 
been interviewed in the test survey (this concerned 10 farmers) or the maximum 
number of interviews had been reached. 
A total of 323 farmers were contacted by means of an introductory letter 
followed by a telephone call by the interviewer asking for participation. This 
initial contact revealed that 34 farmers did not belong to the research population 
since they did not grow the variety Bintje but some other ware potato variety. 
Thus 289 eligible addresses remained. 
A total of 36 farmers refused cooperation. Almost all refusals concerned the 
argument of time constraints on the part of the interviewee. Overall, response 
was very good, namely 87.5% (253/289), especially when taking into account that 
farmers knew they would be interviewed twice for about one and a half hour per 
interview. In stratum A the response was higher (97.5%) than in the other two 
strata. Furthermore, the response rate in NOP was higher than in OF, 
respectively 92% and 84.1%. This difference is significant (p < 0.05, two-tailed). 
In the second interview held in 1984 238 out of 253 farmers were willing to be 
interviewed again. 
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Table 4.5 Description of sampling procedure and response 
COMBINATION OP INTENSITY A B C Total 
AND ABSOLUTE POTATO < 0.195 0.195- > 0.255 
ACREAGE (strata A,B,C) > 5 ha. 0.255 
Census population 1982 116 492 540 1148 
Sample 80 153 167 400 
Overcoverage* 11 13 13 37 
Not contacted 23 7 10 40 
Addresses contacted in 1984 46 133 144 323 
No Bintje variety grown 6 9 19 34 
Eligible addresses 40 124 125 289 
Nonresponse 1984 1 20 15 36 
Response 1984 39 104 110 253 
Response percentage 1984 97.5 83.9 88.0 87.5 
Response 1985 31 84 90 205 
Response percentage 1985 79.5 80.5 81.8 81.0 
Estimated research population 85 417 430 932 
Distribution of population 9.1 44.7 46.1 100% 
Distribution of sample 1984 15.4 41.1 43.5 100% 
Distribution of sample 1985 15.1 41.0 43.9 100% 
* 
Overcoverage consisted of farms outside the defined geographic area (n = 8), farms not being a family 
farm (n = 25) or terminated farms (n = 4). 
In order to test whether the nonresponse group differed significantly from the 
response group, respondents who refused cooperation were asked to answer a 
limited number of questions by telephone. The majority of these farmers, in 
effect 25, agreed to participate. Data were collected on the farmer's age, level of 
education, arable land, cropping plan, usual choice of marketing channel and 
marketing strategy applied in 1983. A significant difference between response 
and nonresponse group could not be detected for any of these variables. 
In 1985 all the farmers interviewed in 1984 were asked to participate again. 
Now 81% (205/253) was willing to be interviewed once more. Data of two years 
are therefore available for 205 farmers. Of course, for certain questions a smaller 
number of responses may be available because of missing data. 
On the basis of the initial sample of N = 400 and the percentages of non-
eligible addresses, an estimate of the research population can now be given (see 
Table 4.5). The total number of farmers in the research population is estimated to 
be 932 + / _ 35 (95% confidence interval). A comparison between the distribution 
of the strata in the research population to sample distributions shows that stratum 
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A is oversampled as planned. When relevant, results will be weighted in 
accordance with the sampling fractions. 
Table 4.6 shows mean statistics of the 1984 sample for the total region and both 
polders separately. The average arable land in 1984 was 38.5 ha. with 34.1 ha. in 
NOP and 42.3 ha. in OF. The table shows clearly that the farms with low potato 
cultivation intensity are, in general, fairly large (average farm size in stratum A 
is 45.3 ha.). Of the total sample, on average 9.5 ha. is allocated to Bintje (7.6 ha. 
in NOP and 11.1 in OF) and 0.8 ha. is allocated to ware potatoes of a different 
variety than Bintje (1.4 in NOP and 0.3 in OF). The average age of the farmers 
is 46 years and the regions do not differ significantly in this respect. However, as 
described above (Table 4.4), although the average age in both polders is the same, 
middle-aged farmers dominate in the OF whereas the NOP consists of fairly 
young as well as old farmers and a relatively small number are middle aged 
farmers. 
Table 4.6 Description of the sample of ware potato cultivating farms in 1984; 
total, per stratum and per region (NOP and OF) (mean values) 
COMBINATION OF INTENSITY A B C Total 
AND ABSOLUTE POTATO < 0.195 0.195- > 0.255 
ACREAGE > 5 ha. 0.255 
Arable land in ha. 
Total 45.3 38.7 36.9 38.5 
NOP 44.0 33.6 32.6 34.1 
OF 46.4 42.0 41.8 42.3 
Bintje grown in ha. 
Total 8.8 9.2 10.0 9.5 
NOP 8.4 7.0 8.0 7.6 
OF 9.1 10.6 11.9 11.1 
Other ware potato varieties in ha. 
Total .9 .7 .8 .8 
NOP 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.4 
OF .3 .2 .4 .3 
Age of farmer 
Total 42.9 46.6 45.7 45.8 
NOP 43.0 46.2 43.5 44.7 
OF 42.9 46.8 47.9 46.9 
* 
Weighted in accordance with sampling fractions 
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Field work 
The questionnaire was drawn up after depth interviews with 16 farmers and a 
number of experts of wholesale companies. The most critical questions in the 
questionnaire, especially those concerned with the elicitation of risk perception 
and the assessment of risk attitude and strength of preference, were pretested 
with several farmers. Complete questionnaires were extensively pretested and 
analysed with as many as 30 farmers. Revisions were implemented when deemed 
necessary. 
Students attending masters level courses in agricultural economics and 
marketing were selected as interviewers. Most of the interviewers had inter-
viewing experience. The interviewers were instructed extensively with respect to 
the purpose of the survey and goals of each separate question. They also received 
training by conducting trial interviews to become familiar with the questionnaire. 
Respondents were contacted by an introductory letter explaining the objectives 
of research and procedure of interviewing. One or two days after having received 
the letter, the respondents were contacted by telephone and asked to participate 
in the interview. A positive reply was followed by an appointment made by the 
interviewer. If respondents did not want to participate, the interviewer recorded 
the reason why as well as some further information about the farmer, as des-
cribed above. 
Since many questions had to be asked and a number of questions cost a great 
deal of time, it was decided in 1984 to break up the interview into two parts. 
Respondents were interviewed twice, with about a week in between. The first 
interview was scheduled during the first two weeks of June. In 1985 only one 
interview was held, also during the first two weeks of June. The time needed to 
complete the personal interviews was 60 to 90 minutes per interview. 
During field work each completed questionnaire was scrutinized by the 
researcher as soon as possible after the interview in the presence of the 
interviewer. This procedure created opportunities to clear up possible ambiguous 
answers or to correct obvious errors. Since in 1984 each farmer was interviewed 
twice, obscurities could be cleared up during the second interview with the 
farmer. This latter error correction was necessary only in two cases. As a result 
of the instruction and training of the interviewers and field work control the 
impression of high quality interviewing prevails. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the structure of the empirical study was delineated. After des-
cribing the operationalizations of variables in the decision making model, 
attention was paid to a description of the population, sampling plan and field 
work. Data were collected in a survey with 253 farmers, who were interviewed in 
two consecutive years. 
90 
Because of the survey context and also for budgetary reasons, data collection had 
to be restricted in two important respects. Firstly, subjective probability dis-
tributions could not be elicited for each marketing strategy but had to be limited 
to seven strategies. Secondly, three measurement procedures could not be repeated 
for each respondent but had to be limited to a third of the sample. However, an 
attempt was made to adjust the design of the study in such a way that possible 
negative consequences could be kept to a minimum. 
In the following chapters extensive discussions of the results of the study will 
be presented. Chapter 5 starts with a presentation of perception results. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRICE PERCEPTION OF MARKETING STRATEGIES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the perception of marketing strategies in respect of price. 
By combining past experiences with market information available at the moment 
of decision, farmers will have to form an impression of the prices associated with 
each marketing strategy. Since experience and information will probably differ 
between farmers, price perception may differ between farmers (this is referred to 
as heterogeneity in perception). 
In this chapter, special attention will be paid to the measurement procedures of 
perception. In this regard two rather different approaches to measuring price 
perception will be compared. These two methods of measurement are denoted as 
the indirect and direct measurement procedure. 
In the indirect measurement approach the perception of a marketing strategy is 
modeled explicitly as a subjective probability distribution. A number of points of 
the cumulative probability distribution are elicited and a probability distribution 
function is fitted to these points. From this distribution function, mean, median, 
standard deviation and skewness are derived. The method is called indirect since 
mean, standard deviation, etc. are derived from the distribution and are not 
directly questioned. 
In contrast, the direct measurement approach does model perception in a fairly 
straightforward way. By means of this method the farmer has to state mean price 
and price risk he associates with a certain marketing strategy. Price risk is 
measured on a general scale by means of magnitude estimation, a technique 
originating from psychophysics. The direct measurement procedure therefore does 
not lead to a subjective probability distribution. This, of course, greatly limits the 
use of perceptions elicited by this method, since it refrains from incorporating 
the perception measurements in a model like subjective expected utility. 
It is interesting to compare both approaches from the viewpoint of whether the 
procedures rank the marketing strategies in the same order with respect to mean 
price and price risk. In that case convergent validity would be established. In 
addition, comparisons with respect to the ease of handling each procedure in 
survey conditions will be made. Apart from presenting and discussing the 
perception of farmers regarding to the marketing strategies, special attention will 
therefore be paid to the evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of both measure-
ment approaches. 
Most attention in this chapter will be paid to the measurement of subjective 
probability distributions (the indirect method). A subjective probability distribu-
tion is an essential element in theories of decision making under risk. Therefore 
the measurement of this distribution is prerequisite in the testing of expected 
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utility model. Furthermore, trying to elicit several distributions per respondent 
for a large sample of respondents, is to our knowledge fairly unique. 
The main goals of this chapter are thus threefold. The first goal is to present and 
discuss the farmer's price perception concerning several marketing strategies. 
These perceptions are needed in the preference formation models (Chapter 7). 
Furthermore, information about the farmer's perception of marketing strategies 
with respect to ware potatoes is valuable in itself, since this has never been 
studied before. The second goal concerns a review of methods of probability 
encoding and an evaluation of the method used in this study with respect to 
validity and practical feasibility in survey conditions. Is it possible to elicit sub-
jective probability distributions on such a large scale and if so, are the measure-
ments internally valid? A third goal concerns the comparison of the direct and 
indirect measurement techniques in order to study the convergent validity of the 
methods. That is, to compare the results obtained by the elicitation of subjective 
probability distributions with those obtained by much more simple methods. 
In Section 5.2 the indirect method of measuring subjective probability distri-
butions will be dealt with. In Section 5.2.1 the problems associated with 
measuring subjective probability distributions in general are reviewed. This is 
followed by a classification and evaluation of elicitation techniques in Section 
5.2.2. A description of the elicitation technique actually applied in this study will 
be presented in Section 5.2.3. Since the technique applied yields only a limited 
number of points of the probability distribution, a distribution function has to be 
fitted to these elicited points. The choice of a suitable distribution function and 
the fitting procedure are described in Section 5.2.4. Next, results will be 
discussed in Section 5.3, with special attention paid to the validity of results 
obtained by the indirect measurement procedure. 
Subsequently, the direct measurement technique and its results are presented in 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5. Especially the method of magnitude estimation for 
measuring price risk will be reviewed. 
Both approaches to measuring price perception will be compared and evaluated 
in Section 5.6 and main findings and conclusions will be presented in Section 5.7. 
5.2 Indirect measurement of price perception: description and evaluation of 
the method 
5.2.1 Some general issues in the elicitation of subjective probability distribu-
tions 
Probability encoding is defined as the process of extracting and quantifying indi-
vidual judgments about uncertain quantities (Spetzler and Stagl von Holstein 
1975). These judgments are probably more or less vague, fuzzy and variable. 
Usually they are not explicit and quantitative so subjects have to think hard 
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before being able to express these judgments quantitatively. Elicitation techniques 
are used with the purpose of helping subjects to express these judgments. 
A large body of literature, mostly originating from psychology, exists that 
relates to probability encoding. It is beyond the scope and aim of this study to 
discuss this literature extensively. Here we will shortly point out some major 
findings and conclusions that can be drawn from these studies. These conclusions 
are based on reviews of the literature of e.g. Hogarth (1975, 1980), Spetzler and 
Stael von Holstein (1975), Hogarth and Makridakis (1981), Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) and Wallsten and Budescu (1983). 
First, the cognitive processes which operate when subjects evaluate uncertainty 
will be briefly discussed. Next, attention will be focused on the reliability and 
validity of the elicitation techniques. 
Biases and distortions in encoding probabilities 
In his extensive review of studies Hogarth (1975) concentrates on the cognitive 
processes that take place when assessing probabilities. He argues that man is a 
selective, sequential information processor with limited capacity and therefore ill-
suited for assessing probability distributions. The elicitation procedure places 
specific demands on man's judgmental processes, especially on information 
acquisition and processing. It is therefore necessary to understand the capabilities 
and limitations of these processes. Hogarth concludes that the limited capabilities 
of man result in systematic biases in probability estimates. He differentiates 
between more than 20 sources of bias and judgmental error (Hogarth 1980). 
In order to clarify the discussion about problems associated with probability 
encoding, it is important to state here what is meant by biases, since we want to 
distinguish biases from distortions. According to Spetzler and StaSl von Holstein 
(1975), biases are conscious or subconscious discrepancies between a subject's 
responses and an accurate description of his underlying knowledge. This accurate 
description of his underlying knowledge can be thought off as a "true" probability 
distribution. The response of a subject to a question about the probability of a 
particular outcome of the distribution can be modeled as a true score plus an 
error. This true score thus is the individual's degree of belief that e.g. the ware 
potato price will be between 15 and 18 cts/kg. When trying to measure this true 
score by means of elicitation techniques, random errors and possibly systematic 
errors are introduced. Different elicitation techniques might introduce different 
systematic effects on response and these systematic effects are denoted here as 
bias. 
A second aspect of probability encoding, however, concerns the relationship 
between an "objective probability" and the perceived probability (the true score 
of the subject). A systematic difference between perception and "objective 
reality" is what we denote as distortions. Distortions are what von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards (1986) mean by cognitive illusions; cognitive, because of the intellectual 
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tasks to which they refer and illusions, because the phenomena are quite similar 
to the well known perceptual illusions (e.g. estimating distances according to the 
haziness of an object irrespective of the clarity of air). Distortions are detected 
when: a) there is some formal rule or empirical relative frequency that specifies 
the correct answer, b) an individual provides a judgment, and c) there is a 
systematic discrepancy between the correct answer and the person's judgment. 
A well known example of such a distortion is the phenomenon of conservatism: 
in the light of relevant new information subjects do not revise their prior 
opinions into posterior opinions as much as is required by the optimal Bayes-rule. 
Posterior judgments are insufficiently adjusted from prior judgments (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1982). Other types of distortions are: the gambler's fallacy, 
overconfidence, insensitivity to base rate information, ignoring regression towards 
the mean effects, ignoring sample size when constructing sampling distributions, 
etc. See e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1982), Hogarth (1980) and von Winterfeldt 
and Edwards (1986) for a description of each of these distortions. 
Of course, in practice it is often difficult or impossible to separate biases from 
distortions. Assessment of the existence of distortions is only possible when 
objective probabilities exist and effects appear to be persistent over a wide 
variety of elicitation techniques, response modes and uncertain quantities. 
According to Phillips (1983), by far not all distortions reported pass this per-
sistence test. 
The distinction between biases and distortions makes it clear that most of the 
above mentioned criticism of Hogarth (1975) concerning man's ability to assess 
probabilities relates to the question whether the internal representation, that is 
the perception, of uncertainty is in accordance with the objective criterion (a 
formal rule or an empirical relative frequency). He pays much less attention to 
the possibly systematic effects (biases) introduced by elicitation techniques.1 
Hogarth, like Kahneman and Tversky (1982), is rather pessimistic about the possibility of minimizing 
distortions, since he views distortions to be caused by limitations in the individual's information 
processing capacities. On the other hand, von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) are more optimistic 
about minimizing distortions. They state that rules of probability calculus are difficult and not 
intuitively clear. Especially the Bayes-rule is fairly complicated. It is therefore hardly surprising that 
people have difficulty combining probabilistic information in the correct way, especially since sub-
jects in experiments often have to make intuitive judgments as they are deprived of physical tools 
like books about statistics, calculators, or even paper and pencil. Moreover, in most experiments 
(Wallsten and Budescu 1983) subjects have neither prior experience in probability assessment nor are 
they reasonably familiar with the uncertain quantities assessed. Training, experience and expertise is 
vital in making accurate and valid judgments, as is shown by experts like weather forecasters who are 
extremely well calibrated and much more informative than climatological model forecasts (Wallsten 
and Budescu 1983). Furthermore, both in experiments and for actual decisions, subjects will not 
always perceive the effort of arriving at better answers than reasonable approximation, as worthwhile 
or necessary. 
Von Winterfeldt and Edwards therefore conclude that the issue of the quality of human intuitive 
performance may be more or less irrelevant to the broader question of human intellectual compe-
tence: if the problem is deemed important and tools are available people will use them and they will 
subsequently get the right answers. Cognitive illusions like perceptual illusions are pervasive and 
people get easily trapped. Thus, tools will be invented and used to prevent people from making 
(large) mistakes, especially when decisions are important. For other decisions people will make 
approximate judgments which may be systematically distorted. 
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The most important and best documented cognitive processes that may lead to 
severe distortions and biases are the heuristics as defined by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982), namely: availability, anchoring and adjustment and 
representativeness. 
- Availability means that judgments are affected by the ease with which relevant 
information is recalled or visualized. For example, recent information is more 
available to the subject since it is easily recalled and it is therefore given too 
much weight in the total judgment. 
An example of how the availability heuristic may result in distorted price per-
ceptions of farmers is when the price which farmers received last year (in 
effect, their most recent information) influences price perception of a mar-
keting strategy more than prices received in former years. Even if prices are 
hardly related between respective years. 
- Anchoring and (insufficient) adjustment deals with the effect that readily 
available pieces of information provide the basis or anchor for formulating 
responses. Subsequent responses are adjustments to this anchor but which are 
typically insufficient inducing different anchor points, e.g. by means of the 
wording of the question or framing of the problem, will result in different 
assessments, all biased toward the anchors. 
An example of a bias which may be introduced by the anchoring and adjust-
ment heuristic concerns an elicitation technique in which the median of a 
subjective probability distribution is elicited first. Next if the quartiles of the 
distribution are elicited, the respondent will probably use the specified median 
as an anchor. With insufficient adjustment the resulting subjective probability 
distribution is tighter than is justified by the respondent's actual state of 
information (a central bias). 
- The heuristic of representativeness concerns judgments in which the proba-
bility of an event is evaluated to the degree to which it is considered repre-
sentative of, or similar to, some major characteristics of the process or popu-
lation from which it originated. Probability judgments are more or less simi-
larity judgments and judgments then become insensitive to information about 
e.g. prior probabilities or sample size. 
These heuristics can be seen as simplifying rules applied to arrive at solutions to 
complex tasks like probability assessments. Knowledge of these heuristics not 
only allows us to explain why people show distortions and biases in evaluating 
probabilities, but also provides information about the type of bias that may be 
present in a particular assessment of probabilities and suggests how to conduct 
the interview when eliciting subjective probability distributions in order to 
reduce bias. For example, to forego the influence of the anchoring and adjust-
ment heuristic, an elicitation technique in which the extremes of the probability 
distribution are elicited first, will probably result in a less tight distribution. 
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This study focuses on minimizing bias introduced by the measurement process. 
No attention is directed toward detecting distortions. As stated in Chapter 2, in 
this study we do not focus upon how the farmer constructs his subjective proba-
bility distribution. Even if farmers' perceptions are distorted, their actual deci-
sions are based upon exactly these perceptions. In order to be able to explain and 
predict preferences and behavior of farmers, measuring these, possibly distorted, 
perceptions with minimal bias is essential. We therefore now turn to a brief 
overview of the reliability and validity of elicitation techniques. 
Reliability and validity issues in eliciting probabilities 
Wallsten and Budescu (1983) review a great number of studies from a psycho-
metric stand-point in order to evaluate reliability and validity of the elicitation 
of probabilities. In their presentation and discussion, results for non-experts are 
differentiated from those for experts like weather forecasters, military intelli-
gence officers and statisticians. Most of the studies Wallsten and Budescu review 
deal with binary distributions instead of continuous distributions, thereby 
restricting their conclusions. Nevertheless some general conclusions can be drawn. 
With respect to reliability, they first conclude that reliability is reported in 
relatively few studies. Secondly, reliability estimates reported mostly concern 
test-retest reliability which is often quite high. Alas, they furthermore conclude 
that, up until now, it has not been possible to state which elicitation technique is 
most reliable in which circumstances. This is also concluded by Ludke et al. 
(1977) who showed that the performance of a technique depends upon the skew-
ness of the distribution to be elicited. 
With respect to the validity of the techniques, Wallsten and Budescu state that 
convergent validity is high. This means that the positive correlation between 
estimates with the use of two or more different elicitation techniques is high, 
that is, higher than is usually found in psychological measurement. Experts in 
probability assignment like weather forecasters showed more consistent results in 
this respect than non-experts. Although in general, correlations between estimates 
by different elicitation techniques are high, probabilities often differ in absolute 
magnitude between the techniques. When intending to use the judgments for 
forecasting purposes, this difference between techniques of course poses a severe 
problem, since one has to choose which technique provides the most accurate 
estimate or one has to combine the estimates from different techniques one way 
or another. Overall, Wallsten and Budescu conclude that various elicitation tech-
niques are relatively valid. 
The results of general stability and convergent validity of the techniques 
reported strengthen our confidence that a consistent quantification of judgment is 
possible. It should be noted, however, that these conclusions, especially with 
respect to non-experts, are based mainly on experimental studies in laboratory 
circumstances or in decision analysis situations and that they mostly concern 
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binary distributions. Few studies exist in which these techniques are applied and 
evaluated with respect to reliability and validity in large scale survey research. 
The limited time available for training and motivating respondents and for 
eliciting, often continuous, probabilities will probably influence the stability and 
validity of the technique. Therefore, if possible, more than one technique should 
be applied when assessing probability distributions. A description of elicitation 
techniques and a discussion of their suitability for use in survey research will 
now be given. 
5.2.2 Review of techniques for eliciting subjective probability distributions 
A number of elicitation techniques is available. Descriptions of these techniques 
can be found in e.g. Winkler (1967), Raiffa (1968), Schlaifer (1969), Spetzler and 
StaSl von Holstein (1975) and Anderson et al. (1977). A short description of the 
most important techniques will be given here, following on the classification of 
Spetzler and Stael von Holstein (1975). 
These authors use two dimensions to differentiate between the techniques: the 
quantity a respondent has to specify and the response mode. The elicitation tech-
niques differ according to whether the respondent must specify either pro-
babilities (P-methods), values of the uncertain quantity (V-methods) or both 
(PV-methods). The second dimension concerns whether the respondent must 
specify numbers as answers (this is called the number response mode) or has to 
choose between alternatives or bets (the choice response mode). In the latter case, 
probabilities or values in the alternatives/bets are adjusted so that the respondent 
becomes indifferent between the alternatives/bets. Thus, points are obtained from 
the probability distribution. The combination of both dimensions of response 
mode and quantity to be specified results in five types of techniques. These are 
shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Classification of elicitation techniques 
RESPONSE MODE 
RESPONDENT 
SPECIFIES Choice Number 
Probability Probability wheel Cumulative probability 
technique 
Value Interval technique Fractile technique 
Probability Drawing a graph 
and value - Visual counter 
technique 
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In the number response mode the cumulative probability technique implies that the 
respondent is asked to assign the cumulative probability at a given value (e.g. 
how big is the chance that the price with this marketing strategy will be lower 
than 15 cts/kg?). If such questions are asked for a number of values, a cumula-
tive distribution function can then be fitted to these points. 
In the fractile technique the respondent has to assign values corresponding to 
probabilities (e.g. at what price is there a chance of 10% of receiving a lower 
price?). This fractile technique seems rather difficult to respondents not 
accustomed to thinking in probabilities. 
In the visual counter technique respondents are given a number of, e.g., coins 
and they are asked to divide these coins among a number of specified price 
intervals in accordance with the chance of occurrence, that is, they have to assign 
a density function. It is also possible to ask respondents to sketch the density dis-
tribution or the cumulative probability distribution (drawing a graph). 
In the choice response mode two types of techniques exist. The probability wheel 
technique makes use of a disc with two sectors of different colors (e.g. red and 
yellow) which are adjustable in size. By adjusting the relative size of the sector, 
the probability of a sector/color is changed. A pointer, fastened to the centre of 
the disc, is spun and will stop in one of the two sectors. Given a certain relative 
size of the sectors, the farmer is asked what he perceives as more probable: 
a) the price with this marketing strategy will be equal to or below 20 cts/kg, or 
b) the event that the pointer will stop in the yellow sector. 
The farmer makes his choice, the relative size is changed and then the farmer is 
asked the same question. After a number of iterations the farmer will be in-
different between alternatives a) and b) which implies that he perceives the 
chance of receiving a price equal to or below 20 cts/kg as being equal to the 
relative size of the yellow sector. The elicitation continues by selecting another 
price and then the same iteration process starts again. Of course, it is also 
possible to fix the size of the yellow sector and iterate with the price towards 
indifference between a) and b). 
Often, with the probability wheel technique the respondent is asked to choose 
between gambles instead of alternatives. E.g. choose between: 
a) receive Dfl 100,= if the price with this marketing strategy exceeds 35 cts/kg 
and receive nothing otherwise; 
b) receive Dfl 100,= if the pointer stops in the yellow sector and receive 
nothing if it stops in the red sector. 
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Again, by adjusting the relative size of the sectors, farmers will become in-
different between these gambles, implying that the chance of receiving a potato 
price exceeding 35 cts/kg equals the chance of the pointer stopping in the yellow 
sector. 
An advantage of the probability wheel technique over other techniques is that 
chances are visualized and that only preference statements are required. Making 
preference statements is likely to be easier than directly expressing the magnitude 
of probabilities or values as is required by the number response mode techniques. 
The probability wheel method is less suitable for very small chances since one 
sector becomes very small. This method should therefore only be used for potato 
prices for which chances are relatively large. 
A second choice response mode technique which is also frequently applied is 
the interval technique or bisection technique. In this technique an interval of 
prices, which is for example shown to the respondent on a ruler, is split into two 
parts. The farmer is then asked to state what he considers more likely: 
a) the price will fall below the dividing point, or 
b) the price will fall above the dividing point. 
After having chosen, the dividing point is adjusted until, after a number of 
iterations, the farmer considers both parts equally likely. This means that the 
median of the probability distribution has been elicited. Proceeding this technique 
both below and above the median results in the quartiles of the distribution, then 
octiles, etc. 
Application of elicitation techniques with farmers as respondents 
In studies with farmers as respondents the visual counter technique is used rather 
frequently for eliciting probability distributions. Francisco and Anderson (1972) 
applied this technique to obtain subjective probability distributions for woolprices 
and rainfall. Bessler (1979) elicited yield estimates for a number of crops using 
this technique and Lee et al. (1985) elicited income distributions for alternative 
conservation practices. According to Grisley and Kellogg (1983, 1985) even low 
educated farmers are capable of using this technique. They elicited price and 
yield distributions with farmers in Northern Thailand. Their method, however, 
was severely criticized by Knight et al. (1985). 
Direct questioning procedures were applied by Carlson (1970) and Pingali and 
Carlson (1985). The latter asked farmers to specify minimum, maximum and 
modal values of pest damage. A triangular distribution was fitted to these points. 
Huijsman (1986) also applied the latter technique to farmers in the Philippines. 
He elicited, with two-week intervals, triangular yield distributions for the major 
crops. Comparing this technique to the visual counter technique, he concluded 
that farmers felt more comfortable about the direct questioning of minimum, 
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maximum and modal values. He evaluated the visual counter technique as being 
too abstract for his low educated farmers. A problem with the direct technique, 
however, was that farmers had difficulty specifying the modal value. They 
showed a tendency to assess the best possible outcome and then to adjust down-
wards insufficiently, which resulted in much too optimistic estimates. Also, 
approaching harvest-time, the distributions narrowed somewhat but stayed fairly 
wide until the very moment of harvest, although actually uncertainty already had 
been resolved to a large extent amply before harvest-time. 
Choice of the elicitation technique to be applied in this study 
Although the visual counter technique is rather popular in studies which concern 
agricultural producers, this technique will not be used in this study. Many coins 
and intervals would be necessary in order to express rather subtle differences 
between the marketing strategies, thereby complicating the procedure. Also 
Spetzler and Stael von Holstein (1975) doubt whether people are capable of 
expressing their judgments in terms of a density function without introducing 
large biases. More specifically, they suggest that symmetric distributions will 
result relatively often. 
Reviewing strengths and weaknesses of various techniques, Spetzler and StaSl 
von Holstein (1975) recommend the use of the probability wheel technique for 
respondents unfamiliar with probabilities. After a number of elicitations, the 
wheel device can be replaced by a number response mode technique. The interval 
technique should be used as a consistency check. Ideally, according to the 
authors, the following process should be adhered to: 
- First, elicit the extremes of the subjective probability distribution. In order to 
avoid the availability heuristic, the subject should be asked to think of 
scenarios which could lead to more extreme outcomes. By having to think 
explicitly about extreme scenarios, thereby making them more available, sub-
jects may be induced to assign larger probabilities to extreme values. Central 
bias is minimized in this manner. 
- Next, a number of points of the cumulative probability distribution are 
elicited, using the probability wheel. 
- By means of the interval technique, median and quartiles of the distribution 
are elicited and combined with the points elicited by the probability wheel 
technique. By using a fitting criterion and procedure, a distribution function is 
fitted to the elicited point. 
- Verification of the subjective probability distribution is obtained by drawing 
bets from the elicited probability distribution. The respondents should agree 
with the implications of the bets. Otherwise, the whole process will start anew 
until agreement is reached. 
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It will be clear that the whole process of informing the respondent and training 
him in measurement techniques, quantifying a number of points and then veri-
fying these judgments, takes a lot of time. In a decision analysis context this may 
be reasonable. In surveys, however, this is too time-consuming, especially when 
several subjective probability distributions have to be elicited for each respon-
dent. It was therefore decided to apply only one elicitation technique and not to 
verify the elicited subjective probability distribution with bets. 2 
In order to be able to choose between the probability wheel and the interval 
technique, these techniques were compared in test interviews with about 30 
farmers. Very soon, it became clear that farmers did not feel very comfortable 
about the probability wheel technique. Most of them considered the technique 
cumbersome and lengthy. The process of iteration was evaluated as very boring, 
especially when the response mode with gambles was applied. Very soon, they 
started to provide direct answers without using the wheel or iteration. However, 
our evaluation of those direct answers is that they were given too quickly without 
careful thought. Contrariwise, the interval technique took less time and farmers 
considered it less lengthy and boring. Consequently the farmers remained moti-
vated to think hard about their answers. We therefore decided to use only the 
interval technique in this study. The exact data collection procedure implemented 
Conclusion 
This section as well as the former contained a review of the techniques that exist 
for eliciting subjective probability distributions and the problems that are 
associated with encoding probabilities. Many studies, mainly originating from 
experimental psychology, report distortions and biases in human judgment when 
assessing probabilities and combining probabilistic information. Well documented 
cognitive processes like the heuristics of availability, anchoring and adjustment 
and representativeness are described which may cause these response biases. On 
the other hand, empirical research also reports relatively high stabilities and con-
vergent validity correlations between various elicitation techniques, although this 
research mostly concerns binary distributions which are elicited in controlled 
laboratory circumstances or in decision analysis. More research is needed con-
cerning the validity and reliability of techniques applied in survey conditions. 
Evaluating the evidence, it is clear that eliciting probabilities is a difficult task 
with many pitfalls which should therefore be conducted very carefully. Biases 
may easily be introduced into the measurement process. Elicitation techniques 
should be applied with care to minimize this bias. In order to achieve this situa-
tion, it is very important that the decision context be structured and clearly 
Note that for the assessment of convergent validity two approaches of measuring price perception are 
already applied: a) the elicitation of subjective probability distributions and b) the direct questioning 
procedure for mean price and magnitude estimation of price risk. 
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defined. Respondents should be convinced that structuring conforms to their 
experience and perception of the decision situation. 
The interviewer is also an important factor since it is his responsibility to make 
sure that respondents perceive the task in the correct way and that they are moti-
vated in thinking thoroughly and carefully about their subjective probabilities. 
He must be weary of biases which may be introduced by heuristics in the elicita-
tion process. For survey research, this means that extensive training and in-
struction of the interviewer is very important. On the other hand, systematic 
biases caused by the interviewer may be introduced, because the interviewer 
plays such a vital and active role in the encoding process. 
With respect to the possibility of biases it is important to state in what way we 
will make use of the elicitations. We do not want to elicit the subjective proba-
bility distributions for normative purposes, that is, we do not want to prescribe 
the farmer which marketing strategy he should choose given the probability dis-
tributions assessed, nor do we want to evaluate the farmer's expertise in fore-
casting. Furthermore, we are only slightly interested in making comparisons 
between farmers, e.g. in seeking systematic differences between them. The main 
aim of eliciting subjective probability distributions in this study is to explain and 
predict the farmer's preferences for marketing strategies. 
Essentially, our main interest is directed towards making comparisons between 
marketing strategies for each individual concerned (a within subject analysis). 
That is, we intend to explain why a farmer prefers, say Strategy A to Strategy B 
and B to C. Therefore, even biases introduced by the elicitation technique, for 
example a central bias, do not pose a big problem as long as it can be assumed 
that the bias is equal for all strategies elicited for that specific farmer. 
5.2.3 Implementation of the interval technique 
The interval technique is used for encoding the subjective probability distribu-
tion. At least three points of the cumulative probability distribution should be 
elicited by means of this technique. It was decided to try to elicit five points, 
namely the three quartiles and two extremes. The extremes of the probability 
distribution are elicited first. By first eliciting the minimum and maximum price 
before eliciting the median and first and third quartile, we have tried to mini-
mize possible central bias caused by the anchoring and incomplete adjustment 
heuristic. 
The following data collection procedure was implemented. From the set of 
marketing strategies, described in Chapter 4, a marketing strategy is randomly 
selected and the farmer is asked to imagine selling his total ware potato harvest 
in accordance with that strategy. Then the farmer is asked to state the price in 
cts/kg which he at least expects to receive in accordance with this marketing 
strategy. After this initial statement, the farmer is asked if he is "almost com-
pletely sure" that market circumstances will not turn out to be so bad that the 
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price to receive will be worse than his initially stated price. In this way, the 
farmer is given the opportunity of careful consideration and is stimulated to 
think about scenarios which might lead to low potato prices. It is thus tried to 
reduce effects of availability. Analogous questions result in the maximum price 
farmers expect to receive in accordance with the selected marketing strategy. 
These expected minimum and maximum prices are taken to represent the 01 and 
99 percentiles of the cumulative distribution function, although these chances 
were not specified in the question. We only asked whether the farmer was "almost 
completely sure". 
Next, both extreme prices elicited were marked on a ruler of about 30 cm long 
with prices ranging from 5 cts/kg to 100 cts/kg, with intervals of 0.5 cts/kg. 
Then, a third price some where in between the minimum and maximum was 
marked on the ruler. The farmer was then asked what he considers more likely: 
either receiving a price in the price range between the minimum and middle 
marker, or receiving a price between the middle and maximum marker. By posi-
tioning the middle marker close to the minimum or maximum marker, it is easy 
for the farmer to choose. After his initial choice, the middle marker is moved 
over the price interval and the same question is asked again. By further iterating 
the procedure, the middle marker is moved until the farmer states that it is 
equally likely to receive a price in both intervals, so that the median of the dis-
tribution is elicited. 
The same procedure is used for eliciting the first quartile between minimum 
and median and the third quartile between median and maximum. With five 
points now having been elicited, the farmer is asked if he considers receiving a 
price this year in each of the four intervals marked down on the ruler, equally 
likely. If not, price intervals are changed until the farmer is satisfied with the 
elicited points. By asking the farmer to compare the four intervals, careful 
thought about his opinion is stimulated and previous answers are verified. 
The procedure is continued by randomly selecting another marketing strategy 
and the whole process starts over again. A farmer's "own marketing strategy" was 
used to train him for the elicitation procedure. 
Farmers responded fairly easily to the whole procedure in test interviews, since 
they only have to deal with the question of equal or unequal chances, without 
making statements of the magnitude of probabilities. However, the elicitation 
procedure per marketing strategy was rather lengthy and after a number of sub-
jective probability distributions the farmers became weary and somewhat bored 
by the procedure. From the viewpoint of keeping respondents motivated and of 
constraining the total time spent on these perception questions, it became 
apparent in test interviews that about 7 marketing strategies, taking about half an 
hour time in total, were deemed the maximum number of strategies to be 
elicited. Therefore, for this task a selection of the marketing strategies as pre-
sented in Table 5.2 had to be made. 
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The strategies selected for elicitation should be: representative of the whole set of 
strategies, easy to understand and rather different from each another. Conse-
quently, the 100% strategies are thus contained in the sample and of the strategies 
with combinations of selling-options, only 50% strategies are considered. 
We selected 6 out of 13 marketing strategies in 1984 and 11 out of 18 in 1985. 
Table 5.2 shows the marketing strategies selected. Evaluating the results of 1984, 
it turned out that it would be interesting to extend the number of strategies, thus 
enabling more comparisons between strategies. Therefore, in 1985 each farmer 
responded to Strategies 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 9 plus one strategy which was randomly 
selected from the set 7, 8, 10, 11 and 16. Because of the constraints set by res-
pondent motivation and time, the probability distributions of these extra strate-
gies could only be elicited for one fifth of the respondents. 
Table 5.2 Indication of marketing strategies for which the sub-
jective probability distribution (spd) is elicited in 1984 
and 1985 
Marketing strategy 1984 1985 
1 100% Pc X X 
2 100% Bp X X 
3 100% Fpl - -
4 100% Sml X X 
5 100% Pp - X 
6 100% Sm2 X X 
7 50% Pc/50% Sml X XX 
8 50% Bp/50% Sml - XX 9 50% Fpl/50% Sml X X 
10 50% Pp/50% Sml - XX 
11 50% Pc/50% Sm2 - XX 
12 50% Fpl/50% Sm2 - -
13 50% Fpl/40% Bp/10% Sml - -14 100% Fp3 - -
15 50% Fp3/50% Sml - -
16 50% Pp/50% Sm2 - XX 
17 25% Pp/25% Fpl/50% Sml - -18 25% Pp/25% Fpl/50% Sm2 - -
X means that the spd. is elicited for all respondents 
X X means that the spd. is elicited for a fifth of the respondents 
Abbreviations used in naming the marketing strategies: 
Pc ~ Pooling at a cooperative company 
Pp = Pooling at a private company 
Fpl = Fixed-price contract, 1 year fixed 
Fp3 = Fixed-price contract, 3 years fixed 
Bp = Bottom-price contract 
Sml = Spot market sales, selling at one moment 
Sm2 = Spot market sales, selling at two moments 
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It is clear that interviewers play a very active role in the elicitation process. The 
iteration task of arriving at indifference, the reactions on remarks of the respon-
dent, as well as the task of verifying the implications of the initial elicitations, all 
require a high involvement on the part of the interviewer. Therefore, notwith-
standing the standard questioning procedure and clear instructions to the inter-
viewers, biases by the interviewer may have resulted. This possibility will be 
checked in Section 5.3.2. 
5.2.4 Fitting a probability distribution function to the elicitations 
Having elicited at least three points of the cumulative probability distribution for 
several marketing strategies and for each farmer, the problem arises of how to 
analyse these elicitations. Of course, it is possible to perform some analyses on 
the elicited scores, but it is probably much more convenient and instructive to fit 
a distribution function to the points and to use the parameters or the moments of 
the distribution in further analyses. 
In principle, it is possible to fit a separate cumulative distribution function to 
each marketing strategy and for each farmer, using some best-fitting criterion. 
This could mean that e.g. a beta distribution fits the points of Strategy 4 of 
farmer 1 best, the lognormal distribution fits Strategy 6 of farmer 1 best, while 
the normal distribution function fits Strategy 6 of farmer 2 best etc. Following 
this procedure, not only the parameters of a distribution function, but also the 
type of distribution function would differ between marketing strategies and 
farmers. 
It is clear that this procedure is rather cumbersome, since eventually about 
3000 distributions must be fitted (250 respondents x 6 strategies x 2 years of 
measurement). With a set of, say, four types of distribution functions this would 
mean fitting more than 12000 distributions. Also, chosing the best fitting distri-
bution function per individual per strategy is impossible since often no more than 
3 points per strategy have been elicited so that only one degree of freedom is left 
for testing. It was therefore decided to fit the same distribution function to each 
marketing strategy and for each farmer, so that differences between strategies 
and farmers are only expressed by differences in parameters of this distribution 
function. 
A suitable distribution function should satisfy the following requirements. First 
of all, the function should be flexible in order to account for a whole range of 
skewed distributions.3 Secondly, the number of parameters to be estimated should 
be small in order to accommodate the cases in which only 3 points were elicited. 
Thirdly, the estimation method should be as simple as possible because of the 
By comparing in the data set the median to the minimum and maximum prices per strategy, it 
became clear that most distributions are skewed to the right. As expected, the median is closer to the 
minimum price than to the maximum price. 
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large number of distributions that have to estimated. Preferably, ordinary least 
squares should be applied. 
Out of the class of linearizable cumulative probability distribution functions 
with two parameters, we selected the Weibull and lognormal distributions 
(Johnson and Kotz 1970) as suitable alternatives. 
The cumulative lognormal distribution is: 
F{x) = N(ln x;n,a) = iV((lna: - fi)/a;0,l) (-5-1) 
where N is the normal distribution function. 
This function can be estimated linearly by: 
In (XJ) = ft, + a wj + ej j = 1, ... , 5 (5.2) 
where ej is an i.i.d. random disturbance term. 
In Equation 5.2 x x to x 5 are (from low to high) the price levels given by the 
respondent and W j to w 6 are the points of the standard normal distribution with 
p-levels: .99, .75, .50, .25, .01, respectively. Vector w thus consists of the values 
(-2.576, -.67, 0, .67, 2.576). 
By applying ordinary least squares to the observations, estimates of mu and 
sigma are obtained (i.e. the regression coefficients) per marketing strategy for 
each respondent. If the respondent provides only 3 or 4 data points, then 
Equation 5.2 can still be estimated. 
The estimates of mu and sigma are used for computing mean, median, standard 
deviation and skewness of the fitted lognormal distribution (see Aitchison and 
Brown 1957). 
The cumulative Weibull distribution is: 
F(x) = 2 = 1 - e(- x/a? (5.3) 
where a and b > 0. 
This function can be written as: 
In (x) = ln a + ±±=iL (5.4) 
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which can be estimated linearly by: 
In (XJ) = a + ft In In ^Y^T-) + Gj (5'5) 
where 
a — ea and b — ^ (5.5a) 
and ej is an i.i.d. random disturbance term. 
In Equation 5.5 x x to x 6 are (from low to high) the price levels given by the 
respondent and z x to z B are the p-levels: .99, .75, .50, .25, .01, respectively. The 
regression estimates of alpha and beta in (5.5) are used in calculating the 
moments of the Weibull distributions by means of a Gamma function (see 
Johnson and Kotz 1970). 
For a number of marketing strategies, both distributions will be fitted and the 
cumulative probability distribution function that results in the lowest residual 
variance averaged over all farmers will be selected for further analysis (Theil 
1971). 
5.3 Results of indirect measurement of price perception 
In this section the results of price perception measurement by means of the inter-
val technique will be presented and discussed. After a review of the percentages 
of response to the elicitation questions, we will discuss which of the probability 
distributions, lognormal or Weibull, fits the data best (5.3.1). In Section 5.3.2, the 
average results are presented and a detailed analysis of the measurements will be 
made by testing the effects of moment of delivery, number of selling moments 
and interviewer on price perception. Heterogeneity in perception will be 
reviewed in Section 5.3.3 by testing the differences in perception between 
farmers actually dealing with a cooperative or with a private company. The dif-
ferences between subjective probability distributions of strategies are analyzed by 
means of stochastic dominance rules and are dealt with in Section 5.3.4. A con-
clusion comes at the end of this chapter (Section 5.3.5). 
5.3.1 Response to the elicitation question and adequacy of fit of the lognormal 
and Weibull distributions 
Eliciting a subjective probability distribution is not an easy task for the respon-
dent, as has become clear from the discussion in the former section. He has to 
answer rather unusual questions about his price expectations of a marketing 
strategy. Moreover, he has to answer them not only for one strategy but for 
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several marketing strategies. This might induce a large number of non-response. 
Table 5.3 shows the number of respondents per marketing strategy for which at 
least the minimum, maximum and median have been obtained. 
Table 5.3 Response to the subjective probability distribution elicitation question 
for marketing strategies that had to be answered by all respondents 
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE 
RESPONSES OF RESPONSES 
STRATEGY 1984 1985 1984 1985 
Own strategy 211 179 88.6 87.3 
1. 100% Pc 199 166 83.6 81.0 
2. 100% Bp 199 151 83.6 73.6 
4. 100% Sml 193 166 81.1 81.0 
5. 100% Pp — 158 — 77.1 
6. 100% Sm2 202 151 84.9 73.6 
Number of respondents 
interviewed 238 205 
Mean response 201 162 84.4 78.9 
The overall response percentage is around 85% in 1984 and 79% in 1985. 
Response is highest for the farmer's own marketing strategy, probably because 
this strategy is always the first one to be elicited and because farmers are most 
acquainted with this strategy. The subjective probability distribution of at least 
two marketing strategies (excluding the own strategy) is elicited for a total of 206 
(86.6%) respondents in 1984 and 179 (87.3%) in 1985. Considering the difficulty 
of the task to the respondent, these response percentages are high. 
Interviewers reported that they had difficulties with some farmers, as they 
viewed the elicitation task as being unrealistic. Sometimes statements were given 
like: "One can't see in the future, anything can happen" and "I am no forecaster". 
Those remarks point to the fact that some farmers had the idea that they should 
give perfect forecasts. Interviewers were instructed to make clear that the task 
did not concern forecasting but the respondent's own opinion about the 
uncertainty of the price he expects. Often, when a farmer made a statement like 
e.g.: "anything can happen", it helped to put the markers at the extremes of the 
ruler and to ask: "So according to you the price with this strategy this year could 
be 5 cts/kg as well as 100 cts/kg?" Most farmers, of course, denied this implica-
tion, so that the interviewer could move the markers, etc. Also, when farmers 
were giving remarks that suggested a uniform probability distribution, the inter-
viewer derived the implications of assuming such a distribution in order to make 
sure that a uniform distribution was what the farmer really expected and meant. 
Mostly, farmers changed their ideas as a consequence. 
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Apart from non-response to the elicitation question itself, there is non-response 
because all 5 points of the cumulative probability distribution were not always 
elicited. The minimum, maximum and median could be measured in most cases. 
However, it turned out that farmers expected fairly low prices in both years. The 
maximum price elicited was often quite low, which resulted in a small range 
between minimum and maximum price. After eliciting the median, still smaller 
ranges between minimum and median and median and maximum resulted. Fre-
quently, these ranges were too small to enable elicitation of the first and third 
quartile. 
No more than three points per strategy are elicited for a rather large percen-
tage of farmers especially in 1984. The response percentages are presented in 
Table 5.4. Five points are obtained for 44.9% of all strategies, four points are 
elicited for 8.7% and three points are elicited for 46.4% of all strategies in 1984. 
In 1985 these percentages are respectively: 71.8%, 7.4% and 20.8%, indicating 
much more complete elicitations in 1985. 
The remarkable difference between 1984 and 1985 illustrates that the number 
of points elicited depends on the range between minimum and maximum. In 
1984, as will be seen later, the farmers were rather sure about the price they 
expected to receive, so the range between minimum and maximum was rather 
small (average range is 14 cts/kg). Consequently, in extreme cases it was virtually 
impossible to try to elicit the quartiles. In 1985, the farmers were less sure about 
the prices, so the range is larger (average range is 19 cts/kg); it was therefore 
often possible to elicit the first and third quartile of the distribution. 
Table 5.4 Number of points of the cumulative proba-
bility distribution elicited per year, over all 
marketing strategies, in percentages 
ELICITED NUMBER OF POINTS 
3 4 5 Total 
1984 46.4 8.7 44.9 100% 
1985 20.8 7.4 71.8 100% 
Comparison of fit of the lognormal and Weibull distribution function 
For half of the observations in 1984, selected randomly, both the lognormal and 
the Weibull probability distribution were fitted to the elicited points by means of 
OLS per individual and per marketing strategy (see 5.2.3). The difference in fit 
between both functions is quite large. To illustrate this, the mean R-square of 
the lognormal distribution is 0.945, whereas the mean R-square of the Weibull 
distribution is 0.852. A pairwise test of the difference in fit by means of the sign 
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test shows a larger fit of the lognormal distribution in virtually all cases, which 
of course is significant. It is clear that the lognormal distribution performs better 
than the Weibull distribution. 
Although it is possible that distribution functions other than the lognormal 
function could give better results in some instances, the lognormal distribution 
overall provides a fairly accurate and satisfactory description of most of the 
cumulative probability distributions. 
In order to illustrate the lognormal distribution, in Figure 5.1 two probability 
density functions are shown. The median of function A is 23.5 cts/kg, the mean 
is 24 cts/kg and the standard deviation is 4.97 cts/kg. For function B these values 
are respectively: 21 cts/kg, 22 cts/kg and 6.87 cts/kg. 
price in cts/kg 
M = 3 . 1 5 7 M = 3 . 0 4 5 
° " = . 2 0 5 c r = . 3 0 5 
Figure 5.1 Two examples of the probability density function of the lognormal 
distribution 
5.3.2 Perception of marketing strategies: the moments of the subjective proba-
bility distributions 
The estimated parameters of the lognormal distribution are used to calculate the 
mean, median, standard deviation and skewness of the distribution. Table 5.5 
shows the average results of those statistics. It is important to clarify the notation 
used. First of all, the mean (expected value) of the probability distribution a 
farmer associates with a strategy is indicated by IMEA (I being an abbreviation 
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of the indirect measurement of the moments of the distribution). The I is 
required in order to be able to discriminate the mean from the mean price speci-
fied by the direct questioning procedure (see 5.4) which will be noted as DMEA 
(direct estimate of mean). The median, standard deviation, skewness and coeffi-
cient of variation are noted respectively as: IMED, ISTA, ISKE and ICV. 
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Figure 5.2 Average perception of marketing strategies with respect to mean 
price (IMEA) and standard deviation of price (ISTA), in both years, 
in cts/kg (data Table 5.5) 
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Secondly, because there is a sample of respondents, the average value of IMEA is 
indicated by MU, the median by MED and the standard deviation by SD. 
Thirdly, the marketing strategies are indicated by a number; in 1984 from 1 to 
13, in 1985 from 1 to 18. To discriminate between both years, 1984 will be noted 
as a and 1985 as b. 
Taking this all together e.g. MU(IMEA7a) indicates the sample average of the 
perceived expected price (IMEA) in 1984 for marketing Strategy 7, and 
MU(ISTAlb) stands for the sample average of the perceived standard deviation in 
1985 for Strategy 1. 
The following observations can be drawn (see Table 5.5 and Figure 5.2): 
- Differences between strategies in average mean price are small in 1984. The 
average mean price lies around 23.5 cts/kg. An exception in this respect is 
Strategy 9 (a combination of fixed-price and spot market sales) which shows 
the highest perceived mean price (24.5 cts/kg). A difference of 1 ct/kg does 
not seem much, but for an average farm where 15 ha. of ware potatoes are 
grown with a return of 50 tons/ha, a difference of 1 ct/kg amounts to an 
extra income of Dfl 7500,=. 
The main reason for the price associated with Strategy 9 to be so high may be 
the level of the fixed-price in the description of the marketing strategy. Prices 
for the fixed contract were set at 22, 23, 24 or 26 cts/kg depending on the 
moment of delivery (see Chapter 4). Apparently, these fixed-price levels are 
higher than the farmers' expectations of the mean price of other selling-
options.4 
- In Figure 5.2 average perceptions of mean price and standard deviation are 
shown for both years. Let us first consider 1984. Strategy 4 (100% spot mar-
ket, selling at one moment) is perceived as most risky, followed by Strategies 6 
and 7. It is illustrative to compare Strategy 2 (100% bottom-price) to 4; on 
average they are equal with respect to mean price, but the standard deviation 
of Strategy 4 is much larger than that of 2. In case a risk averse decision 
maker with this average perception, would only take the first two moments 
(mean and variance) of a probability distribution into account, then he would 
prefer Strategy 2 to 4. The former strategy dominates the latter. On the other 
hand, a risk seeking decision maker would prefer Strategy 4 to 2 in this case. 
A comparison of Strategy 9 with 1 and 2 shows that, although the risk asso-
ciated with these three strategies is approximately equal, the mean price of 9 
is much higher than that of 2 or 1. A decision maker will therefore prefer 
Strategy 9 to 2 or 1. 
As stated in Chapter 4, the price levels for the fixed contract have been set realistically and in 
accordance with the prices stated in contracts dealt in at the moment of the interviews. Actually, 
there was a hausse in fixed-price contracts at that moment. 
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Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics of the moments of the lognormal subjective 
probability distributions of price, estimated per marketing strategy 
and per farmer in 1984 and in 1985 (in cts/kg kg) 
Year 1984 
MU SD MU SD MU SD MU SD MU SD 
STRATEGY IMEA IMEA IMED IMED ISTA ISTA ISKE ISKE ICV ICV 
L 100% Pc 2359 3.83 23.13 3.74 235 L71 30 .19 .10 .06 
2. 100% Bp 23.58 357 23.46 3.13 2.01 1.64 54 .16 .08 .05 
4. 100% Sml 23.56 535 23.10 5.18 3.83 333 .49 .42 .16 .13 
6. 100% Sm2 m i 4.69 2255 439 254 232 38 57 .12 .09 
7. 50%Pc/50%Sml 2358 3.63 23.09 335 237 L85 33 51 .11 .07 
9. 50%Fpl/50%Sml 2432 3.40 2439 334 2.17 134 56 .17 .09 .06 
Year 1985 
MU SD MU SD MU SD MU SD MU SD 
STRATEGY IMEA IMEA IMED IMED ISTA ISTA ISKE ISKE ICV ICV 
i. 100% Pc 22.42 4.18 22.11 358 331 236 .43 56 .14 .08 
2. 100% Bp 24.18 331 23.96 330 2.85 2.10 33 51 .11 .07 
4. 100% Sml 2353 5.63 22.46 5.17 533 453 .67 .45 51 .14 
5. 100% Pp 22£2 455 22.44 4.01 3.65 Z69 .46 59 .15 .10 
6. 100% Sm2 2Z86 459 2232 4.62 4.48 337 36 36 .18 .11 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml 23.62 4.66 23.16 459 4.19 3.06 30 31 .16 .10 
8. 50% Bp/50% Sml 2258 456 22.00 3.99 3.00 237 38 56 .13 .08 
9. 50%Fpl/50%Sml 2456 3.88 24.00 3.74 3.10 258 37 55 .12 .08 
10. 50%Pp/50%Sml 22.97 4.67 22.46 4.44 4.43 Z77 37 31 .19 .10 
11. 50% Pc/50% Sm2 2231 359 22.01 3.78 354 231 .42 55 .14 .08 
16. 50% Pp/50% Sm2 22.18 3.75 2L86 3.61 3.45 Z02 .46 53 .15 .07 
If the strategies in Figure 5.2 would be the sole strategies available to a risk 
averse farmer who takes only mean and variance into account, then an 
efficiency frontier can be drawn, which consists of Strategies 2 and 9. These 
strategies are most favorable with respect to perceived mean price and 
standard deviation of price. Which of these strategies he will choose depends 
on the degree of the risk aversion. Strategy 9, however, is very attractive since 
the mean price is 1 cts/kg higher, whereas the extra risk (standard deviation) 
is only 0.1 cts/kg. 
- Average skewness (MU(ISKE)) is positive for each strategy (Table 5.5), which 
means that the subjective probability distribution is skewed to the right (notice 
that average median is smaller than average mean). This positive skewness is 
in agreement with our expectations. Skewness is largest for the 100% spot 
market selling strategies (Strategies 4 and 6). Farmers perceive a larger chance 
of high prices with these marketing strategies than they do with other selling-
options. 
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- Of course, only average perception has been discussed until now. Table 5.5, 
however, shows that individual perceptions can differ widely from this 
average perception, see e.g. the standard deviation of mean price (SD(IMEA) 
and of price risk (SD(ISTA)). Differences between farmers especially show up 
with respect to the spot market Strategies 4 and 6. Part of the variation 
between farmers can be explained by the differences in moment of delivery. It 
seems obvious that farmers will perceive mean price to increase with moments 
of delivery later in the marketing year. Another part of this variation may be 
due to heterogeneity in perception within the group of farmers with the same 
moment of delivery. Both aspects will be dealt with later in this section. 
The interpretation of 1985 is analogous to the results of 1984. Results are 
presented in Table 5.5 and in Figure 5.2. The discussion will therefore be focused 
on the comparison of average results in both years. Figure 5.3 shows a graph of 
average mean price and standard deviation of strategies in both years. 
- The average perceived mean price in 1985 also fluctuates around 23 cts/kg, 
which is in accordance with the mean price farmers had received for their 
potatoes over a number of years (see Table 2.2 in Chapter 2). This could mean 
that farmers perceived 1984 and 1985 as "average" years, at least at the time 
the interview took place (in June). Eventually, it turned out that both years 
were quite disastrous with respect to prices. The average spot market price was 
13.4 cts/kg in 1984 and 10 cts/kg in 1985. 
The perceived mean price for marketing strategy 1 (100% pooling, coopera-
tive) in 1984 is significantly higher (pairwise t-test) than in 1985 (23.29 
compared to 22.42), whereas the mean price for Strategy 2 (100% bottom-
price) in 1984 is significantly lower than in 1985 (23.58 compared to 24.18). 
Other differences in mean price between the same strategies in both years are 
not significant.5 
- A very clear difference exists between 1984 and 1985 with respect to price 
risk as is indicated by the standard deviation of the probability distribution 
(compare MU(ISTA) between both years). The average perceived price varia-
bility for all strategies, in 1984 is significantly smaller than in 1985 (see 
Figure 5.3). Apparently, farmers viewed the market situation in 1984 as more 
predictable than in 1985 at the moment of the interview. Since differences in 
mean price are small between both years, the larger standard deviation in 1985 
implicates that, on average, the perceived minimum price (and first quartile) 
must be lower in 1985 than in 1984 while the perceived maximum price (and 
third quartile) must be higher.6 Also notice that this smaller range in 1984 
It should be noted here that in this chapter a significant effect means p < 0.05 (two-tailed) unless 
stated otherwise. 
For example for Strategy 4 the average minimum price elicited is 15.8 cts/kg and the average maxi-
mum is 39 cts/kg in 1984, whereas in 1985 these numbers are respectively: 13.5 and 45 cts/kg. 
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explains the smaller number of elicited points per marketing strategy in 1984 
compared to 1985. 
- In 1985, distributions were elicited for five extra marketing strategies, namely 
5, 8, 10, 11 and 16, each for a fifth of the respondents. Although the average 
perception of these strategies is presented in Table 5.5 and Figures 5.2 and 
5.3, one should be careful when comparing the average perception of these 
strategies directly with the over all respondents averaged perception of other 
strategies. Only pairwise analysis of differences between strategies will clarify 
which differences in perceived mean price or standard deviation are signifi-
cant. Figure 5.2 shows that comparable strategies like Strategy 1 and 5 are 
rather close to one another. 100% Pooling at a private company (Strategy 5) is, 
on average, viewed as somewhat higher in expected price and riskier than 
pooling at the cooperative (Strategy 1). One can also compare for instance 
Strategies 7 and 11 or 10 and 16. These latter marketing strategies differ only 
in number of selling moments at the spot market. Further on in this section it 
will be shown that neither of these differences is statistically significant. 
25.0 
24.5 
Figure 5.3 Average perception of marketing strategies: a comparison of 1984 
with 1985 
From Table 5.5 and Figures 5.2 and 5.3 it is clear that, on average, the rank 
order of strategies with respect to mean price and standard deviation of price is 
rather alike in both years. The rank order with respect to price risk (standard 
deviation) in both years is, in increasing order: Strategy 2<9<1<7<6<4. With 
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respect to mean price the rank order is, in decreasing order: 9>2>7>4>6; only the 
position of Strategy 1 differs between the years. However, it is even more 
interesting to study the correspondence in rank order on the individual level. 
Information about the order on the individual level is useful, since it gives an 
indication of the difference between both years in rank order of preference of 
strategies to be expected. If we assume risk attitude to be a fairly stable 
characteristic of a farmer which does not change much on a yearly basis and if 
the farmer acts in accordance with the expected utility model, then differences in 
preference for strategies between both years should be attributed to differences 
in perception. 
In order to measure the correspondence of the order between both years, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient is calculated between 1984 and 1985 over strategies 
and per individual both for mean price (IMEA) and for standard deviation of 
price (ISTA). The mean, median and standard deviation of these correlations are 
computed over all farmers. These statistics are shown in Table 5.6. Only Pearson 
correlations are shown in this table, since Spearman rank order correlations 
showed similar results. Correlations per individual are calculated over minimally 
three and maximally 6 strategies (observations). 
The average correlation for IMEA is 0.36 with a median of 0.34 and 38% of 
the correlations being negative. With respect to ISTA, this resulted in a mean 
correlation of 0.59, a median of 0.60 and 25% negative correlations. The average 
correlation appears to be clearly smaller for mean price than for the price risk of 
strategies. One reason for this difference may be that IMEA of Strategy 1 (100% 
pooling cooperative) is significantly larger in 1984 than in 1985, whereas the 
reverse is true for Strategy 2 (100% bottom-price contract; see above). In view of 
the fact that each correlation is based on a small number of strategies, these 
reversions apparently are of such magnitude that they change the order, thus 
resulting in a low correlation. Contrariwise, ISTA in 1985 is perceived as being 
larger than in 1984 for all strategies. Not only do all differences appear to be in 
the same direction, but apparently they are also more or less equal, thereby not 
disturbing the rank order (the rank order did not change but the magnitude of 
risk did). This leads to a relatively high correlation per individual for the 
attribute risk (ISTA). 
It should be noted here that on first sight one might view the correlations 
between both years for the respective measurements as indicators of stability. 
However since measurements took place with a year in between and each 
measurement concerns the perception of market prices in the marketing year to 
come, this is not the case here. In this case one might expect perceptions to 
change, since market circumstances and, consequently, market prices probably 
differ between respective years. 
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Table 5.6 Sample statistics of Pearson correlations computed per farmer over 
marketing strategies between estimates in 1984 and 1985 of IMEA 
and 1ST A respectively 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN Mean* Median St. dev.* % < 0 N 
IMEA 1984 and IMEA 1985 .357 .339 .845 38 146 
ISTA 1984 and ISTA 1985 .589 .603 .854 25 146 
* 
After Fisher r-to-z transformation 
Effect on perception of type of wholesale company 
The interesting question is whether farmers expect to receive a different price 
when they sell their potatoes via a similar strategy to a cooperative or to a private 
company. This difference can only be estimated if a farmer can choose between 
strategies, which only differ with respect to type of wholesale company (a 
within-subject analysis). For this reason comparisons are only possible for three 
strategies, all concerning 1985, (see Table 5.5) namely: 100% pooling (Strategy 1 
with 5), 50% pooling, 50% spot market (selling at one moment) (7 with 10) and 
50% pooling, 50% spot market (selling at two moments) (11 with 16). 
Testing the effects (pairwise t-test), no significant difference in perception 
shows up in all three cases, neither with respect to IMEA nor with respect to 
ISTA or ICV. This means that farmers perceive the same subjective probability 
distribution of price for similar strategies, whether the strategy implies selling to 
a cooperative or to a private company. 
However the test of the hypothesis is not yet complete. If farmers who actually 
sell their potatoes to the cooperative wholesale company perceive e.g. a higher 
IMEA for 100 % pooling at a cooperative than for 100 % pooling at a private 
company, whereas farmers who sell to a private company perceive the reverse, 
then it is possible that differences in perception can be cancelled out when taking 
private and cooperative farmers together in one sample. Stated otherwise: there 
might be an interaction effect between perception and the farmer's actual choice 
of wholesale company. Such an effect would be plausible since one reason for 
selling potatoes to a company might be the higher price farmers expect to receive 
from that company. Such an interaction effect could also be a result of rationali-
zation of actual choice behavior. 
A pairwise test on perceived differences between the three similar strategies 
has been performed separately for both groups of farmers (cooperative and 
private farmers). Although differences were found between both groups in the 
hypothesized direction i.e. each group perceives the marketing strategy of the 
company they actually deal with as being higher in IMEA and lower in ISTA, 
these differences are not statistically significant. One reason for this result may 
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be the rather small number of respondents (+/- 35) per pair of strategies for 
which the effects could be tested. 
It is concluded that no significant difference can be detected in the perception 
of mean price and price risk between the two types of wholesale companies in 
1985. This finding will be elaborated upon furtheron in this section. 
Analysis of the validity of elicitation 
A more detailed analysis of perception data, centered around the question of the 
validity of measured perceptions will now be presented: are the perception results 
reasonable and in accordance with our expectations? The effects of the following 
variables on perception will be analysed: moment of delivery, number of selling 
moments (one or two) and interviewer. 
Effect on perception of moment of delivery 
The strategies formulated are differentiated by the moment of delivery. The four 
moments are (the percentages of farmers choosing each moment are given 
between brackets): September (3%), October up to December (10%), January up 
to March (35%) and, finally, April up to July (52%). A probability distribution is 
elicited only for the farmer's usual moment of delivery which is rather stable 
over the years. Because of the small number of observations in September, only 
11 farmers in 1984 and only 5 in 1985, the observations of these respondents are 
added to the observations of the period October-December. 
It is expected that a group of farmers who delivers later in the marketing year 
will perceive a higher mean price than a group of farmers delivering earlier 
because of the compensation for storage costs. This compensation is the reason 
for higher fixed-prices, higher bottom-prices and, in the long run, higher 
average spot market prices. A confirmation of this hypothesis would provide an 
indication of the validity of the elicitation. 
After testing this between subjects effect by means of analysis of variance per 
marketing strategy, the hypothesis was confirmed for all strategies in 1984. 
Appendix II shows the average results for each moment of delivery. The largest 
differences in mean price exist between the period September-December on the 
one hand and January-July on the other hand. Differences between the moments 
January-March and April-July are small but differences always occur in the 
hypothesized direction for all marketing strategies. 
The results are less clear in 1985. Only 4 strategies (namely 2, 4, 9, 11) show 
significant effects in the hypothesized direction. It is, however, not very sur-
prising not to find any significant differences for Strategies 8, 10 and 16, since 
the number of observations for these marketing strategies is rather small (+/- 35). 
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Strategies 1, 6 and 7 show effects in the hypothesized direction but these effects 
are not significant because of large interindividual variation. 
It is concluded that, in general, a consistent significant effect of moment of 
delivery on perceived mean price exists for most strategies. Significant effects 
would probably have been detected for other strategies as well had the number of 
observations been larger. 
With respect to effect of moment of delivery on the standard deviation of distri-
butions (ISTA), we expect strategies with spot market sales to be perceived as 
riskier when delivering later. Delivering later implies selling later in the mar-
keting year (see the formulation of marketing strategies in Chapter 4). The reason 
for this expected effect is the increasing variability in prices later in the mar-
keting year which was already noted in Chapter 2. We therefore expect to find 
significant effects for Strategies 4 and 6 and, to a lesser extent, also for Strategies 
7 and 9. Indeed, a significant effect is found in the hypothesized direction for 
Strategies 4, 6, 7 and 9 in 1984, whereas such an effect only appeared for Stra-
tegy 4 in 1985 (see Appendix II). A further confirmation of the hypothesis is that 
the effect of moment of delivery is not found for Strategies 1 and 2. 
Reviewing the results, we conclude that a consistent effect of moment of 
delivery on perceived mean and standard deviation of the elicited subjective 
probability distribution is shown. These significant differences certainly 
strengthen our confidence in the elicitation procedure, especially since the effects 
are tested between groups of farmers. 
Effect on perception of number of selling moments 
Farmers have the opportunity to sell at any number of selling moments and 
whenever they like when selling at spot market prices. In the strategies used in 
this study however, a differentiation is only made between selling at one moment 
(in the last month before delivery) at spot market prices and selling at two 
moments (that is, selling in the last month before delivery and in a month early 
in the marketing year, in an equal quantity per moment). In general, mean price 
and price variability increase as the marketing year progresses. Combined with 
the assumption that farmers sell at any randomly selected day in each month, we 
expect farmers to perceive IMEA and ISTA to be lower when selling at two 
moments than when selling at one moment. In this manner, more selling moments 
reduces expected value and price risk. 
In order to test this hypothesis, pairwise comparisons are made between Strate-
gies 4 (100% spot market (selling at one moment)) and 6 (100 % spot market 
(selling at two moments)). In both years, the differences between strategies are 
significant (pairwise t-test) and in accordance with the hypothesis: IMEA and 
121 
ISTA are perceived as being higher when selling at one moment than when 
selling at two moments.7 
It is concluded that farmers perceive selling at one moment at the spot market 
as being somewhat riskier than selling at two moments, but in their perception 
this larger risk goes together with a higher mean price. This finding confirms the 
hypothesis and this again indicates the validity of the elicited subjective proba-
bility distributions. 
Interviewer effects 
As described above, the elicitation of a subjective probability distribution 
assumes an active role on the part of the interviewer. Each interviewer acts in his 
personal way when actually interacting with the respondent, even after careful 
instruction of the interviewer and training him in unobtrusive behavior. Syste-
matic differences between interviewers might therefore show up. 
The largest influence of the interviewer is expected to be exercised by eliciting 
minimum and maximum price, since interviewers can stress the meaning of 
"almost completely sure" differently. Thus, especially the standard deviation and 
the skewness of the distribution might differ systematically between interviewers. 
The interviewer effects on the values of mean (IMEA), standard deviation (ISTA) 
and skewness (ISK.E) were tested for each marketing strategy by means of 
dummy variable regression analysis after controlling for the effect of moment of 
delivery. Thirteen interviewers conducted the survey in 1984, nine of them con-
ducted it in 1985. Interviewers were assigned randomly to farmers. 
No significant interviewer effect for any marketing strategy is found on mean 
price in 1984. The standard deviation and skewness of the distribution, however, 
are systematically affected by the interviewer. A significant effect appeared for 
all strategies in 1984. More specifically, two interviewers systematically, that is 
for all strategies and all respondents, elicited a small ISTA and ISK.E: relatively 
rather tight and symmetric distributions. Also, fairly high ISTA and ISKE are 
found by two other interviewers. These latter interviewers probably emphasized 
more firmly that farmers had to be "almost completely sure that the price would 
not be higher (lower) than the initial maximum (minimum) price elicited", 
thereby systematically widening the range, and indirectly the skewness, of the 
distribution. 
In order to illustrate the magnitude of differences, here the maximum diffe-
rence found is given. This maximum difference comes up with Strategy 4. The 
difference in average ISTA between the two most extreme interviewers is 
Extra tests in this respect are that in 1985, Strategy 7 can be compared to 11 and 10 to 16. Diffe-
rences between these strategies have to be tested by means of a two-sample test in stead of a pairwise 
test. In both cases no significant differences are found, although MU(IMEA) and MU(ISTA) are 
higher for strategies with two selling moments (see Table 5.5). Because of the small number of obser-
vations in connection with the two sample test, these differences are not significant). 
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4 cts/kg. Of course it is not possible to state which of the interviewer groups 
provides a more valid description of the "real" distribution. However, we should 
perhaps have more confidence in the larger estimates, because we know from 
many experiments that people tend to make too tight subjective probability dis-
tributions. 
In 1985, with different interviewers, differences between interviewers in 
IMEA, ISTA and ISKE elicited were larger than in 1984. IMEA also differed 
systematically between interviewers in this year. Two interviewers systematically 
elicited probability distributions with a low maximum and two interviewers 
elicited relatively high maximum prices. One interviewer elicited a high minimum 
as well as a high median price, which implies that all farmers interviewed by him 
were systematically more optimistic than the other farmers. 
It is clear that some interviewer bias is present, especially with respect to the 
price risk of the strategies. Of course this raises some doubts about the elicita-
tions made. If elicitations were intended to be used as forecasts, such a finding 
would be distressing. However, the elicitations in this study are used primarily 
for the analysis of differences between strategies per individual, e.g. with respect 
to differences in preference of a farmer. Systematic interviewer bias is therefore 
no problem as long as it can be assumed that all strategies elicited for a farmer 
are biased in the same systematic way. Also in perception analysis, we should 
concentrate on pairwise differences between strategies per farmer. This means 
that it is more valid to study the differences in say IMEA between two strategies 
for the same farmer, than to discuss the realism of IMEA being e.g. 25 or 
27 cts/kg. However, notwithstanding the systematic interviewer bias, plausible 
results still showed up in the between subjects analysis of effect of moment of 
delivery, which generally indicates that no dramatic effects are caused by inter-
viewer bias. Effects of moments of delivery are clearly larger. 
5.3.3 Heterogeneity in perception: difference between farmers dealing with a 
cooperative or private company 
Table 5.5 clearly showed that farmers differ in their perception of marketing 
strategies (see SD for IMEA and ISTA). After removing the between-subjects 
effect caused by differences in moment of delivery and interviewer, differences 
between farmers still remain (see e.g. Appendix II). It is interesting to find out 
whether we can account for this heterogeneity. Are the differences strictly per-
sonal or are they related to specific characteristics of the farmer? 
The analysis of heterogeneity in perception is confined here to testing 
(between-subjects) the effect of the farmer's actual choice of type of wholesale 
company (cooperative or private). This characteristic is seen as the most plausible 
and interesting variable for which effects may show up. It is expected that 
farmers who actually sell their potatoes to the cooperative will perceive a higher 
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mean price and a lower price risk for the marketing strategies of the cooperative 
than the farmers dealing with a private company. For strategies implying selling 
to a private company, it is expected that cooperative farmers will perceive a 
lower mean price and a higher price risk than farmers dealing with a private 
company. 
Testing these hypotheses per marketing strategy by means of regression analysis 
(controlling for both the influences of interviewer and moment of delivery), the 
following results are found. A significant effect is detected for only one strategy 
in 1984, namely Strategy 1 (100% pooling, cooperative). Farmers actually selling 
to the cooperative perceive a higher IMEA and a higher ISTA than do those 
selling to a private company. Only two significant effects are found in 1985. 
Cooperative farmers now perceive a higher ISTA for both Strategy 5 (100% 
pooling private) and for Strategy 10 (50% pooling private company, 50% spot 
market (at one moment)) than do private farmers. No significant effect, however, 
is detected with respect to IMEA. 
On the basis of this information we conclude that perception is homogeneous 
with respect to the actual choice of type of wholesale company, with the inte-
resting exception that, although differences are small, private farmers tend to 
perceive less risk when pooling than do cooperative farmers. That is, farmers 
dealing with a private company perceive pooling as a more safe strategy than do 
cooperative farmers. An explanation for this difference may be the larger expe-
rience cooperative farmers have with pooling than do private farmers. This 
because pooling is a relatively recent choice alternative for private farmers (see 
Chapter 2), whereas many cooperative farmers have already been used to pooling 
ever since the seventies. This might implicate that cooperative farmers estimate 
the price risk associated with pooling more accurately. They experienced years 
with high as well as years with low prices. Another explanation may be that pri-
vate farmers are more used to larger risks because many of them usually sell a 
relatively high percentage of their yield at spot market prices. They may there-
fore perceive pooling as a relatively secure strategy. The most significant finding, 
however, is the small number of differences in perception of both groups. 
5.3.4 Stochastic dominance analysis of subjective probability distributions 
Up till now, the analysis has been limited to separately discussing the results for 
each moment of the subjective probability distribution. In order to obtain more 
insight in the price perceptions of farmers between strategies, the whole proba-
bility distribution should be taken into account. Subsequently these distributions 
should be compared per individual. One way of performing such an analysis is by 
means of stochastic dominance. 
Stochastic dominance is a well known and simple rule for reducing the number 
of alternatives to an efficient set of alternatives, without knowing the exact 
124 
utility function of the decision maker (Anderson et al. 1977). Some general 
assumptions concerning the utility function suffice. 
At first sight it may seem inappropriate to introduce the stochastic dominance 
concept in this chapter concerning perception results. The analysis would seem 
more appropriate in Chapter 7 which deals with preference analysis, since at least 
some assumptions concerning the utility function, that is the preference of a 
decision maker, are required for stochastic dominance. However, as we will see, 
the required restrictions on the utility function (i.e. a monotonically increasing 
concave utility function) are undemanding and reasonable and since clear insights 
into perception can be gained by this analysis we will present it here. We will, of 
course, make use of the results discussed here in Chapter 7. 
First now, the concept of stochastic dominance is briefly delineated. A presen-
tation and discussion of stochastic dominance rules is usually limited to three 
degrees: first, second and third degree, with cumulative restrictions placed on the 
utility function. For all three degrees of stochastic dominance the ranking rule is 
transitive: if a probability function F stochastically dominates G and G stochas-
tically dominates H then F must dominate H. 
Figure 5.4a Illustration of FSD (F dominates G but not H) 
First degree of stochastic dominance (FSD) requires a monotonically increasing 
utility function. It states that, for expected utility maximizers, alternative F with 
cumulative probability distribution function F(x) stochastically dominates alter-
native G with cumulative distribution function G(x) iff. F(x) < G(x) for all x 
with at least one strong inequality (that is, < holds for at least one value of x). 
Graphically FSD means that the stochastically dominant distribution curve must 
not lie anywhere to the left of a dominated curve (see Figure 5.4a). 
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Figure 5.4b Illustration of SSD where cumulative probability distributions cross 
twice (area A > area B) 
Second degree of stochastic dominance (SSD) requires the additional assumption 
of a strictly concave utility function, i.e., the decision maker should be risk 
averse. For all risk averse decision makers alternative F SSD alternative G iff. 
for all y in [0,1] with at least one inequality. Graphically this means that area A 
in Figure 5.4b is larger than area B. 
Third degree of stochastic dominance (TSD) requires the additional assumption of 
a decreasingly risk averse decision maker. This behavioral assumption about the 
utility function of the decision maker is rather strong. Also, empirically, 
according to Anderson et al. (1977), the SSD efficient set is often hardly reduced 
by applying the TSD rule. The computational task of establishing TSD may 
therefore not cover the marginal benefit of identifying a slightly smaller efficient 
set. As a consequence, the SSD rule is applied most often. 
Applying the SSD rule to some families of probability distributions leads to 
simple results. For normal probability distributions alternative A SSD alternative 
B iff. the expected value of A (EA(x)) is larger than or equal to the expected 
value of B (EB(x)) and the variance of A (VarA(x)) is smaller than or equal than 
the variance of B (Var_(x)), with at least one inequality: 
(5.6) 
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E A ( x ) > E B ( x ) and VarA(xJ < VarB(x) (5.7) 
An SSD rule also exists for lognormal probability distributions. In this rule the 
variance of x in the rule for normal probability distributions is replaced by the 
variance of In x; 
E A ( x ) > E B ( x ) and VarA(ln x) < VarB(ln x) (5.8) 
Note that VarA(ln x) is the parameter sigma in Equation 5.2. For further details 
about the SSD rule for lognormal probability distributions, see e.g. Levy (1973). 
When stochastic dominance is applied to a number of alternatives by means of 
pairwise comparisons between the alternatives, this seldomly leads to one domi-
nant alternative. Mostly, only an efficient set of alternatives is obtained. More 
specific information is needed about the decision maker's utility function, e.g. the 
degree of risk aversion, in order to be able to choose from this efficient set. 
By assuming risk averse farmers, which is a reasonable assumption (see 
Chapter 6), the SSD rule can be applied to the elicited lognormal probability dis-
tributions. The probability distributions of strategies are compared pairwise per 
individual. Table 5.7 shows the results obtained for the total sample for 1984 and 
1985. In this table, the percentages of farmers for which the column strategy 
stochastically dominates (SSD) the row strategy are given. E.g. in 1984 Strategy 1 
(100% pooling, cooperative) SSD Strategy 2 (100% bottom-price) for 15.8% of the 
farmers, whereas the same strategy is dominated by the 100% bottom-price 
strategy for 34.2% of the farmers. No dominance either way could be established 
for the remaining farmers (100-15.8-34.2=50%) by the SSD rule. The other per-
centages in the table can be interpreted likewise. 
Overall, the order of the strategies in 1984 based on the mean column per-
centage of dominance, at decreasing preference, is: 9>2>1>7>6>4. That is, 
Strategy 9 (a combination of fixed-price and spot market sales), dominates other 
strategies most often, followed by Strategy 2 (100% bottom-price contract), etc. 
These two Strategies 9 and 2 are apparently perceived as rather advantageous 
compared to competing strategies and, if farmers are risk averse and expected 
utility maximizers, should be positively evaluated (see also Figure 5.2). 
Both spot market strategies (4 and 6) are dominated most frequently (42.9% 
and 40.8%, respectively) which means that they are perceived as rather un-
attractive in 1984. Selling at one moment is viewed as worse than selling at two 
moments at the spot market. 
More or less the same rank order of strategies is obtained in 1985 (included 
now is Strategy 5 (100% pooling, private). Based on the mean percentage of 
dominance the rankorder, at decreasing preference is: 2/9>5>7/l>6>4. Again 
Strategies 2 and 9 dominate the other ones most often, while the spot market 
strategies are most frequently dominated. 
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Table 5.7 Pairwise comparison the spd of marketing strategies per farmer, by 
means of second degree of stochastic dominance (in percentages) 
Year 1984 
Row 
STRATEGY 1 2 4 6 7 9 Mean 
1. 100% PC 34.2 b 9.7 13.8 17.0 42.3 23.4 
2. 100% Bp 15.8 a — 8.7 12.0 14.6 26.8 15.6 
4. 100% Sml 36.6 44.6 — 27.3 40.1 66.0 42.9 
6. 100% Sm2 38.5 46.9 14.8 — 34.7 69.2 40.8 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml 25.3 43.2 12.3 16.5 ~ 57.1 30.9 
9. 50% Fpl/50% Sml 12.4 18.6 2.1 3.3 10.2 — 09.3 
Column mean percentage 
of dominance 25.7 37.5 9.5 14.6 23.3 52.3 27.2 
Mean percentage 
of no dominance 51.0 46.9 47.6 44.6 45.8 38.4 45.7C 
For 15.8% of all farmers, marketing strategy 1 stochastically dominates marketing strategy 2 
For 34.2 % of ail farmers, marketing strategy 2 stochastically dominates marketing strategy 1 
Percentage of all pairwise comparisons (over strategies and farmers) for which the SSD rule gave no 
dominance between the marketing strategies (100% - 2 x 27.2%) 
Year 1985 
Row 
STRATEGY 1 2 4 5 6 7 9 Mean 
1. 100% PC 54.2 14.8 20.1 15.3 18.0 46.6 28.1 
2. 100% Bp 7.6 — 4.9 8.5 6.7 5.0 22.9 09.3 
4. 100% Sml 30.3 55.6 — 32.0 23.9 36.4 58.1 39.4 
5. 100% Pp 21.5 54.9 11.3 — 15.4 22.8 47.9 29.0 
6. 100% Sm2 27.1 60.7 16.2 36.4 — 34.3 69.0 40.6 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml 24.0 59.0 9.1 29.1 14.0 2.8 52.1 31.2 
9. 50% Fpl/50% Sml 8.2 17.1 0.0 8.2 1.4 — — 06.3 
Column mean percentage 
of dominance 19.8 50.3 9.4 22.4 12.7 19.9 49.4 26.3 
Mean percentage 
of no dominance 52.1 40.5 51.2 48.6 46.6 48.9 44.3 47.5 
Part of the rankorder in both years can be explained by the realization that 
farmers expected mediocre or low prices in 1984 and 1985. Spot market strategies 
are therefore perceived by many farmers as resulting in relatively low prices. 
Fixed-price contracts (Strategy 9) and the 100% bottom-price contract with its 
specified bottom-price are advantageous and effective in situations in which 
market prices are low. Strategies 9 and 2 are therefore perceived as favorable in 
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both years in comparison with other strategies, especially 100% spot market 
strategies. 
Furthermore, it can be concluded from Table 5.7 that the SSD rule results in a 
selection between strategies in almost 54% (100% - 45.7%) of all pairwise com-
parisons of strategies in 1984 and 52.5% (100% - 47.5%) in 1985. Thus, for a 
minority of all pairwise comparisons more information about the utility function 
is needed for further selection. 
This stochastic dominance analysis suggests therefore that for the elicited sub-
jective probability distributions the necessity to know the exact utility function 
in order to select the most preferred alternative is limited. For many farmers the 
degree of risk aversion will only be necessary in order to be able to choose 
between Strategy 9 and 2. However, should one want a complete preference rank 
order of strategies, then a utility function will surely be necessary, since the SSD 
rules still yields no solution for about 45% of all comparisons. We will see how 
the utility function will rank order strategies in Chapter 7. 
5.3.5 Summary and conclusion of measuring price perception indirectly 
In the former sections, the results of measuring price perception by means of the 
interval technique were presented and discussed. By means of this technique, five 
points of the cumulative probability distribution are elicited per marketing 
strategy and a distribution is fitted to the elicited points. Overall, a lognormal 
probability distribution proved to fit the points better than a Weibull distribution 
function. For all strategies and all farmers the subjective probability distributions 
are therefore represented by the parameters of the lognormal distribution. 
Results show that the elicitations yield reasonable and plausible perceptions. In 
both 1984 and 1985, farmers expected on average a price of around 23 cts/kg, 
which is close to the mean market price calculated over the past 14 years. Per-
ceptions differ most drastically between 1984 and 1985 with respect to price risk: 
price risk was perceived as being much larger in 1985 than in 1984. 
The internal consistency of elicitations is evaluated by testing the effects of 
moment of delivery and number of spot market selling moments on price percep-
tions. A later moment of delivery resulted in a higher perceived mean price, 
whereas a larger number of selling moments resulted in a lower perceived mean 
price and a smaller risk; both results therefore confirm the hypotheses. With 
respect to the type of wholesale company, no perceptual differences have been 
found between strategies that are similar except with respect to the type of com-
pany: that is, farmers do not perceive a different probability distribution when 
potatoes are sold by means of pooling to a cooperative instead of to a private 
company. 
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Comparing the subjective probability distributions pairwise per farmer by means 
of stochastic dominance analysis shows that a dominant strategy can be selected 
in more than half of all pairwise comparisons between strategies. For very many 
farmers, especially the strategy: 100% bottom-price contract and strategy: 50% 
fixed-price, 50% spot market (selling at one moment) dominate other strategies. 
The 100% spot market strategies, either selling at one moment or at two 
moments, are most often dominated by other strategies. These results confirm the 
notion that in years with low or mediocre market prices, which farmers expected 
in 1984 as well as in 1985, contracts with fixed-prices or bottom-prices are more 
favorable with respect to mean price and price risk than strategies which imply 
selling the total, or a large part of, the harvest at spot market prices. In years 
with high market prices one expects the reverse to be true. 
Heterogeneity in perception is analyzed by testing the effect of the farmer's 
actual choice of wholesale company. A difference only shows up for pooling: 
farmers selling to a private wholesale company perceive a lower mean price and a 
smaller price risk than do farmers selling to a cooperative company. It was sug-
gested to attribute this difference in perception to the fact that cooperative 
farmers are on average more experienced with pooling compared to private 
farmers and thus may be more able to evaluate the probability distribution of 
pooling accurately. 
The plausible results summed up above strengthen our confidence in the validity 
of the interval technique for eliciting subjective probability distributions in sur-
vey conditions. It appears to be possible to elicit consistent spd's for a large 
number of respondents and many distributions per respondent in survey condi-
tions. It should be noted however, that it proved to be a fairly difficult question 
in the survey. Apart from about 15% of the farmers who failed to respond to the 
question, farmers had difficulty expressing their vague and unarticulated ideas 
about prices they expected in explicit and quantitative statements. They had to 
think hard before forming their opinions. This may especially hold for strategies 
farmers are less acquainted with because they never choose them in practice (e.g. 
a farmer selling to a private company who has to make statements about strate-
gies implying selling to the cooperative). Furthermore, farmers tended to lose 
interest and got bored because the elicitation procedure is repeated for a number 
of strategies. This made it necessary for us to limit the number of probability 
distributions elicited per farmer to six. The whole task took about 20 to 30 
minutes to complete. 
In eliciting subjective probability distributions the interviewers have to play an 
active role in motivating and stimulating the farmer, explaining the procedure 
and correcting careless answers, getting him to think hard etc. Our results show 
that some systematic interviewer bias is present; especially the elicitation of the 
minimum and maximum price proved sensitive to the interviewer. This inter-
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viewer effect limits comparisons between farmers. However, this interviewer bias 
does not pose severe problems since we are primarily interested for the purpose 
of this study in within-subject comparisons of strategies. 
It would be interesting to study whether the above mentioned problems can be 
minimized by using interactive computer programs to elicit subjective probability 
distributions in large scale survey research. These programs could be constructed 
so as to make the task more interesting to the respondent, e.g. by graphing the 
probability distribution elicited on the screen, and more use could perhaps be 
made of different elicitation techniques to verify the answers obtained by any 
technique within a reasonable amount of time. 
A second interesting subject, to which we will now turn, is a comparison of 
the direct estimates of price perceptions with respect to both results and diffi-
culty of the respondent's task with the indirect measurements discussed above. 
Measurement procedures and results of these direct procedures will be presented 
and discussed in the next sections. Subsequently, in Section 5.6. the results 
obtained by indirect measurement will be correlated to the direct perception 
measurements in order to evaluate the convergent validity of the measurement of 
perception. 
5.4 Direct measurement of price perception: description and evaluation of the 
method 
5.4.1 Direct measurement of mean price per marketing strategy 
In their review of elicitation techniques, Spetzler and Staël von Holstein (1975) 
question the capability of respondents of stating the moments of a probability 
distribution directly. We agree that standard deviation and skewness are very 
difficult to state quantitatively, even for subjects well acquainted with statistics. 
However, it is probably less difficult to explain the meaning of "expected value" 
to subjects not acquainted with statistics, especially if reference is made to the 
idea of a price averaged over years. Without such reference, it is likely that res-
pondents will assess the modal price when asking for the expected value. There-
fore, instead of asking the expected value of price of the coming year, farmers 
are asked to state the mean price they would have received had they sold via a 
particular marketing strategy over a number of years. This is probably a rather 
common way of thinking about strategies for farmers. 
In this study the direct questioning procedure starts with selecting the farmer's 
own and therefore most familiar marketing strategy. Then, the following question 
is asked: "Imagine you would have applied this strategy consistently over 5 to 10 
years. In some years you probably would have received a low price, in other 
years a high price. After a number of years you are able to calculate the mean 
price you received for your ware potatoes. Which mean price do you judge you 
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would have received with this strategy?" Next, another strategy is randomly 
selected from the total set and the farmer is asked the same question again. 
The mean price of all 100% marketing strategies is estimated in this manner. 
The elicitation task is limited to 100% strategies since in test interviews farmers 
automatically, i.e. without interviewer's suggestions in this direction, averaged 
mean prices they stated for 100% strategies to arrive at the mean price for 
5Q%/50% marketing strategies. This observation strengthens the notion that 
farmers indeed understand the procedure and assess mean price instead of modal 
price. 
As with the elicitation of subjective probability distributions, it is possible that 
distortions and biases are introduced by this question procedure. Because the 
question starts off with the farmer's own marketing strategy, the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic may cause biases. The mean price a farmer states for his 
own marketing strategy may act as an anchor for the mean price he assesses for 
subsequent strategies; he may thus not adjust mean price sufficiently from this 
anchor. Also, by focussing on the prices in previous years, the availability 
heuristic might lead to an overweighting of prices a farmer received in the most 
recent years. In view of these possible disturbing effects the mean prices elicited 
will be mainly used for within-subjects analyses. The results of the direct 
measurement of the mean price will be presented in Section 5.5. 
5.4.2 Magnitude estimation of price risk 
Up until now, perception of a marketing strategy has been viewed as a probabi-
lity distribution. Price risk is indicated by the second and higher moments of this 
distribution, e.g. the standard deviation is an adequate measure of risk in case of 
a symmetric distribution. Alternatively, one could leave the meaning of price risk 
open to the decision maker and assume the decision maker trades off risk against 
expected value. Such a view is articulated e.g. in the portfolio theory of Coombs 
(1975). 
Not defining risk beforehand as a characteristic of a probability distribution is 
also more in accordance with usual scaling practices in the social sciences. One 
simply states that each farmer has some unarticulated and vague idea about the 
riskiness of a marketing strategy and that this idea can be measured by means of 
a general risk scale e.g. a 7-point category scale ranging from "very small risk" to 
"very large risk". No reference is made to probability distributions, standard 
deviations and so on. Such a procedure will probably be much easier for the 
respondent compared to the probability elicitation. 
Of course, the subjective expected utility model cannot be used any more for 
determining the preference for a marketing strategy when perception is no longer 
defined as a probability distribution. However, one could just assume a simple 
trade-off model of expected value and risk to explain preferences. Price risk in 
this case is taken as a second attribute which decision makers take into account 
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when evaluating choice alternatives (i.e. alternative marketing strategies). This 
manner of analyzing preferences is very common in e.g. and consumer research 
(see the perceived risk approach in consumer behavior). It is very interesting to 
study if such a simple model of preference formation performs much worse with 
respect to predictive validity than does the theoretically consistent expected 
utility model. In case the simple model performs equally well or only minorly 
worse, especially in survey conditions, the extra time and effort needed to elicit 
subjective probability distributions may not be warranted. 
In order to test the above mentioned simple preference model and to compare the 
ease of measurement and results of the hard way (eliciting probability distribu-
tions) with the convenient way, price risk is left undefined and is measured by a 
direct scaling procedure. 
The category scale could be used for this purpose. In the social sciences, this 
scale is well established and frequently applied in scaling responses. However, 
category scales suffer from a number of serious weaknesses (Lodge 1982). First 
of all, information is lost because of a limited number of response categories. 
Two stimuli placed within the same category are only "more or less" alike. 
Secondly, in principle only ordinal information is obtained, thereby constraining 
analyses. Many researchers use ordinal scales as if they are interval scales and 
they often do so with great success, e.g. the regression method appears to be 
rather robust violations of internal assumptions does not usually lead to serious 
errors in parameter estimation (Bohrnstedt and Carter 1971). However, one is 
never certain about the interval properties of a category scale. Subjects must be 
able to scale differences between stimuli in a consistent way. Wegener (1983) 
showed that not all subjects are capable of performing this task. A third problem 
encountered with category scales is that the response of subjects is perhaps 
affected because the number of categories is both fixed and the same for each 
subject. Judgments are therefore constrained whenever the subjective range of 
people's impressions exceed the category response range. 
Contrariwise, magnitude estimation is evaluated to be a better scaling proce-
dure. This technique originates from psychophysics (see Stevens (1975) or Baird 
and Noma (1978) for a state of the art review of psychophysics). 
In psychophysics, magnitude estimation is applied to scale the relationship 
between a physical stimulus, e.g. loudness or brightness, and the subjective sen-
sation of the stimulus. Subjects are instructed to assign numbers to stimuli in 
proportion to their subjective magnitudes. In other words, subjects have to form 
number ratios in correspondence with subjective stimuli ratios. In practice, a 
reference stimulus is presented to a subject and the subject is then asked to form 
a number ratio of the intensity of a new stimulus with respect to the intensity of 
the reference stimulus. So if the brightness of a reference spot is given to equal 
50 points, and if another spot is shown which is, according to the subject, twice 
as bright as the reference spot, then the subject should assign the number 100 to 
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the latter spot. Other response modes than the number mode can be used, e.g. 
drawing a line or squeezing a calibrated hand dynamometer.8 
Recently it has been suggested to apply magnitude estimation in scaling "social 
stimuli" like the progressiveness of a political party or social status of professions. 
Subjects appear to be capable of expressing ratio judgments in a consistent and 
reliable way for physical stimuli (however, Wegener (1983) found interindividual 
differences in this capability), so it is assumed subjects should be capable of 
making ratio judgments for social stimuli as well. Magnitude estimation has 
already been applied successfully for a large number of diverse social stimuli, 
such as the opinion of political candidates (Lodge 1982), the status of professions 
(Neijens et al. 1981) or the importance of perceived risks associated with buying 
an automobile (Grunert 1984). Here we will use magnitude estimation in order to 
measure the perceived risk of a marketing strategy. 
We are interested in applying magnitude estimation in this study mainly because 
of the unlimited response scale respondents can use for expressing their percep-
tions and because of the ratio nature of risk. It is easy to imagine the price risk 
of a marketing strategy as being twice as large as the risk of another strategy. We 
consider this ratio nature of risk as being more apparent than the ratio nature of, 
say, the progressiveness of a political party. We expect magnitude estimation to 
produce more accurate estimates of risk perception, and to also be more compa-
rable with the subjective probability distribution elicitations than a category scale 
of risk. 
Our questioning format is in accordance with the recommendations of Saris et 
al. (1977) and Lodge (1982) concerning the use of magnitude estimation in large 
scale research. As a response mode we choose the so called line-production tech-
nique which is an easy to handle technique in survey situations. With this 
response mode a marketing strategy is presented to the farmer as a reference and 
the risk of this strategy is expressed by a line of arbitrary length. Next, a ran-
domly selected strategy is presented to the farmer and the farmer is asked to 
compare the price risk he perceives with this strategy to the price risk of the 
reference strategy. If he perceives the price risk of the strategy as being twice as 
large as the price risk of the reference strategy, he should draw a line twice as 
long as the reference line. Should he consider the price risk as being a third of 
the risk of the reference strategy, then he should draw a line with a third of the 
length of the reference line -etc. In this manner, all strategies are rated with 
respect to the reference stimulus. The task is organized in such a way that 
respondents make a comparison between a newly selected strategy and the 
reference each time, without being able to see their former responses. 
By applying magnitude estimation in a large number of experiments, using all sorts of stimuli, 
Stevens always found a power function relating the magnitude of the physical stimulus to the sub-
jective response as measured by magnitude estimation. The consistent relationship found between the 
intensity of the physical stimulus and the subjective response is often called the psychophysical 
power law or Stevens law. 
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It is common practice in psychophysics to take as a reference stimulus a stimulus 
around or somewhat below the (subjective) middle of all stimuli to make sure 
there are stimuli perceived as smaller as well as larger than the reference stimu-
lus. In test interviews 100% pooling at a cooperative company (Strategy 1) proved 
to be a suitable reference, not only because of the perceived mediocre riskiness 
in comparison with the other strategies, but also because of the clear and 
unambiguous understanding of this rather straightforward and well-known 
strategy. 
To make sure farmers understood the procedure and would make ratio judg-
ments instead of ordinal judgments, the farmers practised the technique with a 
number of surface areas as stimuli. As expected, farmers had little difficulty 
grasping the meaning of the technique and responded quite easily and quickly. 
In this study, we only applied line-production as a response mode. Lodge 
(1982) recommends using at least two response modes (e.g. line-production and 
numerical estimates) to be able to test the internal validity of the scaling proce-
dure (this is called the cross-modality matching method). However, because of 
the severe time constraints in this survey and the large number of questions 
farmers already had to answer, it was judged impossible to apply both response 
modes. Many studies in magnitude estimation with different types of stimuli and 
all sorts of subjects showed a good internal validity (see Lodge 1982), therefore 
we considered it justifiable to limit ourselves here to one response mode. 
The results of directly estimating the mean price and price risk per marketing 
strategy will be presented in Section 5.5. 
5.5 Results of directly measuring price perception 
5.5.1 Results of direct measurement of perceived mean price 
As discussed in Section 5.4.1 the mean price farmers associated with each mar-
keting strategy were stated only for 100% strategies. Furthermore, the question 
was asked for only a subsample of farmers in 1985, thus limiting the number of 
observations in 1985. To differentiate between the direct estimates and the 
indirect estimates elicited by means of the interval technique (IMEA), the esti-
mates are denoted as DMEA (direct estimate of mean price). 
Table 5.8 shows the average results of DMEA in both years. The 100% spot 
market strategies (Strategies 4 and 6) are perceived in 1984 as strategies with the 
highest mean price. Especially selling at one moment at spot market prices is 
perceived to result in a high mean price, namely 26.8 cts/kg. For selling at two 
moments this figure is 25.1 cts/kg. The remaining three marketing strategies are 
perceived as being fairly equal in mean price. Strategy 4 again scores highest in 
1985 but the difference with other strategies is much smaller than in 1984. 
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Table 5.8 Average results of direct estimates of mean price, per marketing 
strategy and per year, in cts/kg 
1984 1985 
MU SD MU SD 
STRATEGY DMEA DMEA N DMEA DMEA N 
1. 100% PC 25.00 3.93 197 24.14 4.15 65 
2. 100% Bp 24.90 4.06 190 24.39 3.36 66 
4. 100% Sml 26.84 6.67 191 24.61 4.87 63 
5. 100% Pp 24.87 5.27 190 24.25 3.19 63 
6. 100% Sm2 25.13 5.44 191 23.90 3.90 61 
Comparing the average results of DMEA between both years shows that the 
average mean price for all strategies is higher in 1984 than in 1985, but this dif-
ference is only significant for Strategy 4 (pairwise t-test). An explanation for the 
higher mean prices in 1984 may be offered by the availability heuristic. 
According to this heuristic the most recent prices that farmers received, probably 
influenced the estimate of mean price most. Market prices were very high in 
1983 and low in 1984. We therefore expect farmers to perceive a higher DMEA 
in 1984, after the year 1983 which was characterised by very high market prices, 
than they will expect in 1985, after a year characterised by low prices. The 
results confirm this expectation, although, because of the rather small number of 
pairwise observations, a significant difference is found for only one strategy. 
Again, as with the interval technique, the order of strategies with respect to 
mean price is compared per individual. Table 5.9 shows the sample distribution 
of the Pearson correlations, calculated per farmer. The mean correlation is 0.32 
with a median of 0.39 and 38% of the correlations being negative. Compared to 
the mean and median correlations of the interval technique, namely 0.36 and 
0.34, the correlations of direct measurements are of the same magnitude. 
Table 5.9 Sample statistics of the Pearson correlations computed per farmer 
between estimates of DMEA in 1984 and 1985 for corresponding 
marketing strategies 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN Mean* Median St. dev.* % < 0 N 
DMEA 1984 and DMEA 1985 .318 .386 .654 38 53 
* 
After Fisher r-to-z transformation 
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Effects of moment of delivery, number of selling moments and interviewer on 
perception 
Appendix III shows the average results of direct estimates of mean price broken 
down by moment of delivery. Except for Strategy 1 in 1984 (100% pooling 
cooperative), the moment of delivery showed a significant effect in the hypothe-
sized direction: the group of farmers delivering late in the marketing year per-
ceive a higher mean price than the group of farmers delivering early. Again, as 
with the interval technique, farmers appear to be capable of incorporating the 
effect of storage costs in their perceptions in a valid manner. 
To assess the effect of the number of selling moments, Strategies 4 and 6 
(100% spot market) are compared pairwise. A significant effect is obtained in 
1984: according to the respondents selling at one moment at the spot market 
results in a mean price which is 1.7 cts/kg higher than selling at two moments. A 
smaller effect is observed in 1985 and the significance of the pairwise t-test is 
p = 0.054 (one-tailed). The effect of the number of selling moments on percep-
tion are in line with those of the interval technique. In contrast with the interval 
technique, no significant effects of the interviewer are found for the direct esti-
mates. 
Heterogeneity in perception 
The effect on price perception caused by the type of wholesale company farmers 
actually deal with is tested. Only in two occasions a significant difference shows 
up. Cooperative farmers perceive a significantly lower mean price for Strategies 4 
and 6 (the 100% spot market strategies) in 1984 than do private farmers. Perhaps 
because cooperative farmers do not have the option of selling 100% at spot 
market prices they may be underestimating mean price. However, such an effect 
did not show up with the interval technique (using this technique, differences 
with respect to pooling between both groups of farmers showed up). Since no 
significant differences were found between both groups of farmers for all other 
strategies in 1984 and 1985, the effects for the two strategies found are 
incidental. 
Furthermore, in dealing with the effect of type of wholesale company, Strate-
gies 1 and 5 are compared pairwise. These strategies are similar except for the 
type of wholesale company. As was found by means of the interval technique no 
significant difference is found in the perception of mean price between the two 
companies, neither in 1984 nor in 1985. 
It is concluded that in general no clear differences show up in our data with 
respect to perceived mean price between both groups of farmers. This conclusion 
suggests that farmers neither tend to rationalize their choice of a wholesale com-
pany nor do they choose a company because they expect a higher mean price (for 
similar strategies). Therefore, other motives are probably important for choosing 
between a cooperative and a private wholesale company. 
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Summary 
Reviewing the results, it is concluded that directly measuring mean price yields 
reasonable and plausible outcomes. In contrast with the view of Spetzler and StaSl 
von Holstein (1975) it appears to be possible to elicit in a valid manner the mean 
of a distribution even for respondents unacquainted with statistics. Compared to 
the indirect elicitation of mean price, results suggest the direct measurement to 
be even less susceptible to interviewer bias. Although distortions may have been 
introduced in the measurement by the farmer's use of availability and anchoring 
and adjustment heuristics, it can be said that in within-subject analyses these 
effects pose no problems. 
5.5.2 Results of magnitude estimation of price risk 
The perceived price risk of all strategies, 13 in 1984 and 18 in 1985, is estimated 
by means of magnitude estimation. In 1985, however, this was only done for a 
subset of respondents. The magnitude estimates are differentiated from other 
estimates of risk perception by denoting them RISK estimates. Table 5.10 shows 
the average results. In this table the line lengths drawn by the farmers are trans-
formed into ratios with respect to the reference line. 
In 1984 farmers perceive averagely 6 strategies as being riskier, 3 strategies as 
being of comparable risk and 3 strategies as being less risky than 100% pooling 
cooperative. In 1985 these figures are: 8 strategies riskier, 4 of equal risk and 
5 strategies less risky. Thus, 100% pooling at a cooperative company indeed is 
perceived as a strategy of mediocre risk and therefore in line with the 
requirements for a suitable reference stimulus. 
On average and in conformity with the expectations, the 100% spot market 
strategies (Strategies 4 and 6) are perceived as most risky; Strategies 7, 8 and 10 
also are perceived as risky. Not surprisingly, the fixed-price strategies (3 and 14) 
are perceived as most secure. 
In comparison with the risk perceptions of 1984 small differences show up in 
1985. None of these differences is, tested pairwise, significant. Attention should 
be drawn, however, to what one ought to expect of these differences. Because 
strategies are compared to a reference strategy, differences will only show up if 
the ratio between a strategy and the reference differs between the years. It is 
perfectly possible that the absolute magnitude of risk farmers perceive of strate-
gies in 1985 is e.g. larger than in 1984, as is the case with the indirect measure-
ment of perception (ISTA), without changing the ratios between strategies. 
However, with magnitude estimation no differences between years are detected if 
the ratios do not change. This shows the relative nature of the magnitude esti-
mates compared to the absolute estimates of price risk obtained by eliciting sub-
jective probability distributions. 
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Table 5.10 Results of measurement of price risk obtained by magnitude estima-
tion, in ratio's with respect to marketing strategy (100% Pc) 
1984 1985 
(N = 223) (N = 67) 
MU SD MU SD 
STRATEGY RISK RISK RISK RISK 
1. 100% Pc* 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 
2. 100% Bp .95 .29 .96 .22 
3. 100% Fpl .29 .40 .42 .45 
4. 100% Sml 1.53 .53 1.51 .48 
5. 100% Pp 1.02 .21 1.00 .19 
6. 100% Sm2 1.26 .39 1.35 .39 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml 1.13 .27 1.15 .23 
8. 50% Bp/50% Sml 1.12 .31 1.15 .28 
9. 50% Fpl/50%Sml 1.00 .33 .99 .30 
10. 50% Pp/50% Sml 1.15 .28 1.14 .27 
11. 50% Pc/50% Sm2 1.07 .25 1.08 .23 
12. 50% Fpl/50% Sm2 .97 .28 .98 .31 
13. 50% Fpl/40% Bp/10% Sml .86 21 .94 .32 
14. 100% Fp3 - - .36 .40 
15. 50% Fp3/50% Sml - - .94 .30 
16. 50% Pp/50% Sm2 - - 1.11 .23 
17. 25% Pp/25% Fpl/50% Sml - - 1.02 .28 
18. 25% Pp/25% Fpl/50% Sm2 - - 1.09 .30 
* 
Reference stimulus 
The rank order of strategies with respect to RISK is quite similar in both years 
when considering average estimates (Spearmans rho computed on average data in 
Table 5.10 is 0.94). Also, the Pearson correlation between RISK measurements is 
calculated per individual in 1984 and 1985. The sample mean correlation is 0.48, 
with a median correlation of 0.50 and 25% of the correlations being negative. 
Thus, correlations for RISK are somewhat smaller than those for ISTA; the 
average correlation for ISTA is 0.59 compared to 0.48 for RISK and the median 
correlation for ISTA is 0.60 compared to 0.50 for RISK. However, differences 
are not substantial. Both measurements show the high correspondence in price 
risk order between 1984 and 1985. 
Effect of moment of delivery 
Dealing with the effect of moment of delivery on price risk perception, the same 
argument as was held for the difference between years is valid. Since farmers 
only evaluate strategies for one specific moment of delivery and always with 
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respect to the same reference line, an effect of delivery period will never show 
up if the ratios between strategies are constant over moments of delivery. The 
question to be answered then is whether one can expect ratios to change with the 
moment of delivery. Although it is difficult to make precise statements about the 
ratios, spot market strategies probably show the largest chance of finding ratios 
to change with the moment of delivery. Since price variability increases from 
harvest (in September) to July the perceived risk of selling at spot market prices 
later in the marketing year should be larger than selling earlier in the year. 
Because the risk of Strategy 1 remains constant over the whole marketing year, a 
larger risk ratio for later moments of delivery should be found with spot market 
strategies, especially 4 and 6, in later delivery periods. 
Testing the constancy of the risk ratios over moments of delivery shows mixed 
results. A significant difference in ratios between moments is only found for 5 
out of 29 strategies. Firstly, farmers perceive a larger risk for Strategy 4 in 1984 
and 6 in 1985 when delivering late in the season than do farmers delivering 
earlier. This confirms our expectations. However, no significant effects showed 
up for Strategy 6 in 1984 or Strategy 4 in 1985. Thus, the two significant effects 
are rather incidental. Secondly, significant effects are found for Strategies 2 and 
7 in 1984 and 8 in 1985. However, these effects are somewhat peculiar since the 
risk ratio does not increase or decrease monotonically with the moment of 
delivery, e.g. the ratio is highest for the period January - March. Taking this all 
together then, the effects of moment of delivery found seem fairly incidental and 
it is therefore concluded that in general risk ratios are constant over these 
moments. 
Effects on risk perception of number of selling moments, type of wholesale com-
pany and interviewer 
In both years, farmers perceive selling at one moment at the spot market as being 
riskier than selling at two moments (pairwise t-test). This confirms our expecta-
tions and is in line with the results of indirect measurement. 
No significant differences are found when testing pairwise the differences 
between strategies which are similar except for the type of wholesale company 
(Strategies 1 and 5, 7 and 10, 11 and 16). The risk of selling e.g. via 100% 
pooling at a cooperative company is not perceived as more (or less) risky than 
selling via 100% pooling to a private company. Furthermore, no difference in risk 
perception is found between farmers actually dealing with a cooperative and 
farmers dealing with a private company. Their perception is homogeneous in this 
respect. These results are thus in accordance with the results of indirect 
measurement. 
Interviewer effects are found for 8 out of 12 strategies in 1984 and for 3 out 
of 18 in 1985. It therefore seems that magnitude estimation is susceptible to 
interviewer bias as is the measurement of standard deviation by means of indirect 
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measurement. We should thus focus primarily on within-subject use of measure-
ments. 
5.5.3 Summary and conclusion of measuring price perception directly 
In Figure 5.5 the direct estimates of mean price and price risk are presented, 
both for each year separately and combined in one picture. Circles concern 
measurements carried out in 1984, squares concern those carried out in 1985. 
Strategies which closely approach each other are shown in one square or circle. 
The direct estimates of mean price of 100% strategies are used to compute the 
average mean prices for combinations of strategies. So, if the average mean price 
for 100% spot market is, say 26 cts/kg and for 100% pooling 24 cts/kg, then the 
average mean price for the strategy 50% pooling, 50% spot market is 25 cts/kg. 
Figure 5.5 shows that the average mean price in 1984 is higher than in 1985: 
all circles are positioned above the squares. However, only for Strategy 4 this 
difference is significant (Section 5.5.1). Secondly, the risk ratios are similar in 
both years. In 1984, the most favorable strategies, forming an efficiency frontier, 
are: Strategy 3 (100% fixed-price) with a fairly low mean price but also very 
small risk, Strategy 9 (50% fixed-price, 50% spot market (selling at one moment)) 
with a mediocre mean price but also a medium amount of risk, and Strategy 4 
(100% spot market (selling at one moment)) which is highest in mean price but 
also perceived as most risky. It depends on the degree of risk aversion of the 
decision maker which of these three strategies he prefers. On average, the 
remaining strategies are dominated by the three strategies mentioned above with 
respect to mean price and price risk. 
The results of 1985 are fairly similar to those of 1984 although Strategy 2, the 
100% bottom-price contract, is now on the efficiency frontier instead of Strategy 
9. Strategies 8, 10 and, to a lesser extent, 7 are also on the efficiency frontier. 
These three strategies all concern a combination of a 50% contract selling-option 
(respectively bottom-price and pooling) with 50% spot market • (selling at one 
moment). This shows the theoretically expected effect of diversification: a com-
bination of selling-options leads to medium levels of expected value and risk in 
comparison to strategies consisting of a single selling-option (extreme in expected 
value and risk). Farmers' perceptions are well in line with these theoretical 
expectations. 
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Figure 5.5 Average perception of marketing strategies with respect to mean 
price (DMEA) and price risk (RISK), in both years (data in Tables 
5.8 and 5.10) 
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In both years, Strategy 6 is perceived as unattractive to a fairly dramatic extent. 
The position of this strategy is quite surprising. Farmers perceive this 100% spot 
market strategy with two selling moments as resulting in a fairly poor mean price 
whereas the risk level is hardly less than the one associated with the 100% spot 
market strategy with one selling moment (Strategy 4). Apparently, farmers are of 
the opinion that diversified selling within the marketing year hardly reduces risk, 
whereas expected price is reduced relatively strongly. With the indirect 
measurement differences between Strategies 4 and 6 were more in line with 
expectations. 
In this section the results of two direct and easy questions dealing with price 
perceptions of marketing strategies were discussed. Respondents showed no dif-
ficulties in answering the questions about mean price and magnitude of price 
risk. Both questions took only 3 to 5 minutes each to complete. The validity of 
the measurement was confirmed in testing the effects of moment of delivery and 
number of selling moments. The direct elicitation of mean price may be suscep-
tible to heuristics like anchoring and adjustment and availability, and a syste-
matic interviewer bias showed up for magnitude estimation. However, the 
measurements provide a reasonable and consistent picture of farmers' perceptions, 
in so far as this can be tested. The measurements may yield satisfactory results in 
predicting preference, especially when applied to within-subject analysis. 
5.6 Comparison of direct and indirect measurement 
This section presents an analysis of the correspondence between direct and indi-
rect measurement results. Attention should be paid to convergent validity in order 
to evaluate the validity of the measurements. Convergent validity implies a cor-
respondence between measurements obtained by independent measurement proce-
dures which intend to measure the same construct. Convergent validity is 
established if IMEA and DMEA on the one hand and ISTA and RISK on the 
other hand are fairly highly positively correlated. 
At the same time, it is expected that correlations between estimates of mean 
price and estimates of price risk are also positively correlated. An expected high 
value should go together with a high price risk. That is, an expected low value 
should be compensated by a relatively low risk. Otherwise dominance between 
strategies exists. 
Before turning to a presentation of the correlations between the various 
measurements, we first concentrate on the comparison of absolute measurements 
of mean price estimates. In Table 5.11, the perceived mean price is presented per 
strategy, per year and for both techniques. It is clear that the direct estimate of 
mean price is higher for all marketing strategies in both years. For all strategies 
these differences are significant (pairwise t-test). On average, the difference in 
mean price between the techniques is at least 1.3 cts/kg for the 100% bottom-
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price contract (24.90-23.58) and no less than 3.3. cts/kg for Strategy 4 (100% spot 
market (selling at one moment)) in 1984. The differences are smaller and not 
significant in 1985 (note, however, that in 1985 only +/- 40 pairwise observations 
are available for testing, thus making it difficult to find significant effects). 
The difference in mean price between both measurements procedures is per-
haps induced by the questioning procedure. In the indirect measurement proce-
dure, farmers are explicitly asked to assess the probability distribution concerning 
the price of the coming year. The wording of the direct question, however, more 
directed towards the past. In the direct question, farmers may have assessed a 
historic mean price without attaching full weight to specific information about 
the coming marketing year. Their adjustment from the historic mean price may 
be insufficient. If DMEA is viewed as representing a historic mean price, then it 
can be concluded that farmers (in June) perceived prices in both 1984 and 1985 
as below average (as is indicated by indirect question). As became clear after-
wards, prices in both years indeed were below average (see Table 2.2). 
A comparison with respect to the dimensions of mean price and price risk 
between both measurement procedures (compare Figure 5.3 with Figure 5.5) 
especially points to the difference in position of Strategy 4. By means of the 
indirect measurement procedure, this strategy is perceived as high in risk and low 
in mean price (and consequently unattractive to a risk averse farmer), whereas 
direct measurement shows this strategy to be perceived as high in risk but also 
high(est) in mean price. Again, this difference may well be induced by the above 
mentioned difference in focus of the question. The historic mean price of 
Strategy 4 is probably perceived as fairly high (direct measurement) but farmers 
expected a lower price than this historic mean price in both 1984 and 1985, while 
focussing on the year to come (indirect measurement). Market information in 
these years apparently induced them to adjust their expectations based on past 
experience with respect to the mean price of Strategy 4, in a downward direction 
for both years. 
Table 5.11 Comparison of indirect and direct estimates of perceived mean price, 
per marketing strategy and per year, in cts/kg 
1984 1985 
MU MU MU MU 
STRATEGY IMEA DMEA IMEA DMEA 
1. 100% Pc 23.29 25.00 22.42 24.14 
2. 100% Bp 23.58 24.90 24.18 24.39 
4. 100% Sml 23.56 26.84 23.23 24.61 
5. 100% Pp - 24.87 22.82 24.25 
6. 100% Sm2 23.21 25.13 22.86 23.90 
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The results of the correlations calculated over strategies and per farmer are pre-
sented in Table 5.12. The sample average and median are shown for each cor-
relation. Only Pearson correlations are shown since they did not differ much 
from Spearman correlations. Correlations printed in italics concern the agreement 
between orders of strategies in 1984 and 1985. These correlations were already 
presented in the above sections, but are reproduced here with the purpose of 
enabling direct comparisons. Correlations printed in bold concern the convergent 
validity of the measurement, whereas the remaining correlations indicate the 
correspondence between expected value and price risk. 
Table 5.12 shows an average convergent validity correlation with respect to 
convergent validity in 1984 between IMEA and DMEA of 0.34 with a median of 
0.32 (and 32% of the correlations being negative (not shown in the table)). These 
figures are somewhat smaller in 1985: an average of 0.16, a median of 0.25 and 
38% negative correlations. A Pearson correlation coefficient is also computed over 
both strategies and individuals, after standardising the data per individual. These 
correlations are 0.24 for 1984 and 0.23 for 1985 and they are both significant. 
With respect to the percentages of negative correlations, it should be noted that 
each correlation is based on a small number of observations (5 to 7). In such a 
case, even random influences can easily result in low or negative correlations. 
The convergent correlations between the risk measurements, ISTA and RISK, 
are larger in both years than correlations between measurements of mean price. 
In 1984, a mean correlation of 0.53 results with a median of 0.56 and 22% of the 
correlations being negative. In 1985, these figures are: a mean correlation of 0.33, 
a median of 0.39 and 37% negative correlations. Computed over strategies and 
individuals the correlations are 0.40 in 1984 and 0.32 in 1985 and they are both 
significant. Again, correlations in 1985 are smaller than those in 1984, which also 
holds for the mean price estimates. This is probably due to the relatively smaller 
differences between the strategies 1985 compared to those in 1984. To some 
extent, the farmers perceive the strategies as more or less alike in 1985, so corre-
lations between two measurements procedures tend to attenuate. 
When comparing convergent correlations of mean price with those of price 
risk, the latter turn out to be higher. The risk order of marketing strategies is 
apparently less sensitive to the measurement technique than the order of expected 
values (also the risk order of strategies in 1984 corresponds better with the order 
in 1985 than does mean price: median is 0.60 compared to 0.34). An explanation 
of this finding might be that estimates of expected value are probably closer in 
absolute value between strategies than estimates of standard deviation or risk 
ratios. In such a case, small random response errors easily lead to low correlations 
between procedures measuring this expected value. Stated otherwise: farmers 
apparently perceive relatively less differences between strategies with respect to 
mean price than between those with respect to risk. 
The correlations between mean price and price risk are predominantly positive 
but fairly small (Table 5.12). The indirect measurement shows the largest positive 
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correlation between mean price and price risk. However, the percentages of cor-
relations that are negative are fairly high. With respect to the correlations 
between IMEA and ISTA these percentages are 41% in 1984 and 40% in 1985. 
Between DMEA and RISK these percentages are 45% and 41% respectively. It 
can thus be concluded that for many farmers a high expected value not necessa-
rily goes together with a high price risk. In Chapter 7 more attention will be 
given to the consequences of this finding in relation to the testing of the 
expected utility model. 
Table 5.12 Pearson correlations between the indirect and direct measurement of 
perceived mean price and price risk, computed over strategies per 
farmer (pairwise deletion of missing values, N ranges from 53 
to 206) 
Average correlations* 
IMEA DMEA ISTA RISK 
1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 
IMEA .36 
DMEA .34 .16 .32 
ISTA .17 .23 .14 .01 .59 
RISK -.14 -.06 .05 -.06 .53 .33 .48 
* 
After Fisher r-to-z transformation 
Median correlations 
IMEA DMEA ISTA RISK 
1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 
IMEA .34 
DMEA .32 .25 .39 
ISTA .19 .21 .15 -.08 .60 
RISK -.14 -.12 .07 .09 .56 .39 .50 
Italics: correlations of same techniques between both years 
Bold: convergent validity correlations 
Normal: correlations between mean price and price risk 
Overall, because correlations between convergent measurements are clearly posi-
tive and significant, the conclusion of a satisfactory correspondence between the 
indirect and direct measurement technique seems warranted. Especially when 
taking into account the survey conditions of limited time available for training 
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and motivating the respondents, the active involvement of the interviewer in the 
measurement process and the confrontation of respondents with tasks unfamiliar 
to them, one would not expect to find very high correlations between 
corresponding measurements. However, since no studies are available with which 
to compare our correlations, it is impossible to state whether the convergent 
validity of the measurements is lower than would be appropriate for such 
measurements under these conditions. 
5.7 Major findings and conclusions 
This chapter dealt with the prices farmers perceive to be associated with diffe-
rent marketing strategies. These perceptions are an essential element in explaining 
preferences for marketing strategies. Two approaches to measure these percep-
tions have been applied. 
In the first approach, price perception of a marketing strategy is represented 
by a farmer's subjective probability distribution. Expected utility theory offers a 
framework for combining this probability distribution with a farmer's risk atti-
tude in order to form preferences. The interval technique is applied for eliciting 
the subjective probability distribution. The farmer has to specify the price he 
expects to receive with a certain marketing strategy for five points on the cumu-
lative probability distribution. Then a probability distribution function is fitted to 
these five elicited points, to estimate mean, standard deviation and skewness of 
the distribution. A lognormal distribution proved to fit the data better than a 
Weibull distribution. This way of measuring perception is called the indirect 
method since mean and standard deviation are indirectly obtained by means of 
questions about percentiles questions and a function fitting procedure. 
The second approach is called the direct method. By means of this method, the 
farmer is asked to state directly the mean price he expects with a certain mar-
keting strategy. Subsequently, the price risk of a marketing strategy is obtained 
by magnitude estimation. The farmer expresses the risk he perceives with a 
strategy by drawing a line. It should be noted that the exact meaning of risk is 
not defined (e.g. as standard deviation) in this procedure, but left open to the 
respondent. 
The main difference between both approaches of course is that the direct 
method does not lead to a probability distribution and that the expected utility 
model therefore cannot be applied to the formation of preferences. However, a 
straightforward model consisting of two attributes, namely mean price and price 
risk, can be formulated to predict preferences for marketing strategies. 
Detailed conclusions about the results of each technique and a direct compari-
son of both techniques with respect to findings and validity of the measurements 
are presented in Sections 5.3.5, 5.5.3 and 5.6. Here we will focus on some major 
findings. 
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The price perception of marketing strategies 
Findings show that the farmers expected mediocre market prices in both years 
(expected values of strategies are +/- 23 cts/kg) . In both years however, the 
farmers were clearly too optimistic considering that the actual spot market price 
turned out to be 13 (1984) and 10 cts/kg (1985). Farmers perceived more price 
risk in 1984 than in 1985. Apparently in 1985 the farmers were less sure about 
prices. 
Considering the mediocre market prices that they expected, it is not surprising 
to find that the farmers think that two fairly safe strategies will do well in these 
circumstances. More specifically, Strategy 2 (100% bottom-price) and Strategy 9 
(50% fixed-price, 50% spot market (selling at one moment)) are perceived in such 
a way, that they can be considered very attractive strategies by risk averse 
farmers. Many farmers perceive both strategies on the efficiency frontier in both 
years. Contrariwise, many farmers perceive the 100% spot market strategies 
(Strategies 4 and 6) in such a manner that they are unattractive if the farmer is 
risk averse. Both strategies can be characterized by a high price risk which does 
not go together with a substantially high expected value. Especially selling at two 
moments at spot market prices is unattractive in this respect. 
The validity of the measurements 
The effects of moment of delivery, number of selling moments and interviewer 
were tested systematically in order to establish the validity of the measurement. 
Furthermore the heterogeneity in perception was researched. The following 
effects were found for both measurement techniques. 
- Farmers perceive, as expected, a higher mean price when delivering later in 
the marketing year. 
- Selling at two moments at the spot market reduces mean price and price risk 
compared to selling only at one moment. 
- Farmers perceive no difference between strategies which are similar in every 
aspect but type of wholesaler. Also, no significant differences in perceptions 
have been found between farmers actually dealing with a cooperative or a pri-
vate company. This means that farmers neither rationalize their choice of a 
wholesale company nor choose a company with the expectation of receiving 
higher mean prices with equal or smaller risks. Other motives than price 
apparently play a role in the choice of a marketing channel. 
- Systematic interviewer effects on perception of mean price and standard 
deviation of price were found for the indirect method. Also, the magnitude 
estimation of price risk is significantly affected by the interviewer. Consi-
dering these effects, perception data preferably should be analysed within-
subjects. 
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- The direct method resulted in higher mean prices than the indirect method. 
An explanation for this finding was provided by pointing out the difference in 
focus of the methods. 
Convergent validity of the measurements is studied by correlating per individual 
measurements obtained by the indirect method with those obtained by the direct 
method. This resulted in a positive and significant sample median correlation for 
mean price and an even higher median correlation for price risk. Although the 
correlations are fairly low, it is not clear what one can denote as high or low as 
there is a lack of comparable studies. Considering the survey circumstances in 
this study the fact that average and median correlations are positive and signifi-
cant is at least a promising indication of validity of the measurements. 
Overall, results indicate that plausible perceptions are obtained and that 
measurement procedures can be denoted as reasonably valid. An interesting point 
which has not yet been dealt with concerns the question of which of the two 
measurement procedures should be preferred. The advantages and disadvantages 
of both procedures are briefly summed below. 
Advantages and disadvantages of each method 
The main advantage of the indirect method is that a subjective probability distri-
bution is obtained, which is an essential element in sophisticated theories of 
decision making under risk, like e.g. the subjective expected utility model. 
The main disadvantage of the indirect scaling method is the complexity of the 
procedure. The elicitation of subjective probability distributions is judged as 
fairly difficult (no responses have been obtained for about 15% of the farmers), 
quite time-consuming (about half an hour for 6 or 7 strategies), requiring an 
active role on part of the interviewer thus making the question vulnerable to 
interviewer bias, and, finally, as rather boring if a number of probability distri-
butions have to be elicited. This necessitates the assessment of only a limited 
number of distributions, given the limited time available for an interview. One 
might speculate that computerized elicitation may be an improvement of the 
procedure, if it can especially influence positively the motivation of the respon-
dent, thus enabling more elicitations to be made. From the viewpoint of practical 
feasibility, the technique, as applied in this study, is not very suitable for large 
scale survey research. However, considering the problems associated with eliciting 
probability distributions in survey conditions, the consistent and plausible results 
that are found here seem even more surprising. 
Compared to the indirect method, the direct questioning procedures of mean 
price and price risk are easy and quick (less than 5 minutes each). Respondents 
did not show any difficulty in answering these questions, resulting in hardly any 
nonresponse. Also, estimates could be obtained for all alternatives (marketing 
strategies), whereas the indirect method elicitations had to be limited to 6 or 7 
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strategies. Direct procedures, as used in this study, seem much more suitable for 
survey research with severe time constraints and limited opportunities for 
training and motivating respondents. 
The main disadvantage of the direct method, of course, is the fact that no 
subjective probability distribution is obtained. The direct estimates, as elicited in 
this study, can therefore only be used in theoretically naive models like a linear 
model with expected value and price risk as attributes to be traded-off against 
one another. 
Theoretically speaking therefore, knowledge of the subjective probability dis-
tribution of a farmer should provide a much better way of explaining and pre-
dicting choices under risk, provided this probability distribution can be validly 
elicited. In order to counterbalance the costs and effort involved in measuring 
probability distributions, a prediction of preference by means of these probability 
distributions should be of substantially better quality than prediction by means of 
a model using the direct estimates. In Chapter 7 the difference in predictive 
validity of both measurements and their respective preference formation models 
will be extensively studied. Then the indirect approach has to prove its worth. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RISK ATTITUDE, STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE 
AND RELATIVE RISK ATTITUDE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the analysis of a farmer's risk attitude. The 
primary reason for measuring the risk attitude is to get an evaluation function 
which can be used to rank order probability distributions. This evaluation func-
tion is thus intended to be incorporated in the subjective expected utility model 
in order to explain and predict the farmers' preferences with respect to marketing 
strategies. The usefulness of the evaluation function to these ends will be 
analyzed in Chapter 7. The assessment of the evaluation function, however, is 
only one of several goals of the analysis in this chapter. Another aim, related 
directly to the decision problem of the farmers and of wholesale companies 
dealing with farmers, is to provide a characterization of a sample of farmers with 
respect to risk attitude and to study the relationship of this concept with various 
characteristics of the farmer or his farming situation. 
Scientifically more interesting, however, are the following two topics. Firstly, 
to test the concept of relative risk attitude (Dyer and Sarin 1982). The hypothesis 
of a relative risk attitude makes it necessary to include the concept of strength of 
preference in the analysis. Empirical research into the concept of relative risk 
attitude and the specific functional relationship between risk attitude and 
strength of preference has been conducted only sparingly (see Chapter 3). 
The second topic concerns the evaluation in survey research of the validity, 
reliability and suitability of procedures used to measure risk attitude and strength 
of preference which originate from and are applied mainly in controlled and well 
defined settings of decision analysis. Evaluations of risk attitude assessments have 
been performed chiefly in decision analysis and in laboratory experiments. In 
both contexts, but especially in experiments, much attention is devoted to the 
detection of judgmental biases and errors in utility assessment. The findings of 
these studies show the sensitivity of the assessment to a variety of factors. In 
contrast, survey studies, often involving a large number of decision makers, 
typically make use of only one measurement procedure in risk attitude assess-
ment. In these survey studies no or only some attention is devoted to the validity 
and reliability issue of assessments. By applying four measurement procedures in 
this study, consisting of two risky and two riskless procedures, and by repeating 
each measurement for the same respondent, insight into the research topics men-
tioned above is gained. 
In analyzing the mentioned above topics, two data analysis approaches can be 
applied which are linked to a distinct conception of risk attitude and strength of 
preference. Generally stated, one might link the first approach to a conception of 
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risk attitude and strength of preference typically found in utility theory and 
decision analysis, while the second approach is more in line with that generally 
found in the social sciences, particularly in psychology. The latter approach will 
be referred to as latent variable approach. Both conceptions will now be briefly 
described. 
The first approach is directly linked to expected utility theory. In the context 
of the subjective expected utility model, measuring someone's risk attitude 
implies assessing a utility function u(x) by means of lotteries. The shape of this 
function indicates the risk attitude (and this shape is characterized completely by 
the Pratt-Arrow coefficients of risk aversion). The function itself is essential 
since in this approach the ultimate goal of analysis is to order probability distri-
butions by means of the assessed function. 
It is standard practice to use lotteries in measuring this utility function. By 
using lotteries, decision makers' preferences of are assessed in the presence of 
risk and, as a consequence, these preferences reveal the decision maker's attitude 
towards risk. In contrast, it has been suggested to use a riskless measurement 
procedure in assessing a so-called strength of preference or value function v(x) 
(see Chapter 3). Some contend that this value function will or should be linearly 
related to the utility function (e.g. Allais 1979, von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
1986). Others hypothesize that the relationship between the functions is not 
necessarily linear (e.g. Bell and Raiffa 1982, Dyer and Sarin 1982). Since the 
utility function is measured in the presence of risk and the value function is 
measured under certainty, in their view the first function reveals a decision 
maker's risk attitude whereas the latter shows his attitude in riskless conditions. 
The latter attitude will be referred to as a decision maker's strength of prefe-
rence. Moreover, in case of a non-linear relationship between the utility and 
value function, this departure from linearity is interpreted as a measurement of 
the true/real risk attitude of a decision maker and is referred to as the relative 
risk attitude. This utility theoretic conception of risk attitude, strength of pre-
ference and relative risk attitude then makes it necessary to measure a utility and 
a value function, followed by an analysis of the shape of each function, the dif-
ferences in location of the functions and their functional relationship. 
In the second approach, i.e. the latent variable approach, the risk attitude of a 
decision maker is not restricted to a utility or value function. Risk attitude is 
conceived as a latent, that is, not directly observable, variable which can be 
measured by means of one or more indicators. Such a conception and opera-
tionalization of risk attitude is in line with standard psychometric practice. 
Measuring risk attitude or strength of preference in this manner is analogous to 
procedures applied in measuring concepts like intelligence, self esteem or a per-
son's attitude towards an object. In this latent variable approach no evaluation 
function is obtained so that it is not possible to order probability distributions per 
individual and thus analyze preferences for marketing strategies. The focus is on 
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characterising a decision maker with respect to risk attitude and not on ordering 
probability distributions. 
This second approach should imply the development of a sample of indicators 
of both risk attitude and strength of preference. For example, asking a 
respondent to indicate his extent of agreement with a number of statements con-
cerning risky choice behavior. However, instead of collecting extra data in this 
manner, a more simple and better way of analyzing this latent variable concept of 
risk attitude and strength of preference is to make use of the data that have been 
collected in the first approach. 
utility theory 
approach 
Figure 6.1 Two approaches in structuring the analysis of risk attitude and 
strength of preference 
In Figure 6.1 both approaches are shown schematically. Four measurement proce-
dures are applied, twice for each respondent. The two risky procedures concern 
the lottery technique and conjoint measurement. By means of these techniques an 
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assessment is obtained of the utility function u(x) and of the risk attitude as a 
latent variable. The two riskless procedures consist of the midvalue splitting and 
rating technique. The value function v(x) and the latent variable strength of 
preference are obtained with these techniques. Focus in the utility theory 
approach is on the function that is obtained by each technique (typical analyses 
concern the shape of the function, the degree of risk aversion, the magnitude of 
temporal shift of the function from 1985 to 1984). Especially the functional rela-
tionship between u(x) and v(x) will be given attention to, i.e. the hypothesis of a 
relative risk attitude. 
In the latent variable approach, the four procedures serve as indicators of, 
respectively risk attitude and strength of preference. Of course, the functions 
obtained by the techniques cannot be directly used to this end. The functions will 
therefore be uniquely represented by the Pratt-Arrow coefficients of risk aver-
sion, yielding one score for each procedure for each respondent. Typically, 
analyses in this approach consist of calculating correlations between the indicators 
over respondents, resulting in a multitrait-multimethod matrix. In this manner 
convergent validity and temporal stability of each concept can be assessed. Sub-
sequently, the relationship between both concepts can be analyzed.1 The analyti-
cal framework of LISREL (Jareskog and Sdrbom 1976, 1977, 1984) appears very 
suitable in analyzing such multitrait multimethod matrices. In each of the 
following Sections 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7, both approaches will be paid attention to. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, the design and results of the 
two risky procedures, the lottery technique (in Sections 6.2 and 6.3) and conjoint 
measurement (in Section 6.4), will be presented. Subsequently, in Section 6.5 the 
correspondence of these techniques will be analyzed with specific attention given 
to stability and convergent validity of risk attitude assessment. In Section 6.6 the 
design and results of the two riskless procedures, the midvalue splitting and 
rating technique, are dealt with. This is followed by an analysis of the correspon-
dence between the techniques in assessing strength of preference. In Section 6.7, 
the correspondence between strength of preference and risk attitude will be 
analyzed. The mutual location of the functions u(x) and v(x) will be analyzed and 
the hypothesis of the relative risk attitude will be tested. 
These analyses are followed in Section 6.8 by an analysis of the relationship 
between the risk attitude and variables characterizing the farmers and/or their 
farming situation. In this section, it is tested whether e.g. old farmers are more 
risk averse than young farmers or whether farmers with large farms differ in risk 
attitude from farmers with small farms. An analogous analysis will be performed 
It is important to note here the relationship between both approaches with respect to the concept of 
relative risk attitude. If, for all or most of the respondents, u(x) = a + b v(x) (b > 0), then the cor-
relation between the latent variables risk attitude and strength of preference computed over respon-
dents will be highly positive (these findings would imply a refutation of the hypothesis of a relative 
risk attitude). If u(x) and v(x) are not related linearly, then the correlation between latent variables 
risk attitude and strength of preference computed over respondents will be low or might even be 
negative (these findings would imply a confirmation of the hypothesis of a relative risk attitude). 
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with respect to strength of preference and relative risk attitude. A summary of 
the major findings and the main conclusions conclude this chapter (Section 6.9). 
6.2 Measurement of risk attitude by means of lotteries 
In this section, a review of the techniques for assessing utility functions will be 
given first (6.2.1). This review results in the choice of using the so-called 
midpoint chaining method in assessing points of the utility function. The selec-
tion of suitable functional forms and the method for estimating the parameters of 
these functions will be dealt with in 6.2.2. Finally, in 6.2.3 the results of the 
measurement will be described. 
6.2.1 Review of techniques for assessing utility functions 
A von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function can be assessed by means of a 
number of techniques. In this section a review of optional techniques will be 
given and strengths and weaknesses of the techniques will be presented. First 
now, two general remarks have to be made. 
Firstly, it is important to state here that for all techniques presented below, it 
is assumed that respondents respond in accordance with expected utility theory, 
that is, in the assessment task respondents conform to the axioms of expected 
utility. Essentially then, the method of measurement is not independent of the 
theory. This, of course, is precisely the argument of e.g. Allais (1979) in his 
criticism of expected utility theory. Since in the view of Allais decision makers 
do not choose in accordance with the independence axiom, the assessment of a 
utility function, representing the risk attitude, is not possible. 
Secondly, as Farquhar (1984, p. 1285) states in his extensive review of utility 
assessment techniques: " ... behavioral research on decision making demonstrates 
the labile nature of preference judgments. Seemingly subtle changes in problem 
structure, question format, response mode, individual perspective, or other 
aspects of the assessment process can sometimes dramatically change the prefe-
rence responses of an individual decision maker". Many such biases have been 
reported (see e.g. Hogarth 1980 and Hershey et al. 1982) and some will be dis-
cussed later on in this section. To say the least, behavioral research indicates that 
assessment of utility functions should be considered a difficult task which must 
be handled with great care. Important elements in careful assessment are: pro-
viding a clear and unambiguous decision context, specifying the attribute of 
interest clearly, training the respondent and interviewer in the assessment task, 
and checking for inconsistencies in responses. Furthermore, it is recommended to 
utilize more than one technique in order to study convergent validity. Predictive 
validity will of course be a final check on the validity of the assessment. 
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Classification of assessment techniques 
An elaborate review of assessment techniques of utility functions can be found in 
Farquhar (1984). He differentiates as much as 24 different variants. In almost all 
variants binary lotteries (i.e. lotteries with two outcomes) are used in the assess-
ment, mainly because binary lotteries are the easiest to grasp for respondents. 
Moreover, a respondent has to compare only two binary lotteries at a time. It is 
reasoned that assessing the utility function in this most simple manner will mini-
mize response error and maximize the chance that respondents behave according 
to the expected utility model. 
In the presentation below, a binary lottery will be denoted as [xv p, x 2 ] which 
stands for a lottery which yields outcome x x with probability p and outcome x 2 
with probability (1 - p). If either p = 0, p = 1 or x x = x 2 , the lottery is degene-
rate because a particular outcome is certain. 
A preference comparison of two binary lotteries involves the following expres-
sion: 
[ x p p, x 2 ] R [x 3 , q, x 4 ] (6.1) 
where all items but one are fixed beforehand and the respondent has to specify 
the remaining item, so that Equation 6.1 holds. R in 6.1 denotes the preference 
relation between the lotteries, and consists of: > (is more preferred than), < (is 
less preferred than) or = (is indifferent to). For example, if the respondent is 
offered two lotteries in which the four outcomes as well as the probabilities p 
and q are fixed, he then has to specify the sole unspecified item: the preference 
relation R between the two lotteries. If, on the other hand, the four outcomes (x x 
to x 4 ) and probability p are fixed and if R is specified as = , the respondent then 
has to specify probability q so that he is indifferent between the lotteries. 
The assessment techniques can be classified with respect to two variables (see 
Table 6.1). Firstly, techniques can be divided into standard gambles and paired 
gambles. In a standard gamble, a degenerate lottery (i.e. a certain outcome) is 
compared to a binary lottery. In paired gamble techniques, two binary lotteries 
are compared. A second division between techniques concerns the item that has 
to be specified by the respondent: the preference relation R (preference com-
parisons techniques), the probability (probability equivalence techniques), one of 
the outcomes (value equivalence techniques) or the outcome in a degenerate lottery 
(certainty equivalence techniques). Table 6.1 shows the classification into 7 basic 
groups of techniques which results from these two variables. It should be noted 
that the item that is bold as well as underlined in Table 6.1 has to be specified 
by the respondent, since all other items are fixed beforehand. 
In order to assess a complete utility function the respondent has to make a 
series of comparisons between binary lotteries. In each of the 7 groups of tech-
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niques in Table 6.1 therefore, variants of techniques exist which differ with 
respect to the manner in which the series of lotteries is completed. 
Table 6.1 Classification of techniques for assessing utility functions by means 
of lotteries 
Standard-gamble*1 Paired-gambleb 
1. Preference 
comparison (PC) 
[x x ,p,x 2] R x 3 [Xj.p.Xj] R [x 3 ,q,x 4] 
2. Probability 
equivalence (PE) 
[x 1,ji,x 2] = x 3 [x 1,B,x 2] = [x 3 ,q,x 4] 
3. Value 
equivalence (VE) 
[XpP.Xj ] = x 3 [x x ,P,x 2] = [x 3 ,q,x 4] 
4. Certainty 
equivalence (CE) 
lxvp,x9] = x 3 — 
I X 1 < X 3 < X 2 
x x < x 3 and x 4 < x 2 
Comparison of standard-gamble and paired-gamble techniques 
In a standard-gamble a sure outcome is compared to a lottery, whereas in a 
paired-gamble method two lotteries are compared. This fundamental difference 
between both categories of techniques suggests an advantage of the paired-
gamble approach because this technique is not susceptible to either the certainty 
effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) or the utility for gaming effect (denoted 
plaisir de jeu by Allais 1979). 
The certainty effect refers to the much found empirical observation that deci-
sion makers tend to attach too much weight to outcomes that are certain in 
comparison with outcomes that are merely probable. As a consequence, standard-
gamble techniques would lead to more risk averse utility functions than paired-
gambles. The utility for gaming effect means that someone might value a lottery 
more strongly than would be expected on the basis of his risk attitude, solely due 
to the (expected) pleasure of "playing" the lottery in comparison with the "dull" 
sure outcome. Such an effect is probably very important in e.g. casino gambling; 
this effect is not very plausible for economic decision making. In order to refrain 
from utility for gaming with a standard-gamble technique, a serious assessment 
of the utility function requires much care in order to create a realistic decision 
context.2 
In our study the standard-gamble version represents a realistic decision context, since in the actual 
decision situation farmers can choose a 100% fixed-price contract (the sure option, a degenerate 
lottery) or choose a marketing strategy with risk (a lottery). 
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A disadvantage of the paired-gamble technique concerns the difficulty of the 
assessment task to both the respondent and the interviewer. For example Novick 
et al. (1981, p. 563) conclude, with respect to the probability equivalence version 
(referred to as PE-version, see Table 6.1) of the paired-gamble techniques, that 
they are not convinced of the usefulness of the technique: "... it is difficult even 
for experienced subjects. Fatigue and boredom are definite problems". Notwith-
standing this conclusion by Novick et al., in studies with agricultural producers as 
respondents, a number of well known cases exist in which the paired-gamble 
technique is applied successfully. For example, Officer and Halter (1968), Lin, 
Dean and Moore (1974) and recently Hildreth and Knowles (1986) applied the 
so-called Ramsey-technique (the VE-version of the paired-gamble techniques). 
In Officer and Halter (1968) a direct comparison of the Ramsey-technique, 
PE- and CE-standard-gamble technique was made. The Ramsey and CE-tech-
nique showed greater predictive validity than the PE-technique. They reported 
further that the five farmers they interviewed were more responsive and had a 
greater appreciation of the Ramsey-technique than of the CE-technique. The 
farmers judged the Ramsey-technique to be more realistic because of the two 
uncertain alternatives that have to be compared. A clear disadvantage of the 
Ramsey-technique was the larger number of questions farmers had to answer. 
However, definite conclusions about the pro's and con's of both techniques 
cannot be drawn from this study due to the small number of farmers. Farquhar 
(1984) concludes that relatively few research has been done with respect to biases 
and distortions associated with paired-gamble techniques. Up until now, the 
paired-gamble approach has mostly been used in consistency checks. He states 
that further empirical research is necessary to evaluate whether the theoretical 
reduction in assessment bias is worth the extra trouble in the assessment task. 
In our opinion, the conclusions of Novick et al. and Farquhar concerning the 
difficulty of the paired-gamble techniques to the respondent do not apply to the 
preference comparison version of the paired-gamble, since expressing preferences 
between two gambles is a fairly easy task to the respondent. In this study the 
preference comparison version of the paired-gamble technique will therefore be 
applied, within the framework of conjoint measurement (see Section 6.4). It will 
be shown that this technique provides a measurement of the risk attitude in a 
respondent friendly manner. 
Evaluation of variants of the standard-gamble technique 
The standard-gamble techniques are most popular in assessing utility functions. 
Of the four variants, especially the PE- and CE-technique are often used (for 
abbreviations see Table 6.1). The PC- and VE-version are much less popular. A 
disadvantage of the PC-version of the standard-gamble technique is that it does 
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not result in a complete utility function. The VE-version has, according to 
Farquhar (1984), not yet been applied in expected utility context and strengths 
and weaknesses have not yet been established. Here, most attention will therefore 
be directed to a comparison of the standard-gamble versions of the PE- and CE-
technique. Differences between both techniques and empirical research con-
cerning the pro's and con's of both techniques will be briefly reviewed below. 
In the PE- and CE-technique, the respondent has to specify an item, that is, a 
probability (in PE) or a certainty equivalent (in CE), so that he becomes in-
different between the lottery and the certain outcome. Usually, indifference is 
arrived at in an iterative manner. A sequence of points is successively adjusted 
until indifference is established. A key difference (Hershey et al. 1982) between 
the PE- and CE-technique is whether one arrives at indifference by adjusting 
concrete amounts of the attribute (CE-technique) or by means of more abstract 
probabilities (PE-technique). The necessity of using probabilities as a method of 
adjustment is seen as the most important disadvantage of the PE-technique. For 
example, Mosteller and Nogee (1951) and Novick et al. (1981) emphasize that the 
CE-technique is less demanding on the part of the respondent than the PE-tech-
nique. 
A second difference concerns the manner in which a series of points of the 
utility function is arrived at. Usually in the PE-technique the certain outcome x 3 
(see Table 6.1) is varied whereas the two outcomes (x t and x 2 ) of the lottery 
remain fixed. For a number of values x. on the interval x. < x. < x, the respon-
dent has to specify the probability p } in the lottery. Then, applying the expected 
utility model, u(x.) = p.. These assessments of p. can be seen as independent 
measurements. 
In contrast with the independent measurements of the PE-technique, the most 
commonly applied variant of the CE-technique uses chained responses. In this so-
called midpoint chaining technique (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) former responses to 
lotteries are used in the assessment of subsequent responses. Specifically, the 
midpoint chaining method starts with the assessment of a certainty equivalent x c 
of a lottery with the boundaries of the interval (say xt and x 2 ) as outcomes. By 
scaling u(x x) = 0 and u(x 2) = 1 and if p = 1/2 then u(x c) = 1/2. Subsequently the 
respondent has to assess the certainty equivalents of the 50/50 lotteries [x 1 ,x c ] and 
[x c ,x 2 ] with corresponding expected utilities of 1/4 and 3/4, respectively. Further 
midpoints can be assessed in a similar manner and each comparison involves a 
bisection of a particular interval. 
The chaining of responses might lead to serial dependence of measurements 
and a compounding of errors in measurement (Knowles 1984). Apart from 
chaining, range effects might occur because not only does the range of outcomes 
(that is the difference between the greater and lesser prize in the lottery) change 
throughout the series of lotteries, but also the range between the extremes of the 
interval of the first lottery is large (Krzystofowicz and Duckstein 1980; McCord 
and de Neufville 1986). Later on in this section it will be argued that this 
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varying range of outcomes might also be considered an asset of the midpoint 
chaining technique. 
A further effect specifically noted with the CE-technique is the dependence of 
the utility function on the probabilities specified in the binary lotteries. E.g., Van 
Dam (1973) and Karmarkar (1978) showed that 50/50 lotteries resulted in dif-
ferent utility functions than lotteries with 10/90 or 25/75 probabilities. McCord 
and de Neufville (1983) also report such an effect. In an experiment with 22 
MIT-respondents, the average relative difference between, theoretically equal, 
certainty equivalents for different p-values ranged from 30% to 100%. Of course 
these results are not in line with expected utility theory. In the expected utility 
model the utility function is independent of the probability distribution that is 
evaluated (axiom of independence). 
The dependence of the utility function on the probability used in the lotteries 
leads one to suggest conditional utility functions: u(x/p) instead of u(x) (e.g. see 
the lottery dependent utility theory of Becker and Sarin 1987). Van Dam (1973) 
suggested decision weights in line with Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect 
theory to account for the effects. In actual measurements a preference exists for 
using p = 1/2 in the lotteries because it is thought to result in the least distortion. 
In a number of studies the PE- and CE-technique were directly compared. In 
Officer and Halter (1968) the predictive validity of the CE-technique was supe-
rior. However, they surveyed only 5 farmers. In Hershey et al. (1982), in a criti-
cal review of the study of Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979), it was shown that 
the PE-technique tended to concave functions for losses and convex functions for 
gains, whereas the CE-technique tended towards convex-concave curves. 
Furthermore, they found that the CE-technique generally leads to more risk 
seeking than the PE-technique. 
Further experiments which showed systematic differences between both tech-
niques are reported in Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) and their results were 
elaborated upon by Johnson and Schkade (1989). In both studies the methods are 
compared in two-stage designs. Firstly, subjects have to provide a CE-judgment 
and they later provide an answer for a related lottery with a PE-technique (or 
vice versa). In case of procedure invariant measurement these judgments should 
coincide. To illustrate the two-stage procedure, consider a farmer who indicates a 
certainty equivalent of say 25 cts/kg for a 50/50 lottery with outcomes 10 and 
70 cts/kg. Then e.g. a week later, confronted with a lottery with outcomes 10 and 
70 cts/kg and the sure amount of 25 cts/kg, the same respondent should specify 
p = 0.50 as indifference probability in the lottery. 
Experiments conducted in this manner with students as respondents showed 
serious inconsistencies between the techniques. The extent of discrepancy depends 
upon the respondent's initial risk attitude, the order of questioning (CE followed 
by PE or vice versa) and upon whether lotteries take place in the domain of gains 
or in the domain of losses. Several theoretical explanations have been provided to 
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account for the experimental results (Hershey and Schoemaker 1985). The most 
important explanation seams to be refraining: in the PE-technique the sure 
amount serves as a reference point and the two outcomes are recoded into a gain 
and a loss. By reframing, a pure gain or a pure loss gamble is thus translated into 
a mixed gamble. Experimental evidence shows that in general respondents are 
more risk averse in mixed gambles than in either pure loss or pure gain gambles. 
Consequently the PE-version will result in more risk aversion. Other factors 
which probably contribute to the observed discrepancies are the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic (in the CE-technique the expected value of the lottery might 
serve as an anchor from which the adjustment is insufficient in order to arrive at 
the true certainty equivalent) and random error (Hershey and Schoemaker 1985). 
The large majority of research in establishing the biases of different assessment 
techniques concerns laboratory experiments.3 Surprisingly little attention is 
devoted to the validity and reliability of utility measurement in survey research. 
In survey research typically only one assessment technique is applied in 
measuring risk attitudes. Taking into account the labile nature of the utility 
assessment, the validity of the measurements and conclusions in these studies are 
questionable. 
Also, in survey research hardly any attention is paid to studying the reliability 
of the measurement. Exceptions are the test-retest measurements in Officer and 
Halter (1968) and Binswanger (1980, 1981). Both studies concern agricultural pro-
ducers. For example, Binswanger showed that (lowly educated) farmers in India 
were more risk averse, less sensitive to interviewer variation and more stable in 
judgment when assessments were conducted with real money lotteries (a farmer 
could remain at the status quo or win up to a monthly income) than with lotteries 
with hypothetical outcomes. These differences in validity and reliability between 
real and hypothetical lotteries decreased after playing a number of real lotteries. 
In general, one might conclude that training the respondent seems to yield more 
valid and stable results. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) repeated their 
measurements one year later with business executives as respondents. They found 
significant test-retest correlations but the magnitude of these correlations was 
fairly low. 
Conclusion and choice of assessment technique 
Since the PE- and CE-technique generally do not yield the same results, one 
might wonder which technique is best. According to Johnson and Schkade (1989, 
p. 423), after extensively reviewing the evidence: " ... it is not apparent which 
It should be noted here that the external validity of the experimental results can be questioned. 
Typically, students are taken as subjects; the involvement of these subjects in providing answers may 
be low resulting in the fact that less time, attention and hard thought about their preferences is 
spent. Also, consistency tests are usually absent so that no feedback is provided to encourage further 
thought or revisions in opinions. 
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response mode better reflects a decision maker's true preferences". Not sur-
prisingly, they recommend to use a multiple method approach to " ... guard 
against the sensitivity of assessments to response mode biases". For example, use 
could be made of the so-called hybrid models in which a combination of tech-
niques is used alternately in one assessment task to arrive at a utility function. 
Farquhar (1984) suggests that such hybrid techniques would be less sensitive to 
bias than single techniques, without making it more difficult to the respondent.4 
Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) also recommend to use several techniques, 
the main part of which is to confront subjects with inconsistent answers thereby 
asking them to reconcile the measurements. In fact, in decision analysis con-
sistency is induced explicitly. Differences between e.g. the CE- and PE-technique 
will therefore not show up. 
From the review of the literature we conclude that a multiple method approach 
appears to be a key factor for a valid assessment of utility functions. This 
approach will therefore be applied in this study. Apart from using two certainty 
procedures in measuring the value function, two procedures incorporating risk 
will be applied to measure the utility function. The latter procedures concern the 
paired-gamble technique within a conjoint measurement approach and a 
standard-gamble approach using the midpoint chaining variant of the CE-tech-
nique. 
Several reasons exist for choosing the CE-technique instead of the PE-tech-
nique. Firstly, most studies containing utility measurements with agricultural pro-
ducers as respondents have been conducted with the CE-technique. Examples of 
studies applying the CE-technique are: Officer and Halter (1971), Halter and 
Dean (1971), Francisco and Anderson (1972), Hazell and Scandizzo (1977), Bond 
and Wonder (1980) and Hamal and Anderson (1982). Bond and Wonder and 
Hazell and Scandizzo used probabilities of 1/4 and 3/4 in their lotteries; all other 
studies used p = 1/2. Eliashberg (1980) applied the CE-technique to consumers 
and Swalm (1966) conducted one of the earliest empirical studies in utility 
assessment with business executives as respondents. In general, respondents show 
few difficulties in responding to the questions. 
The main reason however, for preferring the CE-technique to the PE-tech-
nique, is the difference in ease with which the farmers in our study responded to 
both types of questions. In pilot interviews with 15 farmers both the CE- and the 
PE-technique were tested. In these pilot interviews it became clear that most 
farmers had difficulty in answering the PE-questions and in several cases no 
responses could be obtained at all. In particular, the farmers showed difficulties 
It is surprising that, to our best knowledge, no experimental research is performed to evaluate the 
hybrid measurements using an interactive computer device. Further research of this matter is 
especially relevant because decreasing costs of computers enable the use of computer controlled inter-
active utility assessments in survey research which until recently could be used only in decision 
analysis conditions. 
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in arriving at indifference by means of adjusting probabilities. To the farmers a 
difference in probabilities between e.g. p = 0.35 and p = 0.37 bears no vivid 
consequences. This caused reluctance to think more deeply about their 
preferences and often resulted in nice number probabilities like a half, a third, a 
quarter, etc. In sharp contrast with the PE-technique, in the CE-technique the 
attribute of adjustment concerns the price/kg which is interpreted fairly easily. 
To a farmer the difference in price between 23 or 24 cts/kg has a clear meaning 
and the consequences of the one cents difference are easily calculated and 
understood (i.e. about Dfl 500,= per ha.). Also the 50/50 chances in the lotteries 
can be easily interpreted. 
Another main argument in favor of the CE-technique concerns the sequence of 
lotteries in the midpoint chaining technique leading to different ranges in the 
lotteries. These changing outcomes in the binary lotteries can be easily inter-
preted by the farmers. A lottery played on the lower part of the price interval, 
say between 10 and 25 cts/kg, can be interpreted as reflecting the decision 
problem a farmer faces in a year in which the overall market price is fairly low, 
whereas lotteries with high outcomes, say between 35 and 60 cts/kg, reflect the 
decision problem in a year with a high overall price level. These lotteries thus are 
much less artificial than either a PE-technique in which the outcomes of the 
interval remain fixed and the sure outcome is varied over the interval or a CE-
variant in which the outcomes remain fixed and the probabilities are varied. The 
realism added to the midpoint chaining task might reduce the sensitivity to the 
varying range bias, suggested in the literature. 
6.2.2 Implementation of the midpoint chaining technique 
Specification of attribute range 
The attribute for which the utility function is assessed is the price/kg. The out-
comes in the lotteries are denoted in cts/kg or equivalently in Dfl/100 kg. The 
utility function is assessed on an interval ranging from 10 to 70 cts/kg. That is, 
the first lottery presented to the respondents concerns a 50/50 lottery with out-
comes of 10 and 70 cts/kg. These boundaries are chosen in such a way that the 
whole probability distribution associated with a marketing strategy can be 
evaluated. We expect the minimum and maximum price of a marketing strategy 
to lie between 10 and 70 cts/kg on the following grounds. 
The lowest price level of 10 cts/kg is more or less a natural bottom price of a 
marketing strategy. A farmer will at least receive the futter price of ware pota-
toes which is about 7 cts/kg at a minimum. Since, even in a year with very low 
prices, at least part of the total harvest of an individual farmer will be sold at 
higher prices, than the futter price and well above 10 cts/kg, the marketing 
strategy will almost always result in a higher overall price than 10 cts/kg. 
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The upper boundary of the interval is more difficult to determine. In some 
extreme years, e.g. in 1976, prices at the end of the season were above 100 
cts/kg; in 1983 they were up to 100 cts/kg. However, in both years, these prices 
were extremes but only for part of the total selling season. Very few farmers will 
have sold all or the largest part of their harvest at such high prices; typically they 
will have sold at lower prices earlier in the season or at lower contract prices. 
Therefore, the marketing strategy has resulted in a higher price than say 60 or 70 
cts/kg for only a few farmers. To illustrate this phenomenon, in 1983 which was 
a year with high prices at the end of the season, the maximum prices farmers 
actually attained for marketing strategies ranged from 50 to 70 cts/kg. The 
boundary of 70 cts/kg is therefore a realistic maximum. 
Sequence of assessments 
The respondent is confronted with 10 lotteries on the specified interval. For each 
lottery the farmer has to assess the certainty equivalent. In all lotteries p = 1/2. 
The sequence of lotteries is described in Figure 6.2. The curves in this figure 
specify the outcomes in each lottery. The levels of expected utility corresponding 
to the assessed certainty equivalents are specified too in Figure 6.2 (the endpoints 
u(x L) and u(xH) are scaled 0 and 1, respectively). The first equivalent x t is 
assessed between x L and x H (the level of expected utility corresponding to this 
equivalent is 0.500). The second equivalent x 2 is assessed between x L and x x 
(expected utility is 0.250) and the third equivalent x g is assessed between x x and 
x f i (expected utility is 0.750). The fourth equivalent x 4 is assessed between x 2 and 
x g (expected utility is 0.500), etc. In this manner 10 certainty equivalents are 
assessed. 
If these ten certainty equivalents were plotted in a graph with the assessed cer-
tainty equivalents on the x-axis and the expected utilities on the y-axis, a func-
tion could be drawn or fitted through the points. In Figure 6.2 this would result 
in a concave utility function, implying risk aversion (e.g. notice that in Figure 
6.1 the certainty equivalent x x is smaller than (x L + x H ) /2 (the expected value of 
the lottery). Figure 6.2 further shows the variation in range of the lottery. The 
first lottery between x L = 10 and x f l = 70 cts/kg is largest in range, whereas the 
ranges of lotteries 5 and 7 are very small, especially in case of strongly risk 
averse respondents. 
Three of the 10 lotteries concern consistency measurements, namely: x 4 , x 9 and 
x 1 Q . For u(x) = 0.500 three measurements are obtained namely X j , x 4 and x 1 Q ; the 
utility level u(x) = 0.375 is measured twice namely x 6 and x g . Theoretically, the 
certainty equivalents for the same level of utility should be equal. Because of 
measurement error these measurements will not be exactly equal. However, in a 
reliable and valid measurement they will be close to one another. 
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Figure 6.2 Sequence of assessment of 10 certainty equivalents by means of 
50/50 lotteries in the midpoint chaining technique 
The lotteries were presented to the respondents on paper. The lottery was des-
cribed in a tree format. The interviewers were instructed to arrive at the indif-
ference point by iteration. That is, the interviewer confronts the respondent with 
a sure price level that is alternately above and below the "expected" certainty 
equivalent. Such an iteration seems preferable to e.g. incrementing or decre-
menting systematically. The interviewers were extensively trained in the assess-
ment procedure. 
Before conducting the sequence of 10 lotteries the respondent received an 
elaborate explanation of the goals of measurement and some training in the 
assessment procedure by means of conducting four test lotteries. In the descrip-
tion of the decision context farmers were instructed to imagine selling the total 
harvest according to the lottery or the certain price. Prices were set for the 
variety Bintje at the farmer's usual moment of delivery and usual quality, size 
distribution and waste percentage of ware potatoes. 
A number of farmers showed difficulty in responding to the questions. The 
interviewers were instructed to take ample time in explaining the purposes of the 
question and familiarizing the respondent with the questioning procedure. In case 
interviewers seriously doubted the respondents' understanding of the question or 
the seriousness in answering the question, the assessed data were not analysed. 
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6.2.3 Specification of utility functions and method of parameter estimation 
Specification of utility functions 
In the expected utility model the sole requirement of the utility function u(x) is 
that it is a monotonically decreasing or increasing function on the relevant inter-
val. The particular shape of the function is left open. In this study both a nega-
tive exponential and a power function will be fitted to the ten assessed points. 
This choice is based on both theoretical and practical reasons which will be 
delineated below. 
The concepts of absolute and proportional risk aversion, indicated by the Pratt-
Arrow coefficients, provide one way of choosing suitable functions. Most atten-
tion in this respect has been given to wealth as attribute. Tsiang (1972) refers to 
Arrow (1975, 1971) in providing four conditions for a utility function for wealth 
in order to be acceptable: 
1. marginal utility of wealth is positive 
u'{x) > 0 (6.2) 
2. marginal utility of wealth decreases with increasing wealth 
u"{x) < 0 (6.3) 
3. marginal absolute risk aversion is constant or decreasing with increasing 
wealth 
(6.4) 
4. marginal proportional risk aversion is constant or increasing with increasing 
wealth 
d ( - x 
V » ( * ) / > Q (6.5) 
dx ~ 
These conditions imply the following behavioral assumptions. Conditions 1 and 2 
state that the utility function of wealth is increasing and that decision makers are 
risk averse towards wealth. Condition 3 implies that for equal absolute changes in 
wealth, say plus or minus Dfl 10.000, a decision maker is equally or less risk 
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averse if he becomes wealthier. Finally, condition 4 implies that for proportional 
changes in wealth, say plus or minus 10% of his wealth, a decision maker is 
equally or more averse if he becomes wealthier. 
In general the conditions 1, 2 and 3 are theoretically and empirically accepted 
(Tsiang 1972). With respect to condition 4, however, this is not generally the case. 
For example Rubinstein (1976, p. 553) states: "While the issue of the realistic sign 
of absolute risk aversion seems to be settled (decreasing absolute risk aversion), 
the direction of proportional risk aversion remains an open question". In studies 
with agricultural producers the assumption of a decreasing absolute risk attitude 
has been confirmed. For example, Hamal and Anderson (1982) found a 
decreasing absolute and a constant proportional wealth function for a majority of 
60 farmers in Nepal; Hildreth and Knowles (1986) found a decreasing absolute 
risk aversion function with 13 farmers in Minnesota. 
Three functions meet all four conditions mentioned above. These functions are 
a negative exponential, a power and a logarithm function. 
1. Negative exponential function 
u(x) = a + b e~ c x (6.6) 
r(x) = c (6.7) 
s(x) = x r(x) = x c (6.8) 
In Equation 6.7 r(x) is the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion and 
s(x) in Equation 6.8 is the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of proportional risk aversion 
(see Chapter 3). 
In Equation 6.6 parameters a and b are scaling coefficients (u(x) is an interval 
scale). Parameter c concerns the risk attitude. If c > 0 the decision maker is risk 
averse, if c < 0 the decision maker is risk seeking. The Pratt-Arrow coefficients 
show that the negative exponential function implies a constant absolute risk atti-
tude (referred to as CARA) and an increasing proportional risk attitude (IPRA). 
2. Power function 
u(x) = a + b x 1 - c (6.9) 
r(x) = c/x (6.10) 
s(x) = x r(x) = c (6.11) 
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Again parameters a and b in 6.9 are scaling coefficients and c indicates the risk 
attitude. If 0 < c < 1 the decision maker is risk averse, if c < 0 the decision 
maker is risk seeking. The power function implies a decreasing absolute risk 
attitude (DARA) and a constant proportional risk attitude (CPRA). 
3. Logarithm function 
u(x) = a + b In (x+c) (6.12) 
r(x) = 1 / (x+c) (6.13) 
s(x) = x / (x+c) (6.14) 
The logarithm function implies DARA and: CPRA if c = 0, IPRA if c > 0 and 
DPRA if c < 0. 
The conditions 1 to 4 of the function for wealth mentioned above are mainly 
based on plausibility and do not have a strong theoretical foundation. Sinn (1983, 
1985) has tried to provide these foundations by combining von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions and psychophysical theory. In psychophysics the 
relationship between the objective intensity of a stimulus and the subjective 
intensity of the sensation is studied. This relationship is extensively analyzed 
empirically for many different stimuli. 
Two functions are suggested to describe the relationship: a logarithm function 
(put forward by Fechner) and a power function (brought up by Stevens). In the 
logarithm function, equal relative changes in stimulus intensity bring about equal 
absolute changes in sensation intensity. In the power function equal relative 
changes in stimulus intensity bring about equal relative changes in sensation 
intensity (Sinn 1983). 
In Sinn (1983) an interesting discussion can be found concerning which of the 
two specifications is more plausible and more in line with empirical research. 
Sinn departs from the general standpoint in stating that Fechners logarithm law is 
most plausible. For his argumentation the reader is referred to the original 
source. What matters here is that both functions are founded in Weber's relativity 
law: equal relative changes are equally perceptible, equally intensive or equally 
significant (Sinn 1983, p. 145). The perception of such diverse stimuli like taste, 
sound, light, electricity etc. can be described accurately by Weber's law. 
An interesting hypothesis therefore would be to extend Weber's law to the 
stimulus "wealth". Thus Sinn adds the so-called Weak Relativity Axiom to the 
axioms of von Neumann-Morgenstern: equal relative changes in wealth are equally 
significant to the decision maker. The sole functions which confirm this axiom 
are the power and logarithm function. The negative exponential function is 
excluded by this axiom. 
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The linking of psychophysics and utility theory is very interesting and needs 
further attention. Apart from Sinn (1983), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) refer to 
psychophysical theory in discussing the appropriate shape of their value function 
in Prospect Theory. However, they do not elaborate upon the issue like Sinn. 
Notwithstanding the incompatibility of a negative exponential function and 
psychophysics, the negative exponential function is very often used in utility 
assessment. E.g. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) often refer to this function and 
applied the function to model e.g. the utility of response times of a fire depart-
ment. Also a combination of exponential functions is used quite often in decision 
analysis: u(x) = a - b e " c x - d e"** (with c, d and f > 0). According to 
Eliashberg and Hauser (1985) the exponential (and power) function dominate in 
decision analysis and marketing. In a review of several studies, Fishburn and 
Kochenberger (1979) showed a good fit of the negative exponential function 
respectively above and below the reference point. 
Conclusion 
Both the power and negative exponential function are often applied in utility 
assessments. Theoretical arguments concerning absolute and proportional risk 
aversion suggest both functions to be suitable, although the power function is 
favorable from the standpoint of psychophysical theory. Both functions are easy 
to work with. After scaling the boundaries of the functions, the estimation of 
only one parameter suffices to characterize a decision maker's risk attitude. Since 
in this study a large number of functions have to be fitted, this practical aspect 
is very important. 
The logarithm function will not be fitted to the data. For practical reasons the 
analysis has to be limited to fitting two functions. A choice therefore has to be 
made between the power and logarithm function since both share the same 
characteristics of DARA and CPRA. Considering that the power function is most 
often used in decision analysis we prefer the power function. 
From a theoretical and practical viewpoint therefore, in this study both a nega-
tive exponential and a power function will be fitted for each respondent and 
their fit will be compared. The function specification that fits the data best will 
be chosen in subsequent analyses. 
The following specifications of the functions result by scaling the functions; the 
utility of the lowest (x L) and highest (x f i ) value of the price interval are scaled 
0 and 1, respectively. 
169 
1. Negative exponential function 
1 - e - < x - ' L ) 
u{x) = - r _ (6.15) 
with: 
0 < « (a : ) < 1 
2. Power function 
u(x) =  {X - <6-16> 
with: 
0 < u(x) < 1 
1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 
price in cts/kg 
negative exponential power 
Figure 6.3 An example of a negative exponential and a power function 
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In Figure 6.3 an example of both functions is shown. For both functions in this 
figure the certainty equivalent of a 50/50 lottery between 10 and 70 cts/kg is 
25 cts/kg. The figure shows that the power function is more concave than the 
negative exponential function for low price levels. For high price levels the 
negative exponential function is most concave. 
Parameter estimation method 
The sequence of 10 lotteries in the midpoint chaining technique results in 10 
points of the utility function. In order to arrive at a classification of decision 
makers with respect to risk attitude and in order to be able to evaluate probabi-
lity distributions, a smooth curve representing the utility function is needed. In 
case the number of datapoints is larger than the number of function parameters, 
the parameter can be estimated by means of statistical fitting procedures. 
Usually, a non-linear function is fitted by means of least-squares (see Eliashberg 
and Hauser (1985) for another approach in estimating the parameter). For 
example, Officer and Halter (1968) and Lin, Dean and Moore (1974) applied this 
procedure in assessments obtained from agricultural producers. Currim and Sarin 
(1983) applied the procedure to consumers. 
Generally, u(x.) serves as the dependent and x. as the independent variable. In 
most cases no distinction is made between u(x.) as the (error laden) response 
variable (e.g. in case of a PE-technique) or x. as the response variable (in case of 
a CE-technique). In case of a CE-technique however, the inverse function should 
be estimated since the certainty equivalents and not the utility levels are 
measured with error. Here the following procedure is applied (Knowles 1984). 
Assume 
Xi = &i + e,- (6.17) 
with: 
x,- = perfect response 
Xi — actual response 
e,- = error 
If lotteries are constructed with p = 1/2 then: 
« (£• • )=*{"(*>) + « (**)} (6.18) 
with: 
Xj X( Xjk 
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From 6.18 follows: 
• r , = w - 1 { | ( u ( x j ) + w ( a ; i ) ) } (6.19) 
Assume a negative exponential utility function: 
«(*) = ^ 
scaled on the interval [0,1] with u(0) = 0 and u(l) = 1. 
Then by substituting 6.20 and 6.17 in 6.18 and rearranging results in: 
_ l n { i ( e - " J 4 - e - " ) } ( 6 . 2 1 ) 
j-i — r c,' 
—c 
In Equation 6.21 x. and x. respectively represent the low and high outcome in 
the 50/50 lottery and x. stands for the assessed certainty equivalent. The respon-
dent assesses x. for a number of lotteries (10 in this study), with varying out-
comes x. and x.. 
J k 
If a power function is assumed instead of a negative exponential function: 
«(*) = xc (6.22) 
then Equation 6.23 results instead of 6.21: 
(6.23) 
*«=i{(*i + **)C} + C i 
Generally stated, if x is not scaled on the interval [0,1] but on the interval [x L ,x H ] 
with u(x L) = 0 and u(x H) = 1 (see Section 6.2.2), then Equation 6.21 does not 
change, but 6.23 becomes: 
I 
xt = (xH - xL) U (fi^lL)' + (5±^1LY\C + XL + e. (6.24) 
It is easy to see in 6.24 that if x L = 0 and x H - x L = 1 then 6.24 reduces to 6.23. 
Non-linear least-squares is used to estimate parameter c in Equations 6.21 and 
6.24. If Equations 6.21 and 6.24 are written as: 
Xi = fi(c) + e,- (6.25) 
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The parameter c in 6.25 is chosen so as to minimize (Maddala 1986): 
n 
SSE = J2\xi-fi(c)¥ 
(6.26) 
where SSE is the sum of squared errors. 
If the respondent answered all lottery questions then n = 10. 
The parameter c in 6.21 and in 6.24 is estimated by using routine ZXMIN 
from the IMSL-library of FORTRAN programs. In ZXMIN the least squares es-
timate is obtained by Fletcher's Quasi-Newton method (see the IMSL manual for 
further details). The algebraically calculated parameter of the first lottery (at u(x) 
= 0.5) provided the initial estimate of the parameter in ZXMIN. 
If it is assumed that the residuals e. are independently and identically dis-
tributed with mean 0 and variance (sigma)2 and if c-hat is the final estimate of 
c, then (Maddala 1986, p. 174): 
and the nonlinear-least-squares estimator c-hat is approximately normally dis-
tributed with mean c and variance 
The confidence interval calculated for the estimated parameter will be used en-
tirely for descriptive purposes, namely to classify decision makers into the broad 
risk classes of risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking. Because of the small 
number of assessments (n = 10) and the possibly serial dependence of errors in 
the midpoint chaining technique, the variance of the estimator will not be used 
for inferences. 
6.3 Results of measuring risk attitude by means of lotteries 
In this section the results of measuring the farmer's risk attitude by means of the 
lottery technique will be presented. An overview of the certainty equivalents 
measured for each expected utility level will be given first, followed by a dis-
cussion of the results of estimating the parameter in the negative exponential and 
in the power function. In comparing the results of 1984 and 1985, information 
about temporal shifts in risk attitude will be obtained. 
SSE(c) (6.27) 
(6.28) 
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Certainty equivalents measured in 1984 and 1985 
At least three certainty equivalents could be assessed for a total of 225 respon-
dents in 1984. Since the lottery question was asked in the second interview held 
in 1984 and 15 farmers refused cooperation altogether in the second interview, 
certainty equivalents could have been elicited for a maximum of 238 farmers. Of 
these 238 farmers, a total of 13 farmers did not respond to the question because 
they did not completely understand the lottery question or deemed the 
measurement procedure utterly unrealistic. This leads to a response to the 
question of 94.5% (225 out of 238), which is quite high. In 1985, at least three 
equivalents were measured for 191 out of 205 respondents, which results in a 
response percentage of 93.2%. 
In Table 6.2 some descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) 
are shown concerning the certainty equivalents assessed in 1984 and 1985. The 
results in Table 6.2 are ordered by level of expected utility of the lotteries. The 
order in which the lotteries were presented to the respondent is indicated by the 
number in the first column of the table. The second column shows the outcomes 
used in each lottery. With the exception of the first lottery in which the outcomes 
are 10 and 70 cts/kg for all respondents, the outcomes of the lotteries depend 
upon the answers respondents have provided in former lotteries. As a conse-
quence, the expected value of the lottery and range of the lottery for each level 
of expected utility vary between respondents. Table 6.2 therefore shows the 
average expected value and the average range of the lotteries for each level of 
expected utility. 
Furthermore, in Table 6.2 the measurements are classified for each level of 
expected utility into risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking responses. In theory 
only equivalents which are equal to the expected value of the lottery should be 
classified as risk neutral. Such an approach, however, would not take response 
errors into consideration. Equivalents which are close to the expected value of the 
lottery are therefore denoted as risk neutral, too. Specifically, certainty equi-
valents which deviate less than or equal to 5 percent of the range of the lottery 
from the expected value of the lottery, are classified as risk neutral (the level of 
5 percent is subjectively chosen). For example, in a 50/50 lottery with outcomes 
15 and 35 cts/kg the range of the lottery is 20 cts/kg and the expected value is 
25 cts/kg. In this case, certainty equivalents in the interval with boundaries 24 
and 26 cts/kg are denoted as risk neutral. 
As Table 6.2 shows, the average certainty equivalent assessed in 1984 for the 
first lottery between 10 and 70 cts/kg is 27 cts/kg, with a median response of 25 
cts/kg. Since the expected value of the lottery is 40 cts/kg these responses imply, 
of course, that most farmers are risk averse. In 1984, 89% of respondents gave 
risk averse responses in the first lottery whereas 6% provided equivalents which 
imply risk seeking behavior. 
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Table 6.2 Results of the assessment of certainty equivalents (in cts/kg) in 
1984 and 1985, by means of the midpoint chaining technique (XL 
and X^ are the outcomes in the 50/50 lotteries) 
MEASURE- LOTTERY EXP. CERTAINTY RANGE OF E(x) OF PERCENTAGE 
MENT ' j m i T Y EQUIVALENT LOTTERY LOTTERY RESPONDENTS 
x i X L X H E[u(x)] mean median stdev. mean mean A 
R N S " 
Year 1 9 8 4 N = 2 2 5 
7 10 *z .125 16.03 15.0 5 3 4 9.44 14.72 15 25 60 
2 10 Xi 5 5 0 19.44 18.0 6.66 16.90 18.45 24 33 43 
5 ^ *l 3 7 5 23.11 22.0 7.84 7.46 23.17 32 37 3 1 
9 10 X3 3 7 5 23.42 22.0 8 5 8 28.69 2 4 3 4 55 26 20 
1 10 70 3 0 0 26.99 25.0 9.03 60.00 40.00 89 5 6 
4 X2 X3 3 0 0 27.89 26.0 9.77 1 9 5 5 29.06 3 2 37 31 
10 * 7 Xs 3 0 0 28.61 28.0 9.86 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 0 74 18 8 
6 X3 .625 31.97 31.0 1 0 3 5 11.79 3 Z 7 9 59 25 16 
3 
* 1 
70 .750 38.69 38.0 1 1 3 4 43.10 48.45 84 8 8 
8 X3 70 .875 4 8 3 0 50.0 1 2 5 0 3 1 3 1 5 4 3 4 6 8 19 13 
Year 1 9 8 5 N = 1 9 1 
7 10 Xz .125 1 7 5 1 16.0 5.24 11.84 15.92 18 24 58 
2 10 *i .250 21.84 20.0 7.15 21.49 20.74 2 5 35 41 
5 *2 Xj 3 7 5 2 6 3 3 25.0 8.48 9.70 26.68 4 3 33 24 
1 10 70 3 0 0 31.49 31.0 9 3 0 60.00 40.00 7 3 17 10 
4 X2 Xj 3 0 0 31.05 30.0 10.00 21.13 3 Z 4 0 59 25 16 
6 X3 .625 36.86 37.0 10.62 11.44 37.25 54 25 20 
3 Xl 70 .750 4 Z 9 7 44.0 11.42 3 8 3 1 50.74 77 15 8 
8 X3 70 .875 5 1 3 2 54.0 1 1 3 8 27 .03 56.48 67 20 13 
A = risk averse, RN = risk neutral, S = risk seeking 
The variation in equivalents between respondents is quite large in this first 
lottery. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the certainty equivalents assessed are, 
respectively, 15 and 44 cts/kg, the 10th and 90th percentile values are 16.5 and 
37.5 cts/kg. These figures show that risk aversion varies largely between farmers. 
Both strongly risk averse and risk neutral or slightly risk seeking farmers are 
present in the sample. 
The distribution of responses with respect to whether a respondent is risk 
averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking appears to be different between the lotteries. 
The percentage of risk neutral or risk seeking responses is high, especially for 
low levels of expected utility (0.125 and 0.25). This implies a utility function 
; which is linear or even convex for low price levels (predominantly between 10 
and 19 cts/kg). One explanation for this phenomenon might be a range effect as 
was mentioned in Section 6.2.1. In small-ranged lotteries, responses tend to be 
more often risk neutral or risk seeking than in large-ranged lotteries. 
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The analysis of the relationship in Table 6.2 between the percentage of risk 
averse responses and the average range of the lottery seems to support the 
hypothesis of a range effect. A higher percentage of risk averse responses goes 
together with a larger range of the lottery. Measurement 6, however, with an 
expected utility of 0.625, is an exception in this respect. Although the average 
range for this lottery is quite small (11.5 cts/kg), the percentage of risk averse 
responses is fairly large (59%). It therefore seems that, in our case, a small range 
of the lottery induces risk seeking responses only in case of a low expected value 
of the lottery. This might indicate that the range of the lottery is not the only 
reason for less risk averse responses associated with low levels of expected utility. 
A supplementary explanation is that farmers code the outcomes in lotteries played 
for low levels of price as losses and exhibit less risk aversion or even risk seeking 
preferences, as hypothesized in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
Findings in 1985 show a similar pattern concerning the relationship between 
range and risk aversion. 
Three measurements are obtained in 1984 at u(x) = 0.5 and two measurements 
at u(x) = 0.375 in order to test the internal consistency of the assessments. If 
farmers respond in accordance with expected utility theory, the same certainty 
equivalents should result aside from random response error. Table 6.2 shows that 
average responses at u(x) = 0.5 are lowest for the first measurement and highest 
for the tenth measurement, with the fourth measurement in between. When 
tested, these differences are significant (ANOVA with repeated measurement, 
p < 0.001). The first measurement implies more risk aversion than the fourth and 
tenth measurement. Although significant, differences between the assessments are 
not substantial. The median absolute difference for all three pairwise comparisons 
is 2 cts/kg. For 90% of the respondents the absolute difference is smaller than 
5 cts/kg and for 25% of the respondents perfectly consistent answers were 
obtained. Also, correlations between measurements are very high (Pearson corre-
lations are all above 0.90). Taking into account the extreme range of the first 
lottery, which most likely made it a fairly difficult and error prone elicitation, 
these differences are small. 
No significant difference is found between the measurements in 1984 for 
u(x) = 0.375 (pairwise t-test, p = 0.195). In 1985, only one consistency measure-
ment was provided for at u(x) = 0.5. Although the average equivalent of the 
fourth measurement is again smaller than that of the first measurement (see Table 
6.2), this difference is not significant (p = 0.137). It is therefore concluded that 
respondents assessed equivalents in an internally consistent manner. In general 
therefore, this finding implies that farmers responded in accordance with the 
expected utility model. 
By comparing the results of 1984 with those of 1985, it becomes very clear that 
average risk aversion is less in 1985. For example, comparing the first elicitation 
in both years shows that the median certainty equivalent has increased by 
6 cts/kg in 1985, namely from 25 to 31 cts/kg. Especially the percentage of risk 
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neutral responses has increased for this lottery: from 5% in 1984 to 17% in 1985. 
Further comparisons and possible explanations for differences between the years 
will be made after estimating the parameters of the utility functions. We will now 
turn to this estimation. 
Results of estimating the parameters in the negative exponential and power 
function 
In Table 6.3 the descriptive statistics of parameter estimates are presented. It 
concerns the estimate of parameter c in 6.21 and 6.24, respectively. It is clear 
from this table that in 1984 the negative exponential function, implying constant 
absolute risk aversion, provides a much better fit than the power function. The 
average mean sum of squared errors (MSE) of the negative exponential function 
is 7.47 compared to 17.76 of the power function. Moreover, by comparing the 
MSE of the functions pairwise, the negative exponential function shows a better 
fit for all respondents. 
Table 6.3 Results of fitting per individual a power and a negative exponential 
function to the data 
chaining technique 
points measured by means of the midpoint 
PARAMETER MSE N 
FUNCTION mean median st.dev. mean 
Power 1984 .669 .571 .631 17.76 225 
Negative exponential 1984 .043 .036 .042 7.47 225 
Negative exponential 1985 .031 .022 .045 6.27 191 
The reasons for this better fit of the negative exponential function are clear. It 
was already shown in Table 6.2 that farmers responded less risk averse to lotteries 
with low levels of expected utility, especially for u(x) = 0.125 and u(x) = 0.250, 
than to lotteries with high levels of expected utility. The certainty equivalents 
elicited for low levels of expected utility imply a less concave, or even a linear or 
convex, lower part of the curve. Since the power function is most concave in the 
lower part of the curve, (note that the power function describes decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion) the function fits the data much worse than the negative expo-
nential curve which describes constant absolute risk aversion (see also Figure 6.3). 
The pattern of certainty equivalents in 1985 is similar to the one in 1984 (see 
Table 6.2). It was decided therefore to skip fitting the power function in 1985, 
since from the pattern it was clear that the power function would fit equally bad 
compared to the negative exponential function. The average fit of the negative 
exponential function is quite alike in both years. 
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By analyzing the residuals of the negative exponential function, insight can be 
gained into the quality of fit of this function. The function is fitted per indi-
vidual so that there are only 10 residuals per individual. The analysis of residuals 
is therefore conducted by averaging residuals over individuals per level of 
expected utility. The residuals are measured along the x-axis (predicted x minus 
assessed x; see 6.21 and 6.22). 
In both years, the median residual is positive for the two lowest levels of 
expected utility and approximately nil or slightly negative for higher levels of 
expected utility. Since deviations are measured along the x-axis, a positive resi-
dual implies that, in general, the function is located to the left of the assessed 
points for low levels of expected utility. The function is located somewhat to the 
right of the elicited points for high levels of expected utility. This pattern of 
residuals suggests an S-shaped pattern of assessed points which is approximated 
by a fully concave negative exponential function. 
It should be stressed here that, although an S-shaped pattern is suggested by 
the residuals, the median residuals are close to zero. For example, for u(x) = 0.25 
and u(x) = 0.75, the median residual is at a maximum, namely +1 and -1 cts/kg, 
respectively. Nevertheless, it is very interesting to speculate about possible 
reasons for such an S-shaped pattern. One reason is that, as has already been 
noted in the review of the literature in Section 6.2.1, the midpoint chaining tech-
nique shows a bias in producing convex-concave curves (Hershey et al. 1982). 
Our measurement seems to confirm this bias. The pattern would then be viewed 
as a response effect. 
Alternatively, one might view the S-shaped pattern to represent the decision 
maker's true evaluation function. This might be the case when the farmer does 
not evaluate the price or gross margin he receives for his potatoes as a stream of 
income which contributes to his fixed costs, but as gains and losses with respect 
to a reference. Then, the farmer perceives a price which is above the reference 
price as a gain and, according to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 
he will be risk averse, whereas a price below the reference price is perceived as a 
loss resulting in risk seeking choices. For example, the perceived direct costs of 
the crop might act as such a reference. 
The analysis of whether farmers code prices with respect to a reference price 
and, if so, what price they take as a reference could be a subject for further 
inquiry. In such an inquiry, besides applying the midpoint chaining technique, 
some other techniques should be used in assessing utility functions in such a way 
as to enable a separation of response effects from reference point effects. 
In this study the parameter of the negative exponential function will be taken 
to represent the risk attitude of farmers. An S-shaped function will not be fitted 
to the data. Firstly, as has been described, the deviations from the concave func-
tion are fairly small. Secondly, in case response effects cause the pattern, esti-
mating such an S-shaped function would not be appropriate when compared to 
the theoretically more attractive negative exponential or power function. A third 
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but nevertheless important reason concerns the convenience of the negative expo-
nential function. In this function the risk attitude of a farmer can be uniquely 
described by only one parameter. In characterizing farmers, analyzing stability 
and convergent validity, studying relationships with personal and situational 
factors and in analyzing preferences, the use of only one parameter greatly sim-
plifies work in these matters. 
Shift in risk attitude from 1984 to 1985 
Table 6.4 shows the percentiles of the parameter in the negative exponential 
function in both years. This parameter equals the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion. A positive parameter implies risk aversion (the larger the 
parameter, the more risk averse), a negative parameter indicates risk seeking. 
From this table it is clear that the average degree of risk aversion is less in 1985 
(= 0.031) compared to 1984 (= 0.043). A risk parameter is obtained for 179 res-
pondents in both years. Tested pairwise, both parametric and non-parametric, 
this difference is significant (p < 0.001). The parameter is larger in 1985 than in 
1984 for 65% of the respondents. A shift towards risk seeking occurred between 
the years. 
Table 6.4 Distribution of the parameter of the negative exponential function in 
1984 and 1985 (the coefficient of absolute risk aversion), as 
measured by means of the midpoint chaining technique (a larger 
positive parameter implies more risk aversion) 
PARAMETER 
Percentile 1984 1985 
05 -.0140 -.0277 
10 .0017 -.0060 
25 .0180 .0086 
50 .0355 .0220 
75 .0630 .0486 
90 .0965 .0810 
95 .1200 .1073 
Mean .043 .031 
St.dev. .042 .045 
N 225 191 
In 1984, 91.1% of the parameters is positive (implying risk aversion); in 1985, 
this percentage is 84.3%. These figures suggest that the percentage of risk seeking 
managers has increased from 8.9% to 15.7%. However, these percentages only 
discriminate between positive and negative coefficients, without taking the 
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magnitude of the coefficient into consideration. No insight is gained into the 
percentage of risk neutral decision makers because a decision maker will be clas-
sified as risk neutral only in case a parameter is exactly zero which is an unlikely 
finding. 
For this reason, the following procedure was used in classifying decision 
makers on the basis of the coefficient. If it is assumed that the residuals are 
independently and identically distributed per individual, then a standard error of 
the parameter can be estimated per individual (see Equations 6.27 and 6.28 in 
Section 6.2.3). If it is further assumed that the non-linear least-squares estimator 
is approximately normally distributed, then it is possible to test whether the 
parameter is significantly different from zero (= risk neutral) per individual. In 
this manner, the respondents can be classified into risk averse, risk neutral and 
risk seeking decision makers. 
Because it is questionable whether the residuals per individual fit the assump-
tions, the analysis is performed here mainly for illustrative purposes. Table 6.5 
shows the results. The parameters are tested with a significance level of 0.05 
(two-tailed). In 1984, 12% and in 1985, 23% of parameters are not significantly 
different from zero. Those farmers are classified as risk neutral. The percentage 
of risk seeking farmers is low in both years, as expected. 
Table 6.5 Classification of respondents into three classes of risk attitude 
1984 1985 
Risk averse 82% 68% 
Risk neutral 12% 23% 
Risk seeking 6% 9% 
100% 100% 
N 225 191 
By comparing both years, it appears that especially the percentage of risk neutral 
farmers increased (from 12% in 1984 to 23% in 1985), whereas the percentage of 
risk seeking farmers only increased from 6% to 9%. One may therefore conclude 
that the risk attitude shifted from 1984 to 1985 towards risk neutrality, whereas 
only a small percentage became risk seeking in 1985. These findings are thus in 
sharp contrast with the conclusions which would be drawn if only the sign of the 
parameter were used when classifying decision makers into risk classes. The 
analysis therefore shows the value of taking the standard error of the parameter 
into account and this procedure should therefore be standard practice in utility 
assessment and classification of subjects into risk classes. 
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Figure 6.4 provides further insight into the magnitude of differences between 
farmers in risk aversion, both within each year and between the years. In this 
figure the utility functions corresponding to the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile are 
drawn for each year. For example, the curve located most to the left represents 
the negative exponential utility function with parameter c = 0.12: in 1984 only 
5% of the farmers is more risk averse than this curve implies (see Table 6.4). 
1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 
price in cts/kg 
1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 
Figure 6.4 Indication of degree of risk aversion by means of curves cor-
responding to 5th, 50th and 95th percentile (from right to left, res-
pectively), in both years (negative exponential function; midpoint 
chaining technique; data shown in Table 6.4) 
As found above, farmers responded less risk averse in 1985 than in 1984. Before 
digressing upon possible explanations for this shift in risk aversion, it is 
necessary to study the stability of the measurement. Does the assessment in 1985 
yield the same rank order of farmers in respect of risk attitude as the 1984 
measurement? If it does, then risk aversion changed systematically in the sample 
which was probably caused by some common factor, e.g. an increase or decrease 
in wealth. If the correlation between both measurements is far from perfect, this 
might be due to a shift in risk attitude which differs in magnitude between res-
pondents or to unstable measurement. In principle, as e.g. Heise (1969) has 
shown, it is not possible with only two measurements to differentiate between 
temporal stability and systematic change in risk attitude. 
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Computing the correlation between the risk attitudes of both years shows that 
this correlation is 0.45 (n = 179, p < 0.001) for both the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficient. In evaluating the magnitude of this correlation it should 
be taken into account that the time span between the measurements is one year. 
This is an extremely long time interval for test-retest measurements. Usually, a 
period of two weeks between the measurements is advised. It is difficult to 
evaluate the magnitude of the stability, since comparable studies are scarce. To 
our knowledge only in the study of MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986), which 
concerns the risk attitudes of 84 business executives, were measurements repeated 
with a year in between. They found a test-retest correlation of 0.35 (p < 0.001) 
for personal investments; the correlation was not significant for business invest-
ments. The stability in our study is good in comparison with their findings. 
Noticing the reasonable stability of the measurement technique, interest is now 
focussed upon the possible reasons for the shift in risk attitude. Explanations for 
this temporal change in risk attitude towards less risk aversion are hard to give. 
On the contrary, the three plausible reasons for change in attitude described 
below suggest that, should attitudes have changed at all from 1984 to 1985, a 
shift towards risk aversion instead of risk seeking would have occurred. 
The first explanation concerns the effect of wealth on risk attitude. A 
decreasing absolute risk aversion function is usually assumed for wealth (Arrow 
1971). This implies that if a decision maker becomes more wealthy, he becomes 
less risk averse for absolute changes in wealth. In our study, this implies the fol-
lowing. At the moment of the first interview in 1984, farmers had experienced 
very high prices of ware potatoes in the former year (1983/84). Their wealth was 
therefore relatively high. Potato prices in 1984/85 were fairly low, so that the 
farmers' wealth must have decreased at the time of the interview in 1985. 
Farmers thus became less wealthy from 1984 to 1985. As a result, farmers should 
be more risk averse in 1985 compared to 1984 when assuming a decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion for wealth. The data show a shift in the opposite direction, 
however. To accommodate such a shift, one would have to assume an increasing 
absolute risk aversion for wealth, which is rather implausible (Arrow 1971). 
A second argument also leads to the hypothesis of an increasing absolute risk 
aversion for wealth. Possibly, farmers do not take their current wealth position as 
a reference point, but judge the lotteries on basis of their expected wealth posi-
tion. Then, since farmers expected prices in 1985/86 to be lower than those in 
1984/85 (see Chapter 5), they expect to be confronted with a decrease in wealth 
from 1984 to 1985. Again, this would imply more risk aversion in 1985 on part 
of the farmer in case of a decreasing absolute risk attitude. 
A third argument concerns a possible biasing of the probabilities specified in 
the standard lotteries. Firstly, because farmers expected low prices in 1984/85 
and secondly because they expected even lower prices in 1985 than in 1984, they 
may have biased the probability for the low outcome in the binary 50/50 lotteries 
as being larger than 50% (especially in 1985). If so, the certainty equivalents pro-
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vided by the respondents correspond with a lower expected utility of the lottery. 
When the researcher processes the certainty equivalents as if the equivalents cor-
respond to 50/50 lotteries, a higher expected utility than is intended by the 
respondent is matched to the equivalents. With such a perception bias, the utility 
function would be shifted to the left, implying more risk aversion. A shift to the 
right due to biasing of the probabilities could only result if farmers expected 
higher prices in 1985 than in 1984. 
To summarize, the stability of the measurement is significantly positive and 
higher than that found in a reference study. Nevertheless the stability is not very 
high (0.45). If the measurement procedure were quite unreliable, one would 
expect the farmer's risk attitude to shift in a random manner. However, in the 
sample a systematic shift in attitude towards less risk aversion is found. This was 
contrary to the expectations: should the attitude change at all, one would expect 
it to shift towards more risk aversion. 
Summary and conclusions of lottery measurement 
An essential element in the expected utility model is the utility function. This 
function is predominantly assessed under risk by means of lotteries. In our review 
of the literature, a classification of techniques for assessing the function was 
presented and strengths and weaknesses were outlined. In general, the assessment 
appears to be susceptible to quite a range of judgmental biases and response 
mode effects. An overview of the most important biases and effects was given. 
An important conclusion from this review was that studies in which risk atti-
tudes are assessed for a large number of respondents in survey conditions and in 
which, at the same time, much attention is devoted to careful assessment of the 
function and stability of the measurement, are scarse. One purpose of this study 
was to gain more insight into the possibilities and problems of assessing risk 
attitudes on a large scale. 
In this study, the so-called midpoint chaining technique was chosen for 
assessing the utility function. By means of ten binary lotteries, all 50/50 lotteries, 
chained in the appropriate manner, ten points of the function could be assessed. 
Two functions were fitted to these data: a negative exponential function, imply-
ing constant absolute risk aversion on the part of the decision maker, and a 
power function which characterizes a constant proportional risk averse decision 
maker. Very clearly, the negative exponential function fitted the data best. Some 
indications were found of an S-shaped utility function. It was suggested to 
attribute this shape to the response bias of the midpoint chaining technique (most 
likely caused by the varying range in the lotteries) probably in combination with 
an effect of a reference point, as is hypothesized in Prospect Theory. 
Overall, farmers appeared to be risk averse. In 1984, 82% of the farmers were 
risk averse and 12% were risk neutral; in 1985, these percentages were 68% and 
23%, respectively. The remaining farmers were slightly risk seeking. Farmers 
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were somewhat less risk averse in 1985 compared to 1984, contrary to expecta-
tions. 
If the true risk attitude is assumed to be fixed over the years, the stability of 
the risk attitude measurement is not very high (Pearson correlation 0.45), but still 
higher than the stability found in a reference study (0.35). However, as has been 
stated above, by measuring a concept only twice it is not possible to differentiate 
the stability of the measurement from the change in true score of the concept. In 
this study we had to limit ourselves to two moments of measurement. Longitudi-
nal research, with more than two measurements in time, would provide informa-
tion about the reliability of the risk attitude assessments and the temporal sta-
bility of risk attitude. 
In determining whether the midpoint chaining technique is a suitable assessment 
technique in a survey, the following aspects should be taken into account. 
Overall, farmers responded fairly easily to the question. This is illustrated by the 
high response rate of the question (+ 94%) and by the internal consistency in 
assessment. Presenting the question to farmers in the terminology of the actual 
decision-context, in contrast with the often rather hypothetical decision-contexts 
used in many experimental studies, probably motivated the decision makers to 
approach the question conscientiously and to think carefully about their 
preferences. Thus validity of the measurement has probably increased. 
The largest threat to the realism of the question was experienced in the first 
lottery between 10 and 70 cts/kg, corresponding to an expected utility of 0.5 on 
the interval from 0 to 1. Because of this very large range, some farmers showed 
difficulty in providing the first certainty equivalent. This is probably one of the 
weakest aspects of the midpoint chaining technique. However, consistency checks 
for this first assessed point showed only small deviations, although respondents 
somewhat tended to assess less risk averse certainty equivalents in subsequent 
assessments for E[u(x)] = 0.50. A further indication of the fairly good first 
assessment is shown by the correlation between the parameter calculated 
algebraically for the first point assessed and the parameter estimated on basis of 
the complete assessment of ten lotteries. This Pearson correlation is 0.85. 
Taking all findings together, it can be concluded that the midpoint chaining 
technique is a practically feasible technique for assessing utility functions in a 
valid manner in large scale survey research. On the basis of our experiences with 
the assessment technique in this study however, we believe that for assessing 
utility functions by means of lotteries for large numbers of respondents, 
interactive computer controlled assessment, e.g. the hybrid approach (Farquhar 
1984), seems attractive for a number of reasons. Firstly, the paper and pencil 
approach used in this study makes it necessary for the interviewer to play a very 
important role in the assessment process. As with eliciting subjective probability 
distributions, iterating towards indifference assumes a skillful and extensively 
trained interviewer. In a computer controlled assessment, one is probably less 
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dependent on the interviewer's competence. Such a finding would be beneficial 
for consumer survey research conducted by e.g. market research agencies. 
A second argument for adaptive computer controlled assessment is the number 
of lotteries which the respondent has to answer. In survey conditions one would 
opt for assessing the utility function with as few assessments as possible. In our 
study, ten certainty equivalents were assessed for each farmer. As stated above, 
the correlation between the first assessment and the parameter estimated after ten 
assessments, was fairly high (0.85). With adaptive utility assessment, a sequential 
sampling approach could be used in which, after each assessment, it was checked 
whether more assessments would yield sufficiently new information for justifying 
the costs of this extra assessment. Thirdly, graphical display of the assessed func-
tion would probably motivate and stimulate the respondent even more to evaluate 
the adequacy of the assessment. 
In the next section, attention will be directed towards the conjoint measure-
ment technique in assessing risk attitude. This is followed by a comparison of the 
lottery and conjoint measurement technique (henceforth, the midpoint chaining 
technique will be referred to as lottery technique). 
6.4 Measurement of risk attitude by means of conjoint measurement 
6.4.1 Description of the method 
In the former section, the standard method of measuring risk attitude was pre-
sented. Now, an alternative procedure is proposed, namely conjoint measurement. 
This technique is fairly popular in consumer research (see e.g. Green and 
Srinivasan (1978) for analyzing preferences of multiattribute choice alternatives). 
The basics of conjoint measurement were outlined by Tversky (1967) in his study 
of the expected utility model, specifically concerning the question of whether 
probabilities and utilities are combined multiplicatively and then added.8 It is 
therefore quite remarkable that no empirical research exists to our knowledge in 
which risk attitudes are assessed using this technique. Wind (1982) and Corstjens 
and Weinstein (1982) suggested to apply conjoint analysis in this manner, but 
they presented no empirical research. 
Since conjoint measurement is easy to handle in survey research and respon-
dents feel comfortable with the technique as is shown by many consumer studies, 
this technique seems very suitable for assessing the risk attitude of decision 
makers in survey conditions. It should be noted here beforehand that conjoint 
measurement does have limitations in this respect. Specifically, no utility function 
for outcomes is obtained. At the end of this section this point will be elaborated 
Shanteau (1975) and Anderson and Shanteau (1970) replicated this study from the viewpoint of in-
formation integration. 
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upon. But first, the design of the conjoint measurement task and its results will 
be discussed. 
Design of conjoint measurement task 
In conjoint measurement the respondent has to rate or rank order, according to 
preference, a set of profiles describing the choice alternatives. Each profile con-
sists of a combination of levels for a number of attributes. Then, by appropriate 
estimation techniques, the trade-off between levels of attributes can be obtained. 
In this study, the attributes describing the alternatives are expected value and 
standard deviation of price. Thus, each profile specifies a certain level of 
expected price and standard deviation. By asking the respondent to rank order a 
set of profiles, which is systematically varied with respect to levels of expected 
value and standard deviation, the trade-off between both attributes can be esti-
mated. Essentially, the trade-off between expected price and price risk (indicated 
by the standard deviation) provides a measure of the risk attitude of the decision 
maker. Highly risk averse decision makers have to be compensated more with 
respect to expected value than do less risk averse decision makers in order to 
prefer an alternative with a larger risk to an alternative with a smaller risk. For 
risk neutral decision makers no trade-off is made between expected value and 
price risk. They will order the set of profiles according to expected value 
irrespective of the risk associated with the profile. 
The profiles can be described and presented to the respondent in two manners. 
In the direct manner, profiles are characterized by the levels of expected value 
and standard deviation. The profile is then described as e.g. expected value = 
24 cts/kg and standard deviation = 7 cts/kg. In the indirect manner, the profiles 
consist of lotteries with probabilities and outcomes chosen in such a way as to 
represent the levels of expected value and standard deviation, e.g. a 50/50 lottery 
with outcomes 17 and 31 cts/kg representing an expected value of 24 cts/kg and 
a standard deviation of 7 cts/kg. In the direct manner, the description of the 
profiles is much more difficult to grasp and this method therefore seems possible 
only in case respondents are well trained in statistics. We therefore chose the in-
direct manner in this study. 
To further simplify the respondent's task, binary lotteries with 50/50 probabi-
lities were chosen. The conjoint measurement resembles the lottery technique in 
these respects. In fact, the respondents have to evaluate pairwise a series of 
binary 50/50 gambles and can thus be seen as the preference comparison version 
of the paired-gamble technique (see Table 6.1). 
In this study, we limited the design of profiles to two attributes (expected 
value and standard deviation). As a consequence, respondents have had to choose 
only between symmetrical probability distributions. It is obvious that this design 
of the profiles is analogous to mean-variance analysis. Decision makers only have 
to take mean and variance of a distribution into account. Conjoint analysis needs 
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not be constrained in this manner, however. It is perfectly possible to include in 
a profile a level of skewness, or even kurtosis, in order to detect preferences for 
skewness or kurtosis. Such a choice, however, would clearly increase the diffi-
culty of the task for the respondent. In case of binary lotteries, taking skewness 
into account would imply refraining from 50/50 lotteries. Seen in the context of 
the whole interview, consisting of a fairly large number of elaborate and difficult 
questions, we deemed this more sophisticated design inappropriate. 
The stimulus set 
In constructing the profiles, six levels of price risk were chosen, namely 0, 2, 4, 
7, 10 and 13 cts/kg and four levels of expected value: 23, 24, 25 and 26 cts/kg. 
In a full-factorial design this results in 24 combinations. Table 6.6 shows these 
combinations and the outcomes used in the binary lotteries. For example [18,32] 
concerns a lottery of receiving 18 cts/kg or 32 cts/kg with equal chances. The 
combinations were written down in a tree structure on separate cards and pre-
sented to the respondent. It should be noted that the range of the lottery is 
directly related to the level of risk of the lottery, since the standard deviation of 
the lottery equals half the range of the lottery. 
In Table 6.6 the profile combinations in the lower right hand corner are not 
orthogonal profiles. In test interviews it became clear that the orthogonal profiles, 
namely [13,33] and [10,36] were consistently preferred least. As a consequence, 
these profiles did not provide information about the trade-off between expected 
value and risk. It was decided to replace these profiles by two riskless alter-
natives, namely 21 and 19 cts/kg, which can be traded-off against other profiles 
and which thus provide more information about the risk attitude of the decision 
maker. A small disadvantage of this replacement is that the main effects and 
interaction effects in such a non-orthogonal design cannot be estimated uncorre-
cted (Green and Srinivasan 1978). 
Table 6.6 Set of profiles in conjoint measurement task 
EXPECTED VALUE 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 26 25 24 23 
0 26 25 24 23 
2 24/28* 23/27 22/26 21/25 
4 22/30 21/29 20/28 19/27 
7 19/33 18/32 17/31 16/30 
10 16/36 15/35 14/34 21 
13 13/39 12/38 11/37 19 
# 
24/28 indicates a 50/50 lottery with outcomes 24 and 28 cts/kg; the expected value of this lottery is 
26 and the standard deviation is 2. 
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A total of six combinations consist of riskless alternatives. These can be seen as 
representing the choice of a fixed-price contract and at the same time resembling 
the certainty equivalents in the lottery technique. 
If the lotteries in Table 6.6 are compared within a row, then it turns out that 
lotteries located at the left dominate each lottery at the right. For a constant level 
of risk, the expected value decreases from left to right. Of course, it is assumed 
in this case that decision makers prefer high prices to low prices, that is, their 
utility function for price is increasing. 
The ordering of lotteries is less obvious within each column. In this case the 
expected utility model will be contrasted with the hypothesis of an ideal risk 
level (Coombs 1975, Coombs and Huang 1976, Coombs and Avrunin 1977). 
Within a column, lotteries are compared with equal expected value but increasing 
risk. If a decision maker applies the expected utility model, a monotone rank 
order of lotteries will result. In case of a risk averse decision maker, preference 
for lotteries will be monotonically decreasing with risk, whereas for risk seeking 
decision makers preferences will be monotonically increasing with risk. 
In contrast, the single-peaked preference theory of Coombs (1975) hypothesizes 
that decision makers prefer an ideal-level of risk instead of a monotone ordering 
of risk. In case of an ideal risk level, both alternatives with a smaller and alter-
natives with a larger risk than the ideal-level are less preferred. In this theory a 
decision maker could well prefer e.g. the lottery [22,30] to both [24,28] and 
[19,33]. Thus, the lottery with an intermediate level of risk is preferred, although 
the expected values of the lotteries are equal. In expected utility theory such an 
ideal-level of risk is impossible. It is interesting to study whether farmers choose 
according to the expected utility model or come up with an ideal-level of risk. 
MacCrimmon et al. (1980) performed a comparable analysis of this issue. Their 
results will be discussed below and compared to our findings. 
The trade-off between expected value and risk follows from the preference 
order of lotteries in Table 6.6 which are not positioned on the same column or 
row. For example, a decision maker preferring e.g. lottery [20,28] to lottery 
[16,36] is less risk averse than one who prefers lottery [21,25] to lottery [16,36]. 
Data collection procedure 
The profiles were described on separate cards. These were shuffled by the inter-
viewer and handed over one by one to the respondent. The lottery on the card 
was pictured as a probability tree. The respondents were asked to provide a com-
plete rank order of the profiles according to their preference. They were in-
structed to compare systematically each new card handed over to them, with each 
card already having been rank ordered. This ordering proved to be a relatively 
easy task to the respondents. In 1985 the conjoint measurement task was limited 
to a randomly selected third part of the total sample. As a consequence, data is 
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available of two moments of measurements for only a part of the sample 
(n = 61). 
Estimation procedure 
In order to estimate the risk parameters, two models are specified; a mean-
standard deviation model (referred to as MSD-model) and an ideal-point model 
(referred to as IP-model). The models are specified as follows: 
MSD-model 
P. = a + b M. + c SD. + e. (6.29) 
IP-model 
P. = a + b M. + c SD. + d V.+ e. (6.30) 
with: 
P; = integer preference rank order of profile i ( 1 = least preferred) 
M. = expected value of profile i 
SD. = standard deviation of profile i 
V. = variance of profile i 
e. = random error 
i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 24 
In the MSD-model, a linear trade-off is assumed between expected value (mean) 
and risk (as indicated by the standard deviation). The IP-model makes a non-
linear relationship between expected value and risk possible by means of inclu-
ding V. (= SD.2). By testing whether parameter d is significantly different from 
zero it is tested whether a non-linear relationship between expected value and 
risk provides a better fit than a linear relationship. 
In both models, one expects parameter b to be positive: a higher expected value 
goes together with a higher preference. In the MSD-model, parameter c is 
expected to be negative, implying risk aversion (a lower preference for higher 
risk), for most respondents. Parameter c will be positive for risk seeking res-
pondents and zero for risk neutral farmers. In the IP-model an ideal-point for 
risk comes up at SD = -c/2d (c > 0, d < 0). If d approaches 0 than the ideal-
point goes to infinity. Consequently, the MSD-model can be seen as a special 
case of the ideal-point model, namely with an ideal-point at infinity (Carroll 
1972). 
Since the measurement of preferences for profiles consists of a rank order, a 
non-linear estimation method, like LINMAP (Srinivasan and Shocker 1973), is 
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most appropriate. In case preferences are measured on an interval scale, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) is a suitable technique. When both techniques are compared, 
it shows that OLS has the advantage of providing standard errors for the esti-
mated parameters and this enables testing statistically whether the IP-model fits 
the data better than the MSD-model. Furthermore, OLS is a much more conve-
nient and less expensive technique than LINMAP, especially when taking into 
account that both the models have to be estimated in both years for each indi-
vidual. 
Although OLS seems inappropriate in view of the ordinal dependent variable, 
the simulation studies by Carmone et al. (1978) and Wittink and Cattin (1981) 
have found that OLS, when applied to an integer rank order, yields solutions that 
are very close, in terms of predictive validity, to those obtained by nonmetric 
algoritms like LINMAP. The empirical studies of e.g. Green and Srinivasan 
(1978) and Jain et al. (1979) too, showed only minor differences in predictive 
validity between estimation methods. We will therefore use OLS as a method of 
estimation. Of course, by employing ranks as the dependent variable, the usual 
standard errors and statistical tests are not strictly valid. Care should therefore be 
taken in this respect. 
6.4.2 Results of conjoint measurement 
Both the parameters of the MSD-model and those of the IP-model were estimated 
by means of OLS per individual. These estimates, averaged over individuals, are 
presented in Table 6.7. Estimates were obtained in 1984 for a total of 218 res-
pondents (the question was asked in the second interview of 1984 with 238 
farmers as respondents so the response percentage is very high: 91.6% (218/238)). 
Response in 1985 was even higher; estimates could be obtained for 66 out of 
68 respondents (97.1%). The results of both years are available for a total of 
61 respondents. 
In Table 6.7 the average values of several statistics are shown. The significance 
of parameters is tested with significance level p = 0.05 (two-tailed). The 
percentages of significant parameters are presented in the table. 
Both years yield comparable results. As the median R-squares show, the models 
fit fairly well. The signs of the coefficients are in the expected direction and 
mostly significant. For four respondents in 1984 parameter b is not significantly 
positive. This implies that for these respondents a higher expected value of the 
lottery does not yield a higher preference, which is not very plausible. These four 
respondents will be removed in further analyses. 
In the MSD-model, parameter c is not significantly different from zero for 4% 
(1985) to 7.8% (1984) of the respondents, implying risk neutral farmers (the 
standard deviation of the profile does not influence preference). The number of 
cases in which parameter c is significantly positive (= risk seeking decision 
makers) is negligible. 
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Table 6.7 Conjoint analysis of risk preference models: results of OLS per 
individual 
1984 1985 
MSD IP MSD IP MODEL 
Mean R 2 .846 
Mean R2(adj.) .831 
Median R 2 .904 
Minimum R 2 .188 
Maximum R 2 .987 
St.dev. of R 2 .155 
N 218 
Regression coefficients 
Mean b 2.800 
Mean c -1.235 
Mean d 
Significance in % (p < 0.05, two-tailed) 
Parameter b 
Positive, not significant 1.8 
Positive, significant 98.2 
Parameter c 
Positive, not significant 2.8 
Positive, significant 2.8 
Negative, not significant 5.0 
Negative, significant 89.4 
Parameter d 
Positive, not significant 
Positive, significant 
Negative, not significant 
Negative, significant 
.881 .863 .889 
.863 .850 .872 
.929 .924 .932 
.292 .362 .421 
.991 .985 .991 
.121 .142 .120 
218 66 66 
2.717 2.765 2.689 
-.726 -1.337 -.874 
-.041 ~ -.037 
1.8 
98.2 100.0 100.0 
9.6 2.0 11.0 
18.3 2.0 5.0 
25.2 2.0 15.0 
56.9 95.0 70.0 
14.7 - 15.0 
9.2 - 8.0 
34.4 - 33.0 
41.7 — 44.0 
Models 
MSD-model P. = a + b M. + c SD. 
i i i 
IP-model P. = a + b M. + c SD. + d V. 
As is shown by the mean and median R 2 , the IP-model fits the data somewhat 
better than the MSD-model. The differences are small, however. By means of the 
F-test on the change in R 2 due to the inclusion of Vj, it is tested per individual 
whether the IP-model fits significantly better (that is, if the F-value is larger 
191 
than 4.35 (F(l,20) = 4.35, p = 0.025). In 1984, the fit of the IP-model is signifi-
cantly better than the MSD-model for 38% of the respondents. In 1985, this 
percentage is 33%. Because of the ordinal dependent variable, these figures 
should be interpreted carefully. 
Using the estimates of parameters c and d in the IP-model, the ideal-point can 
be calculated. In 1984, this ideal-point is located between the minimum and 
maximum level of risk for 22.6% of the respondents (minimum and maximum 
levels of risk (= standard deviation) are 0 and 13, respectively). In 1985, this 
percentage is 16.7%. In both years these percentages are lower than the percen-
tage of respondents for which the IP-model fits better than the MSD-model. The 
percentages thus show that a significantly larger fit of the IP-model does not 
necessarily imply an ideal-point for risk in the relevant range of the attribute.6 
In order to gain more insight into the role of the ideal-point in ordering the 
profiles, in Table 6.8 the rank order data of 1984 are split into monotone, ideal-
point and other rank orders, for each level of expected value (26, 25 and 24, 
respectively). Monotone rank orders are in accordance with the expected utility 
model and can imply risk aversion or risk seeking. Ideal-point rank orders are 
incompatible with expected utility theory but consistent with Coombs's (1975) 
single-peaked preference theory (only unimodal rank orders are classified as 
ideal-point orders). Furthermore in Table 6.8 the location of the ideal point is 
specified (at small, medium or large risk, respectively). Monotone and ideal-point 
orders taken together form the total of unimodal or single-peaked rank orders. 
To elucidate the classification, consider the 6 profiles in the first column of 
Table 6.6. Suppose these profiles are denoted A, B, C, ... , F (in decreasing 
order). If a respondent makes the rank order A, B, ... , F (with decreasing pre-
ference), he is classified as monotonically risk averse: in each pairwise comparison 
the profile with the smaller risk is preferred. The rank order F, E, B, A is 
classified as monotonically risk seeking. 
A rank order of B, A, C, D, ... , F (with decreasing preference) is classified as 
an ideal-point rank order with the ideal-point at small risk; a rank order of C, 
B, D, A, E, F is classified as an ideal-point rank order with the ideal-point at 
the medium risk, etc. Ideal-points of B and E are denoted as such at small and 
large risk respectively; ideal-points of C and D are classified as medium levels of 
risk. A rank order of e.g. A, C, B, F, D, E is classified as "other rank order" 
because it is not unimodal. 
In classifying rank orders, a further differentiation is made with respect to 
whether the certain profile is included or excluded. For example, a rank order in 
which the profiles are ordered monotonically with respect to risk, but where the 
certain profile is placed somewhere in-between the order, excluding the certain 
In case the ideal-point is located further to the endpoints of the risk scale, the IP-model approxi-
mates the MSD-model to a larger extent (Carroll 1972). 
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profile will change the classification of the order from ideal-point to monotone, 
e.g. the ideal-point rank order B, A, C, D, ... , F becomes the monotone rank 
order B, C, D, ... , F if A (the certain profile) is excluded. 
Table 6.8 shows that the percentage of monotone rank orders is 45% (certain 
profile included). These 45% of the farmers rank order the profiles in accordance 
with expected utility theory. Almost all farmers are monotonically risk averse 
(43.7%), the percentage of monotonically risk seeking farmers is low (1.2%). 
The percentage of ideal-point orders is 28.7%. Monotone and ideal-point order 
taken together results in a total percentage of unimodal orders of 73.7% (certain 
profile included), with a higher percentage for a lower expected value (from 
69.5% to 80.7%). Also, by removing the certain profile, the percentage of uni-
modal orders increases from 73.3% to 84.4%. The removal of the certain profile 
especially lowers the percentage of ideal-point and "other" orders in favor of 
monotone rankorders (the percentage of ideal-point order decreases from 28.7% 
to 19.3% and the percentage of monotone orders increases from 45% to 65%). 
Table 6.8 Classification of preference rank order of risk profiles into mono-
tone, ideal-point and other orders, for each expected value, in 1984, 
in % (percentages are computed vertically) 
CERTAIN PROFILE INCLUDED CERTAIN PROFILE EXCLUDED 
RANK ORDER 
OF PROFILES 26 25 24 Total Mc 1 26 25 24 Total Mc 1 
Monotone 37.6 43.6 53.7 45.0 19.2 56.0 65.1 74.3 65.1 57.5 
- Averse 36.7 42.2 52.3 43.7 12.5 54.1 63.8 72.8 63.5 44.2 
- Seeking .9 1.4 1.4 1.2 6.7 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.7 13.3 
Ideal point 31.7 27.5 27.1 28.7 60.0 25.7 17.4 14.7 19.3 40.0 
- at small risk 17.4 21.6 20.2 19.7 31.7 20.6 12.8 11.9 15.1 -- at medium risk 13.8 5.5 6.9 8.7 17.5 3.2 3.7 2.8 3.2 40.0 
- at large risk .5 .5 - .3 10.8 1.8 .9 - .9 -
Unimodal orders* 69.3 71.1 80.7 73.7 79.2 81.7 82.7 89.0 84.4 97.5 
Other rank orders 30.7 28.9 19.3 26.3 20.8 18.3 17.4 11.0 15.6 2.5 
N 218 218 218 654 120 218 218 218 654 120 
* 
Unimodal orders consist of the sum of monotone and ideal point orders 
MacCrimmon, K.A. et al (1980): Real money lotteries: a study of ideal risk, context effects and simple 
processes. 
When looking at the location of the ideal-point, it shows that respondents prefer 
a profile with a small risk to a profile with either no risk or a medium to large 
risk. For example, with an expected value of 26 cts/kg, about 17.4% of the 
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farmers prefer profile [24,28] to the certain profile of 26 cts/kg, but they prefer 
26 cts/kg to profiles [22,30], [19,33], [13,39]. Analogous preferences are 
exhibited for expected values of 25 and 24 cts/kg. 
Our results contrast to a large extent with the findings of MacCrimmon et al. 
(1980) who, in a comparable design, have found a much higher percentage of 
respondents with an ideal-level of risk. As is shown in Table 6.8, they found in 
their study about 60% of all rank orders to be of the ideal-point type, we found 
only 29%. They therefore concluded that (p. 172): "Our data provides evidence 
that motivated real decision makers playing for significant amounts of real money 
exhibit an ideal-level of risk", thus confirming Coomb's hypothesis. In this study, 
much less support for the hypothesis of Coombs is found. 
They further found that the percentage of monotone rank orders increases dra-
matically from 19.2% to 57.5% (see Table 6.8) if the certain profile is excluded. 
Based on their findings MacCrimmon et al. conclude that (p. 172): " ... if a sure 
prospect creates a different mental set from uncertain alternatives, we must be 
cautious about theories that value uncertain prospects according to their certainty 
equivalent". Although in this study also the inclusion of the certain profile seems 
to invoke some respondents to consider ideal-levels of risk and thus depart from 
expected utility theory, removing the certain profile increased the percentage of 
monotone rank orders in our study to a much smaller extent than in the study of 
MacCrimmon et al. In our data, measurements appear to be much less sensitive to 
the inclusion of the certain profile. Their conclusion thus is only partly supported 
by our findings. 
It should be noted here that the finding that the majority of the ideal-point 
orders concerns an ideal-point at small risk due to the inclusion of the certain 
profile, is not in accordance with the certainty effect as labelled by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979). The certainty effect concerns the effect that a sure prospect 
is evaluated more favorably compared to a prospect that is merely probable (see 
also Section 6.2). Consequently, on the basis of the certainty effect, one expects 
the certain profile to be preferred to an uncertain profile with the same expected 
value. Actually, the reversed effect shows up in the study of MacCrimmon et al. 
and in this study. Farmers prefer a profile with a small risk to the certain profile. 
It is concluded therefore that the certainty effect is not supported in this study. 
Perhaps the utility for gaming (see 6.2) can explain the finding: farmers prefer a 
profile with an insignificant amount of risk to the 'dull' certain profile, solely 
due to the expected pleasure of 'playing' the lottery. 
It is concluded that, in the conjoint measurement task, only a limited percentage 
of decision makers exhibited preferences which are not in accordance with the 
expected utility model. That is, for only about 15% to 20% of the respondents, 
preferences can be described somewhat better by assuming an ideal-point for risk 
in the relevant range of risk. Moreover, exclusion of the certain profile even 
lowers this percentage. In further analyses concerning the risk attitude the 
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parameter estimates of the MSD-model will therefore be used. This model accu-
rately explains preferences among risky profiles of most farmers. 
Distribution and stability of the risk attitude measured by means of conjoint 
measurement 
In the MSD-model, the trade-off between expected value and standard deviation 
on the iso-utility curve is taken to be the risk parameter. This parameter will be 
referred to as RC indicating the risk parameter (= R) measured by means of 
conjoint measurement (= C). This parameter is defined as: 
RC=  d M 
dSD u=u* 
^ S D = _ £ (6.31) 
dU/dM b 
In case of the MSD-model (see Equation 6.29) this parameter RC = -c/b. Since 
b > 0 because of the increasing utility function of price, and c < 0 in case of risk 
aversion (higher risk goes together with a lower preference) RC > 0 in case of a 
risk averse decision maker. If c > 0 it follows that RC < 0, which implies a risk 
seeking attitude. In case of risk neutrality c = 0 and thus RC = 0. 
Table 6.9 shows the distribution of RC in both years. The value of the median 
risk parameter in both years is about 0.50. This value indicates that in order to 
prefer two alternatives equally, an increase of e.g. 2 cts/kg in standard deviation 
should be compensated by an increase of 1 ct/kg in expected value. The table 
further shows that in 1984 about 5% of the farmers was risk neutral to slightly 
risk seeking (RC + 0). 
The average risk parameter is somewhat higher in 1985 than in 1984 (0.49 
versus 0.46, respectively), suggesting an increase in degree of risk aversion. 
However, a pairwise test, both parametric and non-parametric, shows no clear 
significant difference in risk attitude between both years (t(61) = 1.68, 
p < 0.099). This finding is in contrast with that of the lottery technique which 
showed a significant decrease in risk aversion from 1984 to 1985. 
The stability of the RC-parameter is fairly low. Only the Spearman correlation 
is significant, namely 0.30 (p < 0.01, one-tailed). The Pearson correlation is 0.20 
and not significant (p = 0.12). A different measure of stability is the correlation 
between the rank order of profiles in both years. Such a correlation can be com-
puted per individual over the 24 profiles. The median Spearman correlation is 
0.44; the 10th and 90th percentile are 0.18 and 0.78, respectively. When tested 
with p = 0.025 (one-tailed), 60% of the correlations is positive and significant; 
with p = 0.05 (one-tailed) this percentage increases to 70%. Of course, it should 
be taken into account that measurements took place with a year in between. It is 
therefore very difficult to compare these stability correlations with those of other 
studies. For example Acito (1977), McCullough and Best (1979) and Segal (1982) 
found test-retest correlations of respectively 0.89, 0.93 and 0.94 between pre-
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ference rank orders of 27 profiles, measured with respectively 6, 2 and 10 days 
in between. 
Table 6.9 Distribution of the parameter RC in 1984 and 1985, measured by 
means of conjoint measurement (a larger positive parameter implies 
more risk aversion) 
1984 1985 
MODEL MSD MSD 
Percentile 
05 -.02 .12 
10 .17 .28 
25 .35 .39 
50 .51 .53 
75 .61 .64 
90 .73 .76 
95 .78 .81 
Mean .463 .494 
St.dev. .277 .256 
N 214 66 
Summary and conclusion 
An important advantage of conjoint measurement is the simplicity of the task for 
the respondent. Instead of having to provide indifference judgments as with the 
lottery technique, in conjoint measurement a preference statement between lot-
teries suffices. Indications of the ease with which the respondents completed this 
task are the high response percentage and the short time needed to complete the 
task, which ranged between 5 and 10 minutes. Conjoint measurement therefore 
proves to be a suitable technique for measuring risk attitudes in survey condi-
tions. 
The major findings will now be summarized. The mean-standard deviation 
model, implying a linear trade-off between the expected value and the risk 
(standard deviation) of a lottery, appears to be describing the preference struc-
ture of at least 80% of the respondents very well. For less than a fifth of the res-
pondents, Coombs' (1975) hypothesis of an ideal-point for risk provided a better 
fit than the mean-standard deviation model. For most of these respondents, the 
fit improved only slightly, although statistically significantly. Such an ideal-point 
is incompatible with expected utility theory. Furthermore, findings suggest that 
the inclusion of certain profiles in the design induce respondents towards an 
ideal-point model for risk. The effect, however, was much less than found by 
MacCrimmon et al. (1980). Taking into account the small percentage of farmers 
for which the ideal-point model fits significantly better in combination with the 
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minor increase in fit of this model, it is therefore concluded that most of the 
exhibited preferences of respondents in this conjoint measurement task are in 
accordance with expected utility theory. 
Findings show that risk attitude did not shift between both years, but that sta-
bility seems fairly low. However, no studies exist with which to compare our sta-
bilities because of the long annual time interval between test and retest. 
Conjoint measurement is a promising method for an easy assessment of risk atti-
tude and is especially suitable for survey research. The flexibility of the tech-
nique (in principle, the form of the evaluation function is totally free) and the 
ease of the task for the respondent are certainly strengths compared to other 
techniques of assessing risk attitude. A weakness is the low stability of the 
measurement found in this study. Another weakness is that in the usual 
procedure of conjoint measurement no utility function for outcomes is obtained 
which can be incorporated in the expected utility model. One remedy to this 
problem might be to assume e.g. a negative exponential function and estimate the 
parameter in this function in a LINMAP-like procedure with the pairwise 
preferences between profiles as dependent variable. One difficulty in such a 
procedure would be to develop criteria to select the appropriate specification of 
the function. 
The assessment of risk attitude by means of conjoint measurement deserves 
more empirical research in order to further delineate strengths and weaknesses of 
this technique. For example, research could be directed towards assessing the 
influence of different experimental designs on the measurement of risk attitude, 
analyzing the effect of incorporating skewness as an attribute and towards deve-
loping procedures for improving the stability of the measurement. 
6.5 Stability and convergent validity of measuring risk attitude 
The previous sections provided the two measurements of the variable risk atti-
tude. These indicators were obtained in both years. In this section, the convergent 
validity of these indicators will be studied together with the stability of the latent 
variable risk attitude. 
A suitable technique to study these aspects is LISREL (JOreskog and S6rbom 
1976, 1977, 1983; Olsson and Bergman 1977). Figure 6.5 shows the specifications 
of the model. Risk attitude is conceived as a latent variable measured by two in-
dicators, analogous to the common factor model. Arrows are therefore drawn 
from the latent variable towards the indicators. 
The regression coefficient Beta in Figure 6.5 measures the stability of this 
latent variable and specifies the extent that the measurements in both years are 
linearly related. When the solution is standardized, Beta represents the stan-
dardized regression coefficient (= correlation coefficient) between the risk atti-
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tude in 1984 and that in 1985. A systematic shift in attitude is allowed in the 
model and will not influence parameter Beta. 
The epsilons in Figure 6.5 indicate the measurement error of each indicator. In 
terms of the common factor model, the variance of the epsilons represents the 
unique part of each variable (1- h 2). Lambdas represent regression coefficients in 
the unstandardized solution of the LISREL model and beta-weights in the stan-
dardized solution. The input of LISREL is a correlation or covariance matrix. 
The parameters in the model are usually estimated by means of maximum likeli-
hood. In this method standard errors are obtained which enables the testing of 
the significance of the parameters. To this end, it is assumed that the joint dis-
tribution of variables is multivariate normal. This assumption is difficult to meet, 
especially for small samples. 
Table 6.10 provides the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the indica-
tors, both with pairwise and listwise deletion of missing cases. Because the con-
joint measurement task was repeated in 1985 for only a fifth of the total sample, 
listwise deletion of missing cases leads to only n = 59 respondents for which all 
four measurements are available. With pairwise deletion, the number of cases 
ranges from 59 to 214. The removal of outliers did not alter the correlations. 
All correlations are positive and significant, with the exception of stability of 
the conjoint measurement (Pearson correlation). By comparing Spearman and 
Pearson correlations, no large differences show up. As expected, listwise deletion 
generally results in higher correlation coefficients. 
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Table 6.10 Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of indicators of risk 
attitude 
below diagonal: pairwise deletion of missing data 
above diagonal: listwise deletion (n = 59) 
RL84 RC84 RL85 RC85 
Pearson correlations 
Lottery RL84 
Conjoint RC84 
Lottery RL85 
Conjoint RC85 
Spearman correlations 
Lottery RL84 
Conjoint RC84 
Lottery RL85 
Conjoint RC85 
Bold stability 
Italics convergent validity 
p < .05 (one-tailed) 
b p < .025 (one-tailed) 
0 p < .01 (one-tailed) 
d p < .001 (one-tailed) 
The Pearson correlation between the lottery and conjoint measurement is 0.50 in 
1984 and 0.31 in 1985. Spearman correlations are 0.45 and 0.36, respectively. 
These correlations concern the convergent validity of the measurement of risk 
attitude. Since they are significantly positive in both years, this is an indication 
that both techniques measure the same concept. 
The Pearson correlation matrix of Table 6.10 was the input in the LISREL-VI 
version of SPSS-x. Table 6.11 shows the estimates of the parameters (standardized 
values). Replacing the correlation matrix by the covariance matrix did not alter 
conclusions. For ease of interpretation therefore, the results of the correlation 
matrix are presented here. 
With one degree of freedom and listwise deletion the model provides a good fit 
of the data, as is shown by Chi-square (p = 0.76) and the goodness of fit index 
which is near to the maximum value of 1. 
The estimate of stability, Beta, is 0.82 which is significant (t-value = 3.51) and 
high. The most reliable indicators of risk attitude are the lottery measurements as 
is shown by the lambda's 1 and 3. However, also the conjoint measurement indi-
cators contribute significantly to the stability of the concept (t-values of 3.30 and 
49a 
44 d 
27 b 
50° 
23° 
20 
49a 
45 d 
37° 
45a 
23 d 
30° 
59 d 
37 c 
34° 
28° 
21 
31c 
43 a 
27 b 
40a 
37° 
32 c 
36c 
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2.24, respectively). The stability of 0.82 is, of course, higher than for each tech-
nique separately (the stability of the lottery technique is 0.59 and that of the 
conjoint measurement is 0.21). It illustrates the increase in reliability that is 
obtained when measuring concepts by more than one method. 
Table 6.11 Stability of risk attitude, estimated separately for pairwise and list-
wise deletion of missing values (standardized LISREL solution, 
maximum likelihood estimates) 
LISTWISEa PAIRWISE 
Parameter Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-valueb 
0.894c 0.924c 
0.564 3.30 0.526 2.25 
0.803c 0.731c 
A 4 0381 2.24 0.467 2.15 
0.824 3.51 0.643 2.17 
Var. i2 0.207 0.78 0.586 1.24 
0.202 1.02 0.147 0.43 
0.682 4.59 0.723 4.17 
0356 1.40 0.466 1.86 
0.855 5.08 0.782 4.50 
X 2 (d . f= l ) 0.10 0.65 
P 0.76 0.25 
Goodness of 
fit index 0.999 0.998 
a n = 59 
b Standard errors and t-values are computed for n = 59 
c Fixed to 1 in the unstandardized solution 
As was already clear from the smaller correlations in Table 6.10, pairwise dele-
tion results in a lower estimate of stability, namely Beta = 0.64, which is still 
significant (t-value = 2.17). It should be noted here that, because of the different 
number of cases for each correlation, the standard errors and thus the t-values 
are calculated for n = 59 which represents the minimum number of cases a cor-
relation is based on. As a result, the t-values presented are on the safe side. 
Important differences between the manners in which missing values are handled 
do not show up further. 
It is concluded that risk attitude can be successfully represented by a latent 
variable which is indicated by measurements from both a standard lottery 
questioning procedure and conjoint measurement. This results in a stable 
measurement of risk attitude, with the lottery technique yielding the most reliable 
measurement. The contribution of conjoint measurement is less than the lottery 
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technique but statistically significant. It is shown that LISREL provides an 
excellent framework to gain insight into relationships between measurements. 
Explicitly conceiving risk attitude as a latent variable which is indicated by mul-
tiple indicators, provides avenues for further research into the risk attitude con-
cept. 
6.6 Measurement of strength of preference 
This section concerns itself with the assessment of the evaluation function under 
certainty: the strength of preference or value function v(x). First, a number of 
measurement procedures for assessing value functions will be reviewed, followed 
by a description of the implementation of the techniques in this study. The 
results of the assessments obtained by each technique will be presented in Section 
6.6.2. In Section 6.6.3 then the correspondence in assessment is dealt with. 
6.6.1 The midvalue splitting and rating technique in assessing value functions 
Defining strength of preference 
The value function is often called a strength of preference function. Strength of 
preference refers to the intensity of a decision maker's preference for an alter-
native or consequence. The value function is used to order the differences in the 
strength of preference between pairs of alternatives. It thus provides ordered 
value differences (Fishburn 1970, Hauser and Shugan 1980). Several alternative 
axiom systems exist for value functions, see e.g. Krantz et al. (1971). These 
axioms imply that there exists a real-valued function v on X (X denotes the set 
of all possible consequences) so that for all w, x, y, z from X the difference in 
the strength of preference between w and x exceeds the difference between y 
and z, iff.: 
v(w) - v(x) > v(y) - v(z). (6.32) 
This function v is unique up to positive linear transformations, so it provides an 
interval scale of measurement like the utility function u. 
Review of assessment techniques 
In Fishburn (1967) a number of techniques for assessing single and multiattribute 
value functions are presented. For multiattribute decision problems conjoint 
measurement is an appropriate and often used technique in consumer and mar-
keting research to assess the value functions (see e.g. Green and Srinivasan 1978). 
For assessing single attribute value functions three sets of techniques can be dis-
tinguished: direct rating, equisection and ordered metric. 
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The direct rating technique is one of the most well-known and used measurement 
technique in the social sciences. Many different question formats exist like 5 or 
7-point category scales, graphic scales, constant sum scales etc. In psychophysics, 
functions are assessed by means of magnitude estimation (Stevens 1985) in which 
the respondent has to express the intensity of a particular stimulus in comparison 
with a reference stimulus. Magnitude estimation results in interval or even ratio 
scale measurement (see Chapter 5). Another variant of the rating technique that 
arrives at an interval level of measurement involves fixing the boundaries of the 
scale at e.g. 0 and 100 and then asking the respondent to express the intensity 
(e.g. strength of preference) of a stimulus by assigning a number between 0 and 
100. Such a procedure is applied in this study and further on in this study this 
variant will be denoted as rating technique. This technique has been applied in 
studies of Huber (1974) and Eliashberg (1980) in assessing strength of preference. 
A second technique to measure value functions is equisection (Torgerson 1958). 
In this technique the boundaries of the interval are fixed. The respondent is 
asked to distribute n-1 stimuli over the interval such that n intervals result which 
are equal in subjective value (say strength of preference). In case n=2 this 
method is called the bisection or midvalue splitting technique (referred to as 
MVS-technique). In the assessment task the respondent has to specify whether a 
change from x. to x^  equals in value a change from x. to x k (x. < x^  < x k ) . By 
iteration a value of Xj can be found so that the respondent is indifferent between 
both changes; then the first midvalue has been assessed. This midvalue point is 
also referred to as equal difference point (Dyer and Sarin 1982) or value equiva-
lent. Like the midpoint chaining technique concerning lotteries, a sequence of 
successive bisections results in a number of points of the value function. It is 
clear that the assessment procedure in the midvalue splitting technique cor-
responds directly to the definition and meaning of a value function (ordered 
value differences). Empirical studies which used the midvalue splitting technique 
in assessing a value function are e.g. Pliskin and Beck (1976) and Eliashberg 
(1980). 
According to Torgerson (1958) the midvalue splitting technique is one of the 
most simple scaling techniques since an ordinal judgment of the respondent 
suffices. By comparing two intervals the respondent solely has to state whether 
one interval is larger in subjective value than the other interval. Contrariwise, 
with the rating scale a respondent has to place selected stimuli on a scale. He has 
to state whether a stimulus is larger/smaller in value than another stimulus and if 
so, how much larger/smaller. Torgerson thus prefers the midvalue splitting tech-
nique. Eliashberg (1980) on the other hand points out that the successive 
bisections in the midvalue splitting technique might result in a compounding of 
errors (like in the midpoint chaining technique). He thus expects more measure-
ment error and inconsistencies with the midvalue splitting technique than with a 
rating scale. 
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In a direct comparison of both techniques concerning a two attribute decision 
problem (student housing locations with attributes: rent and distance to campus), 
Eliashberg (1980) showed that indeed the predictive validity of the rating tech-
nique was higher than that of the midvalue splitting technique. However, the 
differences in predictive validity were relatively small. To our best knowledge no 
other empirical comparisons between both techniques have been carried out to 
confirm this result. 
A third technique reviewed by Fishburn (1967) concerns the ordered metric 
technique. In this technique the respondent is given two intervals and he has to 
specify whether one interval is larger in value than the other interval, that is 
whether [v(w) - v(x)] R [v(y) - v(z)] (the respondent specifies R: < , > or =). A 
number of such intervals are compared pairwise. Each comparison yields a 
restriction in a linear programming program (e.g. LINMAP) used to calculate the 
scale values. This task is fairly easy to the respondent. However, a main dis-
advantage of this technique is the large number of pairwise comparisons the 
respondent has to make before the value function can be assessed accurately. For 
example, for assessing 7 points of the function (excluding the boundaries), 
according to Dyer et al. (1973) at least 50 pairwise comparisons are necessary. 
Such a large number of comparisons makes this technique unattractive to apply. 
In conclusion, the rating and midvalue splitting technique will be applied in 
measuring the value function. The application of two techniques enables one to 
study the convergent validity. In both techniques a number of points of the value 
function will be assessed. Like in the utility assessment, both a negative 
exponential and power function will be fitted to the assessed points. The 
theoretical and practical arguments for fitting these function specifications which 
were mentioned in respect of utility functions are also valid for value functions. 
Fitting the same function specifications furthermore facilitates the direct 
comparison and analysis of the relationship between the value and utility 
function. 
Implementation of the midvalue splitting technique 
The procedure used in the midvalue splitting technique resembles the lottery 
(midpoint chaining) technique to a very large extent. The same boundaries (10 
and 70 cts/kg) and sequence of successive bisections are chosen. See Figure 6.3 
for this sequence. The consistency measurements 4, 9 and 10 in Figure 6.3 are 
left out in the assessment of the value function. Because of limited interviewing 
time these measurements were replaced with only one consistency measurement 
assessed at v(x) = 0.375 (between v(x) = 0.125 and v(x) = 0.625). In this manner a 
total of 8 assessments is obtained: 7 points of the curve and one consistency 
measurement. 
In the interview, the respondent was presented with two situations: one con-
cerning a change in price from A to B and one concerning such a change from B 
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to C (in which A < B < C). These situations were written down on paper. Sub-
sequently, the farmer was asked to indicate which change in price he deemed 
more valuable: the change in price from A to B or the change from B to C. By 
adjusting the value C, the interviewer iterated towards the equal difference point. 
The question format was: "Consider that the market price of ware potatoes is 
10 cts/kg. Suddenly a large demand for potatoes causes prices to rise to 15 cts/kg. 
Instead of 10 cts/kg you receive 15 cts/kg. Of course you will be pleased with 
this 5 cts/kg rise in price. Now consider yourself in the situation of a 15 cts/kg 
market price; suddenly prices rise to 20 cts/kg. Again you will be pleased with 
this 5 cts/kg rise in price. The question now is which 5 cts/kg rise in price you 
value most: from 10 to 15 or from 15 to 20 cts/kg?". By choosing prices close to 
the boundaries in the initial questions, say 12 cts/kg instead of 15 cts/kg in the 
above question, choices are made easy to the respondent. The rapid rise in price 
was made plausible by referring to the unexpected upward price movement in 
1976 caused by a sudden demand for ware potatoes from the GDR. 
In a number of test questions the respondent was made familiar with the 
questioning procedure. Familiarizing the respondent with the goal and meaning of 
the measurement by means of test questions facilitated the first assessment 
greatly, even considering the extreme boundaries of 10 and 70. In the test assess-
ments "regret" formulations have also been used, that is in the above example the 
respondent is asked the valuation of a sudden 5 cts/kg price fall: from 20 to 15 
compared to that from 15 to 10 cts/kg. According to the axioms of ordered value 
differences this "regret" formulation should result in the same midvalue as the 
"joy" formulation. This has not been tested explicitly. By confronting the respon-
dent with both types of questions during the training task it is tried to induce 
such consistency. 
In 1984, the midvalue splitting question was asked in the first of the two inter-
views held with each farmer. The measurement of the value function therefore 
most likely did not interfere with the utility assessment, since the lottery question 
was asked in the second interview in 1984, at least one week after the first inter-
view. In order to achieve independent measurements in 1985, the midvalue 
splitting and lottery technique were maximally separated in the interview. The 
lottery technique was set in the first part of the interview, the midvalue splitting 
technique was situated at the end of the interview. In 1985 the midvalue splitting 
task was given to a third of the respondents, randomly selected. 
In estimating the parameter of the negative exponential and power function, 
the same procedure will be followed as with the lottery measurement. This pro-
cedure was described extensively in Section 6.2.3. 
Implementation of the rating technique 
In the rating technique, ten price levels are presented to the respondent in 
random order. The respondent is asked to value each price level on a scale 
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between 0 (corresponding to price level 10 cts/kg) and 10 (price level 70 cts/kg). 
Apart from round scale numbers the respondent can specify the fractions 0.25, 
0.50 and 0.75, analogous to the scoring system used in schools to rate perfor-
mances. The respondents are familiar with this scoring system and showed no 
difficulty in answering the questions. Only a few minutes were needed to com-
plete the rating task. 
The following price levels are rated: 14, 17, 20, 23, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50 and 60 
cts/kg. These price levels are chosen so as to get approximately equal value inter-
vals for the majority of respondents. Since in test interviews it was shown that 
for many respondents prices around 25 cts/kg corresponded to v(x) = 0.5 
(implying a concave curve), it was tried to get an equal number of assessments 
below and above +/-25 cts/kg. Such a distribution of assessments enables an 
accurate estimation of the value function. As a consequence, differences between 
the stimulus price levels below 25 cts/kg are smaller than those above 25 cts/kg. 
The rating question was situated in the last part of the second interview in 
1984 in order to avoid effects of the utility measurement in the lottery question 
(situated in the first part of the interview). In 1985, the rating task was situated 
between the lottery and midvalue splitting task in the middle of the interview. 
Since the ten price levels are presented to the respondent in random order one 
can view these measurements as independent. The parameters in the negative 
exponential and power function (see specifications 6.15 and 6.16) can therefore 
be estimated in a straightforward manner. Non-linear least squares estimates are 
obtained with the ratings on the 10-point scale as dependent and the stimulus 
price levels as independent variable. 
In both techniques described above the decision context of the assessment 
equals that of the lottery technique. That is, the farmer has to imagine selling his 
total harvest at the assessed prices. In evaluating prices, respondents were in-
structed to assume a potato produce of usual quality, waste percentage and size 
distribution. 
6.6.2 Results of midvalue splitting and rating technique 
Results of the midvalue splitting technique 
Since the midvalue splitting technique was applied in the first interview of 1984, 
a maximum of 253 respondents could answer the question. The percentage of res-
pondents for which at least three equivalents were obtained is 87.7% (222 out of 
253). In 1985, 86.7% (58 out of 67) responded to the question. These response 
percentages are somewhat lower than those for the lottery technique, which at 
least partly might be due to the fact that in both years, the question was situated 
in the final part of the interview, whereas the lottery technique was situated in 
the first part. 
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In Table 6.12 descriptive statistics of the value equivalents measured by means of 
the midvalue splitting technique are shown, ordered with respect to increasing 
value of v(x). In the same manner as with the lottery technique, for each level of 
v(x) the equivalents are classified into value averse, value neutral and value 
seeking. It should be noted here again that to ease presentation and discussion of 
results, a terminology analogous to that used with the utility function is intro-
duced. As a consequence, a decision maker with a concave value function, 
implying decreasing marginal value, will be referred to as a value averse decision 
maker. In the same manner, value seeking of course implies a convex value func-
tion of increasing marginal value of price. Constant marginal value is referred to 
as value neutral. 
As is shown in Table 6.12 the mean value equivalent at v(x) = 0.50 is 25.5 cts/kg 
in both years. This means that an increase from 10 to 25.5 cts/kg is deemed 
equally valuable as an increase from 25.5 to 70 cts/kg. In the same manner, an 
increase from 10 to 17.5 cts/kg (from v(x) = 0 to v(x) = 0.25) equals in value an 
increase from 17.5 to 25.5 cts/kg (from v(x) = 0.25 to v(x) = 0.50) etc. 
Table 6.12 Results of the measurement of the value equivalents (in cts/kg) in 
1984 and 1985, obtained by the midvalue splitting technique f X L and 
X„ are the boundaries in the assessment of the value equivalent) 
MEASURE- OUTCOMES VALUE EQUIVALENT PERCENTAGE OF 
MENT RESPONDENTS 
X i X L X H V(x) mean median st.dev. D C I
a 
Year 1984 N = 222 
4 10 X 2 0.125 14.21 13.0 3.92 33 30 37 
2 10 X l 0.250 17.55 17.0 5.18 42 33 25 
5 X 2 X 0.375 21.03 20.0 6.56 54 29 17 
8 10 X 0.375 21.12 20.0 6.84 64 25 11 
1 10 70 3 0.500 25.50 25.0 7.80 91 7 2 
6 x l X 3 0.625 30.86 30.0 9.15 60 30 10 
3 x 70 0.750 37.73 39.0 11.04 84 12 4 
7 X 3 70 0.875 47.81 52.0 11.88 70 24 6 
Year 1985 N = 58 
4 10 X 2 0.125 13.87 14.0 1.83 24 42 34 
2 10 X 0.250 17.20 17.5 3.01 41 28 31 
5 X 2 X 0.375 20.90 20.0 4.51 49 42 9 
8 io 2 X 0.375 20.86 21.0 4.72 63 25 12 
1 10 70 3 0.500 25.52 26.5 6.97 95 5 -
6 X 3 0.625 30.35 31.0 8.37 60 28 12 
3 x 70 S 0.750 37.00 38.0 10.73 87 10 3 
7 < 70 0.875 46.53 48.0 11.45 82 16 2 
D = decreasing marginal value ('value averse'), C = constant marginal value ('value neutral'), 
I = increasing marginal value (Value seeking') 
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Almost all the respondents provided 'value averse' equivalents in the first 
assessment between 10 and 70 cts/kg (in 1984 only 2% of the equivalents implies 
'value seeking'.7 By and large therefore, farmers are value averse. Farmers, of 
course, differ amongst themselves with respect to the degree of value aversion. 
For example, in 1984 the value equivalents at the 5th and 95th percentile of the 
first measurement between 10 and 70 cts/kg were 15 and 37.5 cts/kg, respec-
tively. In both years a consistency assessment was made at v(x) = 0.375. There are 
no significant differences in the assessments in both years. 
In Table 6.12, the data shows a pattern similar to that found with the lottery 
technique (compare with Table 6.2). That is, the percentage of value seeking 
responses increases with lower levels of v(x). However, the percentages of value 
seeking responses are lower than those of the lottery technique. For example, at 
v(x) = 0.125 about 35% of responses with the midvalue splitting technique can be 
classified as value seeking, whereas with the lottery technique 60% is classified as 
risk seeking (at u(x) = 0.125). 
In contrast to the risk seeking responses with lotteries, value seeking responses, 
implying increasing marginal value, are not very plausible if farmers evaluate 
prices as a stream of income. Value seeking responses should therefore most 
likely be attributed to response effects, due to the varying range in the sequence 
of assessment. Such an effect has already been suggested and described with the 
lottery technique (see Section 6.3). Another explanation is to attribute the effect 
to a reference point, as is assumed in Prospect Theory. In that case a convex 
value function could result if respondents perceived the prices between 10 and 
+ 21 cts/kg as losses and prices above 21 cts/kg as gains. The price of + 21 cts/kg 
would then be considered the reference price. 
There is a clear resemblance of lottery and midvalue splitting techniques. In 
both techniques, iteration takes place towards indifference, binary outcomes are 
used, assessments are chained, and the range between outcomes depends on 
responses of the subject and the utility/value level. Therefore similar response 
effects can be expected. Our finding of lower percentages of value seeking 
responses with the midvalue splitting technique than with the lottery technique 
shows that respondents, notwithstanding the resemblance in questioning tech-
nique, do perceive a difference in concept measured. In the lottery technique risk 
is introduced, inducing respondents to provide more risk seeking equivalents than 
in the midvalue splitting technique where riskless evaluations are made, inducing 
respondents towards the theoretically more plausible value averse responses. 
Henceforth, for reasons of comparison with the measurement of the utility function, 
decreasing/increasing marginal value responses will be referred to as value averse/seeking. 
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Parameter estimates of the negative exponential and the power function 
A negative exponential and a power function were fitted to the data. Table 6.13 
presents the results of the estimation per individual. The average MSE (= mean 
sum of squared errors) in 1984 shows that the negative exponential function fits 
the data much better than does the power function. This finding as well as its 
explanation are in perfect agreement with those of the lottery technique (see 
Section 6.3): for low levels of v(x) farmers provide less value averse equivalents 
than for higher levels of v(x), so that the power function is too steep for low 
levels of v(x). 
As with the lottery technique the median residuals suggest an S-shaped value 
function. This finding and its explanation will be elaborated upon in Section 6.6.3 
when comparing the midvalue splitting and rating technique. 
Table 6.13 Results of fitting per individual a power and a negative exponential 
function to the data points measured by means of the midvalue 
splitting technique 
PARAMETER MSE N 
FUNCTION mean median st.dev. mean 
Power 1984 .553 .495 .380 16.80 222 
Negative exponential 1984 .051 .039 .042 4.88 222 
Negative exponential 1985 .053 .041 .046 3.12 58 
The average parameter of the negative exponential function is, in both years, 
slightly above 0.50, with a median value of approximately 0.40 (see Table 6.14). 
When tested pairwise, no significant difference shows up between the years 
(t(56) = 0.041, p < 0.68). This means that no systematic shift in strength of prefe-
rence occurred between the years. Figure 6.6 shows the value functions corre-
sponding to three percentiles (5, 50 and 95) in both years. Clearly, the diffe-
rences between 1984 and 1985 are small. 
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Figure 6.6 Indication of degree of strength of preference by means of curves 
corresponding to 5th, 50th and 95th percentile (from right to left, 
respectively), in both years (negative exponential function; midvalue 
splitting technique; parameters shown in Table 6.14) 
Although positive and significant, the stability of the parameter is fairly small. 
The Pearson correlation is 0.35 (p < 0.007) (after removing two outliers, i.e. two 
extreme value averse individuals, the correlation is 0.24 (p < 0.05)). The Spear-
man correlation is 0.29 (p < 0.014) (after removing two outliers 0.23 (p < 0.05)). 
The influence of outliers is relatively large because of the small number of 
observations (n = 57). 
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Table 6.14 Distribution of the parameter of the negative exponential function in 
1984 and 1985, as measured by means of the midvalue splitting 
technique (a larger positive parameter implies a more concave func-
tion) 
PARAMETER 
Percentile 1984 1985 
05 .0044 .0117 
10 .0101 .0131 
25 .0244 .0225 
50 .0385 .0410 
75 .0650 .0670 
90 .1121 .0938 
95 .1377 .1299 
Mean .051 .053 
St.dev. .042 .046 
N 222 58 
Results of the rating technique 
Response percentages of this rating task were extremely high. In 1984, 236 out of 
238 farmers completed the question (99.2%); in 1985, this percentage is 99.0% 
(203 out of 205). These figures show the great ease with which farmers res-
ponded to the question. 
Descriptive statistics of the responses to the rating technique are presented in 
Table 6.15. The responses are ordered with respect to increasing price level. In 
order to facilitate interpretation of the assessments consider the following impli-
cations of the data presented in Table 6.15. Taking into consideration that 
v(x) = 0.5 corresponds to the rating of 5 on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, Table 
6.15 shows that 20 cts/kg is conceived by an average farmer as half way in value 
between 10 and 70 cts/kg (mean rating of 20 cts/kg is 5.15). Stated otherwise, a 
change in price from 10 to 20 cts/kg equals in value a change from 20 to 
70 cts/kg! 
Likewise, the value of 7.5 (v(x) = 0.75) corresponds to 35 cts/kg. This means 
that farmers consider a change in price from 20 cts/kg (v(x) = 0.50) to 35 cts/kg 
(an increase of 15 cts/kg) equally valuable as a change from 35 to 70 cts/kg (an 
increase of 35 cts/kg). Furthermore, since a rating of 6 corresponds to 
"sufficient" in school performance terms, farmers in general consider 23 to 25 
cts/kg a "sufficient" price (see also in Table 2.2 that this sufficient price is the 
average market price for ware potatoes). 
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Table 6.15 Results of the measurement of the value function by means of the 
rating technique 
RATING" 
PRICE IN 
(CTS/KG) 
1984 (N = 236) 1985 (N = 203) 
mean median st.dev. mean median st.dev. 
14 
17 
20 
23 
25 
30 
35 
40 
50 
60 
3.00 
4.23 
5.15 
5.78 
6.26 
7.02 
7.53 
8.09 
8.69 
9.25 
2.99 
4.44 
5.12 
5.98 
6.45 
7.03 
7.54 
8.02 
8.66 
9.05 
1.11 
1.19 
1.12 
1.21 
1.20 
1.15 
1.07 
.93 
.77 
.55 
3.26 
4.69 
5.55 
6.20 
6.61 
7.32 
7.81 
8.26 
8.79 
9.31 
3.07 
4.94 
5.89 
6.11 
6.86 
7.39 
7.91 
8.08 
8.94 
9.42 
1.15 
1.05 
1.12 
1.07 
1.09 
1.03 
.97 
.86 
.78 
.59 
Ratings on a scale of 0 to 10 
The mean ratings that correspond to the price levels indicate that in general the 
value function is fairly steep for low price levels. Notice that the rating of 2.5 
(v(x) = 0.25) is even below 14 cts/kg, which leads to the conclusion that a change 
of less than 4 cts/kg, namely from 10 to 14 cts/kg, represents a quarter in value! 
Fitting a negative exponential and a power function to the data (Equations 6.15 
and 6.16, respectively), confirms the notion of a very steep lower part of the 
function. The average MSE of the power function is smaller in both years than 
the average MSE of the negative exponential function (Table 6.16). Pairwise 
tested, parametric and non-parametric, this difference is largely significant 
(p < 0.01). The rating technique therefore implicates that farmers exhibit 
decreasing absolute risk aversion and constant proportional risk aversion. This 
finding contrasts with those of the lottery and midvalue splitting technique, in 
which the power function showed a worse fit than the negative exponential 
function. 
Reviewing these findings one might suspect a response effect on part of the 
rating technique which could clarify the relatively high valuation of low price 
levels. Using a rating scale between 0 and 10 and making reference, although 
only minorly, to the scoring system used in schools, may have induced some 
respondents to consider all ratings below, say 3 or 4, as "very bad". In this case 
respondents may use only ratings between, say 4 and 10, to evaluate the price 
levels on the interval [10,70]. They may not have considered ratings below 4 as 
relevant. If such a response effect indeed is present, this would probably have 
been smaller if a rating scale between 0 and 100 had been used. 
211 
Table 6.16 Results of fitting per individual a negative exponential and a power 
function to the data points measured by means of the rating technique 
PARAMETER MSE N 
FUNCTION mean median st.dev. mean 
Negative exponential 1984 .065 .066 .025 5.058 236 
Negative exponential 1985 .074 .074 .025 5.994 203 
Power 1984 .384 .354 .131 4.382 236 
Power 1985 .341 .327 .103 4.957 203 
Table 6.15 shows that the average and median ratings per level of price are 
somewhat higher in 1985 than in 1984. This finding can also be drawn from the 
smaller average parameter of the power function in 1985 (and the larger average 
parameter of the negative exponential function) (see Table 6.16). 8 
A total of 67% of the parameters is smaller in 1985 than in 1984. By testing 
the parameters of the power function pairwise between the years, a significant 
difference is found (t(196) = 4.24, p < 0.01). Since a smaller parameter in the 
power function implies a more concave function, this means that farmers became 
more value averse in 1985. The value function is shifted to the left: the same 
price level is valued higher in 1985 than in 1984. Apparently, farmers are more 
pleased with a price of e.g. 20 cts/kg in 1985 than in 1984. Table 6.17 and Figure 
6.7 further illustrate this shift from 1984 to 1985 towards value aversion. 
This shift of the value function is in accordance with a decreasing absolute risk 
aversion function for wealth. As was described in Section 6.3 a farmer's wealth 
decreased from 1984 to 1985. Consequently, he will value an increase in price 
more in 1985 than in 1984. It should be noted however, that this finding is not 
supported by assessments of the midvalue splitting technique, since no shift in 
strength of preference was found with that technique. 
Note that a larger parameter in the power function implies a less concave curve, whereas a larger 
parameter in the negative exponential function implies a more concave curve (see Equations 6.15 and 
6.16). 
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Figure 6.7 Indication of degree of strength of preference by means of curves 
corresponding to 5th, 50th and 95th percentile (from left to right, 
respectively), in both years (power function; rating technique; data 
shown in Table 6.17) 
The stability of the assessment by the rating technique is fairly small, although 
correlations are positive and significant. The Pearson correlation is 0.15 
(p < 0.025) and the Spearman correlation is 0.19 (p < 0.01). These correlations are 
of the same magnitude as those found with the midvalue value splitting tech-
nique. However, since with the rating technique the correlations are computed 
for a larger number of respondents (n = 203 compared to n = 57) the correlations 
here are statistically significant. The low correlations, although statistically sig-
nificant, show that ratings shifted on average between the years but not for all 
individuals by the same amount or in the same direction, thus causing a fairly 
different rank order of respondents with respect to strength of preference. 
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Table 6.17 Distribution of the parameter of the power function in 1984 and 
1985, as measured by means of the rating technique (a larger 
positive parameter implies a less concave function) 
PARAMETER 
Percentile 1984 1985 
05 .226 .205 
10 .259 .231 
25 .301 .268 
50 .354 .327 
75 .447 .399 
90 .558 .466 
95 .640 .545 
Mean .384 .341 
St.dev. .131 .103 
N 236 203 
6.6.3 Stability and convergent validity of strength of preference measurement 
In this section convergent validity and stability of the strength of preference will 
be analyzed in the same manner as was done with respect to the risk attitude. 
That is, strength of preference is conceived as a latent variable indicated by the 
assessments of rating and midvalue splitting technique. 
First, the mutual location of the functions will be analyzed. Figures 6.8 and 6.9 
show the functions corresponding to respectively the 10th, 50th and 90th 
percentile, for both techniques and both years. The figures clearly show the 
differences in function form between a negative exponential and a power 
function. For low values of x the negative exponential curve (MVS-technique) is 
located below the power function (rating technique); for high values of x it is 
located above the power function. In both years, the curve corresponding to the 
median parameter in the negative exponential function is located below the power 
function up to 45 cts/kg. 
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Figure 6.8 Comparison of midvalue splitting and rating technique by means of 
curves corresponding to the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile, in 1984 
0 . 0 f ' . 1 1 1 - r 
1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 
price in cts/kg 
• rating midvalue splitting 
Figure 6.9 Comparison of midvalue splitting and rating technique by means of 
curves corresponding to the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile, in 1985 
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In Table 6.18 the correlations between the parameters obtained by the respective 
measurements are presented. In order to interpret the correlations correctly, it 
should be noted here that high risk aversion implies a large positive coefficient in 
the negative exponential function and a small positive coefficient in the power 
function. Thus, convergent validity between the measurements would be esta-
blished if the correlation between the coefficient obtained by the midvalue split-
ting technique would correlate highly negatively with the coefficient obtained by 
the rating technique. To simplify the analysis, the coefficients in the power 
function obtained by the rating technique are recoded into negative values. As a 
consequence, the correlation should be positive to indicate convergent validity.9 
Table 6.18 Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of indicators of strength 
of preference (after removing two outliers) 
below diagonal: pairwise deletion of missing data 
above diagonal: listwise deletion (n = 55) 
VM84 VR84 VM85 VR85 
Pearson correlations 
MVS VM84 
Rating VR84 14h 
MVS VM85 24 a 
Rating VR85 07 
Spearman correlations 
MVS VM84 
Rating VR84 15h 
MVS VM85 2 3 a 
Rating VR85 10 
Bold stability 
Italics convergent validity 
21 2 7 b 19 
08 47 d 
08 — 30h 
15 b 29h 
18 2 4 a 17 
15 3 9 d 
15 — 32c 
19° 33c 
p < .05 (one-tailed) 
p < .025 (one-tailed) 
p < .01 (one-tailed) 
p < .001 (one-tailed) 
Although the power function showed a better fit than the negative exponential function, which makes 
the parameter in this function the best indicator of risk attitude, the correlations between the 
parameters of these two functions are very high (Pearson = 0.94 and Spearman = 0.99). As a 
consequence, the correlations between the rating technique and midvalue splitting technique as well 
as the stability of the rating technique hardly change when the risk parameter of the negative 
exponential function is taken instead of the parameter of the power function. 
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Table 6.18 shows that with listwise deletion of missing values, only n = 55 cases 
remain. The fairly low convergent validity correlations are most striking in Table 
6.18. The Pearson correlation between midvalue splitting and rating technique is 
0.14 in 1984 and 0.29 in 1985 (pairwise). Both correlations are significant 
(p < 0.025). Listwise, the correlations are 0.21 (p < 0.10) in 1984 and 0.30 
(p < 0.025) in 1985. The Spearman correlations are of comparable size as the 
Pearson correlations. 
Differences between pairwise and listwise handling of missing cases show only 
slightly higher listwise correlations. A notable exception in this respect is the sta-
bility of the rating technique. Pairwise, the stability is 0.15 (Pearson, p < 0.025) 
and 0.19 (Spearman, p < 0.01), listwise the stability is 0.47 (p < 0.001) and 0.39 
(p < 0.001), respectively. These latter stabilities are fairly high. 
When reviewing the fairly low correlations between respective measurements in 
combination with the small number of observations, it should not be surprising 
that the LISREL estimate of stability is not significant. A model analogous to the 
one in Figure 6.5 is estimated. The estimated correlation (Beta) between the 
strength of preference of 1984 with that of 1985 is 0.61 (t-value 1.26 (n = 55)) in 
case of listwise correlations and 0.50 (t-value 0.692 (standard error calculated 
with n = 55)) in case of pairwise correlations. With respect to the risk attitude, 
the stability estimates were 0.82 and 0.64, respectively. In contrast with the risk 
attitude, the strength of preference thus appears to be less stable. 
Summary and conclusion 
Two techniques for measuring the value function were presented. For both the 
midvalue splitting and the rating technique, respondents showed no difficulties in 
answering the questions. The rating technique was judged the easiest one of the 
techniques and took less interviewing time. 
The findings show that respondents exhibit decreasing marginal value, as was 
expected. No respondents exhibit increasing marginal value. No difference in this 
respect shows up between the techniques. 
With respect to the temporal stability of the techniques, the midvalue splitting 
technique did not show a change in strength of preference, whereas with the 
rating technique a shift towards more value aversion from 1984 to 1985 could be 
seen. The stability correlation is positive and statistically significant for both 
techniques but fairly low. Convergent validity between the measurements is low, 
too. The parameters measured by means of the midvalue splitting and rating 
technique are hardly correlated (the correlations are positive and statistically sig-
nificant, though). Consequently, strength of preference conceived as a latent 
variable which is indicated by the assessments obtained by the midvalue splitting 
and rating technique could not be proven to be significantly stable. This may be 
partly due to the small number of observations available in testing the stability 
(n = 55). 
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The most important difference between both techniques concerns the valuation of 
low price levels. In the rating technique, low price levels are more highly 
valuated than in the midvalue splitting technique. As a consequence, the power 
function fitted best for the rating technique, whereas the negative exponential 
function fitted the data best for the midvalue splitting technique. Furthermore, 
the negative exponential function, fitted for the midvalue splitting technique, is 
located to the left of the points assessed for low levels of the value function v(x), 
and located somewhat to the right of the points assessed for medium and high 
levels of v(x). Again, as with the lottery technique, this suggests an S-shaped 
evaluation function, although smaller differences show up with the midvalue 
splitting technique than with the lottery technique. In contrast, the power func-
tion, fitted for the rating technique, on average even underestimates the points 
assessed for low levels of v(x). For none of the respondents do the data obtained 
by the rating technique suggest an S-shaped evaluation function. 
For a possible explanation of these differences between the techniques, one has 
to point out the differences between the respondent's assessment task in associa-
tion with both techniques. Note that an essential difference between the tech-
niques concerns the manner in which the respondents have to provide their 
valuation of a price level. 
In the midvalue splitting technique, two outcomes are presented to the respon-
dent who has to provide the equal difference price. As a result, his valuation of a 
specific price level is implicit in the procedure. That is, the respondent specifies 
a price corresponding to the value implicit in the question. The measurement 
process of the midvalue splitting technique is in this respect analogous to the one 
used with the lottery technique. In the rating technique on the other hand, the 
respondent is presented with an explicit price level and he has to specify his 
valuation of this level directly. So, in contrast with the midvalue splitting 
technique, he provides a value that corresponds to the price level specified in the 
question. Moreover, although the endpoints of the price scale are set beforehand, 
they are less prominently present in the assessment task than the endpoints in the 
midvalue splitting technique. 
The specific task in the MVS-technique of finding the equal difference point 
between two endpoints (analogous to specifying the certainty equivalent in the 
lottery technique) might induce respondents to use the anchoring and (insuffi-
cient) adjustment heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky 1982) (notice, however, that 
by using an appropriate iterating questioning procedure, it has been attempted to 
minimize anchoring effects). The expected value of the lottery and, equivalently, 
the price half way in-between the endpoints in the midvalue splitting task, might 
serve as an anchor on the basis of which respondents have to adjust. It seems that 
especially when evaluating prices for low levels of the function and when ranges 
between the outcomes in the task are small, respondents adjust insufficiently. 
This response effect thus leads to a less concave curve for low price levels, or it 
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might even lead to an S-shape evaluation function. Such an anchoring and 
adjustment effect is unlikely in the rating technique. 
It is concluded here that the tendency towards an S-shape of the points 
assessed can be viewed as resulting from a response effect of the midvalue 
splitting technique (and lottery technique). Alternatively, one might hypothesize a 
true S-shaped value function underlying the preferences. However, not only 
would such a function be questionable from a theoretical point of view, on the 
basis of the results from the rating technique a response effect on the part of the 
midvalue splitting technique is most likely. With the rating technique low prices 
are valued extremely high in comparison with the midvalue splitting technique 
and no indication whatsoever is found which suggests an S-shaped value func-
tion. 
6.7 Testing the concept of relative risk attitude 
This section deals with the correspondence between the assessments of risk atti-
tude and strength of preference. Firstly, in 6.7.1, the correlations between the 
respective assessments will be analyzed. Secondly, the functional relationship 
between the utility and value function will be dealt with in 6.7.2. 
6.7.1 Correlations between assessments of risk attitude and strength of pre-
ference 
For each respondent, the lottery, midvalue splitting and rating technique all yield 
a curve representing risk attitude and strength of preference, respectively. Table 
6.19 illustrates the differences between the techniques. In this table the mean and 
standard deviation of the equivalents, computed for value/utility levels of 0.10, 
0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90, are shown. 
The figures in the table show that for most levels of value/utility the curves of 
midvalue splitting and lottery technique are closer to one another than those of 
midvalue splitting and rating technique. For example, in 1984, the mean price 
corresponding to the value level of 0.50 is 25.66 cts/kg for the midvalue splitting 
technique (VM84) and 19.69 cts/kg for the rating technique (VR84). This is a 
6 cts/kg difference, with the curve of the rating technique located to the left of 
the curve of the midvalue splitting technique. The mean certainty equivalent 
corresponding to the utility level of 0.50 is 27.42 cts/kg for the lottery technique 
(RL84). The difference with VM84 is therefore only 1.76 cts/kg. 
The results in 1985 confirm the findings in 1984. The average difference 
between VM85 and VR85 is 7.24 cts/kg (25.12 - 17.88) for v(x) =0.5, whereas 
the average difference between VM85 and RL85 is 5.79 cts/kg (25.12 - 30.91). 
The latter average has increased in comparison with 1984, but it is still less than 
the difference between rating and midvalue splitting technique. 
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Table 6.19 Mean and standard deviation of value equivalents and certainty equi-
valents for five levels of the value and utility function, and for three 
measurement techniques, in 1984 and 1985 (in cts/kg) 
UTILITY/VALUE LEVEL 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
MEASURE-
MENT mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean stdev. mean st.dev. 
VM84 a 12.70 2.05 17.02 4.09 25.66 7.26 37.86 10.31 49.63 11.43 
VR84 b 10.35 .71 12.05 2.32 19.69 5.38 37.10 6.47 54.53 4.08 
RL84C 13.55 4.64 18.36 6.75 27.42 9.37 39.61 11.31 51.06 11.29 
RL85 14.36 4.15 20.35 7.02 30.91 9.99 43.89 11.58 54.81 10.98 
VM85 12.48 1.17 16.62 3.01 25.12 6.35 37.35 9.85 49.27 11.30 
VR85 10.35 .37 11.37 1.55 17.88 4.46 34.82 6.08 53.11 4.02 
Midvalue splitting technique 
Rating technique 
Lottery technique 
Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show, for each year separately, the functions corresponding 
to the 5th, 50th and 95th parameter percentiles for the lottery and midvalue 
splitting technique (in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 the differences between rating and 
midvalue splitting technique were already shown). 
The findings show that two techniques which are supposed to measure the 
same concept, namely the midvalue splitting and rating technique both measuring 
the value function, are located further away from one another than two tech-
niques which are supposed to measure different concepts, namely midvalue 
splitting and lottery technique measuring, respectively, value and utility function. 
The findings are in agreement with those of McCord and De Neufville (1983), 
who also found larger differences between theoretically equivalent functions than 
between theoretically different functions. 
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price in cts/kg 
lottery midvalue splitting 
Figure 6.10 Curves obtained by the lottery and midvalue splitting technique in 
1984 (curves correspond to the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile (from 
right to left, respectively) 
Now attention is directed towards the correlations between the parameters (Pratt-
Arrow coefficients of risk aversion) obtained with each technique. Even if the 
location of the function differs with different techniques, the correlations 
between the techniques can be high. Table 6.20 shows both Pearson and Spear-
man correlations between the respective measurements. Missing cases are handled 
pairwise; the number of cases on the basis of which the correlations are calcu-
lated therefore varies. The stability of each measurement is presented on the 
diagonal (printed in bold): the parameter in 1984 is correlated with the parameter 
in 1985 for the same technique. Data of 1984 are shown below the diagonal, data 
of 1985 are shown above the diagonal. Removing outliers did not effect the 
correlations, except for VM85, for which two outliers were therefore removed. 
Practically all correlations have the right sign (positive) and almost all are statis-
tically significant for at least p < 0.05 (one-tailed). 
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Figure 6.11 Curves obtained by the lottery and midvalue splitting technique in 
1985 (curves correspond to the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile (from 
right to left, respectively) 
With respect to the stability of the assessments the following can be said. In 
Table 6.20, it is shown that the lottery technique correlates the highest (Pearson = 
0.44) between the years in comparison with other techniques, followed by the 
midvalue splitting technique (0.24). The stability of the conjoint (0.20) and rating 
technique (0.15) is smaller. The Spearman correlation of conjoint measurement is 
substantially higher than the Pearson correlation, though. Although differences 
are small, the correlations suggest that a technique which is evaluated by the 
respondents as easy (conjoint and rating technique) results in somewhat less stable 
measurements than a technique which the respondents perceive as more difficult 
(lottery and midvalue splitting technique). The difficulty of the questioning pro-
cedure perhaps induces respondents to think hard about their preferences and 
consequently the assessments might be more consistent and stable. 
Again, it should be stressed here that the assessments took place with a year in 
between, implying that one should be extremely cautious to conclude from the 
fairly low stability correlations that the assessments are unreliable. Indeed, a 
change in attitude and unreliability of the assessment cannot be separated with 
only two moments of measurement. If attitudes did actually change, and if res-
pondents differed with respect to the amount or the direction of change, then 
even a perfectly reliable measurement instrument would yield low "stability" cor-
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relations. With less than perfect reliable measurement techniques, stability corre-
lations will be attenuated. It can therefore be concluded that the estimated stabi-
lities, which are positive and significant for all four techniques, are the lower 
boundaries of the test-retest reliability of each technique. 
It is thus not possible to simply state that the lottery technique is e.g. more 
stable than the midvalue splitting technique because the stability correlation is 
higher. On the contrary, it might be the other way around. That is, it is possible 
that the true risk attitude did not change, so that the correlation concerns just 
stability. On the other hand, a low stability for the midvalue splitting technique 
may be attributed to a change in true strength of preference notwithstanding the 
fact that the midvalue splitting technique might be highly reliable. 
Taking this into account two conclusions can be drawn from our findings. 
Firstly, attitudes did not change randomly from one year to the next, because 
then no statistically significant positive correlation between the years would have 
been obtained, whether the technique were reliable or not. Secondly, the tech-
niques are not totally unreliable, because if they were, no significant correlations 
would have been obtained, whether the attitudes changed randomly or not at all. 
Now attention is directed towards the correspondence between the techniques. 
Are risk attitude and strength of preference one and the same concept/construct? 
In the terminology of factor analysis one construct means that there is one 
common factor measured by means of four indicators (the assessments obtained 
by four techniques). The hypothesis of a relative risk attitude implies that risk 
attitude and strength of preference are different concepts. This hypothesis 
therefore means that there are two common factors and that each factor is 
indicated by two techniques (a low correlation between latent variables risk 
attitude and strength of preference is thus an indication of a relative risk attitude 
(see note 1 in Section 6.1)). 
Table 6.20 shows the correlations between the different techniques for each 
year separately. The convergent correlation (Pearson) between the lottery and 
conjoint technique in 1984 is 0.49 and 0.14 between the midvalue splitting and 
rating technique. In 1985, these correlations are 0.34 and 0.29, respectively. The 
Spearman correlations are somewhat higher. In both years, these correlations are 
positive and clearly significant. Taking into account that unreliability of the 
measurement technique attenuates the correlation between the measures, it can be 
concluded that the measures for each concept converge in both years. 
However, to confirm that risk attitude and strength of preference are two dif-
ferent concepts, the correlation between measures which are intended to measure 
a different theoretical concept should be low or at least lower than convergent 
correlation. This is only partly confirmed, as is shown in Table 6.20. The confir-
mation stems from the rating and conjoint measurement technique. The rating 
technique appears to correlate less with the lottery and conjoint technique than 
with the midvalue splitting technique, in both years. With respect to the conjoint 
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measurement technique, an analogous conclusion can be drawn: correlations are 
higher with the lottery technique than with both of the other techniques. The 
midvalue splitting technique, however, in both years correlates higher with the 
lottery technique than with the theoretically equivalent rating technique. Fur-
thermore, the correlation between midvalue splitting technique and the conjoint 
measurement is comparable to the one with the rating technique (0.14) (data to 
calculate a correlation between midvalue splitting technique and conjoint 
measurement are only available in 1984). 
Table 6.20 Correlations between indicators of risk attitude (lottery and conjoint) 
and strength of preference (MVS and rating) at two moments of 
measurement (pairwise deletion of missing values) 
diagonal: stabilities 
below diagonal: data 1984 
above diagonal: data 1985 
LOTTERY CONJOINT MVS RATING 
RL RC VM VR 
Pearson correlations 
Lottery RL 44 e 34d 33 d 20 d 
Conjoint RC 49* 20 a * 17 a 
MVS VM 22 e 14° 2 4 b 29c 
Rating VR 04 -07 14c 15° 
Spearman correlations 
Lottery RL 45 e 40e 40 e 2 1 d 
Conjoint RC 49e 30 d * 29 d 
MVS VM 26 e 15 c 23 b 31d 
Rating VR 02 -04 15c 19 d 
Bold stability 
Italics convergent validity 
* 
no data available 
a p < .10 
b p < .05 
C p < .026 
d p < . 0 1 
8 p < .001 (all one-tailed) 
An exploratory factor analysis is performed on the correlation matrix in 1984 
mainly for illustrative purposes. In this manner further insight is gained into the 
mutual relationship between the variables. This analysis was performed only for 
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1984 since in 1985 the correlation between conjoint measurement and midvalue 
splitting technique is not available, thus reducing the number of variables in a 
factor analysis to only three. The estimates of the common factor model are 
obtained by means of generalized least squares. Two factors with eigenvalue 
larger than one resulted (1.60 and 1.10, respectively), explaining a total of 67.7% 
of the variance. These two factors indicate that the hypothesis of one common 
factor cannot be accepted. The correlation matrix is reproduced perfectly by two 
factors. 
The lottery (0.74) and conjoint measurement (0.67) load highest on one factor, 
whereas the rating technique does so on the other factor (0.52) (between brackets 
the factor loadings are given; Varimax rotation). The midvalue splitting technique 
loads on both factors: (0.24) on the first and (0.29) on the second. An oblique 
rotation yields a correlation between the factors of only 0.16 which indicates that 
a weak relationship between strength of preference and risk attitude exists, which 
is mainly due to the correlation of the midvalue splitting technique with the 
lottery technique. 
The findings show that the correlations between the respective measurements 
are too small to conclude that strength of preference and risk attitude are one 
and the same concept. This study indicates that risk attitude and strength of 
preference are different constructs. However, the latent variables are not 
independent, either, which is specifically indicated by the correlation between the 
midvalue splitting and the lottery technique. The assessments obtained by the 
rating scale are dissimilar to those of the other two measurement techniques. Not 
only does this technique yield a different function form, also correlations with 
the other measurements are fairly few. 
The latent variable approach thus confirms the concept of a relative risk atti-
tude. This means that no linear relationship exists between u(x) and v(x). In the 
next section the specific relationship between the functions will be tested. 
6.7.2 The relationship between u(x) and v(x) 
Attention will now be directed towards the relationship w between the value 
function v(x) and utility function u(x) in: u(x) = w(v(x)). More specifically, it 
will be tested whether both functions are related linearly or not. As has been 
discussed in Chapter 3, Allais (1979) is one of the proponents of a linear rela-
tionship. Bell and Raiffa (1980), Dyer and Sarin (1982) and Sinn (1983) hypothe-
size a negative exponential relationship between the utility function and the value 
function. This negative exponential function implies a constant absolute and an 
increasing proportional relative risk attitude. 
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The relationship can be specified in the following manner: 
u(x) = a + b e" c V W for c < 0 or c > 0, (6.33a) 
u(x) = a + b v(x) for c = 0. (6.33b) 
The parameter c in this relationship (6.33a) between v(x) and u(x), specifies the 
relative risk attitude. For c > 0 the decision maker is relatively risk averse, if c < 
0 he is relatively risk seeking. With v(x) taken as the x-axis and u(x) as the y-
axis, a concave curve describes the relationship for c > 0. A convex curve results 
if c < 0. 
In Figure 6.12 an example of four relative risk attitudes is given. The negative 
exponential function describing the relationship between v(x) and u(x) is shown 
for four parameters. One function implies a relatively risk averse decision maker 
(c = 2.3); all others imply relatively risk seeking decision makers. 1 0 
0 . 0 0 0 . 2 5 0 . 5 0 0 . 7 5 1 . 0 0 
v(x) 
Figure 6.12 Relative risk attitudes for four different parameter values in the 
negative exponential function 
To illustrate the concept of relative risk attitude further (see also Chapter 3), 
assume that a 50/50 lottery is presented to the decision maker with values taken 
as the outcomes, e.g. v x(x) = 0.10 and v 2(x) = 0.60. The decision maker is asked 
1 0 The parameters of the functions in this example correspond to, respectively, the 10th, 25th, 50th 
and 90th percentile of the measured relative risk attitude in 1984 (see Table 6.21 below). 
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to specify the certainty equivalent. The expected value of the lottery is 
E[v(x)] = 0.35. If therefore the decision maker specifies a certainty equivalent of 
v c(x) = 0.35, then this decision maker is said to be relatively risk neutral. If the 
decision maker specifies a certainty equivalent of less than 0.35, say v c(x) = 0.25, 
this decision maker is said to be relatively risk averse. That is so because, when 
he is certain of outcomes, a change from v(x) = 0.10 to 0.35 equals in value a 
change from 0.35 to 0.60; under risk, a change from 0.10 to 0.25 equals in utility 
a change from 0.25 to 0.60. The relative risk attitude thus describes the true 
effect of risk on the decision maker's valuation of outcomes, since the con-
founding effect of v(x) is controlled for. 
Estimation procedure 
Since it is not possible to directly measure the relative risk attitude by means of 
presenting respondents with lotteries with values as outcomes (as was done in the 
example above), an indirect way has to be sought. Firstly, both u(x) and v(x) are 
measured for the attribute x. Subsequently, u(x) and v(x) are related statistically. 
See also Krzystofowicz (1983) for such an analysis. 
The relationship between u(x) and v(x) will be studied here for the lottery 
technique (assessment of u(x)) and the midvalue splitting technique (assessment of 
v(x)). The v(x) function, assessed by means of the rating technique, will not be 
taken as a comparison. The main reason for this choice is that differences 
between the lottery and rating technique are larger than the differences between 
the lottery and midvalue technique (see e.g. Table 6.19). If the hypothesis of a 
linear relationship between u(x) and v(x) will be rejected for the midvalue split-
ting and lottery technique, then this hypothesis will be rejected for the rating 
technique, too. 
In order to estimate the relationship in Equation 6.33, the assessed equivalents 
will be used. For the lottery and midvalue splitting technique, 7 points (certainty 
equivalents for u(x) and value equivalents for v(x)) are available for each respon-
dent. These 7 points correspond pairwise with respect to level of utility/value. 
For example, for u(x) = v(x) = 0.25 a certainty equivalent, say 25 cts/kg, and a 
value equivalent, say 30 cts/kg, have been assessed. For the remaining six 
utility/value levels these equivalents also have been measured. Subsequently, the 
relationship between these two series of equivalents is analyzed. The value/utility 
levels associated with these points are spread evenly over the interval between 0 
and 1, namely: 0.125, 0.250, 0.375, ... , 0.750, 0.875. 
As stated above, the negative exponential function seems most appropriate 
theoretically (see also Chapter 3) in describing the relationship between the value 
and utility function. However, it is possible that some other non-linear function 
provides a better fit. 
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For reasons of comparison, therefore, the fit of the negative exponential function 
will be compared to that of the power function, implying a decreasing absolute 
and constant proportional relative risk attitude: 
u(x) = a + b v(x) c (6.34) 
Specifically, the following specifications will be estimated by means of non-linear 
least-squares. The program ZXMIN will be used to estimate the parameters (see 
Section 6.2.3) For the negative exponential function, parameter d will be esti-
mated in: 
1 - e~dH 
Vi = ~. zr + e,- (6.35) 
For the power function, parameter d will be estimated in: 
Vi = z{d + e; (6.36)* 
where: 
z. = an element of the vector of value equivalents corresponding to value 
levels of 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 0.50, 0.625, 0.75 and 0.875, assessed by 
means of the midvalue splitting technique 
y. = an element of the vector of certainty equivalents corresponding to 
utility levels of 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 0.50, 0.625, 0.75 and 0.875, assessed 
by means of the lottery technique, 
e. = random error 
i = 1 , 2 , ... , 7. 
The assessed equivalents concern points on the interval with boundaries 10 and 
70 cts/kg. In Equations 6.35 and 6.36 these original equivalents are translated into 
points on the interval with boundaries 0 (corresponding to 10 cts/kg) and 1 (70 
cts/kg), so 0 < z < 1 and 0 < y < 1. 
Equations 6.35 and 6.36 concern the relationship between the assessed equi-
valents. It should be noted here that by using the equivalents in estimating the 
relative risk attitude, parameter d in 6.35 is related to parameter c in 6.33 by c = 
-d. Likewise, parameter d in 6.36 is related to parameter c in the power function 
(6.34) by c = 1/d. 1 1 
This can be seen as follows. By definition, a decision maker is said to be relatively risk averse if his 
certainty equivalent is smaller than his value equivalent (the utility function is located to the left of 
the value function; parameter c > 0 in 6.33a). Consequently, a convex relationship results between 
the value equivalents (z.) on the x-axis and the certainty equivalents (y.) on the y-axis, yielding a 
negative parameter d in 6.35 (d < 0) and d > 1 in 6.36. In an analogous manner, a concave rela-
tionship is found between z. and y. for a relatively risk seeking decision maker: d > 0 in 6.35 and 
0 < d < 1 in 6.36. ' 1 
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Results of estimating the relative risk attitude 
Descriptive statistics of the estimates of the relative risk attitude are shown in 
Table 6.21. For 188 farmers data are available to estimate the relative risk atti-
tude in 1984, in 1985 for 53 farmers data are available. 
Table 6.21 Results of estimating per individual the relative risk attitude, in 1984 
and 1985 
1984 1985 
Negative 
exponential 
Power Negative 
exponential 
Power 
Mean d * -.266 1.176 -1.199 1.470 
Median d -.220 1.072 -.832 1.276 
St.dev. d 2.110 .592 1.989 .708 
Mean |d| 1.598 1.711 
Median |d| 1.164 1.035 
St.dev. |d| 1.398 1.561 
N 188 188 53 53 
Mean MSE .004 .006 .003 .005 
Median MSE .002 .003 .002 .002 
Percentile of parameter 
10 -3.101 .498 -4.041 .729 
25 -1.420 .747 -2.513 1.010 
75 1.005 1.503 -.0224 1.802 
90 2.289 1.963 1.053 2.442 
Percentage of respondents 
Relatively risk averse 43% 42% 20% 19% 
Relatively risk neutral 07% 05% 04% 06% 
Relatively risk seeking 51% 53% 76% 75% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
* 
Parameter d in Equation 6.35 
The adequacy of fit of each function fitted to the data is indicated by the mean 
sum of squared errors (MSE). Notice from mean and median MSE in Table 6.21 
that the negative exponential function fits the data better than the power 
function. 1 2 Tested pairwise, parametric and non-parametric, this difference is 
Both functions fit the data much better than the linear function. Mean MSE for the linear function 
is 0.031 in 1984 and 0.039 in 1985. For all respondents the linear function fits worse than the 
negative exponential or power function. 
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largely significant in both years (p < 0.01). If a significant relative risk attitude is 
present, it is more likely to be a constant absolute relative risk attitude than a 
constant proportional relative risk attitude. This finding confirms the hypothesis. 
All further analyses performed in this section will concern the negative expo-
nential function. 
In order to test whether the departure of the utility function u(x) from the 
value function v(x) is significant, it is tested whether E(|d|) = 0 (d concerns the 
parameter in the negative exponential function 6.35). If the hypothesis of 
E(|d|) = 0 is not rejected, then the linear relationship between v(x) and u(x) 
cannot be dismissed (Krzystofowicz 1983). The mean absolute value of d in 1984 
is 1.598 and in 1985 it is 1.711. In both years the hypothesis of a linear 
relationship is clearly rejected: in 1984 t(188) = 15.75 and in 1985 t(53) = 8.02. It 
is concluded therefore that in this study a significant relative risk attitude is 
found. This finding thus confirms the findings of Krzystofowicz (1983). 
Table 6.21 further shows that the mean parameter is -0.266 in 1984 and -1.199 
in 1985. These sample averages in both years imply that respondents (as a group) 
exhibit relatively risk seeking behavior (the average parameter is < 0). In 1985 
this tendency is larger than in 1984. This can be seen also in e.g. Figures 6.10 
and 6.11 (Section 6.7.1) in which u(x) is clearly located to the right of v(x) for all 
percentiles in both years. In order to test whether the group departs significantly 
from relative risk neutrality, it is tested whether E(d) = 0 is rejected. The t-tests 
indicate that the tendency towards relatively risk seeking behavior is significant 
in both years. In 1984 t(188) = -1.73 (p < 0.05, one-tailed) and in 1985 
t(53) = -4.39 (p < 0.001), thus the hypothesis of E(d) = 0 is rejected. In general 
therefore, decision makers are relatively risk seeking. 
The mean parameter values further suggest that in 1985 respondents became 
more relatively risk seeking. This finding is not surprising since in the former 
sections it was shown that v(x) did not shift from 1984 to 1985, whereas u(x) 
shifted towards less risk aversion. The gap between u(x) and v(x) widened 
therefore from 1984 to 1985. The distribution of respondents classified into the 
risk classes of relatively risk averse, neutral and seeking, further illustrates this 
finding. In 1984, 51% of the respondents is relatively risk seeking; in 1985 this 
percentage is 76% (see Table 6.21). For only n = 48 respondents the relative risk 
parameter is obtained for both years. The average difference in parameter for 
these 48 respondents is 0.60 and for 58.3% (28 out of 48) of the respondents the 
parameter in 1985 is smaller than in 1984. A statistically significant difference 
between the years can hardly be detected for those 48 respondents (pairwise 
t-test: t(47) = -1.56 (p < 0.062, one-tailed) and Wilcoxon, z = -1.59 (p < 0.055, 
one-tailed)). 
The median values of the parameters indicate that relatively risk seeking 
respondents in both years exhibit their attitude more forcefully than those who 
are relatively risk averse (the median parameter is less negative than the mean 
parameter). However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the hypo-
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thesis of a normal distribution of the parameter at the one-tailed significance 
level of p = 0.10 (p = 0.64 in 1984 and p = 0.104 in 1985). 
The major findings can be summarized as follows. Our findings support the 
hypothesis of the relative risk attitude. The hypothesis of a linear relationship 
between utility and value function is clearly rejected in favor of a negative 
exponential relationship. This finding implies that farmers exhibit a constant 
absolute relative risk attitude. As a group, farmers are relatively risk seeking. 
It is found that farmers tend to shift towards more relatively risk seeking 
behavior in 1985 compared to 1984. This shift is solely due to a change in the 
utility function towards less risk aversion. In Section 6.3, no satisfactory explana-
tion for the direction of the shift in the utility function could be given. There-
fore, the change in relative risk attitude is difficult to explain, too. 
6.7.3 Conclusions 
Reviewing the findings concerning the concepts of risk attitude, strength of 
preference and relative risk attitude leads to the following conclusions. 
The assessment of each concept by means of different techniques in general 
showed a significantly positive convergence between techniques intended to 
measure the same theoretical construct; this implies convergent validity. However, 
since the convergent validity of the techniques is not very high, differences 
between the assessments can be substantial. It is therefore concluded that in 
modeling decision making, whether under certainty or under risk, it is fairly 
risky to rely on only one technique in measuring strength of preference and risk 
attitude. Despite this possible dependence of results upon the measurement tech-
nique chosen, the large majority of studies in applied contexts, especially in the 
agricultural economics literature on decision making under risk, relied and still 
rely on only one assessment technique. Conclusions from these studies should 
therefore be interpreted carefully. Of course, it is stressed here that the 
predictive validity of the techniques has not yet been studied. In Chapter 7, the 
sensitivity of predictive validity with respect to the specific measurement 
technique used will be analyzed. 
It is concluded further that conceiving strength of preference and risk attitude 
as latent variables, each latent variable being indicated by a number of measure-
ments, is very useful in analyzing validity and reliability issues. This framework 
provides ample opportunities, especially if one is interested in characterising a 
large sample of decision makers with respect to e.g. risk attitude. 
Conceiving the concepts of risk attitude and strength of preference as latent 
variables shows that the concepts are only slightly positively related. This indi-
cates that risk attitude and strength of preference are two different constructs; a 
confirmation of the concept of relative risk attitude. Preferences and choice 
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behavior change when going from certainty (riskless measurement of strength of 
preference) to risk (measurement of risk attitude). The introduction of risk 
generally induces respondents to choose differently between lotteries than could 
be expected solely on the basis of their strength of preference. 
If attention is directed towards the specific relationship between the utility and 
value function, the following can be concluded. Our findings indicate that the 
hypothesis of a linear relationship between the utility and value function is 
rejected in favor of the theoretically expected negative exponential relationship, 
implying a constant absolute relative risk attitude. Moreover, the hypothesized 
negative exponential function also fitted the data better than the power function. 
The majority of the farmers showed a tendency towards relatively risk seeking 
behavior. In the classical interpretation of risk attitude in the expected utility 
model, only a small percentage of farmers was classified as slightly risk seeking 
in our study. By removing the confounding effect of the value function, a high 
percentage of farmers is classified as relatively risk seeking. These findings 
clearly illustrate the difference between risk attitude and relative risk attitude. 
It should be noted that it is difficult to indicate how much of the difference 
between utility and value is due to measurement error (random error and/or 
systematic response effects) and how much of the difference is due to the effect 
of introducing risk into the measurement procedure. In this respect it is 
instructive to consider our finding that the differences between two techniques 
measuring a value function (i.e. the midvalue splitting and rating technique) were 
on average larger than the differences between the value function and the utility 
function, indicated by respectively the midvalue splitting and lottery technique. 
On the other hand, the clear resemblance of the questioning procedure in the 
lottery and midvalue splitting technique, uncertainty or certainty in the 
assessment being the sole important difference between the techniques, suggests 
that these two techniques might be considered most appropriate for assessing 
whether or not v(x) and u(x) differ. Clearly, even for these techniques a signifi-
cant difference between the functions showed up in both years. 
To evaluate the concepts further, it is interesting to study the relationship 
between on the one hand the several estimates of risk attitude, strength of prefe-
rence and relative risk attitude and on the other hand characteristics of the 
farmer and his farming situation. These aspects will be dealt with in the fol-
lowing section. 
6.8 Relationship between risk attitude and background variables of the 
farmer 
In the conceptual model presented in Chapter 2 a relationship was hypothesized 
between the risk attitude and personal and situational variables. This analysis will 
be conducted in this section by means of regression analysis. In each year there 
are five dependent variables. Risk attitude is indicated by the lottery and con-
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joint measurement; strength of preference is indicated by the midvalue splitting 
and rating technique and the fifth variable concerns the relative risk attitude. 
Consequently, a total of ten dependent variables results. 
The following set of variables was used as predictor variables. Personal 
characteristics of the farmer are: age, level of education, number of years of 
farming experience and the ancestors' region of descent (see Chapter 2). Situa-
tional variables selected are: arable land (in ha.), ware potato cultivation intensity 
(in %), number of ha. allocated to ware potatoes and whether or not onions are 
grown (like ware potatoes, onions is a risky crop). Another interesting variable is 
the farmer's solvency. However, due to a relatively high percentage of non-
response (19%) which would constrain the analysis to a subset of farmers, this 
variable is not included in the regression analyses. Finally, the effect of the 
interviewer will be tested (data were collected with 14 interviewers in 1984 and 9 
in 1985). All assessment techniques required an active role of the interviewer. 
Consequently, systematic effects might have been introduced. 
Regression analysis is applied as the method of analysis. For each dependent 
variable, a series of analyses were conducted with different subsets of variables. 
A combination of subjective and stepwise selection was used in order to arrive at 
the final solution. Care was taken to preclude high multicollinearity. For 
example, the variables arable land, growing intensity and number of ha. allocated 
to potatoes are not included at the same time since, of course, a perfect linear 
relationship exists between these variables. Aside from arable land and number of 
ha. of ware potatoes grown, all predictor variables were recoded into dummy 
variables. 
The main results of the analyses are summarized in Table 6.22. In this table the 
significant variables are indicated by x (p < 0.10, two-tailed). For ease of pre-
sentation no regression coefficients or t-values are shown. Adjusted R-squares 
are shown before and after inclusion of the interviewer effects. Some of the 
variables are only significant after inclusion of the interviewer dummy variables. 
The results in Table 6.22 clearly show that the indicators of risk attitude and 
strength of preference are only slightly associated with background variables. 
Prior to including the interviewer effects, all R-squares are very low. Only a few 
variables are significant for only some indicators. Moreover, these effects are not 
consistent over the years. 
The region of descent most often shows an effect; it is significantly associated 
with four indicators. However, the results are not consistent even for this 
variable. That is, for two indicators a northern region of descent differs signifi-
cantly from the other regions, whereas with respect to the remaining two indica-
tors this concerns a south-west and a southern region. The intensity and culti-
vation of onions are associated with two indicators: the lottery measurement and 
the relative risk attitude in 1985. Farmers who cultivate potatoes with high 
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intensity and farmers who cultivate onions are somewhat less risk averse and less 
relatively risk averse. 
Table 6.22 Significant effects of background variables and interviewer on indi-
cators of risk attitude, strength of preference and relative risk atti-
tude 
LOTTERY CONJOINT MIDVALUE RATING RELATIVE 
RISK 
1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 
Age 
Education 
Descent X X 
-
X 
X 
X 
X 
- -
Region 
Arable land 
Intensity 
Onions 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X - X -
- X 
X 
R 2-adjusted a .03 .05 .02 .02 .05 .06 - .06 
R 2-adjusted b 
Signif.c 
.06 
.09 
.08 
.06 
.10 
.001 
.05 
.05 
.12 
.003 
.15 
.000 
.04 
.09 
.12 
.18 
Significant variable (p < 0.10, two-tailed) 
Before inclusion of the interviewer dummy-variables 
After inclusion of the interviewer dummy-variables 
Significance of increase in R-square due to interviewer (F-test on change in R-square) 
In general, we conclude that neither a consistent nor a strong relationship exist 
between personal and situational factors and indicators of risk attitude and 
strength of preference. The results suggest that the indicators of risk attitude and 
strength of preference are strongly linked to the specific decision problem the 
farmer is confronted with (the marketing of ware potatoes), so that the farmer's 
general characteristics are hardly relevant for these context specific preferences 
and choices. We think that it is quite possible for the same farmer to be very risk 
averse when marketing ware potatoes and to be only slightly risk averse with 
respect to e.g. pest management or choosing his crop rotation plan. Our findings 
therefore indicate the necessity of assessing risk attitude and strength of 
preference for each context separately. The relative risk attitude is hypothesized 
to be less context specific (Bell and Raiffa 1982). One would thus expect more 
consistent relationships with background variables. However, in this study no 
confirmation for this hypothesis is found. 
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In contrast to the personal and situational factors, the interviewer shows clear 
effects for three of the ten indicators: the conjoint measurement in 1984 and the 
rating technique in both years (see Table 6.22). Especially the rating task seems 
susceptible to interviewer influence. The differences in assessments between 
interviewers are not particularly large, however. For 1984 the mean parameter 
assessed by the three most extreme interviewers is 15% above or below the over-
all mean parameter. For the year 1985 differences are smaller (9% above or below 
overall mean). A reason for the effect of the interviewer in the rating task is 
probably a difference in emphasizing the endpoints of the scaling interval. More 
about this will be said in the next section. In contrast to the rating technique and 
conjoint measurement, the assessments with the lottery and midvalue splitting 
technique seem less easily affected by the interviewer. 
The effect of the interviewer on the assessments should not be exaggerated; for 
only three of the ten measurements a significant effect shows up. Moreover, the 
effects of the interviewer are not consistent over the indicators. That is, there is 
not a group of interviewers who assesses systematically high or low values. Stated 
otherwise, for each indicator other interviewers are most extreme in their assess-
ments. Nevertheless, the results show some sensitivity of the assessments to the 
interviewer. It would be interesting to study whether these effects are smaller 
when, instead of paper and pencil, use is made of an interactive computer device 
in the assessments. 
Finally, it was analyzed whether there are any differences in risk attitude 
between cooperative and private farmers. It is hypothesized that no differences in 
risk attitude will exist between both groups, since the choice of the type of 
wholesale company is mainly based on non-price attributes. When tested, indeed 
no significant differences were found between cooperative and private farmers. 
However, within the group of cooperative farmers one expects that cooperative 
farmers who choose the 100% pooling strategy are more risk averse than those 
choosing the 50% pooling, 50% spot market strategy, since the former strategy is 
perceived as less risky than the latter. Indeed, in both years the farmers choosing 
the 100% pooling strategy were most risk averse for both the conjoint and lottery 
technique. However, this difference was only significant for the conjoint 
measurement. With respect to the conjoint measurement, the mean parameter in 
1984 is 0.55 (100% pooling farmers) compared to 0.42 (50% pooling farmers) 
(t = 2.17, p < .02, one-tailed); in 1985 these figures are 0.57 and 0.42, 
respectively (t = 2.86, p < .004). There are no significant differences between the 
groups with respect to strength of preference or relative risk attitude. 
6.9 Major findings and conclusions 
In this chapter the concepts of risk attitude and strength of preference were 
extensively analyzed. In the introduction to this chapter four main purposes have 
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been formulated: a) to measure an evaluation function which can be used to rank 
order probability distributions; b) to provide a characterization of a sample of 
farmers with respect to risk attitude and to study the relationship of this concept 
with the farmer's characteristics or his farming situation; c) to test the concept of 
relative risk attitude and d) to study in survey research the validity, reliability 
and practical feasibility of measurement procedures of both risk attitude and 
strength of preference. This section summarizes the major findings, especially 
with respect to c) and d). 
A review of the literature showed that the measurement of risk attitude is 
susceptible to a range of biases and response mode effects. In general therefore, 
it is recommended to apply a multiple indicator approach in assessing risk atti-
tude (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986; Johnson and Schkade 1989). Survey 
research in which such a multiple indicator approach is applied to study the 
validity and reliability of procedures in assessing risk attitude is sparse. In this 
study, explicit attention has been given to these aspects; four measurements 
procedures were applied: conjoint measurement, the lottery, the midvalue 
splitting and the rating technique. Of these four techniques the lottery technique 
is predominantly used in risk attitude assessment. 
The concept of relative risk attitude made it necessary to differentiate between 
risky (conjoint measurement and lottery technique) and riskless measurement 
techniques (midvalue splitting and rating technique). If risk attitude and strength 
of preference are one and the same construct, we will have four indicators for 
risk attitude at our disposal. If risk attitude and strength of preference are two 
constructs, then there are two indicators of each concept, which enables an 
analysis of the relationship between the concepts. 
In Table 6.23 the major findings of each measurement technique are summa-
rized. The response percentages of all techniques are high. The midvalue splitting 
technique shows the lowest response percentages. Most likely this is mainly due 
to the fact that in both years this assessment was done at the end of the interview 
which may have made some respondents less motivated to complete the question. 
When compared to the other techniques, the rating task is judged to be the 
easiest to both the respondent and the interviewer. This task was completed 
quickly. The midvalue splitting technique is seen as the most difficult, even 
somewhat more difficult than the lottery technique. For respondents it seems 
fairly difficult to judge changes in attribute levels. Contrariwise, in the lottery 
technique respondents are asked to compare a fixed amount to a lottery. This task 
is to some extent familiar to a farmer since in actual decision making farmers 
have to choose between fixed-price contracts (no risk involved) and other strate-
gies of selling (all involving risk). The conjoint measurement task is judged to be 
somewhat easier than the lottery technique because respondents only have to rank 
order lotteries instead of having to provide indifference judgments. 
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Table 6.23 A summary of major findings with each assessment technique 
CONSTRUCT RISK ATTITÜDE STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE 
Technique Conjoint Lottery Midvalue Rating 
measurement splitting 
Respondent's task rank order 24 
50/50 lotteries 
assess certainty 
equivalents of 10 
50/50 lotteries 
assess 10 
midvalues 
rate 10 price levels 
on a 0 to 10 scale 
Response % in 1984 
Response % in 1985 
95% 
93% 
95% 
97% 
88% 
87% 
99% 
99% 
Ease of task to the: 
- respondent 
- interviewer 
+ 
+ + 
0 
0 
0/-
0 
+ + + 
+ + + 
Internal consistency 
of assessment 
high high high high 
Type of risk attitude linear trade-off 
between mean and 
standard deviation 
constant absolute 
risk aversion (nega-
tive exponential 
function) 
constant absolute risk 
aversion (negative 
exponential function) 
decreasing absolute 
risk aversion (power 
function) 
Percentage of res-
pondents: 
- averse 
- neutral 
- seeking 
1984 1985 
89% 95% 
8% 4% 
3% 1% 
1984 1985 
82% 68% 
12% 23% 
6% 9% 
1984 1985 
91% 95% 
7% 5% 
2% 
1984 1985 
100% 100% 
Stability 
- temporal shift 
(from 1984 to 1985) 
- stability correla-
tion 
- stability of 
latent variable 
no sign, difference less risk averse in 
1985 
030 (p < 0.01) 0.45 (p < 0.001) 
0.82 (p < 0.001) 
no sign, difference more value averse in 
1985 
0.23 (p < 0.05) 0.19 (p < 0.01) 
0.61 (not sign., n = 55) 
Convergent 
validity 
in 1984: 0.49 (p < 0.001) 
in 1985: 0.40 (p < 0.001) 
in 1984: 
in 1985: 
0.15 (p < 0.025) 
031 (p < 0.01) 
Response effects inclusion of certain 
profile induced ideal 
points, but less than 
expected 
more risk seeking 
responses for lotte-
ries low in expected 
utility and small in 
range (tendency to 
S-shaped function) 
same effect as with 
lottery technique, 
but smaller 
- scaling of interval 
boundaries is 
probably not taken 
fully into account 
- no indication 
of an S-shaped 
function 
Further findings - expected utility 
model confirmed 
for at least 80% of 
respondents; 
Coombs' ideal-
point model 
rejected 
- certainty effect 
rejected 
in test interviews 
certainty equivalence 
technique clearly 
preferred to proba-
bility equivalence 
technique 
most susceptible to 
interviewer effects 
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To the interviewer both the lottery and midvalue splitting technique are difficult 
because of the task of iterating towards indifference and the chaining of assess-
ments. The interviewers certainly need extensive training in these respects. 
All techniques are rated high in internal consistency. Consistency assessments 
in the lottery and midvalue splitting technique showed in most cases no signifi-
cant differences. In the rating task, in which price levels were presented to the 
respondent in random order, a higher price level was consistently rated higher. 
Also, in the conjoint measurement task, preferences for profiles equal in risk 
increased with the expected value of a profile. 
The classification of respondents into risk classes differs between techniques. 
The midvalue splitting and rating technique clearly indicate that almost all 
respondents show decreasing marginal value (a concave function). Likewise, in 
the conjoint measurement task only a small percentage of respondents is classified 
as risk seeking or risk neutral. The largest percentage of risk seeking and risk 
neutral respondents is found with the lottery technique. Differences in classifica-
tion between both years of measurement are small, except with respect to the 
lottery technique. With this technique the percentage of risk neutral respondents 
increased from 12% in 1984 to 23% in 1985; a significant shift towards less risk 
aversion showed up in 1985. 
With respect to the constructs of strength of preference, and risk attitude Table 
6.23 clearly shows that the measurement of risk attitude is both more stable and 
has a higher convergent validity. Furthermore, the analysis showed that the 
framework of latent variables, each indicated by multiple measurements is very 
useful and elegant in the analysis of reliability and validity of measurements. We 
would recommend to make more use of this framework in the analysis of deci-
sion making under risk, especially if data are collected for a large number of 
decision makers (typically found in survey research). 
With each technique, some indications of systematic response effects were found. 
However, it is important to note here that the response effects should not be 
exaggerated. Overall, the techniques yield plausible and consistent results. Table 
6.23 shows the most important effects. 
In conjoint measurement the percentage of ideal-point preferences for risk has 
most likely increased due to the inclusion of the certain profile. Respondents 
preferred profiles with marginal risk to both the certain profile and profiles with 
substantial risk. Firstly, this finding, of course, contradicts the hypothesis of the 
certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Secondly, the effect of the sure 
profile was smaller than expected on the basis of a comparable study 
(MacCrimmon et al. 1980). Overall, the percentage of respondents with an ideal-
point for risk was relatively small compared to preferences in accordance with 
the expected utility model. 
Some indications of an S-shaped function were found with both the lottery and 
midvalue splitting technique. Especially for lotteries which are low in expected 
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utility and with a small range in lottery outcomes, respondents tended to give risk 
neutral or risk seeking responses. Further research in which special attention is 
given to the effect of a reference point should clarify whether these responses are 
to be attributed to a method effect or to a respondent's coding of price levels 
into gains and losses as hypothesized in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). 
In contrast with the lottery and midvalue splitting technique, no indications of 
an S-shaped evaluation function is found with the rating technique. On the con-
trary, the assessments show a very steep increase in value for low price levels 
(the power function therefore fitted best for the rating technique). This large 
difference between the techniques might be due to the explicitness of the interval 
boundaries in the measurement process. In contrast with the lottery and midvalue 
splitting technique where the boundaries of each assessment are on the forefront 
and the respondent is asked to assess a midpoint, the boundaries in the rating 
technique are less dominant in the assessment. The respondent is asked to rate 
price levels relative to the endpoints 0 = 10 cts/kg and 10 = 70 cts/kg. In this 
rating task it is possible that respondents use only ratings between, say, 4 and 10 
to evaluate price levels on the interval [10,70]; ratings between 0 and 4 in this 
example are all perceived as "very bad" and so there is no need to differentiate 
between e.g. 3 and 4. Such an effect would probably have been smaller if a 
rating scale between 0 and 100 had been used. 
Finally, the rating task seems most susceptible to interviewer effects. Conjoint 
measurement is sensitive in this respect, too. However, no consistent interviewer 
effects showed up, which means that there was not a particular group of inter-
viewers who systematically assessed extreme values. 
With respect to the relationship between personal and situational factors of the 
farmers and the indicators of risk attitude it is concluded that in this study no 
substantial or noteworthy relationships turn up. It is thought that the assessments 
of risk attitude and strength of preference are too context specific. 
Overall, evidence in this study shows that for all the techniques that were 
applied, consistent and plausible assessments were obtained. The lottery technique 
proves to be best in these respects, followed by the conjoint measurement and 
midvalue splitting technique. The rating task is judged as the least reliable and 
valid method of assessment. 
However, our findings also show that the measurements do not converge highly 
enough to warrant the supposition of having established a valid and stable 
measurement of either the risk attitude or the strength of preference (it should be 
noted in this respect that predictive validity of the assessments still has to be 
analyzed (see the next chapter)). Although stability and convergent correlations 
are positive and significant, their magnitude is fairly small. These rather low 
correlations indicate the danger of relying on only one measurement procedure in 
a study and thus prove the necessity to apply a multiple indicator approach. 
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Furthermore, it signals that more research into the concepts and their measure-
ment has to be conducted in order to develop superior procedures. 
The relative risk attitude 
With respect to the construct of relative risk attitude the not-substantial correla-
tions between risky techniques on the one hand and riskless techniques on the 
other hand indicate that the hypothesis of a relative risk attitude cannot be dis-
missed. Indeed, the specific test of the relationship between the utility function 
and the value function indicated a non-linear relationship. This means that the 
assessments in this study show that risk attitude and strength of preference are 
two distinctive concepts. 
It was shown that the negative exponential function provided a better fit 
between utility and value function than a linear or power function. In this way 
respondents can be characterized by a constant absolute relative risk attitude. 
As a group, the respondents exhibit a slight tendency towards relatively risk 
seeking behavior. However, the number of relatively risk averse respondents 
almost matched the number of relatively risk seeking respondents. The findings 
show that, in general, the introduction of risk into the decision making process 
induces decision makers to choose differently. Some will exhibit less conservative 
preferences in the presence of risk, whereas others will exhibit more conservative 
preferences. 
In testing the hypothesis of the relative risk attitude, the assessments of the 
lottery technique and the midvalue splitting technique were used. The questioning 
procedure in these two techniques is very similar. The sole fundamental dif-
ference in assessment is whether or not risk is involved in the assessment. The 
significant difference in assessment that is found proves to a very large extent 
that respondents react differently under certainty than under risk. We therefore 
do not attribute the difference between the techniques in assessment to method 
variance. 
As this study confirms the existence of the relative risk attitude, it is interesting 
to digress upon some consequences of this finding. Firstly, it implies that 
modeling decision making under risk as if it is a decision under certainty, will 
generally result in incorrect assessments. Consequently, one expects that the pre-
dictive validity of these models under certainty will not be high for decisions 
under risk. However, it is not yet clear how large the differences in predictive 
validity are between certainty and uncertainty models. This is one of the topics 
of Chapter 7. 
Secondly, it should be noted that the concept of relative risk attitude is very 
specifically tied to the difference between a utility and a value function. It can 
only be assessed indirectly, not directly. This is definitely an unattractive feature 
of the concept. One consequence is that measurement error is introduced from 
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two sources, namely the utility and the value function. Another consequence of 
the indirect assessment is that it is difficult to communicate the contents of the 
concept. 
Thirdly, it is relevant to consider the question whether the concept of relative 
risk attitude is really theoretically compelling. That is, is it attractive to consider 
a quantal effect between certainty and uncertainty in such a way that the 
evaluation function shifts dramatically when moving from certainty to uncer-
tainty? Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) conclude negatively. They refute the 
idea of relative risk attitude and as a consequence allow no inconsistencies 
between risky and riskless measurements. Decision makers are urged to resolve 
their inconsistenties. We are less convinced that the concept of relative risk 
attitude is theoretically unattractive. To us, indeed a quantal effect between 
certainty and risk is plausible. The psychological state of uncertainty is of a 
different nature than that of certainty. Uncertainty, of course, is the general 
state. 
In our view, the concept of relative risk attitude bridges the gap between 
Bernoulli's model and his explanation of risk aversion and the von Neumann-
Morgenstern model. In the Bernoulli model strength of preference (i.e. decreasing 
marginal value) is the sole explanation for risk aversion. In contrast, in the origi-
nal theory of von Neumann-Morgenstern no explanation is provided for risk 
aversion. Their theory rests on the fundamental assumption that decision makers 
do arrive at indifference probabilities or certainty equivalents, one way or 
another. The theory does not require that a reference is made to strength of 
preference, in this respect. However, when actually considering lotteries and 
when urged to state how one arrives at a particular certainty equivalent, strength 
of preference notions easily come to mind. Although these notions are important, 
we think, and our empirical study confirms this idea, that strength of preference 
alone is not enough to explain decisions. 
We suggest a two-stage process. A decision under risk is governed by value 
comparisons of outcomes under certainty plus either the displeasure originating 
from nervousness about the risk of ending up with an unfavorable subjective 
value (relative risk aversion) or the pleasure derived from the chance of ending 
up with a favorable subjective value (relative risk seeking). The relative risk 
attitude, or the true risk attitude of a decision maker, thus is the net result of 
hope (greed) and fear, approach and avoidance concerning subjective values. 
Of course, in some sense we are back to where we started: why is one person 
more 'nervous' about the chances of an unfavorable subjective value than another 
person? Should the relative risk attitude be seen as a personality trait and, if so, 
how does this trait develop? The real benefit of the concept still has to be con-
firmed. It has to be shown that it describes the true risk attitude of a decision 
maker better and more stable, and that it is less dependent than the conventional 
measure of risk attitude upon both the attribute under consideration and the 
decision context. Further empirical research is therefore surely needed to prove 
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the worth of the concept. But at this moment in time we think it is too early to 
refute the idea of a relative risk attitude as e.g. von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
(1987) do. 
Further conclusions concerning the differences between risky and riskless 
procedures will be drawn in the analysis of the predictive validity of the utility 
and value assessment and in the test of the subjective expected utility model. In 
the next chapter these issues will be dealt with. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ANALYSIS OF PREFERENCE FOR MARKETING STRATEGIES 
AND 
TEST OF THE EXPECTED UTILITY MODEL 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will focus on explaining and predicting the farmer's prefe-
rence for a marketing strategy. The model of preference formation for a mar-
keting strategy, described and presented in Chapter 3, will be tested. In this 
model the preference is hypothesized to be dependent upon two attributes: the 
price farmers expect to receive with a certain marketing strategy and the type of 
wholesale company. Within this two-attribute model, the effect of the price 
attribute on preferences is modelled according to the expected utility model. 
This chapter deals with four issues. The central issue in this chapter will be the 
capability of this expected utility model to explain preferences. That is, what is 
the predictive validity of the expected utility model? In the expected utility 
model the subjective probability distribution of price of a marketing strategy (the 
primary subject of Chapter 5) is combined with the utility function (risk attitude) 
of the farmer (analyzed in Chapter 6) to arrive at the expected utility of a mar-
keting strategy. The model furthermore assumes that decision makers will form a 
preference ranking of strategies in accordance with the rank order of expected 
utility. 
In order to test and evaluate the predictive validity of the expected utility 
model, the model will be contrasted with a benchmark model. This benchmark 
model is the expected value model. In the expected value model, price risk of a 
strategy and risk attitude of the decision maker are not taken into account. That 
is, a linear utility function of the decision maker is assumed (a risk neutral deci-
sion maker) so that only the expected value of the subjective probability distri-
bution governs preferences. Thus, it is assumed that the preference rank order of 
strategies in the expected value model equals the rank order of expected value of 
the strategies. 
Essentially then, the issue of the capability of the expected utility model to 
explain preferences boils down to the question whether the expected utility model 
performs better than the expected value model in explaining preferences. Before-
hand, one would expect that the predictive validity of the expected utility model 
will be higher than that of the expected value model. This expectation follows 
directly from the findings in the previous two chapters. The analysis in Chapter 5 
showed that farmers perceive a substantial amount of price risk associated with 
each marketing strategy and in Chapter 6 it was shown that the majority of the 
farmers is risk averse. In this chapter then, it will be empirically assessed 
whether the expectation is correct. Are the perceived price risk and the risk 
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aversion of farmers indeed influential variables in the formation of preference 
and secondly, how influential are these variables? Section 7.3.1 will deal with 
these issues. 
The second issue in this chapter concerns the effects on the predictive validity 
of the expected utility model if the utility function is substituted by a value 
function. In the standard version of the expected utility model a utility function 
is assumed. This utility function is measured under risk by means of lotteries. 
The value function, on the other hand, is measured by means of riskless tech-
niques. In this study the midvalue splitting and rating technique are used to 
measure the value function. The analysis in Chapter 6 has shown that significant 
differences exist between the utility and value function. 
Since risk is introduced only in the lottery technique and not in the other two 
techniques, one would expect a higher predictive validity of the expected utility 
model when using the utility function than when using the value function. This 
expectation will be checked in this chapter. That is, is the predictive validity of 
the expected utility model indeed higher when using the function measured under 
risk than when using the function measured under certainty! Stated differently, 
does the relative risk attitude of a farmer influence preferences? The findings 
will be dealt with in Section 7.3.2. 
A third subject of this chapter concerns an evaluation of the expected utility 
model from the viewpoint of efficiency in the explanation of preference. This 
concerns the question whether a more simple model than the sophisticated 
expected utility model would explain preferences equally well. The reason for 
searching for a more simple model is that, as was shown in Chapters 5 and 6, a 
number of elaborate measurements are necessary if one wants to use the expected 
utility model. A subjective probability distribution must be elicited for each 
choice alternative and the decision maker's risk attitude has to be assessed. Both 
measurements are fairly difficult and time consuming on the part of the respon-
dent, which can become problematic when conducting research with a large 
number of respondents. Furthermore, incorporating the measurements in an 
analysis of preference requires a great deal of effort and time on part of the 
analyst. 
Solely seen from the viewpoint of explaining preference, one can therefore put 
forward the question whether the expected utility model would result in a sub-
stantially better explanation of preference than a more pragmatic model of prefe-
rence formation. The latter model uses measurements which are obtained more 
easily and quicker than the measurements needed in the expected utility model. 
In this study it is possible to make an explicit comparison of the expected utility 
model and such a pragmatic model. The farmer's perception of marketing strate-
gies has not only been assessed by means of subjective probability distributions 
but also by means of a number of straightforward questions. The mean price of a 
strategy was asked directly and price risk was measured by means of magnitude 
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estimation. In Section 7.3.3 the predictive validity of a pragmatic model using 
these measurements will be analyzed. 
In the analyses of Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.3 the attention is primarily directed 
towards within-subject analyses. That is, models are tested which predict why a 
decision maker prefers marketing strategy A to B and B to C etc. In contrast, in 
Section 7.4 a number of between-subject analyses will be conducted. This means 
that the following question is raised (the fourth topic in this chapter): which 
farmers have a high preference for a particular marketing strategy and which 
farmers evaluate that strategy negatively? An attempt is made to explain the 
attitude towards a marketing strategy by the farmer's characteristics like risk 
attitude, age, level of education and so on. In a different manner than in the 
within-subject analyses the effect of risk attitude on preferences can thus be 
assessed. 
Before presenting the results of the analyses mentioned above, first a number 
of general observations will be discussed in the next section. The section contains 
the descriptive statistics of the preference measurement, it describes the effect of 
the type of wholesale company on preference and, finally, it presents findings 
concerning the stability of preferences. 
7.2 Measurement of preference: some general aspects 
Data collection procedure 
The farmers evaluated the marketing strategies on a seven-point rating scale: 13 
strategies in 1984 and 18 in 1985 (see Chapter 4). The question they had to 
answer read: When I consider all advantages and disadvantages of choosing this 
strategy this year, my judgment of this strategy is: very negative (rating = 1) to 
very positive (rating = 7). To simplify the task, all strategies were displayed on 
cards and presented to the farmer. He was then asked to put each card in one of 
seven categories displayed on a large sheet. The question mentioned above was 
written at the top of the sheet. The farmers were told that they were allowed to 
put more than one strategy in a category. This procedure resulted in a number of 
piles of strategies. Having completed the task so far, the farmer was asked to 
reconsider the strategies in each pile and order them according to his preference. 
In this manner a complete rank order of the strategies was obtained. Both the 
category rating and the rank order were recorded. The farmers showed no diffi-
culties in completing the task. 
In both years, the measurement of preference for marketing strategies was 
situated in the first part of the questionnaire, amply before the measurements of 
risk perception and risk attitude in order to reduce the possibility of interference 
of measurements. 
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Main results 
Table 7.1 shows descriptive statistics of the preference measurement in both 
years. From this table some primary remarks can be made. 
The strategies consisting of a combination of a fixed-price contract and some 
other way of selling are evaluated very positively. See the high mean preference 
score of Strategies 9, 12 and 13. Apparently, in both years the fixed-price con-
tract is very attractive to farmers, especially when it is combined with a chance 
of profiting from high market prices by means of selling at the spot market. 
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics of preference measured on a seven-point rating 
scale (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive) in 1984 (N = 230) and 
1985 (N = 200) 
MEAN MEDIAN ST.DEV. 
STRATEGY 1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 
1. 100% Pc 4.27 3.73 4.38 3.40 1.98 2.18 
2. 100% Bp 4.21 4.08 4.39 4.28 1.40 1.57 
3. 100% Fpl 4.52 4.10 4.75 4.19 1.69 1.56 
4. 100% Sml 3.37 2.99 2.99 2.45 1.89 1.77 
5. 100% Pp 4.10 3.69 4.21 3.62 1.66 1.88 
6. 100% Sm2 4.06 3.43 4.08 3.31 1.61 1.70 
7. 50% Pc /50% Sml 4.49 4.05 4.68 4.03 1.54 1.72 
8. 50% Bp /50% Sml 4.41 4.16 4.47 4.16 1.32 1.44 
9. 50% Fpl/50% Sml 5.03 4.84 5.32 4.92 1.34 1.30 
10. 50% Pp /50% Sml 4.47 4.12 4.62 4.08 1.36 1.54 
11. 50% Pc /50% Sm2 4.50 3.77 4.69 3.77 1.43 1.69 
12. 50% Fpl/50% Sm2 5.07 4.46 5.32 4.68 1.27 1.46 
13. 50% Fpl/40% Bp/10% Sml 4.62 4.57 4.81 4.75 1.47 1.41 
14. 100% Fp3 — 3.96 — 4.10 — 1.61 
15. 50% Fp3/50% Sml — 4.39 — 4.55 -- 1.45 
16. 50% Pp/50% Sm2 — 3.92 — 3.97 — 1.39 
17. 25% Pp/25% Fpl/50% Sml — 4.09 -- 4.11 — 1.53 
18. 25% Pp/25% Fpl/50% Sm2 — 4.03 — 3.98 — 1.45 
Pc = pooling contract, cooperative company 
Pp = pooling contract, private company 
Bp = bottom-price contract, private company 
Fp = fixed-price contract, private company (1 or 3 years fixed) 
Sml = selling at the spot market, selling at one moment 
Sm2 = selling at the spot market, selling at two moments 
In contrast, selling the total harvest at spot market prices is evaluated negatively, 
as can be seen from the mean preference for Strategies 4 and 6, which are lowest 
in both years. Of these two strategies, Strategy 6 (selling at two moments at the 
spot market) is evaluated more positively than Strategy 4 (selling at one moment 
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at the spot market) in both years (pairwise test, p < .001). Perhaps this preference 
for selling twice at the spot market is caused by the farmers' risk aversion. Since, 
according to the farmers (see Chapter 5), selling twice at the spot market results 
in a smaller risk than selling only once, risk averse farmers would opt for selling 
twice. 
In both years, the farmers' opinions on 100% pooling at a cooperative company 
(Strategy 1) varies largely; more so than their opinions on other strategies. This 
can be concluded from the high standard deviation of the ratings. Farmers also 
largely differ in their evaluation of Strategy 4. In Section 7.4 it will be analyzed 
which characteristics of farmers can explain the differences in preference 
between farmers for both these strategies. 
A comparison of the results of 1984 with those of 1985 shows that the mean 
evaluation for all marketing strategies is lower in 1985 than in 1984. Tested 
pairwise, the difference between both years is significant for all marketing 
strategies. It indicates that farmers evaluated all strategies fairly negative, which 
is most likely due to the low prices they expected in 1985 irrespective of the 
specific strategy (see Chapter 5). Another reason for this difference between the 
years might be that five strategies were added to the preference measurement in 
1985 compared to 1984 (13 strategies were used in 1984; in 1985 this was 
extended to 18 strategies). These extra strategies may have induced farmers to 
lower their mean evaluation score of the other 13 strategies due to a change in 
reference. However, since further analyses are performed within each year, this 
difference in scale rating between both years is not a severe problem. 
Effect of type of wholesale company farmers actually deal with 
In Table 7.1 the preference ratings averaged over all farmers were displayed. In 
Table 7.2 the ratings are broken down by type of wholesale company the farmers 
actually deal with. In the remainder of this chapter a farmer selling his potatoes 
to a cooperative company will be referred to as a 'cooperative farmer', whereas a 
farmer dealing with a private company will be referred to as a 'private farmer'. 
Table 7.2 clearly shows the differences in both years in the evaluation of mar-
keting strategies between the two groups of farmers. Cooperative farmers 
evaluate strategies implying selling to a cooperative company (Strategies 1, 7 
and 11) more positively than do private farmers. Private farmers evaluate strate-
gies implying selling to a private company more positively than do cooperative 
farmers. Each group of farmers thus dislikes strategies supplied by the competing 
wholesale company. 
There is, however, one notable and interesting exception in the pattern men-
tioned above. As Table 7.2 shows, cooperative farmers evaluate in both years 
100% pooling at a private company (Strategy 5) more positively than do private 
farmers (p < .001). Apparently, cooperative farmers are much more fond of 
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pooling than private farmers, irrespective of the type of wholesale company they 
have to deal with. 
Table 7.2 Mean preference ratings in 1984 and 1985, separately for cooperative 
and private farmers (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive) 
1984 1985 
Coope- Private Coope- Private 
STRATEGY rative rative 
1. 100% Pc 5.6 3.3 5.4 2.7 
2. 100% Bp 4.2 4.2 3.8 4.3 
3. 100% Fpl 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.1 
4. 100% Sml 2.9 3.7 2.7 3.2 
5. 100% Pp 4.5 3.8 4.3 3.3 
6. 100% Sm2 3.6 4.4 3.0 3.7 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml 5.3 3.9 5.1 3.4 
8. 50% Bp/50% Sml 4.1 4.6 3.7 4.4 
9. 50% Fpl/50% Sml 4.8 5.2 4.4 5.1 
10. 50% Pp/50% Sml 4.4 4.5 4.1 4.1 
11. 50% Pc/50% Sm2 5.3 4.0 4.7 3.2 
12. 50% Fpl/50% Sm2 5.0 5.1 4.1 4.7 
13. 50% Fpl/40% Bp/10% Sml 4.4 4.8 4.2 4.8 
14. 100% Fp3 — — 4.2 3.8 
15. 50% Fp3/50% Sml — — 4.1 4.6 
16. 50% Pp/50% Sm2 — — 3.9 4.0 
17. 25% Pp/25% Fpl/50% Sml -- — 3.5 4.5 
18. 25% Pp/25% Fpl/50% Sm2 -- — 3.5 4.4 
The effect of the type of wholesale company can be studied further by taking a 
closer look at a number of pairwise combinations of strategies, namely: a com-
parison of Strategy 1 with 5, Strategy 7 with 10 and Strategy 11 with 16. The 
strategies concern the 100% pooling strategies (Strategies 1 and 5) and the strate-
gies in which 50% pooling is combined with 50% spot market sales (Strategies 7, 
10, 11, and 16). These marketing strategies are selected because in each pairwise 
combination the strategies are similar except with respect to type of wholesale 
company. As a consequence, these combinations enable one to analyse differences 
between cooperative and private farmers more clearly. Table 7.3 shows the mean 
preference ratings for the five pairwise combinations. Data are presented for the 
total group of farmers and for cooperative and private farmers separately. 
When testing the differences between the corresponding strategies by means of 
the pairwise t-test, it turns out that for the total group no significant differences 
between these strategies exist. For example, 100% pooling at a cooperative com-
pany is evaluated equally positive as 100% pooling at a private company. How-
ever, testing the pairwise differences separately for each group of farmers, the 
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differences are significant and substantial for all five comparisons. If they can 
choose similar strategies with each type of wholesale company, each group of 
farmers clearly prefers the strategy implying the type of wholesale company he 
actually deals with. 1 The findings in Table 7.3 further show that although private 
farmers like 100% pooling less than do cooperative farmers (see above), if they 
have to choose between a) 100% pooling and selling to a cooperative company 
(Strategy 1) or b) 100% pooling and selling to a private company (Strategy 5), 
they will prefer the latter, (see also Section 7.3.1). 
Table 7.3 Testing the effect of type of wholesale company on preferences for 
five pairwise combinations of marketing strategies (mean preference 
ratings), for all farmers and separately for cooperative and private 
farmers 
STRATEGY 
All 
1984 
Coope-
rative 
Private All 
1985 
Coope-
rative 
Private 
1. 100% Pc (coop.) 4.27 5.59 3.34 3.73 5.35 2.71 
5. 100% Pp (priv.) 4.10 4.48 3.83 3.69 4.31 3.29 
Difference (1-5) .17 1.11 -.49 .04 1.04 -.58 
Significance - ** ** - ** ** 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml (coop.) 4.49 5.33 3.90 4.05 5.12 3.38 
10. 50% Pp/50% Sml (priv.) 4.47 4.37 4.54 4.12 4.14 4.11 
Difference (7-10) .02 .96 -.63 -.07 .98 -.73 
Significance - ** ** - ** ** 
11. 50% Pc/50% Sm2 (coop.) 3.77 4.71 3.17 
16. 50% Pp/50% Sm2 (priv.) — — — 3.92 3.86 3.97 
Difference (11-16) -.16 .86 -.79 
Significance - ** ** 
* * = p < 0.001 (one-tailed) 
- = not significant 
The preference formation model, hypothesized and presented in Chapter 3, 
provides two explanations for the differences between cooperative and private 
farmers in the evaluation of marketing strategies. Firstly, a difference between 
the groups in price risk perception of a strategy; secondly, a difference due to 
other attributes of the strategy. 
Another effect of the wholesale company shows up in Table 7.1. The standard deviation of the rating 
is larger for cooperative strategies than for similar private strategies (compare Strategy 1 and 5, 7 
and 10, 11 and 16). Apparently farmers differ more in their opinions about the cooperative than 
about private companies. 
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Let us now first turn to the difference between the groups in price perception by 
considering, for example, the 100% pooling strategies (Strategies 1 and 5). Why 
do cooperative farmers prefer Strategy 1 to 5 and why do private farmers prefer 
Strategy 5 to 1? One reason might be that, although it is a similar strategy, 
cooperative farmers on average expect a different subjective probability dis-
tribution of 100% pooling with a cooperative company than of 100% pooling with 
a private company. The expected utility of the strategy with a cooperative com-
pany could then be higher and preference for this strategy is therefore also 
higher. For private farmers on the other hand, the expected utility of 100% 
pooling with a private company might be higher than that of 100% pooling with 
a cooperative company. Alternatively, the prices associated with a strategy and, as 
a consequence, the expected utility of the strategy might be biased by the 
farmer's actual choice of wholesale company (a rationalization of choice). 
In the second explanation, other attributes than price could be the reason for 
the differences. Perhaps farmers perceive exactly the same probability distribu-
tion of the 100% pooling strategy, irrespective of the type of wholesale company. 
The two strategies would then be equal in respect of expected utility. Although 
equal in expected utility, cooperative farmers might nevertheless prefer 100% 
pooling with a cooperative company because of such factors as the style of 
trading, a lower debtor risk, the system of payments for high quality potatoes, 
etc. 
Since no significant effect of wholesale company on perception could be 
detected (see Section 5.3.3), the second explanation is most likely. Of course, in 
general a combination of both reasons is possible: a difference in price perception 
as well as a favorable attitude based on non-price attributes. In the model 
presented in Section 7.3.1 the effects of type of wholesale company and dif-
ferences in price perception will therefore simultaneously be taken into account. 
Strategy loyalty 
For each individual, preference data are available in both years for 13 marketing 
strategies. These data will be used to study the loyalty towards strategy choice (it 
should be noted that loyalty here is studied with respect to preference and not to 
actual choice). Table 7.4 shows the descriptive statistics of Pearson and Spearman 
correlations computed per individual. For N = 191 individuals data are available. 
The mean correlation is 0.52 with a median correlation of 0.55. The third quartile 
is 0.69. For 8% of the respondents the correlation is negative. 
Another measure of the stability of preference is the correlation computed over 
individuals and over strategies. Before computing the correlation over individuals 
the preference data were centered per individual (see 7.3.1). The resulting corre-
lations are a Pearson correlation of 0.46 and a Spearman correlation of 0.45, both 
significant (p < .001). 
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Table 7.4 Stability of preferences; sample statistics of Pearson and Spearman 
correlations computed per individual (N = 191) 
Mean* Mean St.dev.* Percentiles % < 0 
25 50 75 
Pearson .520 .467 .400 .324 .540 .691 8 
Spearman .501 .453 .396 .285 .544 .670 8 
* 
After Fisher r--to-B transformation 
If the attention is directed towards the correspondence in the most favorite 
strategy in both years, another indication of stability of preference, then it turns 
out that 42% of farmers prefer the same strategy in both years. If first and 
second choice are taken together then 69% of the farmers can be classified as 
strategy loyal. 
Loyalty is highest for strategies implying selling to a cooperative company 
(Strategies 1, 7 and 11). Loyalty towards the first choice of these strategies is no 
less than 80% (that is, 80% of the cooperative farmers prefer the same strategy in 
1985 as in 1984). Apparently, cooperative farmers do not switch easily from e.g. 
100% pooling to 50% pooling, 50% spot market or vice versa. It is concluded that 
they do perceive these optional strategies with a cooperative company as very 
different. 
Loyalty for the remainder of strategies, all implying selling to a private com-
pany, is much lower; on the average this amounts to 28% of first choices of pri-
vate farmers. Apparently, the optional strategies with a private company are 
perceived as less diverse from one another than those with a cooperative com-
pany. Private farmers easily switch from one strategy to another. Of these strate-
gies with a private company, farmers appear to be most loyal (63%) towards 
Strategy 4 (100% spot market, selling at one moment). Particularly interesting is 
the loyalty towards the fixed-price contract. In 1984, the share of the first 
choices of this strategy is 13% decreasing to 7% in 1985. Many farmers thus 
switched from the fixed-price contract to another strategy in 1985. The most 
likely explanation for this decrease in preference is that in 1985 the level of the 
fixed-price is perceived as relatively low in comparison with the expected prices 
for other strategies (see Chapter 5). 
The findings mentioned above show that the first choices of cooperative 
farmers did not change much between the years. Private farmers showed much 
more switching behavior than cooperative farmers. The stability correlations in-
dicate that, the preference ranking of the marketing strategies is fairly alike in 
both years. 
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7.3 Test of the preference formation model 
This section concerns itself with testing the preference formation model hypo-
thesized in Chapter 3. In Section 7.3.1 the predictive validity of this model will 
be compared to the expected value model. This is followed by an analysis of the 
effect of substituting the utility function by the value function in the expected 
utility model (Section 7.3.2). A comparison of the predictive validity of the 
expected utility model with a pragmatic model of preference formation follows in 
Section 7.3.3. 
7.3.1 The predictive validity of the expected utility and expected value models 
Specification of the models 
The formation of preference is hypothesized to be based upon two attributes. One 
attribute is the price farmers expect to receive with each marketing strategy. The 
second attribute is the type of wholesale company, differentiated into a coopera-
tive or private company, that farmers sell their potatoes to. Thus we get the 
general model: 
Pref = f(price, type of wholesale company) (7.1) 
Both attributes need further explanation and specification. 
Firstly, consider the type of wholesale company. As stated in Chapter 3, the 
type of wholesale company is not by itself a reason for choosing the marketing 
strategy. We view the type of company as a proxy variable for differences 
between cooperative and private companies on a number of attributes. These 
attributes concern differences between companies in style of trading, debtor risk, 
type of contact with representative personnel, differences in the payment for 
high quality potatoes, etc. Since in the marketing strategies we distinguished 
solely between cooperative and private companies, the net effect of all the above 
mentioned attributes on preference can be represented adequately by a single 
dummy variable. This means that, by using the dummy variable of type of 
wholesale company, it can be tested whether a farmer evaluates marketing strate-
gies which imply selling to a cooperative company on average higher (or lower) 
than marketing strategies which imply selling to a private company. 
A complete review of which attributes or motives are most important in 
choosing the type of wholesale company and the differences between farmers in 
the importance they attach to each of these attributes, are issues which have been 
reported elsewhere (Smidts 1985).2 In this section, the attention is directed 
The three main motives for choosing a cooperative company are: a) the smaller risk of bad debts; b) 
"the cooperative is your partner and not your opponent"; c) habit/from generation to generation. The 
main reasons for choosing a private company are: a) more freedom/less restrictions; b) habit/from 
generation to generation; c) cooperative is too large and bureaucratic. 
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towards a test of the expected utility model so that a single dummy variable 
suffices. 
Secondly, in Model 7.1 also a clarification is needed for the specific meaning 
of the attribute price. Price stands for a subjective probability distribution. In 
order to enable testing of the model, this subjective probability distribution has 
to be converted into a single number for each marketing strategy for each 
farmer. If the expected utility model is assumed to govern preference, this single 
number will of course be the expected utility of the subjective probability distri-
bution. 
Taking the remarks above into account, Equation 7.1 can be rewritten as: 
Prefjj is the preference rating for marketing strategy j by farmer /', 
EUjj is the expected utility of marketing strategy j for farmer i, 
Companyj is a dummy variable that indicates whether marketing strategy j 
implies selling to a cooperative company or to a private company. 
In this Model 7.2 then, the preference for strategy j is allowed to differ between 
farmers i. Furthermore, the preference rating a farmer gives to a strategy is 
assumed to depend upon the farmer's expected utility of the strategy (EU-) and 
the type of wholesale company (Companyj). Of course, the expected utility of 
strategy j is modelled to differ between farmers / because of differences between 
farmers in the subjective probability distribution of strategy j , differences 
between farmers in risk attitude or both. 
The expected utility of a marketing strategy, EUjj in Equation 7.2, is computed 
according to the following expression: 
Prefjj = f (EUjj, Companyj) (7.2) 
i = 1, 2, .... , n 
j = 1, 2, .... , n m 
where: 
•70 
(7.3) 
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where: 
f-(x) is the probability density of price for marketing strategy j as perceived 
by farmer i, 
uj(x) is the utility function of farmer i on the price interval 10 to 70 cts/kg. 
In the standard version of the expected utility model assumed in this section, 
uj(x) is the utility function measured by means of lotteries. In Section 7.3.2 the 
effect on predictive validity will be studied when Uj(x) in 7.3 is be substituted by 
the value function Vj(x), measured by means of riskless techniques. 
In Chapter 5 it was shown that the subjective probability distribution of a 
marketing strategy could be represented satisfactorily by a lognormal distribution. 
So the probability density fjj(x) in Equation 7.3 concerns the density function of 
the lognormal distribution. Furthermore, it was shown in Chapter 6 that the 
farmer's utility function Uj(x) could be represented adequately by a negative 
exponential function. Taking these findings into account, Equation 7.3 can be 
specified further as: 
with 
Hi, — In IMEDij 
and 
» - 2 In l M E ^ 
CTy ~ " IMED, 
In Equation 7.4, IMEA and IMED refer to the moments of the lognormal distri-
bution; the mean of the distribution is denoted by IMEA and the median by 
IMED (see the notation used in Chapter 5). Equation 7.4 is computed using pro-
cedure DCADRE in the IMSL-library of FORTRAN programs. 
In case of a risk neutral farmer or under the assumption that he is risk neutral, 
then the utility function is linear and expression 7.3 reduces to: 
EUij = / fij(x)xdx = EVij (7.5) 
Jio 
254 
That is, the expected utility of the marketing strategy is now equal to the 
expected value (EV) of the probability distribution of price. The price risk of a 
strategy does not influence the farmer's preference for the strategy. This 
expected value model can be considered the benchmark model from which the 
expected utility model is evaluated. 
To summarize, the test of the predictive validity of the expected utility model 
will concern the comparison of the two following models: the expected value 
model and the expected utility model. 
Expected value model 
Prefjj = a + b EVjj + c Companyj (7.6) 
Expected utility model 
Prefjj = a + b EUjj + c Companyj (7.7) 
Beforehand, we would expect the expected utility model to outperform the 
expected value model in explaining preference, because the expected utility 
model takes price risk into account. Since price risk of marketing strategies is 
considerable, as was shown in Chapter 5, and since farmers are definitely not risk 
neutral, as was concluded in Chapter 6, risk should influence preferences for 
marketing strategies. 
The models in 7.6 and 7.7 combine the attributes additively. Of course, other 
functions e.g. the multilinear function of which the additive function is a special 
case, have been proposed in combining attributes. Most noteworthy in this respect 
is the analysis of Keeney and Raiffa (1976) who provide an elaborate discussion 
on multiattribute models under uncertainty and present conditions, e.g mutual 
utility independence, in order to select the functions suitable for combining the 
attributes. Their analysis is not particularly relevant here, however. In this case, 
the combination of attributes is relatively simple since only one attribute, namely 
price, is represented by a probability distribution. The certain attribute, type of 
wholesale company, is therefore combined with price in the most simple, that is, 
additive manner. 
Procedure for testing the models 
By means of linear regression analysis over individuals, the parameters in Equa-
tions 7.6 and 7.7 will be estimated. Preferably, both models should be estimated 
per individual since parameters might differ between individuals. For example, 
for some farmers the type of wholesale company might be more important in the 
formation of preference than the price, whereas for others this might be the 
other way around. However, estimating the models per individual is not possible 
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since the number of marketing strategies per individual for which perception data 
are available is fairly small. The maximum number of strategies per individual 
for which a subjective probability distribution is elicited is 7. This means that at 
best only 4 degrees of freedom would result when estimating Equations 7.6 or 7.7 
per individual. Often however, even less than 7 probability distributions have 
been elicited. This small number of observations per individual thus necessitates 
an analysis over individuals. 
In the regression over individuals, within-subject data (differences between 
strategies per individual) are pooled with between-subject data (differences 
between individuals per strategy). In that case, the same parameters are assumed 
for all individuals. One should test whether this implication of pooling is justi-
fied. For example, one could estimate the models separately for particular groups 
of respondents and see whether differences in parameters between these groups 
exist. 
One such partial analysis should evidently be performed. The analysis in 
Section 7.2 showed that the type of wholesale company the farmers actually sell 
to will influence the parameter of the dummy variable 'company' in Equations 
7.6 and 7.7. That is, farmers actually selling to a private company prefer mar-
keting strategies implying selling to a private company on average more than 
cooperative marketing strategies, whereas for farmers actually dealing with a 
cooperative company the reverse effect shows up. In case the dummy variable 
'company' is coded 0 for a strategy with a private company and 1 for a strategy 
with a cooperative company, then it is to be expected that the parameter of this 
dummy will be negative for individuals dealing with a private company and posi-
tive for individuals dealing with a cooperative company. Stated differently, an 
interaction effect will probably be present between the type of wholesale com-
pany implied in the strategy and the farmer's actual choice behavior with respect 
to the wholesale company. 
One manner to analyse the effect mentioned above is to perform two regres-
sions, one for respondents dealing with a cooperative company and one con-
cerning respondents dealing with a private company. Alternatively however, it is 
also possible to estimate the effect in one regression. In Equation 7.8 the model is 
shown in which the hypothesized interaction effect is taken into account and can 
be estimated in one regression. 
Pref- = a + b EUy + c Company j + d COOPj + e Companyj*COOPj + e - (7.8) 
where: 
Companyj is a dummy variable indicating the type of wholesale company 
implied in strategy j (coded 1 if it concerns a strategy with a cooperative 
company and coded 0 if it concerns a strategy with a private company), 
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COOPj is a dummy variable indicating the type of wholesale company farmer 
i actually deals with (coded 1 if he deals with a cooperative and 0 if he deals 
with a private company), 
Companyj*COOPj is the multiplication of the dummy variables Companyj 
and COOPj, which represents the interaction effect, 
ejj is a random error term, 
i = 1, 2, ... , n and j = 1, 2, ... , m. 
In this regression analysis the data consist of vectors of length (« x m). By testing 
whether parameters d and/or e are significantly different from 0, it is tested 
whether the two groups of farmers (cooperative and private farmers) evaluate the 
strategies differently. 
In the expected value model (7.6) the same interaction effect is assumed. This 
expected value model has the same specification as Equation 7.8 but EUjj is 
substituted by EVjj = IMEAjj. In correspondence with the notation used in 
Chapter 5, IMEAjj denotes the expected value of the lognormal distribution 
specified by farmer i for marketing strategy j . 
Prior to the regressions the data have undergone a selection and a transformation. 
Firstly, a data selection has taken place by selecting only those respondents for 
which five or more subjective probability distributions were elicited. This selec-
tion has taken place because the analysis is primarily directed towards testing 
within-subjects effects. With at least five strategies per subject these effects can 
be estimated. The inclusion of subjects for which, say, only one or two proba-
bility distributions are elicited, would predominantly increase only between-sub-
jects variance and would not be beneficial in testing within-subject effects. The 
maximum number of strategies per subject for which probability distributions are 
elicited is seven. 
Secondly, the data are centered per individual. This means that the mean of a 
variable is computed per individual and subsequently subtracted from the indi-
vidual's raw data. In this manner differences in mean scores between individuals 
are removed from the data. Differences between individuals were especially large 
with respect to the expected value of the subjective probability distributions. 
Results of testing the models 
Equation 7.8 was estimated by means of regression analysis over individuals. In 
order to enable a proper comparison between the expected value and expected 
utility model the same cases (respondents and strategies) are taken in the regres-
sions concerning a particular year. Table 7.5 shows these results of the regressions 
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in both years. In order to ease presentation, no t-values are shown in Table 7.5. 
However, the coefficient of each variable is statistically significant (p < .001). 
Firstly, Table 7.5 shows that the hypothesized effect of type of wholesale com-
pany, represented by the variables COOP, Company and COOP*Company, is 
clearly present. For both years the combined effect of these variables is shown in 
Figure 7.1. Cooperative farmers evaluate strategies implying selling to a coopera-
tive company on average clearly higher than strategies implying selling to a pri-
vate company. With private farmers the reverse effect shows up. The difference 
in evaluation of cooperative and private strategies for cooperative farmers is 
larger (0.92 + 0.64 = 1.56) than for private farmers (0.64). In 1985 these diffe-
rences are, respectively, 1.49 (1.04 + 0.45) for cooperative farmers and 0.91 for 
private farmers. These findings mean that on average cooperative farmers dislike 
strategies of the competitive company much more than private farmers do. Con-
sequently, it will be more difficult to persuade a cooperative farmer to switch to 
a private company than vice versa. 
1984 
Pre fe rence 
O 
- 1 
-0.53 
C o o p e r a t i v e 
s t r a t e g i e s 
P r i v a t e 
s t r a t e g i e s 
cooperative farmers 
1985 
Pre fe rence 
- 1 -0.91 
C o o p e r a t i v e 
s t r a t e g i e s 
P r i v a t e 
s t r a t e g i e s 
private farmers 
Figure 7.1 Combined effect on preference of the type of wholesale company 
implied in the strategy and the type of company the farmer actually 
deals with, in 1984 and 1985 
Secondly, Table 7.5 shows that in both years, the inclusion of IMEA respectively 
EU in the regression results in a significant increase in fit of each model. 
Especially in 1984 the increase in R 2 due to these variables is substantial (0.098 
due to IMEA and 0.118 due to EU). 
The findings that both the type of wholesale company and the price farmers 
associate with a marketing strategy significantly affect preference, confirm the 
hypothesized preference formation model. 
258 
Table 7.5 Predictive validity of the expected value model and the expected 
utility model in both years (regression over individuals; preference is 
measured on a seven-point scale (7 = very positive)) 
1984 1985 
EXPECTED EXPECTED EXPECTED EXPECTED 
VALUE UTILITY VALUE UTILITY 
MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL 
Regr. Beta Regr. Beta Regr. Beta Regr. Beta 
VARIABLES coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
Constant .167 .169 .178 .170 
1. COOPa -.534 -.161 -.540 -.163 -.915 -.221 -.876 -.211 
2. Company15 -.647 -.209 -.648 -.209 -.447 -.134 -.442 -.133 
3. Company*COOP 2.110 .465 2.115 .466 2.397 .378 2.375 .374 
4. IMEA .212 .316 — — .120 .181 
5. EU — — 1.01 .346 — — .670 .230 
R 2 .226 .246 .118 .137 
St. error 1.35 1.34 1.53 1.51 
N 1135 1135 1093 1093 
Partial correlation 
r(PREF,IMEA) .334 .187 
r(PREF.EU) .367 .238 
History of R2 
R 2 (vars. 1,2,3) .128 .128 .086 .086 
R 2 (allvars.) .226 .246 .118 .137 
R 2-change .098 .118- .032 .052 
F-change 142.3 176.3 39.5 63.4 
— = not included in the equation 
Dummy variable: coded 1 if the marketing strategy implies a cooperative company (Strategies 1, 7 or 
11), coded 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: coded 1 if the farmer actually deals with a cooperative company, coded 0 if the 
farmer deals with a private company 
The fit of both models of preference formation is clearly less in 1985 than in 
1984 as is shown by both the R-square and the standard error of regression. This 
lower predictive validity in 1985 is due to both a smaller effect of type of 
wholesale company (R-square change in 1985 due to these variables is 0.086 
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compared to 0.128 in 1984) and, more particularly, to a smaller effect of the 
variables IMEA and EU, respectively. An explanation for this finding probably is 
that farmers expected low market prices in 1985. In their view, all strategies 
perform almost equally bad under these conditions (see Chapter 5). Therefore 
differences between strategies will be smaller in expected utility so that the cor-
relation between expected utility and preference will be attenuated. 
The most interesting feature of Table 7.5, of course, is the difference between 
the models in predictive validity. A comparison of fit of the expected value 
model and the expected utility model shows that in both years the expected 
utility model outperforms the expected value model. In both years the R 2 of the 
expected utility model is 0.02 higher than the expected value model. It is inte-
resting to test whether this difference in R 2 between the models is significant. 
Steiger (1980) indicated a testing procedure concerning the significance of the 
difference between two 'correlated correlations' (both correlations are based on 
the same sample and share a variable). In Tabachnick and Fidell (1989, 
p. 158-160) the general procedure is described to test, with respect to multiple-R, 
whether one set of independent variables predicts a dependent variable better 
than another set (for the theoretical basis of an analogous testing procedure see 
Bouman (1988, especially p.242-263). 
When the difference in multiple-R is tested, it turns out that the predictive 
validity of the expected utility model is indeed significantly higher than that of 
the expected value model in both years (z = 3.15, p < 0.001 in 1984 and z = 4.11, 
p < 0.001 in 1985). Apparently, by taking the price risk of a marketing strategy 
and the risk attitude of the decision maker into account, the predictive validity 
increases. This finding, consistent in both years, confirms the hypothesis that the 
expected utility model provides a better explanation of preference. 
Even though the expected utility model in both years provides a significantly 
better fit than the expected value model, the increment in fit does not seem par-
ticularly large. A lack of reference studies makes it difficult to evaluate whether 
the increment in fit (increase in R 2 = 0.02) is less than one might expect, in this 
study the ordering of marketing strategies does not change very much whether 
solely the expected value of the probability distribution or the whole probability 
distribution is taken into account. Stated differently, a linear utility function 
(assuming a risk neutral farmer) predicts preferences almost equally well as a 
non-linear utility function (assuming a risk averse or risk seeking farmer). 
Some further tests obtained by analyses per individual 
One might wonder about the reasons for the seemingly small increment in fit of 
the expected utility model. Two lines of thought suggest themselves in the ex-
ploration of this issue. Firstly, it might be due to the subjective probability dis-
tributions that have been elicited. That is, differences between strategies in 
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expected value may be relatively large compared to the differences in price risk. 
Consequently, the ordering of these distributions is primarily based on expected 
value and the ordering is hardly altered when price risk is taken into account 
(irrespective of the degree of risk aversion). 
Secondly, how sensitive is the ordering of distributions to the degree of risk 
aversion? Although on average farmers were risk averse, perhaps the degree of 
risk aversion is relatively small so that for many farmers the concave curve can 
be approximated fairly well by means of a linear function. An interesting 
question that remains is whether, by assuming more risk aversion for all farmers, 
the difference in fit of the models increases. Another interesting question in this 
respect is whether, from the viewpoint of predictive validity, it is preferable to 
assess a decision maker's unique risk attitude or to assume the same risk attitude 
for all decision makers? 
In order to gain insight into these issues, a number of analyses per individual 
have been conducted. By conducting analyses per individual attention is directed 
totally to within-subject effects. Table 7.6 shows sample statistics of several cor-
relations computed per individual. For example, PREF, IMEA denotes the corre-
lation between preference and IMEA computed over strategies per individual. 
Only Pearson correlations are presented. The Spearman rank order correlations 
were calculated too but they did not deviate much from the Pearson correlations. 
Correlations were calculated only when at least five data points per individual 
were available. 
Based on correlations per individual it again turns out that the expected utility 
model performs better in explaining preferences than the expected value model. 
Table 7.6 shows that, although differences are small, the correlation between the 
preference rating and expected utility (correlation PREF, EU) exceeds on average 
the correlation between preference rating and expected value (correlation PREF, 
IMEA). This is found in both years of measurement. 
In order to test whether the correlation between preference and expected utility 
significantly exceeds the correlation between preference and expected value, the 
one sample t-test for correlations should be used (Blalock 1979, p. 425). This test 
has to be applied per individual. However, in this test N-3 degrees of freedom 
should be used. Since the minimum number of observations per individual is 5 
and the maximum number is 7, only 2 to 4 degrees of freedom would be left. 
Taking into account the small differences in magnitude between the correlations 
it is clear that it is extremely difficult to detect in this testing procedure a signi-
ficant difference between the correlations per individual. Alternatively, the pair-
wise comparison between the correlations is analyzed over indv-duals by means 
of the pairwise t-test and the Sign test. The t-test was applied to the Fisher 
r-to-z transformed correlations. 
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Table 7.6 Descriptive statistics of Pearson correlation coefficients computed 
per individual 
Mean Mean 8 
25 
Percentiles 
50 75 
St.dev.3 % < 0 
1984 (N = 180) 
PREF, IMEA .326 .422 .052 .424 .741 .483 23 
PREF, EU .346 .446 .107 .420 .755 .470 21 
PREF, EU(c = 0.12) .354 .453 .103 .386 .750 .588 19 
IMEA, EU .978 .998 .990 .999 .999 .098 0 b 
IMEA, ISTA -.131 -.185 -.679 -.187 .425 .606 60 
1985 (N = 137) 
PREF, IMEA .211 .310 -.179 .255 .582 .485 33 
PREF, EU .234 .330 -.167 .267 .595 .477 31 
PREF, EU(c = 0.12) .269 .366 -.080 .323 .638 .614 28 
IMEA, EU .985 .997 .990 .998 .999 .055 0 c 
IMEA, ISTA .047 .076 -.561 .054 .646 .642 47 
After Fisher r-to-z transformation 
7% of correlations is < 0.95, minimum = 0.13 
6% of correlations is < 0.95, minimum = 0.41 
EU Expected utility computed with the risk aversion coefficient parameter measured by the 
lottery technique 
EU (c = .12) Expected utility computed with the risk parameter c = .12 for all farmers 
Table 7.7 shows the results of these tests in both years. It is clear that the corre-
lation between expected utility and preference significantly exceeds the correla-
tion between expected value and preference in both years. However, Table 7.7 
furthermore shows that in 1984, in no less than 40% (n = 73) of all cases the 
correlation between EU and preference is lower than the correlation between 
IMEA and preference. In 1985 this percentage is 36.5% (n = 50). Thus, for only 
60% of the cases, the introduction of risk attitude results in a better fit, however 
small. Nevertheless, for the farmers as a group, it is shown that by taking risk 
attitude into account, preferences can be explained somewhat better. 
It should be noted here that only the Pearson correlation coefficient is sensitive 
enough to detect differences between the expected value and expected utility 
model. The Spearman correlation coefficient, computed over the rank order of 
strategies provided by the farmers, resulted in a high percentage of ties: the cor-
relation between preference and EU equals that between preference and IMEA. 
The percentage of ties is 82% in 1984 and in 1985 71%. Excluding the ties, two 
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thirds of the correlations between preference and EU exceeded those between 
preference and IMEA. 
Table 7.7 Pairwise test of expected utility model and 
expected value model based Pearson correla-
tions computed per individual 
1984 1985 
T-test 
t-value 2.31 2.11 
p (one-tailed) .011 .018 
Sign test 
z-value 2.26 3.08 
p (one-tailed) .012 .001 
N 180 137 
r(PREF,EU) > r(PREF,IMEA) 104 87 
r(PREF,EU) < r(PREF,IMEA) 73 50 
r(PREF,EU) = r(PREFJMEA) 3 0 
r(PREF,EU) Pearson correlation between expected utility (EU) and 
preference (PREF) 
r(PREF,IMEA) Pearson correlation between expected value (IMEA) 
and preference (PREF) 
Although Pearson correlations show that the expected utility model outperforms 
the expected value model, differences between both models are small. This is 
illustrated further by considering the correlation between the expected value 
(IMEA) and expected utility (EU) of the strategy. This correlation is shown in 
Table 7.6 and appears to be very high. The median correlation in 1984 is 0.999 
and 0.998 in 1985. The percentage of correlations lower than 0.97 is very small: 
10% in 1984 and 9% in 1985. These very high correlations indicate that on the 
individual level for a very large portion of the decision makers the predicted 
preference order of strategies is hardly altered by taking price risk and risk atti-
tude into account compared to assuming risk neutral decision makers. The 
ordering of marketing strategies is for most respondents fairly insensitive to the 
risk attitude assessed. 
Two further analyses confirmed the relative insensitivity to the risk attitude. 
Firstly, since the risk attitude is assessed with measurement error, it was tested 
whether it would make a difference with respect to the prediction of preferences 
if the risk attitude parameter would have been higher or lower than the para-
meter assessed. To this end, for each individual a 10% higher and 10% lower 
parameter than the parameter assessed by means of lotteries is assumed and sub-
sequently correlations between expected utilities and preference are calculated 
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(the amount of 10% represents a relatively large measurement error because 10% 
is even somewhat higher than twice the average standard deviation of the 
parameter assessed). It turned out that the correlation computed with the 10% 
higher parameter is not significantly different from the correlation calculated 
with the 10% lower parameter. The ordering of marketing strategies is at least 
insensitive to measurement error present in assessing the risk attitude. 
Secondly, Table 7.6 shows the sample statistics of the correlation between 
preference and EU(c = 0.12). EU(c = 012) denotes the expected utility that is 
calculated if for all farmers a risk parameter of c = 0.12 in the negative expo-
nential function is assumed. The parameter of c = 0.12 implies a very risk averse 
decision maker. The parameter is three (1984) to four (1985) times higher than 
the mean parameter assessed in the lottery question. Compare in Table 7.6 the 
correlation between preference and EU with the correlation between preference 
and EU(c = .12). The mean correlation between preference and EU(c = .12) 
appears to be higher. Tested pairwise however, it turns out that the correlation 
between preference and EU(c = .12) is not significantly different from the cor-
relation between preference and EU in 1984 (p < 0.43). In 1985 the difference in 
correlation is larger and almost statistically significant (t(136) = -1.58, p < 0.06, 
one-tailed). These findings implicate that, for the farmers as a group, the 
assumption of a very risk averse farmers instead of the uniquely assessed risk 
attitudes does not result in a significantly higher predictive validity. 
With a view to the finding above, does it matter whether the risk attitude is 
assessed uniquely per individual or could the same parameter for each respondent 
be assumed equally well? Although differences are very small, the answer to this 
question is that it indeed does matter: the unique risk attitude performs somewhat 
better than assuming the same extreme risk attitude for each respondent. 
This can be shown by testing the correlation between preference and expected 
value (PREF, IMEA) pairwise with a) the correlation between preference and EU 
(PREF, EU) and b) the correlation between preference and EU(c = .12) (PREF, 
EU(c = .12). In both pairwise tests the difference in correlations is significant but 
the level of significance of the t-test between expected value and a) is lower 
(p = .011 in 1984 and p = .018 in 1985) than the level of significance between 
expected value and b) (p = .024 in 1984 and p = .034 in 1985). This means that 
compared to the expected value model, the prediction of preference for some 
farmers improves when assuming the extreme risk attitude in comparison with 
the unique risk attitude, whereas for others it deteriorates. For example, in 1984 
when using the assessed risk parameter, for 59% of the farmers the expected 
utility model gives a better prediction than the expected value model, whereas 
when assuming the same extreme risk attitude this percentage is 54%. Thus, for a 
lower percentage of farmers the predictive validity is higher with the assumption 
of the extreme risk attitude than with the assumption of the unique risk attitude 
(notice in this respect the larger standard deviation of the correlation between 
preference and EU(c = .12) compared to the deviation between preference and 
264 
EU in Table 7.6). It is therefore concluded that although the differences are very 
small, the risk attitude assessed by means of lotteries shows a higher predictive 
validity than the assumption of the same extreme risk attitude for all farmers. 
Overall, the findings show the relative insensitivity of the preference ranking 
towards the risk attitude. This is not an entirely unexpected result. The analysis 
of perception in Chapter 5 already provided some indications for this finding. In 
Chapter 5, an analysis of stochastic dominance was presented. The elicited sub-
jective probability distributions were compared pairwise with respect to second 
degree of stochastic dominance (= SSD). SSD for a pair of strategies means that 
the assumption of a concave utility function suffices for determining the prefe-
rence order for that pair of marketing strategies. The magnitude of the risk 
parameter in the utility function is not important in that case. It turned out that 
in more than 50% of all pairwise comparisons of strategies, the risk aversion 
parameter does not influence the preference order, because SSD existed. With 
such a high percentage of pairwise dominance it is not surprising to find a small 
effect of risk attitude on the preference order of the strategies. 
To elaborate upon this point, consider the correlation per individual between 
the expected value (IMEA) and price risk indicated by the standard deviation 
(ISTA). Table 7.6 shows that of all correlations between expected value (IMEA) 
and price risk (ISTA), 60% is negative in 1984 and 47% is negative in 1985. 
Although the correlations are fairly small for most farmers and far from - 1 , it 
still shows that for many farmers the relationship between expected value and 
price risk is weakly negative. This is surprising since in principle one expects a 
high mean price for a marketing strategy to go together with a large price risk, 
that is, IMEA and ISTA should be positively correlated. This positive correlation 
is expected because the essence of risky decision making concerns the question 
how much expected value the decision maker is prepared to trade-in for a 
reduction in risk. A negative correlation between expected value and risk means 
that choosing a strategy with a higher expected value goes together with a lower 
risk. Of course, in that case dominance between strategies exists. Apparently, 
many farmers perceive strategies with a high mean price to have a small risk. 
This explains to some extent why the expected utility model provides only a 
minor increase in predictive validity with respect to the expected value model. 
7.3.2 The effect on predictive validity of substituting the utility function by 
the value function 
In the former section the analysis was confined to the predictive validity of the 
standard expected utility model in which expected utilities were computed using 
the utility function. Now, the predictive validity of the utility function will be 
compared to that of the value function. That is, does it matter whether the risk 
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attitude or the strength of preference is taken as evaluation function in the 
model? 
In the standard version of the expected utility model the evaluation function is 
assumed to be measured by means of lotteries. Thus risk is incorporated into the 
measurement. In the measurement of the value function, however, no uncertainty 
is introduced. Consequently, it is hypothesized that the predictive validity of the 
expected utility model when using the utility function will be higher than the 
validity when using the value function. It was shown already in Chapter 6 that 
the utility function and value function are significantly different the hypothesis 
of a relative risk attitude could not be refuted. The question here is, whether this 
difference between the functions affects the predictive validity and if so, 
whether the effect is in the hypothesized direction. 
A second topic concerns the effect on predictive validity of the technique used 
in assessing the value function. The value function was assessed using two tech-
niques: the midvalue splitting and the rating technique. In Chapter 6 the mid-
value splitting technique was shown to be more stable and valid than the rating 
technique. The question here is, whether also with respect to predictive validity 
the midvalue splitting technique performs best. 
The method of analysis uses Pearson correlations computed per individual. The 
expected utility of each marketing strategy is calculated per individual using the 
function assessed by each technique (i.e. lottery, midvalue splitting and rating 
respectively). Then, the correlations between preference and the respective 
expected utilities are computed over strategies and per individual. In this manner 
three correlations per individual result. Differences between correlations are 
tested pairwise by means of the pairwise t-test and the Wilcoxon-matched-pairs 
test. 
Results of substituting the utility function by the value function 
In Table 7.8 the descriptive statistics of the correlations per individual and the 
results of the pairwise tests are shown. Firstly, consider the difference in pre-
dictive validity of the utility (lottery) and value function (midvalue splitting, 
rating). No significant difference exists between the lottery and midvalue split-
ting technique (in 1984 t = 0.03, in 1985 t = -0.31). However, in both years a 
significant and substantial difference is found between on the one hand, the 
lottery and the midvalue splitting technique, and on the other hand, the rating 
technique. The predictive validity of both the lottery and midvalue splitting tech-
nique is much higher than that of the rating technique. The median correlation in 
1984 of the lottery technique is 0.420, of the midvalue splitting technique 0.453, 
but for the rating technique only 0.181. 
This pattern is found in both years although differences are smaller in 1985 
(see the t-values). A total of 70% of the correlations between preference and 
expected utility computed with the lottery technique is larger than the correlation 
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between preference and rating technique in 1984. In 1985, 58% of the correla-
tions is larger. The same figures hold for the difference between the mid value 
splitting and rating technique. However, due to the small number of pairwise 
observations in 1985 (n = 47) the large difference between the midvalue splitting 
and rating technique is only significant at p = 0.06 (one-tailed). 
Table 7.8 Descriptive statistics of Pearson correlation coefficients computed 
per individual between preference and expected utility, for each tech-
nique 
Mean Mean a Percentiles St.dev , a % < 0 
25 50 75 
1984 (N=180) 
Lottery (neg. exp.) .346 .446 .107 .420 .755 .470 21 
Midvalue (neg. exp.) b .349 .450 .094 .453 .753 .600 22 
Rating (power) .165 .217 -.146 .181 .488 .547 37 
1985 (N=137) 
Lottery (neg. exp.) .234 .330 -.167 .267 .595 .477 31 
Midvalue (neg. exp.) c .218 .284 -.018 .142 .515 .500 33 
Rating (power) .129 .145 -.161 .185 .404 .407 35 
a After Fisher r-to-z transformation 
b N = 166 
C N = 47 
Tests of significance (pairwise t-test; one-•tailed) 
1984 1985 
Lottery-Midvalue t = .03 (n.s.) t = -.31 (n.s) 
Lottery-Rating t = 5.59 (p < .001) t = 2.27 (P = .01) 
Midvalue-Rating t = 4.81 (p < .001) t = 1.55 (P = .06) 
Lottery (neg. exp.) utility function/risk attitude measured by means of the lottery technique and 
a negative exponential function fitted to the data 
Midvalue (neg. exp.) value function/strength of preference measured by means of the midvalue 
splitting technique and a negative exponential function fitted to the data 
Rating (power) value function/strength of preference measured by means of the rating tech-
nique and a power function fitted to the data 
The findings hint at the following conclusion. Again, as was clear from Section 
7.3.1, this section shows that the ordering of marketing strategies is insensitive to 
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the magnitude of the parameter in the negative exponential function. This can be 
concluded from the fact that no difference in predictive validity is found 
between the midvalue splitting and lottery technique, although the parameters in 
the negative exponential function are significantly different (see Chapter 6). 
However, the ordering of strategies appears to be sensitive to the shape of the 
evaluation function. This is shown by the much smaller predictive validity of the 
rating technique (power function) in comparison with the lottery and midvalue 
splitting technique (both a negative exponential function). This sensitivity to the 
shape of the evaluation function is confirmed further by the finding of a large 
difference in predictive validity between the negative exponential and the power 
function in the lottery technique. The negative exponential function performs 
much better.3 For example, in 1984 the median of the negative exponential func-
tion is 0.42 (see Table 7.8) compared to the median correlation of 0.17 of the 
power function. 
In this study it is not possible to make a definite conclusion about the difference 
in predictive validity between the utility and value function (or, equivalently, 
between risk attitude and strength of preference). However, to say the least, the 
utility function performs equally well as the value function (comparison of 
lottery and midvalue splitting technique) or better than the value function 
(comparison of lottery and rating technique). Alas, since the ordering of strategies 
is fairly insensitive to the magnitude of the parameter in the negative exponential 
function, no difference can be detected between the lottery and midvalue split-
ting technique. However, with a view to the consistency in results in this and the 
previous section which all hint towards the validity of the expected utility model, 
would it be too optimistic to speculate that, in case of probability distributions 
which are more sensitive to the parameter in the function, the utility function 
would perform better than the value function? 
7.3.3 Predictive validity of a pragmatic model of preference formation 
Up until now the analysis of preference has been conducted in line with the 
expected utility model. The subjective probability distribution and utility/value 
function were combined in the normatively correct manner. It is clear that the 
application of the expected utility model necessitates elaborate measurements. Not 
only does a subjective probability distribution have to be elicited for each choice 
alternative, an assessment of the evaluation function also has to be made. In large 
scale survey research e.g. with farmers or consumers as respondents, these 
measurements place a great burden on part of the respondent (and researcher). 
This finding thus clearly enhances the validity of the expected utility model. It turns out that, firstly, 
it makes a difference what function specification is fitted to the assessed data and, secondly, the 
function that fits best (i.e. the negative exponential compared to the power function) has a substan-
tially higher predictive validity. 
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One might therefore put forward the question of whether these measurements are 
worth the trouble. That is, is a pragmatic or naive preference model, using easier 
and more respondent friendly measurements, equally capable of predicting prefe-
rences as the sophisticated expected utility model? This question will be given 
attention in this section. 
To avoid misunderstandings, it should be noted here that the comparison of the 
pragmatic model with the expected utility model concerns only the predictive 
validity of both models. This section thus concerns only an evaluation of the 
usefulness of the elaborate measurements of subjective probability distributions 
and risk attitude from the viewpoint of achieving a high predictive validity in 
the easiest way. Many other goals of analysis can be given which necessitate the 
elaborate measurement of probability distributions and evaluation functions. 
Many such goals have been pointed out in Chapters 5 and 6 and the analyses 
there showed the merits of the measurements. 
Specification of the model 
The most simple and pragmatic model of preference formation consists of a 
model in which mean price and price risk are traded-off linearly. Taking into 
account the type of wholesale company, the following specification of the model 
can be given: 
Prefjj = a + b MEAN-PRICEjj + c PRICE-RISKjj + d Companyj (7.9) 
In this model no risk attitude of a farmer needs to be assessed since the para-
meters b and c concern the trade-off between expected value and price risk. If 
the preference is known, then these parameters can be estimated by means of 
regression analysis. 
In this study two measurements for MEAN-PRICE respectively PRICE-RISK 
are available (see Chapter 5). Price perception was measured by means of two 
techniques: a direct questioning technique and an indirect questioning technique. 
The direct question consisted of a magnitude estimation of risk and a direct 
question to assess the mean price farmers expected to receive with a marketing 
strategy. The respondents responded fairly easily and quickly to both questions. 
The indirect questioning procedure consisted of the elicitation of a subjective 
probability distribution. From this distribution mean price and the standard 
deviation of price are computed. These measurements enable us to compare the 
predictive validity of both measurement procedures. 
In the direct measurement version of the pragmatic model, price risk is repre-
sented by the measurement obtained by magnitude estimation (denoted by RISK). 
Except for a centering of data per individual, the raw data of the magnitude 
estimation will be used. The direct measurement of mean price is denoted by 
269 
DMEA. Taking into account the effect of the type of wholesale company the 
farmer actually deals with (denoted by the variable COOPj), the following speci-
fication results. 
Prefy = a + b DMEAjj + c RISKy + 
(7.10) 
+ d Companyj + e COOPj + f COOPj*Companyj 
i = 1, 2, .... , n 
j = 1, 2, .... , m 
where: 
Prefjj is the preference rating for marketing strategy j by farmer /, 
DMEAjj is the perceived mean price of marketing strategy j for farmer i 
(directly assessed), 
RISKjj is the perceived price risk of marketing strategy j for farmer / 
(directly assessed), 
Companyj is a dummy variable that indicates whether marketing strategy j 
implies selling to a cooperative company (coded 1) or to a private company 
(coded 0) 
COOPj is a dummy variable indicating the type of wholesale company farmer 
i actually deals with (coded 1 if he deals with a cooperative and 0 if he deals 
with a private company), 
Companyj*COOPj is the multiplication of the dummy variables Companyj 
and COOPj, which represents the interaction effect. 
In the indirect measurement version of the model the expected value of the sub-
jective probability distribution (denoted by IMEA) and the standard deviation 
(denoted by ISTA) will be used. 
Prefjj = a + b IMEAjj + c ISTAjj + 
(7.11) 
+ d Companyj + e COOPj + f COOPj*Companyj 
The indirect measurement model should outperform the direct measurement 
model in prediction. In Chapter 5 it became clear that indirect measurement is 
much more difficult to carry out with respondents than simple direct measure-
ment. To be worth the extra trouble of measuring the subjective probability dis-
tributions, the indirect measurement should show a substantially larger fit. 
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Preferably, with respect to predictive validity, one should make a direct com-
parison of Models 7.10 and 7.8: a comparison of the pragmatic model with the 
standard expected utility model. However, the predictive validity of Model 7.10 
is biased upwards since in 7.10 an estimate of risk attitude is obtained by maxi-
mizing the fit of the model whereas in Model 7.8 the risk attitude is assessed. A 
fair comparison between the models could be obtained by applying a jackknifing 
procedure. Such a procedure was deemed too complicated and costly to be used 
here, so that it was decided to obtain an approximation of the model comparison 
by contrasting Models 7.10 and 7.11. 
Method of estimating the models 
Regression analysis over individuals is applied to estimate the Models 7.10 and 
7.11, analogous to the procedure used to compare the expected value and 
expected utility model in Section 7.3.1. Again, as in the model presented in that 
section, an interaction effect between the type of wholesale company implied in 
the strategy and the type of wholesale company farmers are dealing with is 
included. Also, the data were centered per individual. In the regressions a linear 
trade-off is assumed between, on the one hand, DMEA and RISK, on the other 
hand, IMEA and ISTA. This assumption of linearity has been checked by in-
cluding RISK2 respectively ISTA2 in the respective models. The inclusion of 
these variables did not significantly increase the fit of the models. 
To enable a comparison between both models in each year, the same observa-
tions (respondents and marketing strategies) have been used. This leads to 
N = 951 observations in 1984. Only N = 292 observations are available in 1985, 
since the indirect and direct measurement of price perception were measured for 
only a portion of the respondents. 
Results 
In Table 7.9 the results of the four regressions are shown. All variables are sig-
nificant at the significance level p < .001, except the variable RISK in 1985 for 
which p < .03 (one-tailed). Also, all effects are in the hypothesized direction. 
Not surprisingly, recalling the results of the former sections, the overall fit of 
the models (indicated by R 2 and the standard error) in 1985 is less than the fit in 
1984. Since the R 2 due to the effect of the type of wholesale company is almost 
equal in both years (R 2 = .118 in 1984 and R 2 = .103 in 1985), the lower R 2 in 
1985 of the complete model is totally due to the lower correlation of preference 
with the variables mean price and price risk. For example, the partial correlation 
of preference and IMEA is .349 in 1984 and .177 in 1985. 
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Table 7.9 Predictive validity of the indirect and direct measurement technique 
of price perception (regression over individuals; preferences 
measured on a 7-point scale, with 7 = very positive) 
1984 1985 
INDIRECT 1 DIRECT 2 INDIRECT 1 DIRECT 2 
VARIABLES 
Regr. 
coeff. 
Beta Regr. 
coeff. 
Beta Regr. 
coeff. 
Beta Regr. 
coeff. 
Beta 
Constant .182 .215 .158 .160 
1. COOPa 
2. Company1" 
3. Company*COOP 
-.490 
-.684 
2.151 
-.148 
-.219 
.473 
-.632 
-.686 
2.191 
-.191 
-.220 
.482 
-.850 
-.456 
2.603 
-.218 
-.136 
.399 
-.914 
-.422 
2.439 
-.234 
-.126 
.372 
4. IMEA/DMEA 
5. ISTA/RISK 
.222 
-.122 
.330 
-.128 
.100 
-.010 
.188 
-.260 
.124 
-.117 
.189 
-.182 
.143 
-.004 
.224 
-.101 
R 2 
St. error 
N 
.234 
1.35 
951 
.207 
1.38 
951 
.140 
1.47 
292 
.157 
1.46 
292 
Partial correlation 
r(Pref, IMEA/DMEA) 
r(Pref,ISTA/RISK) 
.349 
-.143 
.186 
-.257 
.177 
-.171 
.233 
-.108 
History of R2 
R 2 (vars. 1,2,3) 
R 2 (vars. 1,2,3,4) 
R 2 (vars. 1,2,3,4,5) 
F-change (var. 5) 
.118 
.218 
.234 
19.6 
.118 
.141 
.207 
78.5 
.103 
.114 
.140 
8.5 
.103 
.147 
.157 
3.4 
Indirect model includes IMEA and ISTA (see 7.11) 
Direct model includes DMEA and RISK (see 7.10) 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the marketing strategy implies a cooperative company, coded 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable coded 1 in case of a cooperative farmer, coded 0 in case of a private farmer. 
In accordance with the finding that the expected utility model outperforms the 
expected value model, in all four models fitted here, price risk significantly in-
fluences preferences. The coefficients of ISTA and RISK are in the hypothesized 
direction and significantly different from zero. In three instances, however, the 
increases in fit due to price risk are not particularly large. The fairly large con-
tribution of RISK to the direct model of 1984 is an exception in this respect. 
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When comparing the predictive validity of the direct and indirect model, incon-
sistent results show up between both years. R 2 of the indirect measurement model 
is larger than the direct measurement in 1984 as hypothesized (0.234 compared to 
0.207). The reverse, however, is shown in 1985 (0.140 compared to 0.157). In 
1984, the difference in predictive validity is significant (z = 1.36, p < 0.08, one-
tailed), in 1985 the difference is not significant (z = -0.60). (It should be noted 
that in 1985 only a subset of the respondents was included in the analysis, which 
might influence the results). 
Furthermore, the contribution of the mean price respectively price risk in pre-
dicting preference is different in both years (see the partial correlations and 
changes in R-square). In the indirect model of 1984 IMEA is more important 
than ISTA, whereas RISK is most important in the direct model (RISK con-
tributes 6.6% in variance whereas ISTA contributes only 1.6%). In contrast, IMEA 
and ISTA are equally important in the indirect model in 1985, whereas now 
DMEA provides the largest contribution to the direct model and RISK hardly 
correlates, although significantly (p < .03), with preference. These differences 
between the two years prevent generalizations about the contributions of the two 
components. 
Since differences in fit between the models are small in both years, it seems 
most appropriate to conclude that predictive validity does not differ between 
both measurement techniques. It is therefore concluded that from the viewpoint 
of explaining preference, measuring subjective probability distributions does not 
seem worth the trouble. In this study, very simple direct techniques explain 
preferences equally well and should therefore be preferred. 
It can be concluded further that in explaining preferences, price risk does con-
tribute significantly in the hypothesized direction but this contribution is fairly 
small. These findings confirm the conclusions in the former section: price risk 
does indeed influence preferences but this influence is not substantial. 
7.4 Relationship between the characteristics of a farmer and his preference 
for a marketing strategy 
Farmers differ in their evaluation of marketing strategies. The same marketing 
strategy can be evaluated very positively by some farmers, and very negatively 
by other farmers. The question is whether there are variables describing farmers 
that can explain these differences. Such an analysis provides information about 
who likes or dislikes a particular marketing strategy and thus can be beneficial in 
decisions concerning e.g. market segmentation or product positioning. 
Selection of variables 
A number of characteristics of farmers are available in this study that can be 
expected to show a relationship with the preference for a marketing strategy. The 
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most interesting variable in this respect is the risk attitude of a farmer measured 
by the lottery technique. For example, in Chapter 5 it was concluded that selling 
100% at spot market prices (Strategies 4 and 6) were perceived as very risky 
strategies, whereas e.g. the 100% fixed-price contract was considered low in price 
risk. It is thus expected that highly risk averse farmers will evaluate Strategy 3 
more positively and Strategies 4 and 6 more negatively than moderately risk 
averse farmers. 
A second important variable is the type of wholesale company the farmer 
actually deals with. Already in Section 7.2 significant differences in preference 
showed up between cooperative and private farmers. Other variables for which 
the relationship with preferences will be analysed are the level of education of 
the farmer, his age, the region his lives in and his ancestors region of descent. 
Two situational factors that might influence preferences are the percentage of 
arable land the farmer allocates to ware potatoes (the cultivation intensity) and his 
usual moment of delivery. It is hypothesized that a farmer with a high intensity 
of potatoes, whose income is therefore very much dependent upon the results 
obtained with potatoes, will prefer relatively safe marketing strategies. The 
moment of delivery is expected to influence particularly the preferences for 
pooling and spot market strategies. If a farmer, because of the quality of his 
storage facilities, has to deliver early in the selling season, say before January, he 
has not much flexibility in timing his spot market sales. For example, in case of 
low prices early in the season he has no opportunity to wait and see if it gets 
better. Or, if he wants to reduce risk by spreading his sales, then he has a very 
limited time interval to do so. In these cases pooling is an ideal strategy because, 
although the farmer delivers early in the season, the price he receives for his 
potatoes is the average price calculated over sales which are spread out over the 
total selling season. We therefore expect that farmers delivering early in the 
season will evaluate pooling strategies more positively and spot market strategies 
more negatively than farmers who deliver towards the end of the season. 
Method of analysis 
The analysis is conducted per marketing strategy by means of regression analysis. 
That is, the preference rating (centered per individual) of a particular strategy is 
the dependent variable and the characteristics of farmers and their farming situa-
tion are taken as independent variables. Since preference ratings are available for 
13 strategies in 1984 and 18 strategies in 1985, a total of 31 regression analyses is 
performed. In each regression a series of specifications were checked in order to 
arrive at a final model. 
All independent variables, including the interval scaled variables like age and 
risk attitude, are recoded into one or more dummy variables. This is done 
because it increases the flexibility of the model since also non-linear relationships 
between independent and dependent variables can be handled. For example, a 
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parabolic relationship between age and preference exists in case middle aged 
farmers prefer a particular strategy more than do both young and old farmers. 
Secondly, the use of dummy variables somewhat simplifies the interpretation of 
effects. All interval scaled variables are coded into two dummy variables so that 
three levels of the variables are distinguished. With respect to risk attitude the 
farmers are classified into three classes (low, medium and high risk averse) in 
such a way that the classes contain respectively 25%, 50% and 25% of the 
farmers. 
In all regressions the first order interaction effects between the independent 
variables have been checked. Only a few of these interactions appeared to be 
significant. 
Results concerning the relationship between farmer characteristics and preference 
In Table 7.10 the results of the regression analyses per marketing strategy are 
shown. The presentation and discussion here is limited to the 13 strategies of 
1984 since the pattern of effects in 1985 turned out to be fairly comparable to 
that in 1984. In Table 7.10 the regression coefficients of only the significant 
variables are presented (p < 0.05, one tailed). For ease of presentation no t-values 
are given. However, when one is interested in the importance of effects, the rank 
order of the coefficients is similar to the rank order of t-values. 
To illustrate the interpretation of the results in the table, here the findings 
with respect to marketing Strategies 1 and 4 will be discussed elaborately. 
Five variables are significantly related to the preference rating of 100% pooling 
at a cooperative company (Strategy 1). These variables are: the type of wholesale 
company the farmer deals with, the moment of delivery, the region, the age and 
the level of education of the farmer. The regression coefficients in Table 7.10 
show that cooperative farmers rate this strategy on average 2.08 higher than do 
private farmers. This is a substantial difference on the 7-point rating scale. As 
hypothesized, farmers who have to deliver early in the selling season (September 
to December) evaluate the 100% pooling more positively than farmers delivering 
late in May to July (a difference of 1.06). Also, farmers who deliver in January-
March are on average more positive than farmers delivering late in May to July 
(a difference of 0.57). 
Two regions are differentiated: the older polder (NOP) and the new one (OF) 
(see Chapter 2). It turns out that farmers living in the NOP-polder are on average 
less fond of 100% pooling at a cooperative company than farmers living in the 
OF-polder (a difference of 0.83). With respect to age it turns out that old farmers 
(> 50) evaluate 100% pooling more positively than farmers younger than 50. 
Finally, medium and highly educated farmers evaluate the strategy more posi-
tively than lowly educated farmers. For both age and level of education no dif-
ferences show up between, respectively, young and middle aged farmers or 
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between highly and medium educated farmers. Taken all variables together the 
R 2 is 0.46 which is fairly high and the highest of all strategies. 
The preference for 100% spot market, selling at one moment (Strategy 4) is sig-
nificantly related to four variables: the type of wholesale company the farmer 
deals with, the moment of delivery, the region the farmer lives in and the risk 
attitude of the farmer. It turns out that private farmers, farmers delivering late in 
the season and farmers in the NOP are more fond of this strategy. 
Preference 
O • » v cooperative farmers 
private farmers 
i i i 1 
low medium high 
degree of risk aversion 
Figure 7.2 Effect of risk attitude on preference for 100% spot market strategy, 
shown separately for cooperative and private farmers. 
The total effect of risk attitude on preference is a combination of variables 
'Averse-medium', 'Averse-high' and the interaction of risk attitude and type of 
wholesale company (Comp*Averse-medium). Figure 7.2 shows the combined 
effect of these variables. The effect of risk attitude on preference is profound: 
both types of farmers evaluate 100% spot market more negatively when they are 
more risk averse. Overall, private farmers evaluate 100% spot market more posi-
tively than do cooperative farmers, except highly risk averse private farmers. In 
contrast with private farmers, for cooperative farmers no difference in evaluation 
exists between medium and highly risk averse farmers (this is implied in the 
positive interaction effect of Comp*Averse-medium). The R 2 of the regression is 
0.21 which is substantially lower than the R 2 of the 100% pooling strategy. 
In the same manner the results with respect to the other strategies could be 
described using Table 7.10. We will not perform this description, but alternatively 
discuss a number of findings per variable over strategies. 
Firstly, consider the effect of risk attitude on preferences (see Table 7.10). 
Clear and large effects of risk attitude show up with three marketing strategies: 
the 100% fixed-price strategy (Strategy 3) and both 100% spot market strategies 
(Strategies 4 and 6). The effects show up in the expected direction. With the 
fixed-price contract more risk aversion induces a higher preference; with the 
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100% spot market strategies more risk aversion induces a lower preference. From 
the viewpoint of amount of price risk these strategies are most extreme: the 
fixed-price is perceived as least risky and 100% spot market as most risky.4 
Apparently, the preference for the strategies which are extreme in price risk 
(either with very small or with very large risk), is clearly influenced by the risk 
attitude, whereas the risk attitude does not influence preferences for strategies 
which are mediocre in price risk. The risk attitude is not particularly relevant in 
inducing differences in preference between the strategies which are mediocre in 
price risk, probably because farmers perceive only minor differences in expected 
price and price risk for these strategies. 
It should be noted here that in 1985 an effect of risk attitude is only present 
for two marketing strategies, namely Strategies 3 and 13. No significant effect of 
risk attitude shows up with respect to the 100% spot market strategies. 
Secondly, with respect to the effect of moment of delivery the following can be 
concluded (see Table 7.10). The clearest effects show up for the 100% pooling 
strategies (Strategies 1 and 5). Farmers who, due to the quality of their storage 
facilities, have to deliver early in the season, show a high preference for 100% 
pooling strategies. This effect is in the hypothesized direction: the opportunity of 
delivering (and selling) later in the season invokes a lower preference for these 
100% pooling strategies. Also bottom-price and fixed-price contracts (Strategies 
2, 3 and 13) are evaluated more positively by farmers who deliver early in the 
season. In 1985 comparable results were found. 
For the remaining marketing strategies which all imply selling all or a part of 
the harvest at the spot market, the preference of farmers delivering later in the 
season is more positive than the preference of farmers delivering early in the 
season. This effect is found in both years although in 1985 the effect of moment 
of delivery is quite large only for Strategy 4 (100% spot market selling at one 
moment). It should be noted that most often only a difference exists between 
delivering in September-December and delivering in May-July. Few effects are 
found between delivering in January-March compared to May-July. 
To summarize the findings with respect to moment of delivery: pooling, 
bottom-price and fixed-price contracts are especially attractive to farmers very 
limited in their selling opportunities at spot market prices, namely farmers who 
have to deliver in September-December. Farmers delivering later in the season 
are more attracted to the spot market. Therefore it is concluded that the moment 
of delivery does have a significant effect in the hypothesized direction. The 
internal validity of the preference measurement is enhanced by this finding. 
The effect of type of wholesale company is clearly shown in Table 7.10. The 
effects of this variable, however, were already discussed elaborately in 
Section 7.2 and will not be repeated here. 
Very risk averse farmers also evaluate Strategy 13 more positively. This strategy is perceived as the 
second least risky strategy. 
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Table 7.10 Relationship between preference and characteristics of a farmer 
obtained by regression analysis per strategy (regression coefficients; 
p < .05, one-tailed); high score = very positive) 
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With respect to the other variables some isolated effects show up. The most im-
portant results are discussed. Most often the region shows an effect. Effects are 
present especially for 100% pooling and 100% spot market selling at one moment 
(Strategies 1, 4 and 5). Farmers living in the NOP-polder are less enthusiastic 
about the 100% pooling strategies than farmers from the OF-polder, whereas the 
OF-farmers prefer 100% spot market selling less than the NOP-farmers. The 
actual choice behavior of farmers confirms these preferences (Smidts 1985). For 
example, in 1983 41% of the farmers in the NOP sold more than 85% of their 
harvest at spot market prices, whereas only 16% of the farmers in the OF-polder 
did so. In contrast, only 18% of the farmers in the NOP sold all or part of their 
harvest by means of pooling, whereas in the OF-polder 58% of the farmers chose 
pooling. 
Explanations for these effects of region on preferences are hard to give. Since 
differences in e.g. risk attitude, age, level of education, potato cultivation inten-
sity between the polders are controlled for, these variables cannot explain the 
difference in preference. One might speculate that, since contract forms like 
pooling are fairly new, farmers living in the older polder (NOP) are more 
habituated to the more traditional spot market selling. Consequently, the adoption 
of marketing strategies other than spot market selling could be slow. Farmers 
living in the newer polder (OF) perhaps required less risky marketing strategies 
when they settled in the polder and started their farming. At that time contract 
forms like pooling were available. Also, the private wholesale companies in the 
NOP might be relatively less active in introducing and promoting e.g. pooling 
contracts than the wholesale companies in the newer polder. The wholesale com-
panies in the NOP are more used to spot market selling, too. 
Potato cultivation intensity, age and level of education show significant effects 
on preference for some marketing strategies. For example, age and level of edu-
cation influence preferences for the 100% pooling strategy (Strategy 1). These 
effects were already discussed above. Overall, however, the effects of these 
variables are fairly small and not very consistent over strategies. These variables 
are therefore fairly unimportant in explaining differences in preference. 
The percentage of variance in preference ratings explained by the characteris-
tics of farmers are highest for the three strategies implying selling to a coopera-
tive company. The R-squares in 1984 of these strategies are 0.46 (Strategy 1), 
0.30 (Strategy 5) and 0.27 (Strategy 11). In 1985 these figures are 0.42, 0.26 and 
0.26 respectively. Also the R-squares of Strategies 4 and 5 are above average. 
This means that the characteristics of farmers are most useful in guiding market 
segmentation for these three to five strategies. 
To summarize, the analysis of the relationship between background characteristics 
and preferences for marketing strategies showed important effects in the 
hypothesized direction of: the risk attitude of the farmer, the type of wholesale 
company the farmer deals with, the moment of delivery and the region. Small 
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and isolated effects were found for variables like age and level of education of 
the farmer. Effects of risk attitude most clearly showed up with strategies which 
are extreme in price risk, namely the fixed-price contract and 100% spot market 
sales. For strategies with an intermediate level of price risk no effects of risk 
attitude showed up. 
7.5 Summary and conclusions 
The main finding in this chapter concerns the confirmation of the hypothesized 
model of preference formation. The results indicate that preference for a mar-
keting strategy is dependent upon two attributes: the probability distribution of 
price farmers associate with a marketing strategy and the type of wholesale com-
pany used in the strategy. 
Furthermore, it was shown that taking the whole subjective probability of 
price into account in accordance with the expected utility model yields a 
significantly higher predictive validity than taking solely the expected value of 
the probability distribution of price into account. Stated differently, price risk of 
a strategy and risk attitude of a farmer influence the preference for a marketing 
strategy. Price risk and risk attitude are relevant for explaining farmers' 
preferences for marketing strategies and for improving predictive validity. The 
results mentioned are consistent over the years. Although the predictive validity 
of the preference formation model is lower in 1985 compared to 1984, in both 
years the expected utility model shows a higher predictive validity than the ex-
pected value model. 
A further finding concerns the relative insensitivity of the preference order 
predicted by the expected utility model to the degree of risk aversion. The 
assumption of a 10% larger or 10% smaller parameter in the utility function than 
the one assessed by means of the lottery technique did not affect the order of 
strategies. Also, assuming a large parameter for all farmers, implying very risk 
averse decision makers only affected the preference order to a small degree. For 
some farmers predictive validity improved, for others it decreased. Overall, the 
predictive validity of the model did not significantly improve. On the contrary, 
indications were found that the risk attitude assessed by means of lotteries per-
formed somewhat better than assuming the same extreme risk averse risk attitude 
for all farmers. 
With respect to the effect of the marketing channel it was found that the 
influence of the type of wholesale company on preference is mediated by the 
farmer's actual choice of type of wholesale company. That is, farmers actually 
dealing with a private wholesale company prefer, on average, the marketing 
strategies supplied by a private company to strategies supplied by a cooperative 
company, irrespective of the strategy's probability distribution of price. In a 
similar vein, this result applies to farmers actually dealing with a cooperative 
company. This finding hints towards a two-stage decision process: in the first 
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stage, the farmer chooses the type of wholesale company and in the second stage 
the farmer ranks marketing strategies on the basis of the attribute price. 
In this study we found that the difference in predictive validity between the 
expected utility and expected value model, although significant, is relatively 
small. One can speculate why this is the case here. The main reason for the small 
difference between the models and also for the insensitivity of predictive validity 
to the magnitude of the risk aversion coefficient in the utility function, should 
be sought in the farmers' price perception. 
In Chapter 5, the analysis of perception showed a high percentage of pairwise 
second degree of stochastic dominance between the strategies. This implies that a 
concave utility function suffices for ranking the strategies. The magnitude of the 
risk aversion coefficient is not important in those cases. Analyses of the sub-
jective probability distributions showed that for about 50% of the farmers a 
negative correlation, computed on the individual level, is found between the 
expected value and the standard deviation of a strategy. A negative correlation 
will result in dominance between strategies. In cases of dominance between the 
strategies, the rank order of strategies predicted by the expected utility model 
will be equal to that predicted by the expected value model. 
Considering these findings with respect to price perception, it is even more 
noteworthy to find that the expected utility model performs significantly better 
than the expected value model in both years. A data set with less stochastic 
dominance would most likely have yielded a larger difference in fit between the 
models. 
A second topic that has been dealt with in this chapter concerns the difference in 
predictive validity between the utility function (risk attitude) and value function 
(strength of preference). It was hypothesized that the utility function assessed by 
means of the lottery technique would perform better than a value function 
assessed by means of riskless techniques, i.e. the midvalue splitting and rating 
technique. 
This hypothesis was only partly confirmed: no significant difference in pre-
dictive validity showed up between the lottery and midvalue splitting technique 
but both these techniques performed better than the rating technique. Firstly, this 
result confirms the findings in Chapter 6 concerning the validity of the rating 
technique. In that chapter the rating technique was judged less reliable and valid 
in assessing evaluation functions than both the lottery and midvalue splitting 
technique. In this chapter the predictive validity of the rating technique is shown 
to be inferior, too. Secondly, this result confirms once more that in this study the 
predictive validity is fairly insensitive to the magnitude of the parameter in the 
evaluation function. For both the lottery and the midvalue splitting technique this 
evaluation function concerns a negative exponential function. In Chapter 6 the 
parameter of this function was proven to differ significantly between the tech-
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niques. The high degree of stochastic dominant subjective probability distribu-
tions, however, prevents a proper testing of the difference in predictive validity 
of the lottery and midvalue splitting technique. The issue of the difference in 
predictive validity between risk attitude and strength of preference therefore, can 
therefore not be resolved with the data set in this study. 
A further conclusion that can be drawn from the results concerns the recom-
mendation of the lottery technique in assessing evaluation functions. Firstly, in 
Chapter 6 our judgment of the lottery technique was more positive than that of 
the midvalue splitting technique. Secondly, the predictive validity of the lottery 
technique is at the least equal to that of the midvalue splitting technique. We 
would therefore prefer to use the lottery technique in studies in which, for 
whatever reason, only one assessment technique can be applied. Of course, the 
general recommendation is to apply more than one assessment technique when-
ever possible. In the latter case the midvalue splitting technique should be con-
sidered the next best alternative after the lottery technique. The rating technique 
is considered the least appropriate technique in assessing evaluation functions. 
A third issue concerned the predictive validity of a pragmatic model. In this 
model, mean price (expected value) and price risk are combined in a linear addi-
tive manner. Two versions of this model have been compared. The direct 
measurement version utilizes perceptions of mean price and price risk obtained 
with simple and quick direct questioning techniques. The indirect version uses 
expected value and standard deviation which are drawn from the elicited sub-
jective probability distributions. This indirect version thus necessitates much 
more elaborate measurements than the direct version. In order to be worth this 
extra effort the predictive validity of this indirect model should be higher. 
Firstly, it is found that in both versions, both mean price and price risk sig-
nificantly influence preferences for marketing strategies. The statistically signi-
ficant effect of price risk is in agreement with the finding that the expected 
utility model outperforms the expected value model. Secondly, the findings indi-
cate that the indirect and direct model perform more or less equally well with 
respect to predictive validity. From a pragmatic point of view therefore the 
straightforward direct measurements should be preferred to eliciting subjective 
probability distributions. These direct measurements are much easier and less 
time-consuming on the part of both the respondent and analyst. In case decisions 
under risk of a large number of decision makers e.g. if consumers are modeled, 
such a pragmatic approach seems appropriate considering the findings in this 
study. 
However, before definite conclusions can be drawn in this respect, more 
studies are certainly needed in which explicit comparisons are made between the 
sophisticated expected utility model and naive or pragmatic preference formation 
models to confirm or refute the findings in this study. Of course, in case predic-
tive validity is not the sole goal of an analysis, the expected utility model is 
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much more appropriate to describe and model the decision making process than 
some pragmatic model. 
Finally, the analysis of the relationship between the preference for a marketing 
strategy and the characteristics of farmers and their farming situation yielded 
interesting results. The most important variables affecting preferences are: the 
farmer's risk attitude, the type of wholesale company he deals with, his usual 
moment of delivery and the region he lives in. 
The effects of risk attitude are in the expected direction and were shown to be 
most influential if strategies with an extreme price risk were concerned. That is, 
both for strategies with very small price risks and for strategies with large price 
risks, the risk attitude is clearly related to the farmers' preferences. Effects of 
e.g. the farmer's age and level of education were small and valid for only some 
strategies. 
The relationship between the characteristics and the preferences was strongest 
with respect to pooling at a cooperative company and in case of selling the total 
harvest at spot market prices. For these strategies the farmers' characteristics 
yield most information for marketing decisions to be made by wholesale compa-
nies. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study is concerned with decision making under risk. The three main objec-
tives of the study are: a) to review and discuss a number of theoretical notions on 
individual decision making under risk; much attention is specifically given to the 
definition and empirical testing of the concept of relative risk attitude, b) to in-
vestigate in a large scale survey research the validity, reliability and practical 
feasibility of measurement procedures for measuring subjective probability dis-
tributions, risk attitude and strength of preference, and c) to develop and test 
empirically a model which describes the farmer's decision making process with 
respect to the choice of a marketing strategy for ware potatoes. 
The theoretical and methodological issues in this study are analyzed in the 
context of a fanner's choice of a marketing strategy. A field study was conducted 
in which a large number of farmers (250) were interviewed three times in two 
consecutive years. The test-retest design of the study not only enables an analysis 
of the stability of the measured concepts but also provides insight into whether 
findings and conclusions in the first year of measurement can be replicated in the 
second year. In total, the data collected per farmer amount to about four hours of 
interviewing time. The response percentages in the three consecutive surveys and 
the respondents' motivation were high. 
In the following three sections the major findings of the study will be pre-
sented and the main conclusions will be drawn. This chapter is structured in 
accordance with the three objectives of the study. Findings concerning each 
objective which are spread over several chapters of this book, will be brought 
together here in separate sections. The implications of the findings for studying 
decision making under risk are dealt with and with respect to each issue some 
suggestions for further research will be given. 
8.1 Findings and conclusions with respect to the theoretical issues 
Three general fields of study of risky decision making can be distinguished: 
utility theory, behavioral decision theory and decision analysis. We characterize 
the utility theory approach as 'normative, theoretical'. The focus in this approach 
is on how a decision maker should choose between risky alternatives and on 
deriving theoretically optimal solutions for individual and market behavior. The 
behavioral decision theory approach is characterized as 'descriptive, empirical'. In 
this field of inquiry the focus is on how decision makers arrive at their judg-
ments and decisions, and on providing explanations for the deviations of those 
judgments and decisions from the rational models developed in utility theory. 
Much empirical, especially experimental research is conducted. 
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The third field, decision analysis tries to reconcile the efforts of the afore-
mentioned approaches. We characterize this field as 'normative, empirical'. The 
main objective of decision analysis is to structure a decision problem and to 
select the (normatively) best alternative, given the decision maker's risk percep-
tions and risk attitude. Much attention is therefore paid to the procedures of the 
measurement of risk perceptions and risk attitudes. 
In this study, theoretical and methodological notions of all three fields are 
used. Briefly stated, utility theory provides the fundamental normative models for 
analyzing individual decision making. Behavioral decision theory provides infor-
mation on how effectively these models describe individual decision making and 
suggests alternative descriptive models. The methodology used in this study stems 
mainly from decision analysis. 
Expected utility theory 
Two models of the utility theory are extensively discussed: the expected utility 
models of Bernoulli and of von Neumann-Morgenstern. In both models, to choose 
the alternative with the highest expected utility is considered rational (Chapter 3). 
An essential element in the Bernoulli model concerns the strength of preference 
notion. Outcomes are transformed into subjective values by means of the strength 
of the preference function v(x). These subjective values are seen as representing 
intensity of satisfaction. By introducing a decreasing marginal value function 
v(x), Bernoulli is able to explain risk aversion. One problem with his model con-
cerns the question why it would be rational to choose the alternative with the 
maximum expected utility if the function v(x) only represents a decision maker's 
evaluations in riskless conditions? Moreover, why would it be rational to maxi-
mize expected utility? 
The expected utility model of von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) provides a 
solution to these problems. From a small number of compelling axioms they 
prove that, if one abides the axioms, it is rational to maximize expected utility. 
An essential difference between their model and the Bernoulli model concerns 
their utility function u(x), which does not represent strength of preference. U(x) 
describes a decision maker's evaluations in risky conditions since this function is 
measured by means of lotteries. The function u(x) represents the indifference 
probabilities in standard lotteries tickets. As such, it would be better to call u(x) 
a probability indifference function than a utility function. One problem with the 
model is that, since no strength of preference interpretation is given to u(x), the 
von Neumann-Morgenstern theory does not yield an explanation for risk aver-
sion. 
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The relative risk attitude 
The concept of relative risk attitude (also referred to as intrinsic risk attitude) 
has been introduced recently (see e.g. Bell and Raiffa 1982). We see this concept 
as a bridge between the Bernoulli and the von Neumann-Morgenstern model. The 
relative risk attitude model states that u(x) is a confounded measure of a decision 
maker's strength of preference and his 'true' risk attitude. In the model, the out-
comes x are transformed into subjective values by means of the strength of 
preference function v(x). Subsequently, these subjective values are evaluated 
under risk to yield the utility function u(x). The relationship between the u(x) 
and v(x) function is called the relative risk attitude: u(x) = g(v(x)). Only if u(x) 
and v(x) are linearly related (u(x) = a + b v(x); b > ), the models of Bernoulli and 
von Neumann-Morgenstern coincide. In this case, the decision maker is said to be 
relatively risk neutral. In case of a non-linear relationship between u(x) and v(x), 
the decision maker is said to be relatively risk averse (if the transformation 
function g is concave) or relatively risk seeking (g is convex). Risk aversion is 
thus seen as the effect of decreasing marginal value plus the aversion against the 
dispersion in subjective values. 
Several authors, e.g. Bell and Raiffa (1982) and Sinn (1983), hypothesize that 
the transformation of v(x) into u(x) is governed by a negative exponential func-
tion. This function implies a constant absolute as well as an increasing propor-
tional relative risk attitude on the part of the decision maker. 
The main advantage of the concept of relative risk attitude is that a superior 
descriptive measure of the 'true' risk attitude of the decision maker is obtained. 
This relative risk attitude is considered less dependent upon the attribute under 
consideration or upon the specific decision context than the traditional indicator 
of risk attitude (i.e. the function u(x)). 
Another advantage is especially relevant for modeling (multiattribute) decision 
making under risk of a large number of decision makers, e.g. consumers. If 
indeed a negative exponential function links v(x) to u(x) and if the parameter in 
this function does not depend upon the attribute, it would be fairly easy to 
transform a multiattribute value function, describing decision making under cer-
tainty, into a multiattribute utility function, describing decision making under 
risk. Only a small number of extra assessments would suffice. Since multiattribute 
value functions can be measured more easily than multiattribute utility functions, 
this would greatly simplify modeling decision making under risk. 
The concept of relative risk attitude is not generally accepted, though. A 
number of authors state that v(x) and u(x) are one and the same function (i.e. a 
linear relationship). One group of critics defines axioms or conditions which 
imply a linear relationship between u(x) and v(x) For example, if strength of 
preference is assumed to exist for lotteries, the equivalence of the functions can 
be shown (Sarin 1982). The axiom of cardinal isovariance of Allais (1979) also 
leads to this result. Another group of critics, e.g. von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
(1986), claim that differences between the functions are entirely the result of 
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method variance. Different assessment methods systematically result in dif-
ferences between u(x) and v(x). As a result respondents should be urged to 
resolve these inconsistencies in assessment between the methods. In the view of 
both groups, decreasing marginal value is the sole reason for risk aversion. The 
standpoint of these authors, of course, implies that modeling (multiattribute) 
decision making under risk is even more simplified, since in their view a 
(multiattribute) value function can be used directly for decision making under 
risk. 
A review of the literature shows that empirical research into the differences 
between u(x) and v(x) is rare. Furthermore, the results of these studies are in-
conclusive. In some studies method variance is found to be so large that this 
variance blurs possible true differences between the functions. Others only find 
marginal differences between the functions, whereas e.g. Krzystofowicz (1983a,b) 
discovered significant differences between both functions and a confirmation of 
the hypothesis of a negative exponential relationship. 
In this study, the concept of relative risk attitude is tested empirically. Our study 
differs in this matter from other empirical studies in several respects. It concerns 
a) decision makers confronted with their own decision problem instead of hypo-
thetical decision contexts, b) a large number of decision makers was included in 
the study in comparison with the small number of subjects in other studies, and 
c) for the first time, the stability of the concept of relative risk attitude has been 
analyzed and the relationship between background characteristics of the decision 
maker and relative risk attitude has been assessed. 
In our study the relationship between u(x) and v(x) was assessed per respon-
dent. The results clearly indicate that the hypothesis of a relative risk attitude 
cannot be dismissed. In both years, a significant difference was found between 
the strength of preference and the utility function (for the method of testing 
applied, see Section 6.7). Moreover, the relationship between u(x) and v(x) was 
described better by the hypothesized negative exponential function than by either 
the linear or the power function. This finding implies that the respondents 
exhibit a constant absolute and an increasing proportional relative risk attitude. 
As a group, the respondents exhibit a slight tendency towards relatively risk 
seeking behavior. Whereas in 1984 the percentage of relatively risk averse res-
pondents almost matched the percentage of relatively risk seeking respondents, 
the tendency towards relatively risk seeking in 1985 was larger than in 1984. In 
1985 about 75% of the respondents can be classified as relatively risk seeking. 
This shift towards more respondents with relative risk seeking attitudes in 1985 is 
entirely due to a temporal shift in u(x). The strength of preference function v(x) 
did not shift significantly between the years. Consequently, the gap between the 
functions widened (for further results see Sections 6.7, 6.9 and 8.3). 
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The stability of the relative risk attitude is low and not statistically significant 
due to the significant shift in u(x). It was expected that the relative risk attitude 
would be a stable characteristic of the decision maker. In that case a shift of the 
utility function would coincide with a shift of strength of preference function. 
The results in our study do not confirm this hypothesis. 
No clear relationships were detected between the relative risk attitude and 
personal or situational variables (see also Section 8.3). 
From the significant difference between u(x) and v(x) it can be concluded that, 
in general, the introduction of risk into the decision making process induces 
decision makers to choose differently. Consequently, a preference formation 
model which incorporates u(x) should have a higher predictive validity for risky 
choices than a model which contains v(x). This hypothesis was tested with respect 
to the farmers' preferences for marketing strategies. 
The hypothesis was not confirmed in this study. No significant difference in 
predictive validity could be detected between the models, although in 1985 the 
model incorporating u(x) performed somewhat better than the model incorpo-
rating v(x) (Section 7.3.2). The main reason for not finding a difference between 
the models is the high percentage of second degree of stochastic dominant sub-
jective probability distributions in our data set. This precludes a proper testing of 
the models. The issue of the difference in predictive validity between a utility 
and a strength of preference function, therefore cannot be resolved with the data 
set in this study. 
The empirical confirmation of the concept of relative risk attitude in this study 
indicates that it constitutes a proper link between the Bernoulli and the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern model. By means of the concept more insight is gained 
into the meaning of risk aversion. This study found that the difference between 
u(x) and v(x) is not merely a method effect. Our empirical research demonstrates 
a fundamental difference between preferences under certainty and under risk. 
An implication of our results is that primarily for theoretical reasons, both 
risky and riskless techniques are required in assessing a decision maker's risk 
attitude. It is advised to apply at least one risky and one riskless technique rou-
tinely when studying decision making under risk. This refers especially to basic 
research in decision making under risk but we would recommend this procedure 
for applied research too. Moreover, even when decisions are modeled under cer-
tainty, e.g. in consumer research, it should be standard practice to use risky 
measurement procedures next to riskless techniques. For example, in conjoint 
measurement not only rank order or ratings of profiles should be obtained but 
also a number of probability indifference judgments (see e.g. Currim and Sarin 
(1983) for an example of a procedure for assessing probability judgments for job 
descriptions). In this way, much empirical evidence would be obtained concerning 
differences between strength of preference and utility functions and more insight 
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would be obtained into the effect of risk on decision making. The concept of 
relative risk attitude provides an interesting agenda for research, particularly with 
respect to consumer decision making. This concept could be seen as a stimulation 
of the use of sophisticated models in consumer decision making under risk 
replacing the 'old' perceived risk approach. 
More research is certainly needed to confirm and further expand our results. In 
particular, it would be interesting to study whether the negative exponential 
function describes the relationship between u(x) and v(x) well, irrespective of the 
attribute or the specific decision context. Also, models under certainty should be 
compared explicitly to models under risk as regards to predictive validity. 
Research into these topics could turn out to be very beneficial for modeling 
(multiattribute) decision making under risk. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to investigate further whether the relative risk 
attitude is a more stable characteristic of a decision maker than the conventional 
measurement of risk attitude. In this study this hypothesis was not confirmed. 
Our results indicate a weakness of the concept namely that it can be assessed only 
indirectly via u(x) and v(x). Measurement error and changes in true score of both 
these sources therefore enters into the measurement of the relative risk attitude. 
A priori chances of finding differences between subsequent assessments of a 
decision maker's relative risk attitude are therefore fairly large. 
The subjective expected utility model and alternative models 
The subjective expected utility model of von Neumann-Morgenstern (the SEU-
model) is essentially a normative model. It prescribes how a decision maker 
should choose given his risk perceptions and risk attitude. A review of the lite-
rature shows that as a descriptive model, it has received a lot of criticism. A host 
of mainly experimental psychological studies indicate that decision tasks can be 
designed in which decisions deviate systematically from the prescribed decisions. 
A review is given of the most important violations of the SEU-model. 
The deviation from the normative model stimulated the development of a large 
number of alternative descriptive models which may account for the deficiencies 
of the SEU-model. The majority of these models originate from utility theory 
and are fairly formal. In these models, typically, one or more axioms of the 
original theory are weakened or replaced by some other assumption. This often 
implies that the utility of an outcome is made dependent upon the probability 
distribution, upon other feasible outcomes, or both. 
In behavioral decision theory an important alternative descriptive model is 
developed, too. It concerns Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) which 
incorporates as compactly as possible recent insights into the way decision makers 
deal with risky choices. The model is built on the basis of experiments on deci-
sion making under risk. As such, it can explain most of the deviations from the 
normative model. An essential element in the model is the hypothesis of a con-
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vex/concave strength of preference function which is defined on gains and losses 
with respect to a reference point. Another important element is the decision 
weight function which transforms subjective probabilities into decision weights. 
We noted that the decision weight function can be seen as another way of 
proposing the relative risk attitude. The hypothesized general underweighting of 
probabilities then leads to the hypothesis of, in general, relatively risk averse 
decision makers. 
A comparison of the alternative models with the subjective expected utility 
model resulted in the following observations (Section 3.4). It was concluded that 
all these models are essentially expectancy-value models like the expected utility 
model. This means that utilities/values are multiplied by probabilities/decision 
weights and then these components are added up. This implies that any criticism 
on the expectancy-value nature of the expected utility model, is also pertinent to 
the alternative models. Another feature of the alternative models is that extra 
parameters are introduced. Consequently, the models are more complex than the 
expected utility model, more difficult to falsify, and less easily empirically tested. 
Taking into account the difficulties which surround the alternative descriptive 
models, we concluded that within the realm of expectancy-value models, the sub-
jective expected utility model is still the most useful model for analyzing decision 
making under risk, not only for normative purposes but also for descriptive pur-
poses. Until other models are being constructed which will be able to explain and 
predict preferences under risk better than the SEU-model without a substantial 
loss on theoretical and operational tractability, the SEU-model is still a worth-
while bench-mark model and frame of reference for studying decision making 
under risk. Consequently, the expected utility model is chosen for modeling the 
farmer's decision making process in this study. 
The predictive validity of the SEU-model 
In order to test the predictive validity of the SEU-model, this model has been 
applied in this study to the preference formation of marketing strategies (Section 
7.3). The predictive validity of the SEU-model was compared to the subjective 
expected value model (referred to as SEV-model). This latter model can be seen 
as a bench-mark model in which risk neutral decision makers are assumed. 
Analyses were conducted both over individuals and per individual. 
In both years, the SEU-model outperformed the SEV-model in predictive vali-
dity. Apparently, by taking the decision maker's risk attitude into account a 
better explanation of preference is obtained. The increment in fit of the SEU-
model relative to the SEV-model is not particularly large. A lack of reference 
studies makes it difficult to judge the increment in fit, but with the data set in 
this study a linear utility function (i.e. a risk neutral decision maker) predicts 
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preferences almost equally well as a non-linear utility function (assuming a risk 
averse or risk seeking decision maker). 
The most important reason for the finding that the rank ordering of choice 
alternatives is fairly insensitive to the magnitude of the parameter in the utility 
function, is the high percentage of second degree of stochastic dominance 
(referred to as SSD) between pairs of strategies. In 50% of all pairwise compari-
sons SSD existed. This means that for these comparisons the magnitude of the 
parameter in the concave utility function does not affect the preference order of 
the pair of strategies. With such a high percentage of SSD it is not surprising to 
find a fairly small effect of risk attitude on preference. Considering this finding 
with respect to price perception, it is even more noteworthy to find that the 
SEU-model performs significantly better than the SEV-model. A data set with 
less stochastic dominance would most likely have yielded a larger difference in 
fit between the models. 
If the SEU-model is to be utilized, it is necessary to elicit subjective probability 
distributions (spd's). As will be concluded in the next section these elicitations 
are far from easy to both the respondent and the interviewer. An important 
question therefore is whether the predictive validity of a model using the elicited 
spd's is higher than a model using more simple measurements. This question is 
particularly relevant to survey research. 
In order to analyze this topic a 'pragmatic' model of preference formation was 
developed (Section 7.3.3). In this model, mean price (expected value) and price 
risk are combined linear additively. As such, this model is in line with standard 
modeling practices in marketing research. A direct measurement version of this 
model utilizes perceptions of mean price and price risk obtained with the simple 
and quick direct questioning techniques. The indirect version uses the moments 
of the elicited spd's. 
Firstly, it has been found that in both versions, both mean price and price risk 
significantly influence preferences for marketing strategies. This statistically 
significant effect of price risk is in agreement with the finding that the SEU-
model outperforms the SEV-model. 
Secondly, no significant difference is found in predictive validity of the 
models. The indirect and direct model perform equally well. From a pragmatic 
point of view therefore the results suggest that straightforward direct measure-
ments should be preferred to eliciting spd's. These direct measurements are much 
easier and less time consuming on the part of the respondent, the interviewer and 
analyst. In case of e.g. large scale research in which decisions under risk are 
modeled, such a pragmatic approach seems appropriate considering the findings 
in this study. By means of direct scaling techniques an approximation of the 
perception of risky choice alternatives is obtained. Especially, in applied research 
with many respondents and many risky alternatives such an approximation might 
be deemed satisfactory if one accepts to forego a theoretical consistent model of 
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decision making under risk. Of course, in case predictive validity is not the sole 
goal of analysis, the greater richness of the expected utility model may be an 
important reason to choose that model. 
8.2 Findings and conclusions with respect to the methodological issues 
Two observations motivated the elaborate attention given to methodological issues 
in this study. Firstly, the measurement procedures for the elicitation of subjective 
probability distributions and the assessment of risk attitude and strength of 
preference mainly stem from decision analysis. Typically, a decision analysis 
takes place in ideal measurement conditions, such as a small number of decision 
makers who are highly motivated, a substantial amount of time available for the 
interviews, one expert interviewer and so forth. However, the circumstances in a 
survey are much less ideal. The question therefore arises to what extent the tech-
niques of decision analysis are feasible in these survey conditions. 
Secondly, most research on validity and reliability issues is conducted in 
experimental settings, often conducted with students and hypothetical decision 
contexts. In field studies the validity and reliability of the measurement proce-
dures has been studied much less. The field studies concerning decision making 
under risk that have been carried out typically involved a fairly small number of 
respondents, usually applied only one measurement technique in eliciting sub-
jective probability distributions and in the assessment of risk attitudes, and in 
most cases these measurements took place only once with each respondent. 
This study contributes to the insight into validity and reliability of the 
measurement of risk perception and risk attitude in survey conditions. For this 
purpose a multiple indicator approach has been applied in combination with a 
test-retest measurement. Each important concept (risk perception, risk attitude 
and strength of preference) has been operationalized in two ways and each 
respondent was interviewed twice with a year in-between. Furthermore, a large 
number of respondents was interviewed, enabling more statistical analyses to be 
made like for example causal modeling. 
First, major findings and conclusions with respect to risk perception measure-
ment are given, followed by a discussion of the results of risk attitude and 
strength of preference measurement. 
Risk perception measurement 
The task of eliciting subjective probability distributions was reviewed extensively 
(Section 5.2). A general assertion is that probability encoding is a difficult task 
and involves many errors. In order to clarify the discussion on the difficulties in 
probability encoding, a distinction has been made between biases and distortions. 
Biases refer to the systematic or random errors introduced by the elicitation tech-
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nique; a difference is created between the subject's responses and his 'true' 
probability distribution. Distortions refer to a difference between a subject's true 
probability distribution (his perception) and an objective probability e.g. a rela-
tive frequency. Examples of distortions are: the gambler's fallacy, conservatism, 
ignoring regression towards the mean effects, etc. The distinction between biases 
and distortions makes it clear that many of the judgment errors in probability 
assessment pertain to distortions and do not necessarily refer to errors introduced 
by the elicitation technique. 
In this study, the process of how respondents form their judgments and the 
possible distortions involved in this process were not studied. The attention is 
focused on measuring the probability judgments with a minimal bias. Important 
means to this end are: a clearly structured and defined decision context, sensi-
tivity to the possible deteriorating effects of the heuristics of anchoring and 
adjustment, availability and representativeness and the extensive training of the 
interviewer. 
A review of the literature indicates general stability and convergent validity of 
the elicitation techniques. However, these conclusions are based mainly on 
experimental studies in laboratory circumstances or in decision analysis and 
mostly concern binary distributions. Few studies exist in which these techniques 
are applied and evaluated with respect to validity and reliability in large scale 
survey research. In fact, trying to elicit several subjective probability distribu-
tions per respondent for a sample of respondents of this size, to our knowledge, 
is rather unique. 
In this study, a representative stimulus set of marketing strategies (13 in 1984 and 
18 in 1985) was created. Ideally, for each marketing strategy a subjective proba-
bility distribution (an spd) of prices associated with the strategy should be 
elicited. To this end, two techniques, the probability wheel and interval tech-
nique, were selected of which the suitability was analyzed in test interviews. The 
probability wheel technique did not work with those respondents. The respon-
dents, however, felt comfortable with the interval technique. This technique was 
therefore chosen in the final study. In the interval technique percentiles of the 
cumulative probability distribution are elicited. 
The test interviews, however, indicated that the elicitation of spd's takes ample 
time and respondents tend to loose interest and motivation when a large number 
of distributions have to be elicited. These constraints necessitated us to limit the 
number of elicited distributions (marketing strategies) to seven per respondent 
taking about 20 to 30 minutes to complete the total task. 
By using the interval technique we elicited five percentiles per distribution. A 
lognormal and a Weibull distribution were fitted to these five data points per in-
dividual and per marketing strategy. The lognormal distribution fitted the elicita-
tions clearly better than the Weibull distribution, in both years of measurement. 
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Insight into the validity of the elicitations was obtained by means of an elaborate 
testing of the internal consistency of the elicited distributions. In this respect, the 
effects on a subject's perception of moment of delivery, the number of selling 
moments at spot market prices and the type of wholesale company were analyzed. 
In both years of measurement, the effects were in the hypothesized direction. 
Further testing showed some systematic interviewer bias. Particularly, the elicita-
tion of the minimum and the maximum of a distribution proved somewhat sensi-
tive to the interviewer. This interviewer effect limits comparisons to be made 
between respondents. However, the effects of the interviewer were small in com-
parison with the hypothesized effects of moment of delivery, number of selling 
moments and type of wholesale company. 
Taking the findings into account, it can be concluded that in both years the 
interval technique proved appropriate for eliciting valid subjective probability 
distributions in survey conditions. As far as can be tested, these elicitations 
yielded plausible and consistent results. It turned out to be a fairly difficult task 
to the respondents, too. About 15% of the respondents failed to respond to the 
question. Respondents had to think hard before being able to express their vague 
and unarticulated ideas about prices associated with a marketing strategy into 
quantitative judgments, especially for strategies they were less acquainted with. 
Consequently, a lot of time is necessary for this task. Respondents' fatigue with 
the task limit the number of distributions which can be elicited per respondent. 
Effects of boredom can probably be diminished if the elicitations are divided 
over the interview. 
The survey context did not allow the elicitation of spd's by means of two tech-
niques. Still, in order to gain insight into convergent validity aspects, direct tech-
niques were applied as an additional source for information about the respon-
dent's risk perception (Sections 5.4 and 5.5). The mean price farmers associated 
with a marketing strategy was asked directly and by means of magnitude estima-
tion the price risk of a strategy was assessed. Both techniques are conventional 
scaling practices in social sciences, especially in marketing research (perceived 
risk approach). The main advantage of these techniques is that they can easily be 
applied in survey research. The main disadvantage is, of course, that no proba-
bility distribution is obtained, so that the expected utility model cannot be 
applied. 
Respondents showed no difficulty in responding to the direct techniques. It 
took only about 4 minutes to complete each task and the nonresponse percentage 
with each task was very low. By testing the effects of moment of delivery, 
number of selling moments and type of wholesale company the internal consis-
tency of the measurements proved to be high. A systematic interviewer bias 
showed up for the magnitude estimation task. Overall, it is concluded that in 
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both years of measurement, the direct measurements provide a reasonable and 
consistent picture of the respondents' perceptions. 
If a comparison is made between the measurements obtained by the indirect 
(the elicitation of spd's) and direct technique the following results come up. 
Firstly, when tested pairwise per respondent, the direct elicitation of mean price 
appears to be significantly higher than the indirect elicitation for all marketing 
strategies in both years. An explanation for this finding was given by pointing 
out the difference in focus of both questions. The direct questioning is focussed 
more towards the past than the indirect technique. Consequently, the heuristics of 
anchoring and adjustment and of availability probably have induced the higher 
direct estimates. 
Secondly, the correspondence in measurements of both techniques can be 
analyzed by computing correlations per respondent over strategies. This analysis 
showed positive results. Significant and positive sample median correlations for 
mean price (0.32 in 1985 and 0.25 in 1985) and even higher median correlations 
for price risk (0.56 in 1984 and 0.39 in 1985) were obtained. This means that in 
both years to a large extent convergent validity has been established. 
Risk attitude and strength of preference measurement 
A review of techniques for assessing utility functions indicated a sensitivity of 
the measurement to response mode, the probabilities used in the lotteries, 
chaining, range effects and the like (Section 6.1). In the literature it is concluded 
that at this moment in time it is not possible to select the best technique. It is 
therefore advised to use a multiple of techniques to guard against the sensitivity 
of assessments to biases. The multiple method approach is seen as a key factor 
for reliable and valid assessment of utility functions, particularly in basic 
research. 
In this study, we applied two techniques, the lottery technique and conjoint 
measurement, in assessing the utility function u(x) or, equivalently, the risk atti-
tude (Sections 6.2 to 6.4). In the lottery technique, also often referred to as mid-
point chaining or bisection technique, the respondent has to assess the certainty 
equivalent of a binary 50/50 lottery (a standard-gamble approach). By chaining 
the lotteries, a series of equivalents is obtained to which a utility function can be 
fitted. In test interviews the midpoint chaining technique was compared to the 
frequently recommended probability equivalence technique. The midpoint 
chaining technique was clearly judged to be the most easy technique. 
In the conjoint measurement task the respondents have to rank a set of 50/50 
lotteries with respect to preference. This task can be seen as a series of pre-
ference comparisons of binary lotteries (a paired-gamble approach). By means of 
regression analysis the trade-off between expected value and standard deviation 
is obtained. Surprisingly, conjoint measurement has not yet been routinely 
applied in assessing risk attitude. This technique seems particularly suitable for 
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assessing risk attitude in survey research because it is thought to be a fairly easy 
and quick task for the respondent. Furthermore, e.g. in marketing research much 
experience is accumulated on how to conduct conjoint measurement analyses. 
The strength of preference function v(x) is also measured by two techniques, 
i.e. the midvalue splitting technique and the rating technique (Section 6.6) . In the 
rating technique a number of stimuli (price levels) are rated on a scale from 0 to 
10. In the midvalue splitting technique respondents have to specify a point C in 
such a way that, according to the respondent, a change from A to C equals in 
value a change from C to B (A < C < B). By appropriately chaining the assess-
ments, a series of values is obtained to which a function can be fitted. The mid-
value splitting technique to a very large extent resembles the midpoint chaining 
technique. A fundamental difference, of course, is that the midvalue splitting 
technique concerns a riskless measurement. 
Two approaches were chosen to analyze the data. In what we called the utility 
theory approach, the focus is entirely on the utility and strength of preference 
functions themselves. The shape of each function, the difference in location of 
the functions and the functional relationship between the utility and the strength 
of preference function are the main points of concern. Alternatively, in the so-
called latent variable approach the concepts of risk attitude and strength of 
preference are both conceived as a latent, that is not directly observable, variable 
which can be measured by means of one or more indicators. Each respondent is 
represented by a score on an indicator and the focus in this approach is on the 
correlation between respective indicators, computed over individuals. The analy-
tical framework of LISREL is suitable in this correlational approach for ana-
lyzing the convergence and stability of assessments. The latent variable approach 
provides a useful supplement to the type of analyses usually performed in utility 
theory and decision analysis. 
The four measurement techniques (lottery, conjoint, midvalue splitting and rating 
technique) were compared with respect to several criteria. A brief overview of 
the most important conclusions will be given below (Table 6.23 in Section 6.9 
provides a numerical overview). 
The rating and conjoint measurement task are found to be most easy to both 
the respondent and the interviewer. The lottery and midvalue splitting technique 
are more difficult in these respects. The findings obtained with the techniques 
indicate that all techniques yield internally consistent results. 
The stability correlations differ between the techniques, but all are positive and 
significant. The lottery technique is highest in stability, followed by the conjoint 
measurement. Likewise, convergent validity correlations are all positive and sta-
tistically significant. Convergent validity of the risk attitude assessment is higher 
than that of strength of preference. Although, due to a lack of reference studies, 
the magnitude of the correlations is difficult to evaluate, to us their magnitude is 
judged as not particularly high, e.g. the highest correlation, between the lottery 
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and conjoint measurement in 1984, is 0.49. These results show the danger of 
relying on only one measurement procedure and thus prove the necessity of 
applying a multiple indicator approach, even in applied research. Furthermore, it 
signals that more research into the concepts and their measurement has to be 
conducted in order to develop superior procedures. 
With each technique we came across a number of response effects. The lottery 
technique and midvalue splitting technique assessment tended somewhat towards 
S-shape functions. This effect could concern a pure method effect due to the 
chaining of assessments and the varying range of outcomes in the assessment task. 
Alternatively it could be attributed to an effect of a reference point as is 
hypothesized in Prospect Theory. Since the effect is relatively small a method 
effect seems most likely. The conjoint measurement assessment appeared to be 
sensitive to the inclusion of sure profiles in the set of profiles, although the 
effects found were much smaller than expected on the basis of a comparable 
study. Both for the conjoint measurement and the rating task an interviewer bias 
was detected. 
Our findings clearly indicate that in basic research into decision making under 
risk a multiple indicator approach should be applied. However, the elaborateness 
of the measurement tasks to respondent, interviewer and analyst will probably 
hamper the use of this approach, particularly in applied research. Most likely, a 
choice will have to be made between the techniques. Our results indicate that if a 
choice has to be made the lottery technique should be preferred. Of the four 
techniques, the lottery technique is highest in internal consistency and stability 
and at the least equal but probably somewhat higher in predictive validity than 
other techniques. Conjoint measurement and the midvalue splitting technique are 
next best choices. Overall, the rating task is judged as the least reliable and valid 
method of assessment. The results of this technique deviate too much from the 
other techniques. Further research into the methodological aspects of the 
measurement procedures in survey research, conducted with respect to different 
types of decisions and different decision makers e.g. small business managers or 
consumers, is needed to extend our findings. 
The perception and attitude component in the SEU-model 
If from methodological perspective a comparison is made between the elicitation 
of risk perception and the assessment of risk attitude, the following conclusion 
can be drawn. Our study showed that the difficulty of the spd' elicitation task to 
the respondent and the interviewer and the time needed for the task are definite 
problems in survey research. Although the assessment of risk attitude and 
strength of preference are also far from easy and sensitive to response effects, 
our experiences in this study leads us to conclude that the crux of studying deci-
sion making under risk in survey context is not so much the measurement of the 
utility component in the SEU-model but concerns the elicitation of spd's. This 
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would justify much time to be spend on the elicitation of perceptions in inter-
views. 
Possibly, part of the difficulties can be removed by using interactive computer 
programs in the elicitation task. This would enable more internal consistency 
measurements to be made, immediately following the initial elicitations. Further-
more, a combination of techniques could be used to verify the answers by any 
technique within a reasonable amount of time. Also, the task could probably be 
made more interesting by e.g. using graphic displays. We think that the availa-
bility of portable and relatively cheap computer devices will stimulate more field 
research to be conducted into eliciting several distributions for many respondents. 
Of course, the assessment of risk attitude will probably also benefit from such 
devices. Notwithstanding these aspects, however, the elicitation of spd's is 
essentially a difficult task and will continue to require hard thought on the part 
of the respondent and a substantial amount of interviewing time, irrespective of 
the method applied. 
8.3 Findings and conclusions with respect to the farmers' marketing behavior 
In the agricultural economics literature, risk is given much attention to. Most of 
this attention concerns total farm planning, e.g. the derivation of optimum crop-
ping plans, or concerns specific production decisions like fertilizer input deci-
sions and pest management. The major part of these analyses is theoretical or 
involves simulations. Far less studies concern empirical research into the farmers' 
decision making under risk. Little empirical research deals with the farmers' 
marketing behavior under risk. In this study, this marketing decision making has 
been paid attention to. 
The decision problem in this study concerns a farmer's choice of a marketing 
strategy for ware potatoes (Chapter 2). Of the crops grown at a typical farm in 
the region in which this study took place, ware potatoes contribute most to the 
farmers' income. However, the gross margin of ware potatoes is highly variable. 
This variability is mainly due to variability in market prices for potatoes. By 
means of the marketing strategy the farmer can respond to the substantial varia-
bility in ware potato prices. 
A marketing strategy is defined here as a) a farmer's choice of a marketing 
channel, b) given this channel choice, his choice of allocating the harvest to 
selling-options and the timing of selling, and c) his choice of a moment of 
delivery. Examples of selling-options open to the farmer are: a fixed-price con-
tract (16%), a bottom-price contract (5%), a pooling contract (36%) and selling at 
spot market prices (42%); the market share is given between brackets (computed 
on kgs. of harvest in 1983 (Smidts 1985)). Typically, farmers choose a combina-
tion (portfolio) of selling-options e.g. 35% of harvest is sold via a fixed-price 
contract and 65% via spot market sales. 
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We conceived the marketing strategy as a multiattribute alternative. In structuring 
the decision problem it was concluded that ultimately only two attributes are seen 
as relevant in modeling preferences for marketing strategies. These attributes are 
the price farmers associate with a marketing strategy and the marketing channel. 
The price is a random variable, so that risk is introduced into the decision 
problem. The marketing channel concerns the type of wholesale company the 
farmer deals with. The farmer can either choose to deal with a cooperative com-
pany or with one or more privately-owned companies. It is suggested that the 
farmer chooses a marketing strategy in a two-phase process. First, he chooses a 
marketing channel on the basis of non-price attributes, e.g. contracting risk, the 
quality assessment and payment system, services offered by the company and so 
forth. Within a marketing channel, the farmer chooses a combination of selling-
options in accordance with his risk attitude. 
A conceptual model of the decision making process was developed in which, in 
respect of the attribute price, the elements of risk perception and risk attitude 
are seen as central in the two-attribute model preference formation model. The 
combination of risk perception and risk attitude is modeled by means of the 
SEU-model. The main findings will be summarized below. 
Perception of marketing strategies 
Our findings show that farmers in both years associated average prices with the 
strategies (expected values of strategies are +/- 23 Dfl/100 kg). On hindsight, 
farmers were clearly too optimistic in both years, considering that the average 
prices farmer actually received were respectively 17.4 and 16 Dfl/100 kg (Table 
2.1). Farmers perceived more price risk in 1985 than in 1984. Apparently in 1985 
farmers were less sure about prices. 
Considering the average prices that farmers expected, it is not surprising to 
find that the farmers thought that of the total set of marketing strategies two 
fairly safe strategies would do well in these circumstances. More specifically, the 
100% bottom-price contract (Strategy 2) and the 50% fixed-price contract, 50% 
spot market (selling at one moment) (Strategy 9) were perceived as very attractive 
strategies by risk averse farmers. Many farmers perceived both strategies on the 
efficiency frontier in both years. Both strategies involve a safety against very low 
market prices. Contrariwise, many farmers perceived the 100% spot market 
strategies (Strategies 4 and 6) in such a manner that they would be unattractive 
for a risk averse farmer. Both strategies are characterized by a high price risk 
(i.e. a high standard deviation) which does not go together with a substantially 
high expected value. Furthermore, selling at two moments at spot market prices is 
considered unattractive in this respect. 
An analysis of the effects on perception of moment of delivery, number of 
selling moments and type of wholesale company yielded the following results. 
Farmers perceive, as expected, a higher mean price when delivering later in the 
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marketing year. This finding confirms the expectations since inventory costs 
should be taken into account. Nevertheless, the finding is relevant with respect to 
the validity of the elicitation of spd's since the effect is found in a between-sub-
jects design. 
Selling at two moments at the spot market reduces mean price and price risk 
compared to selling only at one moment, as was hypothesized. Furthermore, 
farmers perceive no difference between strategies which are similar in every 
aspect, but type of wholesale company. Stated otherwise, the subjective probabi-
lity distribution of price does not depend upon the marketing channel. 
The heterogeneity in perception was tested with respect to the type of whole-
sale company the farmer actually deals with. Farmers might perceive higher mean 
prices and/or smaller risks for strategies of the company they actually deal with 
than for strategies of the competing company. However, no significant diffe-
rences in perceptions have been found in this respect. This means that farmers 
neither rationalize their choice of a company nor choose a company with the 
expectation of receiving higher mean prices with equal or smaller risks. Appa-
rently other motives than price play a role in the choice of a marketing channel. 
In Smidts (1985) an enumeration of these motives can be found. The findings 
confirm the hypothesized two-phase process. The implication of this finding for 
the marketing strategy of cooperative and private wholesale companies is that 
each company should emphasize and communicate other choice criteria than price 
in order to distinguish themselves from competing companies. Examples of such 
criteria are the amount of contracting risk, the amount of advice given during 
the growth and storage of potatoes, the type of relationship between sales person-
nel and the farmer. 
Risk attitude 
On the basis of the lottery technique, 82% of the farmers can be classified as risk 
averse and 12% as risk neutral in 1984. A total of 6% is (slightly) risk seeking. In 
1985 these figures are: 68% risk averse, 23% risk neutral and 9% risk seeking. 
These figures indicate a temporal shift in risk attitude towards risk neutrality. An 
explanation for this shift can only be given when an increasing absolute risk 
averse utility function for wealth is assumed. With the conjoint measurement no 
significant temporal shift in risk attitude has been found. The variation between 
farmers in risk attitude is substantial. 
In both years of measurement, a negative exponential function fitted the data 
of the lottery technique clearly better than a power function. The negative expo-
nential function implies that a farmer can be characterized by a constant absolute 
and an increasing proportional risk attitude. To the farmer's decision problem a 
constant absolute risk attitude implies that a farmer responds similarly to the risk 
of losing or gaining, say, 10 cts/kg, in a year with high market prices relative to 
a year with low market prices. Increasing proportional risk aversion implies that 
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the farmer will respond more conservatively towards a risk of losing or gaining, 
say, 10%, in a year with high market prices relative to a year with low market 
prices. 
Strength of preference 
With respect to strength of preference, plausible measurements are obtained. In 
the rating task all the farmers are, in both years, classified as exhibiting 
decreasing marginal value, as expected. A power function, implying a decreasing 
absolute risk attitude and a constant proportional risk attitude fitted the data best. 
With the midvalue splitting technique 9% of the farmers have a linear value 
function in 1984; for 1985 this percentage is 5%. The remaining farmers exhibit 
decreasing marginal value. Similar to the lottery technique, a negative exponential 
function clearly fitted the data best. No temporal shift in strength of preference 
is found for the midvalue splitting technique; with the rating technique the curve 
in 1985 was somewhat more concave than in 1984. 
Relative risk attitude 
In 1984, 43% of the farmers can be classified as relatively risk averse, 51% as 
relatively risk seeking and 7% as relatively risk neutral. In 1985 a shift towards 
relatively risk seeking shows up: 20% relatively risk averse, 76% relatively risk 
seeking and 4% relatively risk neutral. This shift should not come as a surprise, 
of course, since the utility function (assessed by means of the lottery technique) 
shifted towards risk seeking whereas the strength of preference function 
(midvalue splitting technique) did not shift (see also Section 8.1). 
In the study, the relationship between assessments of risk attitude, strength of 
preference and relative risk attitude and a number of personal and situational 
variables have been analyzed. Neither strong nor consistent relationships were 
found. This result suggests that the measurements of risk attitude and strength of 
preference are strongly context specific, so that general characteristics of the 
farmer are hardly relevant for these context specific preferences and choices. 
With context specific here is meant that farmers can be strongly risk averse with 
respect to marketing ware potatoes, but can at the same time be less risk averse 
with respect to e.g. pest management or choice of ware potato cultivation inten-
sity. It should be noted here that in this study it was not possible to relate indi-
cators of the financial structure of the farm to the risk attitude measurement. 
Such factors might be more influential on risky choice behavior than factors like 
age and level of education. 
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The model of preference formation 
The proposed preference formation model was largely confirmed. Both price and 
marketing channel significantly influence preferences for marketing strategies in 
the hypothesized direction. This finding confirms that indeed risk perceptions 
and risk attitude influence farmer's preferences for marketing strategies. 
Although the model is confirmed in this study, the fit of the model is fairly low. 
It was found that the effect of the marketing channel on preference is 
mediated by the farmer's actual choice of the type of wholesale company. 
Farmers actually dealing with a cooperative company evaluate strategies implying 
selling to a cooperative company on average clearly higher than strategies 
implying selling to a private company. With farmers actually dealing with a pri-
vate company the reverse effect shows up. 
The analysis of the relationship between the preference for a marketing 
strategy and the farmer's personal and situational characteristics yielded inte-
resting effects. The most important variables affecting preferences are: the 
farmer's risk attitude, the type of wholesale company he deals with, his usual 
moment of delivery and the region he lives in. The significant effect of risk 
attitude again confirms the preference formation model. 
The effects of risk attitude are in an expected direction and were shown to be 
most influential if strategies with an extreme price risk were concerned. That is, 
for strategies both with a very small, and large price risk, the risk attitude is 
clearly related to the preferences of farmers. Effects of e.g. the farmer's age and 
level of education were small and only present for some strategies. 
The relationship between the characteristics and the preferences was most clear 
with respect to pooling at a cooperative company (Strategy 1) and in case of 
selling the total harvest at spot market prices (Strategies 4 and 6). These results 
imply that for these strategies the farmers' characteristics yield most information 
for decisions on e.g. market segmentation to be made by wholesale companies. 
The differences in risk attitude between farmers and the finding that risk atti-
tude indeed influences preferences, suggest opportunities for wholesale companies 
to use a farmer's risk attitude more explicitly as a market segmentation variable. 
Specific services could be tailored to each risk attitude segment. For example, 
until now, wholesale companies market single selling-options from which a 
farmer can construct his own combination of options. The large majority of the 
farmers indeed makes combinations of selling-options. Alternatively, a wholesale 
company could construct a number of portfolios of selling-options themselves in 
such a way that these portfolios increase both in expected value of price and in 
price risk. For each risk attitude segment such a portfolio of selling-options could 
be developed and marketed. This would ease the choice problem for farmers. 
The present research concentrated heavily on one aspect of the farmer's decision 
making: modeling the choice of a marketing strategy. Several fields of inquiry are 
interesting enough to warrant future research. 
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It would be interesting to analyze further how farmers form their perceptions 
concerning market prices. That is, what are the basic factors that govern these 
perceptions, which information sources are used and how is information from 
these sources weighted and combined into an overall judgment. Furthermore, how 
are subjective, intuitive judgments about the market combined with more objec-
tive information from e.g. the futures market or yield estimates? In general, 
according to von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) this latter topic of combining 
subjective and objective information is one of the most interesting research topics 
in decision analysis in the years to come. Especially, within the context of deci-
sion support systems these aspects could be analyzed. This applies of course not 
only to farmers' decision making processes but also to (marketing) decision 
making in general. 
Another interesting topic concerns the hypothesis that the decision maker's 
relative risk attitude is not dependent upon the context of the decision or the 
attribute under consideration. It would be interesting to test this hypothesis with 
respect to the diverse fields of the farmer's management task. For example, this 
could concern marketing decisions with respect to other crops with large market 
risks e.g. onions, production management decisions e.g. decisions concerning 
fertilizer input and pest management, investment decisions or decisions 
concerning the adoption of new technologies or management tools. If such a 
stable characteristic of the farmer would be found for each of these, probably 
multiattributed decisions, this would clearly increase our insight into the farmer's 
decision making. 
A further topic concerns the effect of social factors on the choices under risk. 
In this study, the farmer's decision making process has been modeled as an 
individual process isolated from the presence of other people. However, prefe-
rences and choices of reference farmers (e.g. the farmer's neighbours) or the 
farmer's wife will probably also influence the choice behavior. For example, are 
farmers more risk averse if more people are influencing the decision making 
process? 
Overall, the findings in this study show that the farmer's decision making process 
provided a good empirical setting for studying a number of theoretical and 
methodological issues. Since it concerned individual decision making of a large 
number of decision makers, typically research into the decision making processes 
under risk of small-businesses and of consumers could benefit from our findings. 
It will be interesting to study whether findings and conclusions can be confirmed 
and enhanced by studying the topics for other decision makers (e.g. managers in 
horticulture, small retailers, consumers), other decisions e.g. hedging on the 
futures market, and for group instead of individual decision making. The concept 
of relative risk attitude seems promising for the study of group decision making 
too (Dyer and Sarin 1982). Furthermore, a longitudinal approach with more than 
two moments of measurement is considered worthwhile. In this manner the 
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changes in risk perceptions, risk attitudes and strength of preference can be 
studied in response to changes in the market circumstances or in the decision 
maker's situation. 
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APPENDIX II 
Average results of indirect measurement of price perception in '84 and '85, per marketing strategy 
and per moment of delivery in cts/kg 
Year 1984 
STRATEGY 
1. 100% Pc 
2. 100% Bp 
4. 100% Sml 
6. 100% Sm2 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml 
9. 50% Fpl/50% Sml 
Sept-Dec. Jan.-March April-July 
MU SD MU SD MU SD 
IMEA MEA IMEA IMEA IMEA IMEA SIG. 
21.97 4.50 23.16 2.55 23.71 4.21 X 
22.00 3.41 23.02 2.70 2435 3.34 XXX 
20.04 2.86 23.90 4.16 24.26 6.13 XXX 
19.71 2.56 23.05 3.84 23.89 5.18 XXX 
21.32 3.59 23.53 2.95 23.65 3.88 XXX 
2139 3.08 24.62 2.58 25.23 3.48 XXX 
Year 1984 
Sept-Dec. 
MU SD 
STRATEGY ISTA ISTA 
1. 100% Pc 2.38 1.80 
2. 100% Bp 2.08 1.51 
4. 100% Sml 2.14 1.53 
6. 100% Sm2 1.77 1.01 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml 2.09 1.43 
9. 50% Fpl/50% Sml 1.39 .68 
Jan.-March April-July 
MU SD MU SD 
ISTA ISTA ISTA ISTA SIG. 
2.22 1.72 2.41 1.68 
2.00 135 1.98 1.83 
3.34 3.21 4.57 3.88 XXX 
2.72 2.20 3.26 2.47 XX 
2.28 1.57 2.88 2.05 XX 
1.84 135 2.54 1.68 XXX 
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APPENDIX II 
continued 
Year 1985 
Sept-Dec. Jan.-March April-July 
MU SD MU SD MU SD 
STRATEGY ISTA ISTA ISTA ISTA ISTA ISTA SIG. 
1. 100% Pc 2.90 1.98 3.47 2.66 3.29 2.25 
2. 100% Bp 2.68 1.72 2.99 2.36 2.75 2.05 — 
4. 100% Sml 3.05 2.50 5.43 4.37 6.07 4.44 XXX 
5. 100% Pp 3.35 2.08 3.91 3.18 3.60 2.48 — 
6. 100% Sm2 3.00 2.27 4.52 3.43 4.79 3.52 — 
7. 50% Pc/50% Sml 3.98 2.45 4.65 3.14 3.84 3.22 — 
8. 50% Bp/50% Sml 1.90 1.60 3.34 2.37 3.30 3.06 — 
9. 50% Fpl/50% Sml 1.93 1.19 3.63 3.04 3.16 2.01 --
10. 50% Pp/50% Sml 332 2.80 4.57 2.65 4.71 2.96 — 
11 50% Pc/50% Sm2 3.42 1.94 2.22 1.40 3.83 2.77 — 
16 50% Pp/50% Sm2 2.84 1.91 3.39 2.71 3.53 1.35 -
Significance: x = p < .05 
(one-tailed) xx = p < .025 
xxx = p < .01 
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APPENDIX III 
Average results of direct measurement of price perception in 1984 and 1985, per marketing 
strategy, per moment of delivery, in cts/kg 
Year 1984 
Sept-Dec. Jan.-March April-July 
MU SD MU SD MU SD 
STRATEGY DMEA DMEA DMEA DMEA DMEA DMEA SIG. 
1. 100% Pc 23.56 4.45 24.91 4.76 25.27 3.13 -
2. 100% Bp 2433 3.85 24.02 4.10 25.55 3.98 XX 
4. 100% Sml 21.23 2.99 25.62 6.46 28.46 6.61 XXX 
5. 100% Pp 23.21 4.58 24.52 6.93 2535 3.85 -
6. 100% Sm2 2030 2.08 2432 5.58 26.41 5.19 XXX 
Year 1985 
Sept-Dec. Jan.-March April-July 
MU SD MU SD MU SD 
STRATEGY DMEA DMEA DMEA DMEA DMEA DMEA SIG 
1. 100% Pc 22.33 3.64 23.66 3.34 25.19 4.81 
2. 100% Bp 23.50 2.20 23.82 3.40 25.22 3.50 -
4. 100% Sml 20.56 3.01 23.21 3.79 27.25 4.98 XXX 
5. 100% Pp 22.55 3.04 23.76 3.43 25.34 2.62 XX 
6. 100% Sm2 20.91 3.07 23.69 3.95 24.77 3.75 X 
Significance: x = p < .05 
(one-tailed) xx = p < .025 
xxx = p < .01 
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SAMENVATTING 
Deze studie gaat over besluitvorming onder onzekerheid. Een drietal onderwerpen 
komt in de studie aan de orde. Ten eerste wordt een overzicht en evaluatie 
gegeven van de belangrijkste theoretische inzichten met betrekking tot het nemen 
van beslissingen onder risico. Veel aandacht in dit verband gaat uit naar het 
concept van de relatieve risico-attitude. Een tweede onderwerp betreft het 
onderzoek naar de betrouwbaarheid, validiteit en praktische haalbaarheid van 
methoden voor het meten van risicopercepties en risico-attitudes in grootschalig 
survey onderzoek. In de derde plaats wordt een model ontwikkeld en_g.eto.etst 
betreffende de keuze van de afzetstrategie door telers van cojnjmnptie^r^pj^len. 
Uit_een overzicht van de literatuur blijkt dat beperkt e m p i r i s ^ j r m ^ e j i g ^ J s 
verricht naar marketing beslissingen onder risico van boeren. 
De_theoretische en methodologische vragen worden empirisch onde^zocht^voor^ 
heX_beslissingsgedrag van telers van consumptieaardappebn^^^dj^Jjselmjer^ 
£0|ders. Dit beslissingsgedrag blijkt hiervoor uitermate geschikt te z i jn^aa. 
vanwege het homogene produkt dat verhandeld wordt en h e ^ g r o ^ j a n m h j g o j ^ , 
namelijk individuele, beslissers die allen geconfronteerd worden me^dezelfd£ 
ipjfk|risico^s en allen uit dezelfde keuzemogelijkheden kunnen kiezen^jryjiyleje^ 
marktrisico's te^  reageren. 
Voor het beantwoorden van de onderzoeksvragen is een veldonderzoek gehou-
den onder 250 telers welke drie keer geïnterviewd zijn in twee opeenvolgende 
oogstjaren (84/85 en 85/86). Op deze wijze is iedere teler in totaal ruim vier uur 
lang geïnterviewd. Desondanks waren de bereidheid om mee te werken aan het 
onderzoek en de motivatie van de respondenten hoog. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een 
uitgebreide beschrijving van de opzet en uitvoering van de empirische studie 
gegeven. Onderscheidende kenmerken van deze studie ten opzichte van reeds 
verrichte studies op dit gebied zijn de test-retest opzet, de toepassing van meer 
dan één methode voor het meten van risicopercepties en risico-attitudes, het 
grote aantal beslissers dat onderzocht wordt en het feit dat de analyse betrekking 
heeft op beslissers die geconfronteerd worden met hun eigen, jaarlijks terug-
komende, beslissingsprobleem. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt aangegeven dat het inkomen van de akkerbouwers in de 
IJsselmeerpolders voor een groot deel bepaald wordt door de resultaten die 
behaald worden met consumptieaardappelen. Deze resultaten zijn echtejr^jmn^ 
sterkejchommelingen onderhevig vanwege de grote prijsschommelingen van het 
vrije produkt consumptieaardappelen. Door mlddeT van de keuze van_de^jfzet-
s.MIg§ig-I'ff.ar.keting strategy') kan een teler de grootte van het prijsrisico 
beïnvloeden. Zo^  kan hij kiezen voor een vast-prijscontract (16%), een bodem-
PjijscontractJ5%), pooling (36%) en verkopen tegen dagprijs (42%); tussen haak-
jesjs telkens het marktaandeel van de verkoopmogelijkheid gegeven, berekend^op 
basis van afgezette hoeveelheden in 1983 (Smidts F985). Gebruikelijk is dat telers 
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een combinatie van deze verkoopmogelijkheden ('selltng-options') kiezen, bij-
vQfl£bg.gld 35% van de fysieke^pbrengst verkopen tegen een vaste prijs, 25% 
vojgensjpooling en de rest verkopen tegen dagprijs. Deze dagprijsverkopen 
kunnen gespreid worden over het verkoopseizoen dat loopt van september/okto-
bej- tot en met juni/juli. Tevens dient de teler een afzetkanaal en een leverings-
tijdstip^ te kiezen. De keuzes van de teler met betrekking tot de cojnWnatie^van 
verkoopmogelijkheden, het leveringsmoment en het afzetkanaal wordt _gedefi-
nieerd als zijn afzetstrategie. 
Eenjnodel wordt geschetst voor de preferentJevonn^^ voor een 
afzetstrategie (hoofdstuk 2). De preferentie wordt volgens het model bepaald door 
twee attributen: de prijs die behaald kan worden met de strategie (een sto-
chastische variabele) en het afzetkanaal. Bij,het afzetkanaal kan de teler kiezen 
voor de coöperatie of voor één of meer particuliere groothandelaren. Attributen 
welkeJrij de keuze van het afzetkanaal een rol spelen^zijn hej J^etóejujejnlsico, 
het_.contractrisico, gewoonte e.d. (zie Smidts 1985). Aan de_preferent^orming_ 
betreffende het attribuut prijs liggen twee aspecten ten grondslag. Dit_zijn_de 
subjectieve kansverdeling van de _ prijs bij ,eenjbepjalde^strategie^i., de risico-
attitude vanjde teler. Aan de meting van beide onderdelen wordt in deze studie 
veel aandacht besteed. 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de theoretische inzichten besproken voor het nemen van 
risicobeslissingen. Als uitgangspunt zijn de 'expected utility' modellen van 
Bernoulli uit 1738 en van von Neumann en Morgenstern (1947) genomen. Gecon-
stateerd wordt dat een essentieel verschil tussen beide modellen de definiëring en 
meting van de evaluatiefunctie betreft. In het Bernoulli model wordt deze functie 
gezien als een cardinale nutsfunctie die de intensiteit van psychologische satis-
factie met een bepaalde uitkomst weergeeft (in het vervolg een 'strength of 
preference' functie genoemd en aangeduid met v(x)). Deze functie wordt gemeten 
onder zekerheid. Bernoulli stelt dat deze functie gekenmerkt wordt door dalend 
marginaal nut (een concave curve) zodat dit de verklaring is voor risicomijdend 
gedrag. Een probleem bij deze theorie is echter de vraag waarom evaluaties van 
beslissers onder zekerheid iets zouden zeggen over hun evaluaties onder onzeker-
heid. In het model van von Neumann-Morgenstern wordt daarom een evaluatie-
functie verondersteld die gemeten wordt onder onzekerheid met behulp van zoge-
naamde loterijen (deze functie wordt in het vervolg aangeduid met kansindiffe-
rentie of nutsfunctie u(x)). In dit model is geen verwijzing naar 'strength of 
preference' nodig om te bewijzen dat het rationeel is 'expected utility' te 
maximaliseren. Een probleem bij dit model is echter dat geen verklaring voor 
risicomijdend gedrag gegeven wordt. Een beslisser die in loterijen indiffe-
rentiekansen specificeert welke een concave u(x) impliceren, wordt risicomijdend 
genoemd zonder te verklaren hoe de beslisser tot deze indifferentiekansen komt. 
Het concept van de relatieve risico-attitude (ook wel aangeduid als intrinsieke 
risico-attitude) is geïntroduceerd om een verbinding tussen beide bovengenoemde 
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modellen te geven. Er wordt gesteld dat u(x) een combinatie is van de evaluaties 
onder zekerheid (de 'strength of preference' van een beslisser voor uitkomsten) en 
de wérkelijke risico-attitude van een beslisser. Door bij dezelfde beslisser het 
verschil tussen u(x) en v(x) te meten kan de werkelijke risico-attitude vastgesteld 
worden. Aangezien zowel u(x) als v(x) schalen zijn op intervalniveau, dient in 
zijn algemeenheid de relatie tussen beide functies bestudeerd te worden: u(x) = 
f(v(x)). Wanneer deze relatie lineair is dan wordt de beslisser relatief risico-
neutraal genoemd, is het verband concaaf dan is de beslisser relatief risico-
mijdend, is het verband convex dan kenmerkt de beslisser zich als relatief 
risico zoekend. 
Wanneer wordt nagegaan welke functies in aanmerking komen om de relatie 
tussen u(x) en v(x) te beschrijven dan blijken er twee functionele verbanden 
mogelijk te zijn. Ofwel het verband is lineair (in dat geval vallen u(x) en v(x) 
samen en is derhalve het Bernoulli model identiek aan het von Neumann-
Morgenstern model), ofwel het verband wordt beschreven door een negatief 
exponentiële functie. In het laatste geval worden beslissers gekenmerkt door een 
constant absolute en toenemend proportionele relative risico-attitude (voor een 
uitleg van de begrippen constant absoluut en toenemend proportioneel risico-
mijdend wordt verwezen naar pagina 43 t/m 45). Argumenten voor en tegen 
ieder van de relaties worden gegeven in hoofdstuk 3. Tevens wordt geconstateerd 
dat empirisch onderzoek naar het verband schaars is en tegengestelde resultaten te 
zien geeft. In deze studie wordt een empirische bijdrage geleverd aan het 
vraagstuk. Aangetoond wordt dat het lineaire verband tussen u(x) en v(x) 
verworpen dient te worden ten gunste van het negatief exponentiële verband. 
Vervolgens wordt in paragraaf 3.4 een evaluatie gegeven van het 'subjective 
expected utility' model van von Neumann-Morgenstern (aangeduid met SEU-
model) als descriptief model. Uit de literatuur blijkt dat het SEU-model als 
descriptief model veel kritiek gekregen (als normatief model wordt het SEU-
model weinig ter discussie gesteld). In zijn algemeenheid kan gesteld worden dat 
het model slechts bij benadering het beslissingsgedrag onder risico kan verklaren 
en voorspellen. 
De problemen met het SEU-model als descriptief model hebben geleid tot de 
formulering van alternatieve descriptieve modellen. Een aantal van deze modellen 
die afkomstig zijn uit zowel de nutstheorie (o.a. de modellen van Machina (1982), 
Loomes and Sugden (1982), Becker and Sarin (1987)) als de psychologie (Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman en Tversky 1979)) worden besproken. Vastgesteld wordt dat 
ieder van die modellen aanzienlijk complexer is dan het SEU-model en tevens 
één of meer elementen bevat welke moeilijk of niet geoperationaliseerd kunnen 
worden. Het is bovendien nog niet aangetoond dat deze modellen ondanks hun 
grotere complexiteit en uitgebreidere dataverzameling een betere beschrijving van 
beslissingen geven (zie bijvoorbeeld Currim and Sarin 1989). In deze veldstudie 
worden deze modellen dan ook niet toegepast. 
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Hoofdstuk 3 sluit af met een modellering van het beslissingsprobleem van de teler 
volgens het SEU-model. De predictieve validiteit van dit SEU-model zal verge-
leken worden met die van het SEV-model (het 'subjective expected value' 
model). Di^^^^^modjl^^rcmderstelt risicojieuJrate^bjsJ^ers^AJs^e^eJejsjiet 
risiconeutraal zijn dan mag verwacht worden dat de predictieve validiteit van het 
SEU-model die van het SEV-modei zal overtreffen. 
In de hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7 worden achtereenvolgens de resultaten besproken 
van de meting van risicoperceptie, de risico-attitude, de relatieve risico-attitude 
en van de combinatie van percepties en risico-attitude in de preferentievorming 
voor afzetstrategieën. 
De prijs die de teler verwacht te kunnen ontvangen bij een bepaaJWe^afzet-
strategie^is op twee manieren gemeten: indirect_ejrijdirect ^hoofdjtuk_5J^Met_ 
indirect wordt hier bedoeld dat een subjectieve kansverdeling per^tratggie is 
gemeten waarna, indirect, de momenten (zoals gemiddelde en standaardafwijking) 
van de kansverdeling worden bepaald. JhiHeciirecJejr^^ 
rechtstreeks gevraagd naar de gemiddelde prijs en wordt het prijsrisico van een 
strategie direct gemeten met 'magnitude scaling'. Een groot verschil tussen de 
methoden is dat de directe methode geen kansverdeling oplevert die gebruikt kan 
worden in het SEU-model. Daarentegen is deze directe methode aanzienlijk 
sneller en eenvoudiger. 
In hetjügemeen kan gesteld worden dat het meten van subjectieve kansverde-
lingen veel tijd kost en door respondenten als moeilijk ervaren woHtTlKraantal_ 
afzetstrategieën waarvoor een kansverdeling gemeten kon worden diende derhalve 
beperkt te worden tot zeven. Vanwege de moeilijkheidsgraad van de meting kon 
desondanks voor een zesde deel van de respondenten geen kansverdeling gemeten 
worden. In tegenstelling hiermee kon met de directe methode voor vrijwel alle 
respondenten in korte tijd de perceptie vastgesteld worden van alle strategieën. 
De_resultaten van jle j)ercepjjejne^ de 
paragrafen 5.3 t/m 5.7. Aangezien de telers voor ^^e^^o^sjlarjn^^lajigfjsge 
prijzen verwachten blijken de strategieën 100% bodemprijs en 50%^as^JlUsJ, 
50% dagprijs (verkoop op éénjnoment) zich in beide jaren op de efficiënte grens 
je_bevinden (het betreft hier de gemiddelde perceptie^ individuele tdersjkjjnnen 
hiervan afwijken). Dat wil zeggen dat beide strategieën^aantrekkelijk zijn voor 
rjsjcomijdende beslissers; de mate van risicomijdendheid is bepalend of een teler 
de ene dan wel de andere strategie prefereert. Uit de metingen blijkt tevens dat 
de risicovolle 100% dagprijs afzetstrategieën onaantrekkelijk zijn voor risico-
mjjdendebeslissers. ~=~— 
De validiteit van de perceptiemetingen is onderzocht door de effecten te 
toetsen van het leveringsmoment, het aantal verkoopmomenten bij verkoop tegen 
dagprijs en het afzetkanaal. Zowel bij de indirecte als de directe meting worden 
in beide jaren resultaten gevonden die consistent zijn met de verwachtingen. 
Wanneer de metingen verkregen met de directe en indirecte techniek vergeleken 
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worden per respondent, dan blijkt een goede overeenkomst van de metingen. Wel 
levert de directe meting systematisch een significant hogere gemiddelde prijs op 
dan de indirecte methode. Als verklaring hiervoor is aangegeven dat in de directe 
vraagmethode meer dan in de indirecte vraagmethode, de teler gefocussed werd 
op de (hoge) prijzen in voorgaande oogstjaren en vervolgens onvoldoende gewicht 
toekende aan de verwachtingen over de (lage) prijzen van het komende oogstjaar 
(een voorbeeld van de zogenaamde 'anchoring and adjustment' heuristiek). 
Dejheteroéeniteit in perceptie is onderzocht door te kijken^of tejers dieijeyeren 
S^i^ ^^ êESSËL_HHlS!£ËE^ J.ni^ers P e r cipJëren dan telers die leveren aan de 
particuliere groothandel. Geen significante verschillen tussen beide groepen 
konden worden vastgesteld. 
Ondanks de moeilijkheidsgraad van de metingen van subjectieve kansverdelin-
gen laten de resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat het mogelijk is een aantal 
consistente en plausibele subjectieve kansverdelingen per respondent te meten in 
een survey. Dit veronderstelt wel dat ruim tijd voor deze metingen wordt 
uitgetrokken en dat de interviewers goed geoefend zijn. 
De methoden voor het meten van risico-attitude (u(x)) en 'strength of preference' 
(v(x)) worden uitgebreid besproken in hoofdstuk 6. Vastgesteld wordt dat voor 
het betrouwbaar en valide meten van deze concepten ieder concept met meer dan 
één methode gemeten dient te worden (aangeduid met de term 'multiple method 
approach'). In deze studie is de risico-attitude gemeten op twee manieren. In de 
loterij techniek dienen respondenten zekerheidsequivalenten te specificeren voor 
50/50 loterijen. Door een tiental loterijen aan respondenten voor te leggen 
worden tien punten van de nutsfunctie verkregen. Met niet-lineaire regressie 
wordt een functie door de punten gefit. De tweede techniek die is toegepast is 
conjunct meten. Respondenten moeten in deze taak een set van 50/50 loterijen 
naar voorkeur ordenen. Daarna wordt met regressieanalyse de lineaire trade-off 
bepaald tussen gemiddelde en standaardafwijking van de loterij. De trade-off is 
dan een maat voor de risico-attitude van de beslisser. 
'Strength of preference' is eveneens op twee manieren gemeten, namelijk met 
de middenwaarde ('midvalue splitting') en de 'rating' techniek. In beide gevallen 
worden tien punten van de curve v(x) gemeten. De curves u(x) en v(x) zijn voor 
alle technieken gemeten voor het attribuut prijs (in guldens per 100 kg), en voor 
prijzen tussen de 10 en 70 gulden per 100 kg. 
Een belangrijk deel van hoofdstuk 6 is gewijd aan de resultaten die in beide 
jaren verkregen zijn met ieder van de technieken, waarbij aandacht wordt 
besteed aan het gemak waarmee respondenten en interviewer met de techniek 
omgaan, de interne consistentie, de stabiliteit en responseffecten. Tevens wordt 
de convergente validiteit bepaald van de concepten risico-attitude en 'strength of 
preference'. In tabel 6.23 (pagina 237) worden de belangrijkste bevindingen 
samengevat. De loterij techniek blijkt op de meeste punten het meest positief 
beoordeeld te kunnen worden, de rating techniek daarentegen blijkt de minst 
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betrouwbare en minst valide meettechniek. 
Bij de loterij techniek blijkt de negatief exponentiële functie de gegevensJiet 
best te beschrijven. Telers kunnen daarom gekarakteriseerd worden door een con-
stant absolute en een toenemend proportionele risico-attitude. Het^gr^ojste^deel 
van de telers wordtinbeidejarenals risicomijdend geclassificeerd (82% in 1984 
en 68% in 1985). De rest van de telers is^risjoojiejitrajd^^^ 
zoekend^ Gemidjleld^warej^ 
bevredigende verklaring voor deze verschuiving bleek moeilijk te geven. 
Wat betreft v(x) blijkt dat voor vrijwel alle telers, volgens verwachting, de 
curve concaaf is, hetgeen dalend marginaal nut impliceert. Weinig significante 
verbanden zijn gevonden tussen de diverse metingen van risico-attitude en 
'strength of preference' en de persoonlijke en situationele kenmerken van de 
teler. 
In paragraaf 6.7 wordt de hypothese van de relatieve risico-attitude getoetst. In 
de toets zijn de metingen gebruikt die verkregen zijn met de loterij en met de 
middenwaarde techniek. Per individu is het verband tussen de gegevens ver-
kregen met beide technieken geschat volgens een negatief exponentiële en een 
machtsfunctie. In beide jaren blijkt dat er een significant verschil bestaat tussen 
u(x) en v(x) en dat de relatie tussen beide functies beter door de theoretisch 
verwachte negatief exponentiële dan door de machtsfunctie wordt beschreven. 
Wanneer gekeken wordt naar de klassicifatie van de telers naar relatieve risico-
attitude dan blijkt dat er in 1984 evenveel relatief risicomijdende als relatief 
nsjcozoekende telers zijn. In 1985 is ongeveer driekwart van de telers relatief 
risicozoekend. Deze verschuiving in de relatieve risico-attitudejwordt veroorzaakt 
door_een sigj^icante ^fggj^jyjgg^^ "W^deric^hting van een je j^gerej i s ico-
mijdendheid, terwijl v(x) niet verschilt tussen de jaren. 
De hypothese van een relatieve risico-attitude wordt derhalve in deze studie 
bevestigd. Beslissers evalueren uitkomsten onder zekerheid anders dan onder 
onzekerheid, zodat het Bernoulli model wordt verworpen als model voor het 
beschrijven van beslissingen onder risico ten gunste van het von Neumann-
Morgenstern model. In de paragrafen 6.7 en 6.9 wordt verder ingegaan op de 
theoretische en praktische implicaties van de gevonden resultaten. Eén implicatie 
is dat het niet alleen vanuit methodologisch oogpunt maar ook vanuit theoretisch 
gezichtspunt aanbeveling verdient om in onderzoek naar beslissingen onder 
onzekerheid altijd tenminste één meettechniek onder zekerheid en één onder 
onzekerheid toe te passen. Verschillen tussen beide metingen kunnen geïnter-
preteerd worden als het netto effect van risico op beslissingen. Op deze wijze 
wordt een betere indicator van de risico-attitude van een beslisser verkregen dan 
met de conventionele meting die alleen gebaseerd is op u(x). 
Wanneer methodologisch de perceptiemetingen vergeleken worden met de metin-
gen van risico-attitude en 'strength of preference' dan leren de ervaringen in 
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deze studie ons dat de crux van het modelleren van besluitvorming onder onze-
kerheid ligt bij de perceptiemetingen. Het tijdsbeslag, de motivatie van de 
respondent, de mogelijke invloed van de interviewer en de kans op respons-
effecten zijn duidelijk problematischer bij de meting van subjectieve kans-
verdelingen. Een veelvuldiger gebruik van theoretisch consistente modellen voor 
beslissingen onder onzekerheid, zoals het SEU-model, in onderzoek met grote 
aantallen beslissers, bijvoorbeeld consumenten, zal dan ook afhangen van de mate 
waarin het meten van kansverdelingen sneller en respondent vriendelijker 
gemaakt kan worden. Wellicht dat computergestuurde interactieve metingen hier-
voor mogelijkheden bieden. 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden perceptie- en attitudemetingen samengebracht in de toets 
van het preferentiemodel. Geprobeerd word1de' v ° o r k g u r _ y ^ _ egnteler „vogr. 
velschillende!afzetstr^e^ën_tg^verklaren. De _r^u_Ijaten_Jtoten^en bevestiging 
zien van het veronderstelde twee attributen model. In jle eerste plaajte_bJ^ jM_heJ 
afzetkanaal^duidelijk van invloed op de voorkjejrr^jvjor^f^tstratejjeën. Dit 
bevestigt het veronderstelde twee-fasen keuzeproces. Dit proces houdt in dat een 
teler_op basis van andere attributen dan prijs kiest voor een afzetkanaal en daar-
binnen_een verkoopstrategie kiest die past bij zijn risico-attitude metjbetrekking 
JoJ^prijs. VerterJ^jkt dat het^ effect van afzetkanaal op de voorkeur duidelijk 
afhankelijk is van de huidige keuze van de teler voor het kanaal. Daarbij_valt_op 
dat de negatieve houding van telers bij de coöperatie tegenover de particuliere 
gr^thandel groter^ is_dan^mgekeerd. Het zaï daarom relatief gemakkelijker zijn 
een teler die levert aan de particuliere groothandel van afzetkanaajje Jaten ver-
anderen dan omgekeerd. 
In de tweede plaats blijkt in beide jaren het SEU-model een betere; yerkjaring 
van de voorkeur voor afzetstrategieën te geven dan het SEV-model. Hieruit volgt 
dat de risicoperceptie en risico-attitude significant van jnvloed te zijn_^op_de 
^ Q Ï M H L Ï S E J S E J Ë J E Ï J ^ ^ 6 ^ ^ 6 ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ! ™ • ^ e t v e r s c n * ' m verklaring van 
beide modellen is echter niet zo groot. Nadere analyse geeft aan dat de oorzaak 
hiervoor waarschijnlijk gezocht moet worden in het hoge percentage tweede 
graads stochastisch dominante subjectieve kansverdelingen ('second degree of 
stochastic dominance'). Dit houdt in dat de preferentievolgorde van twee kans-
verdelingen niet afhankelijk is van de mate van risicomijdendheid van de beslis-
ser; iedere concave curve leidt tot dezelfde voorkeursvolgorde tussen beide 
kansverdelingen. Door dit hoge percentage paarsgewijs stochastisch dominante 
kansverdelingen (in beide jaren ongeveer de helft van alle paarsgewijze verge-
lijkingen) is de door het model voorspelde volgorde van afzetstrategieën relatief 
ongevoelig voor de specifieke risico-attitude van een beslisser. Het valt aan te 
nemen dat wanneer het percentage lager zou zijn geweest, het verschil in ver-
klaring tussen het SEU en het SEV-model groter zou zijn geweest. 
Onderzocht wordt tevens wat het effect is wanneer u(x) in het SEU-model 
vervangen worden door v(x). Immers, de analyse in hoofdstuk 6 heeft laten zien 
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dat u(x) en v(x) significant van elkaar verschillen en dat alleen u(x) voorkeuren 
onder risico beschrijft. Op basis daarvan wordt verwacht dat het model met u(x) 
voorkeuren onder risico beter zal verklaren dan een model met v(x). Deze hypo-
these wordt gedeeltelijk bevestigd. In beide jaren kon geen significant verschil in 
predictieve validiteit aangetoond worden tussen de loterij meting en de midden-
waarde meting; wel geeft de loterij meting een iets betere fit te zien. In beide 
jaren is er echter wel een significant verschil tussen de loterij meting en de 
'rating* meting van v(x). De predictieve validiteit van de loterij meting is 
duidelijk groter. De verklaring voor deze gemengde uitkomsten wordt gezocht in 
het percentage stochastisch dominante kansverdelingen in combinatie met de 
functie die bij iedere techniek de beste fit van de data geeft (bij de loterij en 
middenwaarde techniek een negatief exponentiële functie, bij de rating techniek 
een machtsfunctie). 
Tevens wordt in hoofdstuk 7 nagegaan of een model dat gebruik maakt van de 
indirecte perceptiemetingen een betere verklaring van de voorkeur van telers 
geeft dan een zogenaamd pragmatisch model dat gebruik maakt van de directe 
metingen, (dit pragmatische model vertoont veel overeenkomsten met de zoge-
naamde 'perceived risk' benadering in consumentenonderzoek). Uiteraard zou de 
verklaring met de indirecte metingen aanzienlijk groter dienen te zijn omdat de 
'«investeringen tijd en moeite voor het verzamelen van de indirecte gegevens veel 
gröte#'is dan die voor de directe metingen. Samengevat blijkt dat de resultaten 
wat dit betreft niet duidelijk zijn. In 1984 blijkt het indirecte model enigszins 
beter, in 1985 is er weinig verschil tussen de modellen. Op basis van deze bevin-
ding wordt dan ook geconcludeerd dat wanneer in grootschalig survey onderzoek 
de interesse slechts uitgaat naar de predictieve validiteit, het gebruik van de 
eenvoudige directe metingen in een naïef model de voorkeur verdient boven het 
gebruik van de indirecte metingen. In de overige gevallen zal het theoretisch 
consistente 'expected utility' model de voorkeur verdienen. 
T^nslcjte^wordt bekeken in hoeverre de voorkeur voor een bepaalde afzet-
strategie samenhangt met persoonlijke en situa^tionele kenmerken van de teler. De 
resultaten hiervan wordeiit^chreveri in^p^aragrajfJM^Opnieuw Jalj jk t u]t _deze 
anal^s^^atderisico-attitude van de teler effect heeft op zjjn^oorkeur^Zo 
hebben bijvoorbeeld sterk risicomijdende telers een grotere voorkeur_voor_wejnig 
ns^ante^fze^rategieën dan minder sterkjrSIgomijjggd^Jelers. Andere factoren 
die de voorkeur van telers beïnvloeden zijn het gebruikelijke levenngsmoment 
„vjmjlej^er, dejegfc^ (Noordoost polder of Oostejijjc^ Flevoland) en of dejteler^ 
jgyert aan de coöperatie of aajn^een^arüc^iwe^andejaar. Factorenjüs leeftijd, 
*-fi—__y_? e n intensiteit van aardappelverbouw geven slechts bij enkejejtrategjeën 
_eff^cJe^^p^^voorkeurje^zien. 
Hoofdstuk 8 bevat tenslotte een samenvatting van de belangrijkste bevindingen 
en conclusies geordend volgens de drie onderwerpen van het onderzoek. Een 
aantal implicaties van de bevindingen wordt genoemd en tevens worden per 
onderwerp enkele suggesties gedaan voor verder onderzoek. 
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